People v. St. Clair

90 A.D. 239, 18 N.Y. Crim. 67, 86 N.Y.S. 77
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJanuary 15, 1904
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 90 A.D. 239 (People v. St. Clair) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. St. Clair, 90 A.D. 239, 18 N.Y. Crim. 67, 86 N.Y.S. 77 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1904).

Opinions

Laughlin, J.:

The complainant, Frederick A. La Roche, was a manufacturer of electrical apparatus and his place of business was at the corner of Thirteenth and Hudson streets in the city of Hew York. He acted as general sales agent and superintendent of the business. On the 3d day of April, 1903, the defendant was in the employ of Meechan’s Detective Agency. On that day he was arrested by a police officer for following the complainant from place to place along the public streets and making inquiries concerning him and annoying and interfering with him, and was tried on that charge. The People gave evidence tending to show that defendant had been following the complainant for four days; that he would station himself on the street corner opposite the complainant’s office in. the morning and remain there keeping an outlook toward the office or toward complainant when on the walk, in front of the office, where he frequently transacted business ; that when complainant came upon the street defendant would follow, in plain sight, wherever he went; that whenever complainant went into a restaurant for luncheon defendant would follow him in, sit at a table near by and leave when [241]*241complainant did and resume his pursuit; that on the day of the arrest complainant departed from his principal place of business in an automobile to visit a branch office on Thirty-eighth street and the defendant followed on a bicycle, riding at his upmost speed to keep nearly up, and then when complainant entered his branch office the defendant watched for his return and again in like manner followed the automobile hack to the place from which it started and on seeing complainant re-enter his place of business dismounted and remained on the street corner looking over as before ; that the complainant observed that the defendant was watching and following him and saw defendant point him out to several people and overheard him remark to them That is him how ” at a time when complainant was endeavoring to transact business on the walk in front of his place of business; that this conduct on the part of the defendant disturbed the complainant’s peace of mind and interfered with his ability to transact business; that at times the defendant, when evidently in doubt concerning the complainant’s movements, made inquiries of complainant’s employees and others and on these occasions would be observed pointing over toward complainant’s place of business. The defendant did not attempt to speak to the complainant or obstruct his passage upon the public streets or elsewhere, but he kept within from 10 to 200 feet and usually nearer than 100 feet and remained in plain sight. The defendant testified in his own behalf. He denied that he had followed the complainant prior to the day of the arrest or that he made inquiries concerning him' of any one except the janitor of the building and one of complainant’s employees. He assigned no reason for following the complainant except that he was instructed by the detective agency to go arotind to complainant’s place of business and look and see ” what he was doing. According to the evidence presented in behalf of the People, however, the defendant had been following the complainant for several days and in a manner that rendered it perfectly obvious to the latter. The complainant at every turn was confronted with the presence of the defendant in the immediate vicinity and the inference is fairly justified that defendant became aware that the complainant had discovered his espionage arid thereafter continued his surveillance as before." [242]*242By chapter 327 of the Laws of 1891 section 675 of the Penal Code as originally enacted (Laws of 1881, chap. 676),. and amended in. 1882 (Laws of 1882, chap. 384), was amended by adding thereto the following: “ Any person who shall by any offensive or disorderly act or language, annoy or interfere with any person or persons in any place, or with the passengers of any public stage, railroad car,, ferry boat, or other public conveyance, or who. shall disturb or offend the occupants of such stage, car, boat or conveyance, by any disorderly act, language or display, although such act, conduct Or display may not amount to an assault or battery, shall be deemed guilty of á -misdemeanor.’ The charge Upon, which the défendant has been tried and convicted is for a violation of the. provision of the section added by the amendment of 1891.

The-, appellant -contends in - the first place that, the words in any place” are qualified by the subsequent provisions of the statute; and that it was only designed to prohibit and punish acts committed in public stages, railroad cars, ferry boats or other public conveyances, or similar- places. We are unable to agree with this construction. The words in any place ” undoubtedly have reference to a public placeand public stages,, railroad cars, ferry boats . and other public conveyances were doubtless specified to remove any question as: to whether they were public places and included in the words “ in any place ” preceding them in the statute.. It does not appear whether the detective agency by which defendant was employed was licensed ; but since it is Unlawful to engage in the business- of a private detective for hire or -reward without a-license (Laws of 1898, chap. 422, §§ 1, 5, as amd. by Laws. of. 1901, chap., 362 and Laws of 1899, chap.' 318 respectively) it should,, perhaps,, be presume^ that the firm was duly licensed. It is contended at the outset by, counsel for appellant that licensed private detectives are not subject to the operation, of section 675 of the Penal Code, even if otherwise it should be applicable to them. - It is manifest -that the primary object of licensing private detectives upon good character being satisfactorily shown, and requiring them to give a substantial bond, is the protection of persons 'requiring such', service and affording them, redress in. case of misconduct. The language of the statute (Laws of 1898, chap. 422, § 2, as amd. by Laws of 1901,, chap. 362) indicates that it was con[243]*243templated that such licensed detectives, or detective agencies might engage in the business of “ furnishing or supplying information as to the personal character of any person or firm, or as to the character or kind of the business and occupation of any person, firm or corporation.” But this does not indicate a legislative intent to license or permit such detectives or their employees, who do not require a license (Laws of 1898, chap. 422, § 4), to annoy or interfere with citizens or others. Moreover, the provisions of the Penal Code now under consideration were enacted before the enactment of the first statute providing for licensing private detectives, and if the Legislature intended to exempt them from the operation thereof it would have so provided. As we view it, the Legislature intended to prohibit one person from, by any offensive or disorderly act or language, annoying or interfering with another in a public place. Two things must occur to constitute the crime. One of these relates to the con-, duct of the accused, and the other to the effect of such conduct upon the complainant. There must be an annoyance to or interference with some person in a public place by act or language which is either offensive or disorderly. It is clear that if one person, without lawful excuse, persists in talking to or walking with another, with whom he is not acquainted, this may be offensive or disorderly and it may constitute an interference with or annoyance to the person accosted within the prohibition of the statute.

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Bluebook (online)
90 A.D. 239, 18 N.Y. Crim. 67, 86 N.Y.S. 77, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-st-clair-nyappdiv-1904.