People v. Stadd

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Stadd

32 A.D.2d 940, 303 N.Y.S.2d 699, 1969 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3417

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 7, 1969

StatusPublished

This text of 32 A.D.2d 940 (People v. Stadd) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Stadd, 32 A.D.2d 940, 303 N.Y.S.2d 699, 1969 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3417 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1969).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered July 17, 1967, convicting defendant of assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed. In our opinion, the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the testimony of witnesses Christensen and Neyland was proper (see People v. Dannic, 30 A D 2d 679, and eases cited therein). Insofar as Christensen is concerned, there was sufficient evidence to establish that he would have been interrogated even if defendant had not mentioned his name in his statement to the detective. With respect to .Neyland, the evidence establishes no more than that her identity was learned as a result of defendant’s reference to her in his improperly obtained statement to the police. There is absolutely no proof which indicates that, apart from revealing her identity, defendant’s statement was instrumental in inducing her to testify or in affecting the substance of her testimony. We have considered defendant’s other contentions and find them to be without merit. Christ, Acting P. J., Benjamin, Munder, Martuscello and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court, Nassau County, rendered July 17, 1967, convicting defendant of assault in the third degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment affirmed. In our opinion, the denial of defendant’s motion to suppress the testimony of witnesses Christensen and Neyland was proper (see People v. Dannic, 30 A D 2d 679, and eases cited therein). Insofar as Christensen is concerned, there was sufficient evidence to establish that he would have been interrogated even if defendant had not mentioned his name in his statement to the detective. With respect to .Neyland, the evidence establishes no more than that her identity was learned as a result of defendant’s reference to her in his improperly obtained statement to the police. There is absolutely no proof which indicates that, apart from revealing her identity, defendant’s statement was instrumental in inducing her to testify or in affecting the substance of her testimony. We have considered defendant’s other contentions and find them to be without merit. Christ, Acting P. J., Benjamin, Munder, Martuscello and Kleinfeld, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

32 A.D.2d 940, 303 N.Y.S.2d 699, 1969 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 3417, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-stadd-nyappdiv-1969.