Filed 2/13/14 P. v. Stangl CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D063645
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD243182)
GARY WILLIAM STANGL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Amalia L.
Meza, Judge. Affirmed.
Cannon & Harris and Donna L. Harris for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Marissa
Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Gary William Stangl appeals certain conditions of probation imposed on him by
the trial court following his guilty plea to assault with caustic chemicals (Pen. Code, § 244). We conclude that the probation conditions challenged by Stangl are reasonable
based on his prior criminal history, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Around 6:00 a.m. on the morning of September 9, 2012, Stangl threw a bottle
filled with nitric acid through the window of his brother's home. The bottle broke, and
the acid burned an occupant of the house and caused property damage.
An amended information charged Stangl with assault with caustic chemicals (Pen.
Code, § 244) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (id., § 245,
subd. (a)(4)). Stangl pled guilty to assault with caustic chemicals, and the other count
was dismissed. The preliminary hearing transcript formed the factual basis for the plea.
After denying Stangl's motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial court granted
formal probation to Stangl on the condition, among other things, that he serve 365 days in
local custody.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel challenged two of the conditions of
probation recommended in the probation officer's report, arguing that they had no nexus
to the facts of the case: (1) that Stangl "not knowingly use/possess any stolen, forged,
counterfeit or fraudulent documents" (hereinafter, "the document condition"), and (2) that
Stangl "not knowingly use or possess alcohol if directed by the [probation officer]" and
"[a]ttend 'Self-help' meetings . . . if directed by the [probation officer]" (hereinafter, "the
alcohol condition"). The trial court imposed those conditions of probation over defense
counsel's objection, ruling that "there is a sufficient nexus based on the criminal history
2 and the overall workup of the defendant and the potential issues that he is going to face
and has faced in the past."
II
DISCUSSION
The sole issue raised by Stangl's appeal is a challenge to the conditions of
probation that the trial court imposed over defense counsel's objection. As we will
explain, based on Stangl's criminal history, the probation conditions were warranted.
A. Standard of Review
"We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion." (People v. Olguin
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).) "As with any exercise of discretion, the sentencing
court violates this standard when its determination is arbitrary or capricious or ' " 'exceeds
the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.' " ' " (People v. Carbajal
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.)
B. Applicable Law
"[T]he Legislature has empowered the court, in making a probation determination,
to impose any 'reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the
end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the
law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and
specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer . . . .' (Pen. Code,
§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) Although the trial court's discretion is broad in this regard, . . . a
condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in Penal Code section 1203.1.
[Citations.] . . . [¶] . . . Generally, '[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid
3 unless it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted,
(2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . ." [Citation.]' [Citation.] This
test is conjunctive — all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will
invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no
relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is
not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to
preventing future criminality." (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 379-380.)
C. The Probation Conditions Are Warranted Based on Stangl's Criminal History
Stangl argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the alcohol
condition and the document condition because those conditions have no nexus to Stangl's
current conviction for assault with caustic chemicals. As we will explain, we reject this
argument because both conditions have a relationship to Stangl's criminal history, and in
order to prevent future criminality, the trial court was entitled to consider Stangl's
criminal history in imposing conditions of probation.
As set forth above, one of the three circumstances in which a probation condition
is reasonable is when it is imposed to prevent future criminality. (Olguin, supra, 45
Cal.4th at p. 379.) In imposing such a probation condition, "[a] trial court may properly
go beyond the exact confines of the current offense to consider all the relevant
circumstances regarding the probationer." (People v. Patillo (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1576,
1580.) "[A] condition . . . 'reasonably related to future criminality' . . . may not be held
invalid whether or not it has any 'relationship to the crime of which the offender was
4 convicted.' " (People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 65, italics added.) "[T]he
entire circumstances of [the defendant's] background and the crime for which he was
convicted, must be carefully scrutinized." (In re Martinez (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 577,
584.)
The alcohol condition was reasonable because the probation officer's report shows
that Stangl has a history of criminal offenses related to alcohol and drug use.
Specifically, Stangl had a previous conviction for driving under the influence in 1992
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), along with an earlier arrest for driving under the
influence in 1989 in Utah. Stangl also had convictions for possession of a controlled
substance in 1992 and 1994, and he admitted to the probation officer that he had last used
methamphetamine in 2012. Courts have observed that alcohol and drug abuse are
reasonably related for the purpose of imposing alcohol conditions to prevent future
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Filed 2/13/14 P. v. Stangl CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D063645
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD243182)
GARY WILLIAM STANGL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Amalia L.
Meza, Judge. Affirmed.
Cannon & Harris and Donna L. Harris for Defendant and Appellant.
Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland and Marissa
Bejarano, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Gary William Stangl appeals certain conditions of probation imposed on him by
the trial court following his guilty plea to assault with caustic chemicals (Pen. Code, § 244). We conclude that the probation conditions challenged by Stangl are reasonable
based on his prior criminal history, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Around 6:00 a.m. on the morning of September 9, 2012, Stangl threw a bottle
filled with nitric acid through the window of his brother's home. The bottle broke, and
the acid burned an occupant of the house and caused property damage.
An amended information charged Stangl with assault with caustic chemicals (Pen.
Code, § 244) and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury (id., § 245,
subd. (a)(4)). Stangl pled guilty to assault with caustic chemicals, and the other count
was dismissed. The preliminary hearing transcript formed the factual basis for the plea.
After denying Stangl's motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the trial court granted
formal probation to Stangl on the condition, among other things, that he serve 365 days in
local custody.
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel challenged two of the conditions of
probation recommended in the probation officer's report, arguing that they had no nexus
to the facts of the case: (1) that Stangl "not knowingly use/possess any stolen, forged,
counterfeit or fraudulent documents" (hereinafter, "the document condition"), and (2) that
Stangl "not knowingly use or possess alcohol if directed by the [probation officer]" and
"[a]ttend 'Self-help' meetings . . . if directed by the [probation officer]" (hereinafter, "the
alcohol condition"). The trial court imposed those conditions of probation over defense
counsel's objection, ruling that "there is a sufficient nexus based on the criminal history
2 and the overall workup of the defendant and the potential issues that he is going to face
and has faced in the past."
II
DISCUSSION
The sole issue raised by Stangl's appeal is a challenge to the conditions of
probation that the trial court imposed over defense counsel's objection. As we will
explain, based on Stangl's criminal history, the probation conditions were warranted.
A. Standard of Review
"We review conditions of probation for abuse of discretion." (People v. Olguin
(2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379 (Olguin).) "As with any exercise of discretion, the sentencing
court violates this standard when its determination is arbitrary or capricious or ' " 'exceeds
the bounds of reason, all of the circumstances being considered.' " ' " (People v. Carbajal
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121.)
B. Applicable Law
"[T]he Legislature has empowered the court, in making a probation determination,
to impose any 'reasonable conditions, as it may determine are fitting and proper to the
end that justice may be done, that amends may be made to society for the breach of the
law, for any injury done to any person resulting from that breach, and generally and
specifically for the reformation and rehabilitation of the probationer . . . .' (Pen. Code,
§ 1203.1, subd. (j).) Although the trial court's discretion is broad in this regard, . . . a
condition of probation must serve a purpose specified in Penal Code section 1203.1.
[Citations.] . . . [¶] . . . Generally, '[a] condition of probation will not be held invalid
3 unless it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted,
(2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . ." [Citation.]' [Citation.] This
test is conjunctive — all three prongs must be satisfied before a reviewing court will
invalidate a probation term. [Citations.] As such, even if a condition of probation has no
relationship to the crime of which a defendant was convicted and involves conduct that is
not itself criminal, the condition is valid as long as the condition is reasonably related to
preventing future criminality." (Olguin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 379-380.)
C. The Probation Conditions Are Warranted Based on Stangl's Criminal History
Stangl argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the alcohol
condition and the document condition because those conditions have no nexus to Stangl's
current conviction for assault with caustic chemicals. As we will explain, we reject this
argument because both conditions have a relationship to Stangl's criminal history, and in
order to prevent future criminality, the trial court was entitled to consider Stangl's
criminal history in imposing conditions of probation.
As set forth above, one of the three circumstances in which a probation condition
is reasonable is when it is imposed to prevent future criminality. (Olguin, supra, 45
Cal.4th at p. 379.) In imposing such a probation condition, "[a] trial court may properly
go beyond the exact confines of the current offense to consider all the relevant
circumstances regarding the probationer." (People v. Patillo (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 1576,
1580.) "[A] condition . . . 'reasonably related to future criminality' . . . may not be held
invalid whether or not it has any 'relationship to the crime of which the offender was
4 convicted.' " (People v. Balestra (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 57, 65, italics added.) "[T]he
entire circumstances of [the defendant's] background and the crime for which he was
convicted, must be carefully scrutinized." (In re Martinez (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 577,
584.)
The alcohol condition was reasonable because the probation officer's report shows
that Stangl has a history of criminal offenses related to alcohol and drug use.
Specifically, Stangl had a previous conviction for driving under the influence in 1992
(Veh. Code, § 23152, subd. (a)), along with an earlier arrest for driving under the
influence in 1989 in Utah. Stangl also had convictions for possession of a controlled
substance in 1992 and 1994, and he admitted to the probation officer that he had last used
methamphetamine in 2012. Courts have observed that alcohol and drug abuse are
reasonably related for the purpose of imposing alcohol conditions to prevent future
criminality. (People v. Beal (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 84, 87 ["alcohol use may lead to
future criminality where the defendant has a history of substance abuse and is convicted
of a drug-related offense"]; see People v. Smith (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1035
[noting the "nexus between drug use and alcohol consumption"].)
"Whether an alcohol-use condition of probation is an abuse of the trial court's
discretion is determined by the particular facts of each case." (People v. Lindsay (1992)
10 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1644.) Here, under the particular facts of this case — namely
Stangl's criminal history — even though there was no evidence that the current offense
was related to alcohol, it was within the trial court's discretion to conclude that the
alcohol condition would reasonably prevent future criminality. Specifically, the alcohol
5 condition would help Stangl avoid future alcohol-related crimes like his prior instances of
driving under the influence. (See People v. Burton (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 382, 390 [in
assessing reasonableness of alcohol-related probation conditions, court considered
whether "appellant had ever been convicted of an alcohol-related offense"].)
The document condition was also reasonable based on Stangl's criminal history.
Specifically, the probation officer's report shows that in 1994 Stangl was convicted of
giving false identification to a peace officer (Pen. Code, § 148.9, subd. (a)). The trial
court could reasonably conclude that to prevent another such incident and therefore deter
future criminality, the probation conditions should specifically prohibit Stangl from
knowingly using or possessing any stolen, forged, counterfeit or fraudulent documents.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
IRION, J.
WE CONCUR:
NARES, Acting P. J.
MCDONALD, J.