The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY April 10, 2025
2025COA39
No. 23CA1556, People v. Spomer — Government — Interstate Compacts and Agreements — Interstate Agreement on Detainers; Criminal Law — Arrest Warrants
This appeal involves the application of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers (IAD), section 24-60-501, C.R.S. 2024. The
People appeal a judgment dismissing a criminal case based on a
violation of the IAD. The district court concluded that the IAD’s
protections extended to the defendant’s case because while the
defendant was in custody in another state, an open warrant for his
arrest in this case constituted a “detainer” under the IAD.
A division of the court of appeals addresses an issue of first
impression in Colorado: Is an arrest warrant, standing alone, a
detainer under the IAD such that its mere existence, without more,
triggers the IAD’s requirements? The division concludes that the
arrest warrant in this case didn’t constitute a detainer for IAD purposes. So the district court erred by treating it as a detainer
and finding a violation of the IAD. The division, therefore, reverses
the judgment of dismissal and remands the case for the charges to
be reinstated and the district court to address the additional issues
that were left unresolved when it dismissed the case. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA39
Court of Appeals No. 23CA1556 Jefferson County District Court No. 20CR3720 Honorable Russel Klein, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Shawn Paul Spomer,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT REVERSED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division VI Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Brown and Hawthorne*, JJ., concur
Announced April 10, 2025
Alexis King, District Attorney, Rebecca A. Adams, Senior Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Golden, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Megan A. Ring, Colorado State Public Defender, Rachel Z. Geiman, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee
*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. 2024. ¶1 The People appeal the judgment dismissing a Jefferson County
criminal case against defendant, Shawn Paul Spomer, based on a
violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD), section 24-
60-501, C.R.S. 2024. The district court concluded that the IAD’s
protections extended to Spomer’s case because while he was in
custody in another state, an open warrant for his arrest in this case
constituted a “detainer” under the IAD.
¶2 This case presents an issue of first impression in Colorado: Is
an arrest warrant, standing alone, a detainer under the IAD such
that its mere existence, without more, triggers the IAD’s
requirements? We conclude that the arrest warrant in this case
didn’t constitute a detainer for IAD purposes. So the district court
erred by treating it as a detainer and finding a violation of the IAD.
We, therefore, reverse the judgment of dismissal and remand the
case for the charges to be reinstated and the district court to
address the additional issues that were left unresolved when it
dismissed the case.
I. Background
¶3 In October 2020, a detective saw Spomer driving a vehicle that
had been reported as stolen. The detective contacted Spomer,
1 suspecting him of felony motor vehicle theft, but didn’t arrest him
because of existing COVID-19 jail restrictions. Instead, the
detective released Spomer after advising him that he would be
facing a felony summons or warrant at a later time.
¶4 In November 2020, the People filed a complaint in the
Jefferson County courts, charging Spomer with first degree
aggravated motor vehicle theft, criminal possession of an
identification document, unlawful possession of a controlled
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia. The court issued
a summons for Spomer to appear at a hearing on the charges but
later issued a warrant for his arrest because the prosecution was
unable to serve him with the summons.
¶5 In June 2021, Spomer was arrested in Weld County, where he
was also facing criminal charges. Based on his arrest in Weld
County, the arrest warrant in this matter was cancelled. Spomer
was released on bond, the public defender was appointed to
represent him, and an arraignment in this case — the Jefferson
County case — was set for October 5, 2021. Spomer failed to
appear for that arraignment, so the Jefferson County District Court
issued a warrant for his arrest.
2 ¶6 In November 2021, Spomer was arrested in Adams County,
and the warrant in this matter was again cancelled. Spomer was
once more released on bond, and the arraignment in this case was
reset for January 10, 2022. Spomer once again didn’t appear for
the scheduled arraignment, so the district court issued yet another
warrant for his arrest.
¶7 The record reflects that Spomer failed to appear at the
January 10 arraignment because he was in custody in Kansas. He
remained in custody in Kansas until sometime in February 2022,
when he was extradited to Ohio to face criminal charges there.
Spomer was sentenced in the Ohio matter in June 2022 and was
expected to be released from custody in Ohio in May 2023.
¶8 In June 2022, the Weld County District Attorney lodged a
detainer against Spomer with the Ohio Department of
Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) for the charges pending in
Weld County.
¶9 In March 2023, Spomer filed a pro se letter with the Jefferson
County District Court stating that he was incarcerated in Ohio and
that he had received “notice from the Bureau of Sentence
Computation & Records Management of a pending warrant and
3 detainer out of [Jefferson] [C]ounty.” He asked that the pending
Jefferson County charges be dismissed or that he be granted time
served on them so that he could remain in Ohio after his release
from custody. The court denied his requests in his pro se letter,
noting that he was represented by counsel.
¶ 10 In May 2023, Spomer completed his Ohio sentence and was
returned to Colorado based on the Weld County detainer. In June
2023, Spomer, through appointed counsel, filed a motion to dismiss
the underlying Jefferson County case for violations of the IAD and
his constitutional rights to a speedy trial and due process. As
relevant here, he asserted that the ODRC warden had failed to
comply with his obligation under the IAD to notify Spomer “of the
detainers against him from Jefferson County.” In response, the
prosecution argued that the IAD and its obligations weren’t
triggered because no detainer on the pending Jefferson County
charges had been lodged with the ODRC.
¶ 11 At a July 23, 2023, hearing, the district court addressed
Spomer’s motion, including the issue of whether the warrant issued
for his arrest in this matter constituted a detainer sufficient to
trigger the IAD’s requirements. The court found that the warrant
4 constituted a detainer because a warrant meets the definition, and
fulfills the purpose, of a detainer under the IAD. The court then
concluded that Spomer’s rights under the IAD had been violated
because officials at the ODRC had failed to notify him of the
detainer. Based on this finding, the court ruled that “the only
remedy available under the IAD [wa]s for a dismissal of the case
given the substantial time periods between when the warrant was
issued and detainer should have been notified and . . . where we are
here today.” Because it dismissed all charges based on an IAD
violation, the court didn’t address Spomer’s constitutional claims.
The People appeal this judgment of dismissal.
II. Legal Authority and Standard of Review
¶ 12 In 1969, Colorado adopted the IAD — a congressionally
sanctioned interstate compact that establishes procedures for
resolving one compact state’s pending criminal charges against a
person imprisoned in another compact state. See § 24-60-501; New
York v. Hill, 528 U.S. 110, 111 (2000); Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d
5 817, 819 (Colo. 1997).1 “[I]t is the policy of the party states and the
purpose of th[e] [IAD] to encourage the expeditious and orderly
disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status
of any and all detainers based on untried indictments,
informations, or complaints.” § 24-60-501, art. I.
¶ 13 The IAD designates the state in which the prisoner is
incarcerated as the “sending state” and the state with the untried
indictments, informations, or complaints as the “receiving state.”
§ 24-60-501, art. II(b), (c). “[S]tate” is defined as, among other
things, a state of the United States, the United States of America,
and the District of Columbia. § 24-60-501, art. II(a).
1 In 1969, the General Assembly, in a single bill, adopted the IAD
and the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA). See Ch. 111, secs. 8-9, §§ 39-23-1 to -8 (UMDDA), §§ 74-16-1 to -7 (IAD), 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 286, 291-97; see also Johnson v. People, 939 P.2d 817, 819 (Colo. 1997) (discussing the legislative history of and relationship between the IAD and UMDDA). The IAD was originally codified in article 17 (instead of article 16) of title 74 because another interstate compact — the Interstate Library Compact — had already been codified at the same location earlier that session. See Ch. 193, sec. 1, §§ 74-16-1 to -7, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 552-57. The IAD was subsequently renumbered to sections 24-60-501 to -507 in the 1973 codification of the Colorado Revised Statutes.
6 ¶ 14 The IAD sets forth four procedural steps that must be followed
by the custodial officials of the receiving state, the officials of the
sending state, and the prisoner. Johnson, 939 P.2d at 820-21.
“[S]trict compliance with the terms of the IAD is required . . . .” Id.
at 824.
¶ 15 As relevant here, the first step requires the officials of the
receiving state to lodge a detainer against the prisoner with the
officials of the sending state who have custody of the prisoner.
§ 24-60-501, art. III(a); Johnson, 939 P.2d at 820. The detainer acts
as “a legal order that requires a State in which an individual is
currently imprisoned to hold that individual when [they] ha[ve]
finished serving [their] sentence so that [they] may be tried by a
different State for a different crime.” Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S.
146, 148 (2001). “[T]he provisions of the [IAD] are triggered only
when a ‘detainer’ is filed with the custodial (sending) State by
another State (receiving) having untried charges pending against
the prisoner . . . .” United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 343
(1978).
¶ 16 After a detainer is filed and the IAD is triggered, “the custodial
official is required to notify the prisoner of the source and contents
7 of the detainer and [the prisoner’s] right to make a request for final
disposition of the indictment, information, or complaint on which
the detainer is based.” Johnson, 939 P.2d at 820 (citing § 24-60-
501, art. III(c)). The prisoner must then “deliver to the warden or
custodial official a written notice and request for final disposition.”
Id. (citing § 24-60-501, art. III(b)). Finally, “the custodial official
must forward the prisoner’s request for a final disposition and a
certification containing information regarding the prisoner’s
incarceration to the appropriate court and the prosecuting officer.”
Id. (citing § 24-60-501, art. III(a)).
¶ 17 If these procedures are followed, the prosecutor in the
receiving state must try the prisoner within 180 days after receipt of
the prisoner’s request for final disposition, “unless the court having
jurisdiction grants a necessary or reasonable continuance.” Id. at
821 (citing § 24-60-501, art. III(a)).
¶ 18 We review de novo a court’s interpretation and application of
the IAD. People v. Harter, 216 P.3d 606, 608 (Colo. App. 2009); see
also People v. Walton, 167 P.3d 163, 165 (Colo. App. 2007). As an
interstate compact, the IAD is both state and federal law. Johnson,
939 P.2d at 821. Thus, “federal decisions are instructive regarding
8 the interpretation of its terms,” and “[a] uniform standard of
compliance and interpretation by the compact states reinforces the
IAD’s public policy intent.” Id.
¶ 19 We review a court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a case under
the IAD for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ray, 899 F.3d
852, 857 (10th Cir. 2018); cf. People v. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d 101,
106 (Colo. 1983) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the district
court’s dismissal of a case for violating the intrastate Uniform
Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (UMDDA)); People v. Bost,
770 P.2d 1209, 1214 (Colo. 1989) (Because the IAD and the
UMDDA “reflect the same policy of facilitating speedy disposition of
untried charges, . . . the principles of one may be applied to the
other unless the provisions conflict.”). Under the abuse of
discretion standard, we will “uphold the trial court’s ruling unless it
is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or when it is based
on an erroneous understanding or application of the law.” People v.
Sandoval, 2018 COA 156, ¶ 26.
9 III. Analysis
¶ 20 The People contend that the district court erred by finding that
the issuance of the arrest warrant for Spomer, by itself, constituted
a detainer for IAD purposes. We agree that the district court erred.
¶ 21 The IAD doesn’t define “detainer.” Mauro, 436 U.S. at 359.
But the Supreme Court has interpreted detainer to mean “a request
filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a
prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for the
agency, or that the agency be advised when the prisoner’s release is
imminent.” Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 44 (1993); see also Hill,
528 U.S. at 112; Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 719 (1985).
¶ 22 The Colorado Supreme Court has consistently relied on this
definition when addressing IAD issues, see Johnson, 939 P.2d at
819; Moody v. Corsentino, 843 P.2d 1355, 1367 (Colo. 1993);
Sweaney v. Dist. Ct., 713 P.2d 914, 915 (Colo. 1986); People v.
Morgan, 712 P.2d 1004, 1006 (Colo. 1986); People v. Yellen, 704
P.2d 306, 311 (Colo. 1985); People v. Moody, 676 P.2d 691, 693 n.2
(Colo. 1984), and we are bound to follow this definition of detainer
for IAD purposes, see Ray, 899 F.3d at 858 (“[W]e are bound by the
pronouncements of the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court has
10 defined detainer on multiple occasions to mean something specific
in the context of the IAD.”); see also In re Estate of Ramstetter, 2016
COA 81, ¶ 40 (the court of appeals is bound to follow supreme court
precedent).
¶ 23 This definition still doesn’t directly answer the question before
us — namely, whether an outstanding arrest warrant by itself
constitutes a detainer. But we aren’t without guidance in
answering that question.
¶ 24 A “warrant” is statutorily defined as “a written order issued by
a judge of a court of record directed to any peace officer
commanding the arrest of the person named or described in the
order.” § 16-1-104(18), C.R.S. 2024. Contrary to the district
court’s finding, we conclude that this statutory language doesn’t
show that a warrant falls within the definition of detainer or fulfill
the purposes of a detainer because a warrant doesn’t ask a
custodial institution to hold a prisoner for a criminal justice agency
or to advise the agency of the prisoner’s imminent release. See Fex,
507 U.S. at 44.
¶ 25 In Tucker v. United States, 569 A.2d 162 (D.C. 1990), the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals applied the United
11 States Supreme Court’s definition of detainer to determine whether
an arrest warrant constituted a detainer for IAD purposes. The
court determined that an arrest warrant could be considered a
detainer but that more than its mere issuance was required:
Under this definition, an arrest warrant will serve as a detainer within the purview of the IAD if: 1) it is based on an untried information, indictment, or complaint; 2) it is filed by a criminal justice agency; 3) it is filed directly with the facility where a prisoner is incarcerated; 4) it notifies prison officials that a prisoner is wanted to face pending charges; and 5) it asks the institution where the prisoner is incarcerated either to hold the prisoner at the conclusion the prisoner’s sentence, or to notify agency officials when the prisoner’s release is imminent.
Id. at 165. The court concluded that, “[w]here all five of these
criteria are satisfied, an arrest warrant is plainly ‘lodged’ as a
detainer, and the provisions of the IAD come into play.” Id.
¶ 26 For three reasons, we are persuaded by Tucker that these
additional criteria are required before an arrest warrant may be
considered a detainer under the IAD.
¶ 27 First, the other circuits confronted with this issue apply a
similar definition. See United States v. Jones, 454 F.3d 642, 647
(7th Cir. 2006) (“A detainer is a notice filed with a prisoner’s
12 institution of incarceration alerting both [the prisoner] and the
institution that the prisoner is wanted to face criminal charges in
another jurisdiction”; “[p]ractically, the detainer is a request that
the prisoner be held for the other jurisdiction’s prosecutors or that
the holding institution notify the prosecutors of the prisoner’s
pending release.”); United States v. Paredes-Batista, 140 F.3d 367,
372 (2d Cir. 1998) (A detainer is a notice that is “filed with an
institution in which a particular prisoner is incarcerated, advising
that [the prisoner] is wanted to face pending criminal charges in
another jurisdiction, and requesting that the prisoner either be held
for the other jurisdiction’s prosecutors or that these prosecutors be
notified when the prisoner’s release is imminent.”); Bost, 770 P.2d
at 1214 (“[T]he provisions of the IAD are triggered only when a
prosecutor files charges against a person serving a term of
imprisonment in another state and files a detainer with the official
having custody of the prisoner.”); People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182,
1186 (Colo. 1988) (“The provisions of the IAD are activated when a
state charges a person imprisoned in another state with a crime
and files a detainer with the official having custody of the
prisoner.”); Yellen, 704 P.2d at 311 (“[T]he IAD expressly conditions
13 the duty to promptly inform upon the filing of a detainer,” and a
detainer must be filed with the institution in which a prisoner is
serving a sentence.); cf. Ray, 899 F.3d at 858 (An arrest “doesn’t fit
within the Supreme Court’s binding definition of detainer” because
it “isn’t ‘a notification filed with the institution in which a prisoner
is serving a sentence.’” (quoting Mauro, 436 U.S. at 359)).
¶ 28 Second, adopting the Tucker criteria furthers the policy of
uniformly applying the IAD’s provisions among the party states.
See Johnson, 939 P.2d at 820-21 (“[O]ur interpretation of the IAD,
as a compact among states and the United States, should be guided
by a policy of uniformity in applying its provisions to the transfer,
transport, and trial of incarcerated persons between jurisdictions.”);
see also State v. Williams, 573 N.W.2d 106, 113 (Neb. 1997); State
v. Prentice, 613 S.E.2d 498, 503 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005); State v.
Barney, 2008 UT App 250, ¶¶ 7-8, 189 P.3d 1277, 1279; State v.
Welker, 110 P.3d 1167, 1170 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005), aff’d, 141 P.3d
8 (Wash. 2006).
¶ 29 Third and finally, adopting the Tucker criteria avoids serious
pragmatic issues that would arise under the rule urged by Spomer
and adopted by the district court. Specifically, if the mere issuance
14 of an arrest warrant constitutes a detainer, custodial officials in
each party state would be obligated to conduct daily searches of
national arrest warrant databases to determine whether an arrest
warrant had been issued for each prisoner in the custody of their
institution. This is both impractical and beyond what is
contemplated by the statute.
¶ 30 Applying the Tucker criteria to Spomer’s case, the warrant
satisfies the first, second, and fourth criteria — (1) it’s based on an
untried information or complaint; (2) it was filed by a criminal
justice agency; and (4) it notifies whoever reads it that a prisoner is
wanted to face pending charges — but it fails the third and fifth
criteria — (3) it wasn’t filed directly with the facility where Spomer
was incarcerated and (5) it doesn’t ask the institution where
Spomer was incarcerated either to hold him at the conclusion of his
sentence or to notify Colorado officials when his release is
imminent. Indeed, there is no indication in the record, and Spomer
doesn’t argue, that a Jefferson County criminal justice agency filed
or lodged the arrest warrant with the ODRC or that the agency
officials requested that Spomer be held or that they be alerted to his
imminent release.
15 ¶ 31 Accordingly, we conclude that the mere issuance of the
warrant for Spomer’s arrest was insufficient to meet the definition
of detainer and to trigger the IAD provisions. See Tucker, 569 A.2d
at 164-67 (holding that District of Columbia arrest warrants left
with South Carolina police officers didn’t constitute a detainer
against the prisoner because the warrants were left at the request of
the South Carolina police, they weren’t provided to correctional
officers, and they didn’t contain a request that South Carolina hold
the prisoner at the completion of his sentence or notify the District
of Columbia of the prisoner’s imminent release); United States v.
Fulford, 825 F.2d 3, 10-11 (3d Cir. 1987) (An arrest warrant wasn’t
considered a detainer because it wasn’t directed to the institution in
which the prisoner was confined and, therefore, “cannot fairly be
considered notice to the institution’s officials.”); Barney, ¶¶ 7-8, 189
P.3d at 1279 (a Utah arrest warrant wasn’t a detainer because it
hadn’t been sent to the Montana State Prison, where the prisoner
was in custody, and the Utah officials hadn’t requested that the
prison either hold the prisoner or inform them of his imminent
release); cf. Yellen, 704 P.2d at 308, 311 (reversing the district
court’s dismissal of a case for violations of the UMDDA because,
16 while the superintendent of the institution in which the prisoner
was serving a sentence was aware of the pending charges in
another jurisdiction, no “warrant” or “detainer” had been filed with
the institution).
¶ 32 To be clear, we don’t suggest that an arrest warrant can never
constitute a detainer but only that the issuance of the warrant, by
itself, is insufficient to meet the definition of a detainer for IAD
purposes. See Tucker, 569 A.2d at 165 n.5.
¶ 33 Spomer recognizes the above authority but argues that, if an
arrest warrant isn’t considered a detainer in this case, we create a
loophole that would undermine the IAD. As an example, he posits
that, where, like here, a prisoner in out-of-state custody has
pending charges in two Colorado judicial districts and the criminal
justice agency from judicial district “B” lodges a detainer on its
pending charges, the criminal justice agency from judicial district
“A” can obtain the benefit of, but not invoke or assume the burden
of, the IAD. This is so, Spomer argues, because “[a]n arrest warrant
from district A, even if limited to Colorado, all but guarantees that
once the [prisoner] is back in Colorado because of district B’s
detainer, the [prisoner] will eventually be brought to district A.”
17 Spomer asserts that, because of district A’s decision not to file a
detainer, the prisoner would encounter the very problems that the
IAD is intended to alleviate — such as defending their case long
after the charges had been filed, losing their ability to preserve
evidence, and losing the opportunity to obtain concurrent
sentencing — with no means of availing himself of the IAD’s
safeguards.
¶ 34 Spomer isn’t wrong that declining his broad interpretation of
“detainer” creates a risk that a jurisdiction with an open arrest
warrant for a defendant being detained out-of-state will reap the
benefits of another in-state jurisdiction lodging a detainer without
the burdens associated with doing so itself. We even agree that the
circumstances Spomer presents to us seem to manifest the risk
that his hypothetical posits. But we aren’t persuaded that the risks
presented by Spomer’s hypothetical, or even his cases’ underlying
facts, warrant interpreting “detainer” as he urges or constitute an
IAD violation or a subversion of its purpose.
¶ 35 Importantly, the IAD doesn’t require a criminal justice agency
to file a detainer on pending, untried charges against a prisoner in
out-of-state custody. Fex, 507 U.S. at 50 n.4. And when a detainer
18 is filed, “[t]he applicability of the IAD is specifically limited to
charges on the basis of which detainers have been filed.” People v.
Campbell, 742 P.2d 302, 306 (Colo. 1987); see also Newton, 764
P.2d at 1184, 1189 (where a prisoner in out-of-state custody had
charges pending in two separate cases from Adams County, the IAD
applied only to the one case listed in the detainer and not to the
other case).
¶ 36 Moreover, the purpose of the IAD is to address the problems
resulting from the filing of a detainer, and issues related to pending
charges on which a detainer isn’t filed fall outside of the IAD’s
reach. See People v. Higinbotham, 712 P.2d 993, 997 (Colo. 1986)
(“[T]he primary purpose of . . . the [IAD] is to provide a mechanism
for prisoners to insist upon speedy and final disposition of untried
charges that are the subjects of detainers . . . .”) (emphasis added);
Harter, 216 P.3d at 609; see also Campbell, 742 P.2d at 307 (While
“[m]any of the same adverse effects that attend the filing of a
detainer are also presented by the existence of untried charges even
in the absence of a detainer,” “these concerns are expressly placed
outside the purview of the IAD by its language requiring the filing of
a detainer to trigger the statute’s applicability.”).
19 ¶ 37 Finally, we are persuaded by People v. Greenwald, 704 P.2d
312 (Colo. 1985), where the Colorado Supreme Court faced a
factual scenario similar to Spomer’s hypothetical and declined to
apply the IAD. While the opinion in Greenwald didn’t answer the
question posed in this appeal, we find its legal analysis instructive.
¶ 38 In Greenwald, the defendant was incarcerated in Oregon while
he had two pending criminal cases in Jefferson County and a
pending criminal case in Arapahoe County. Id. at 314. The
Jefferson County prosecutor lodged a detainer with the Oregon
custodial institution. Id. After the defendant was released on
parole from his Oregon sentence, he was returned to Jefferson
County. Id. Upon learning that the defendant was in custody in
Jefferson County, the Arapahoe County prosecutor obtained a writ
of habeas ad prosequendum, and the defendant was brought to
Arapahoe County in connection with the pending charges there. Id.
at 314-15.
¶ 39 The defendant filed motions to dismiss in all three cases for
IAD violations. Id. at 315. Two divisions of the Jefferson County
District Court granted the motions and dismissed the cases in that
jurisdiction. Id. The Arapahoe County District Court also granted
20 the motion and dismissed its case, finding that the IAD applied to
the charges pending against the defendant in its jurisdiction. Id.
¶ 40 The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the
Jefferson County cases because the detainer lodged by the
Jefferson County prosecutor triggered application of the IAD to
those charges, and the Oregon custodial officials failed to comply
with their obligations by not advising the defendant of his right to
request a final disposition of the Jefferson County charges
underlying the detainer. Id. But the supreme court reversed the
Arapahoe County case’s dismissal, concluding that “the Arapahoe
County charges were not subject to the [requirements of the IAD]
because those charges did not underlie a detainer previously lodged
against the defendant.” Id. at 316.
¶ 41 The supreme court held that, even though “the defendant’s
presence in Colorado was achieved by means of provisions of the
IAD,” the IAD didn’t apply to the Arapahoe County charges because
“the proceedings relating to his return to Colorado were concerned
solely with charges pending in Jefferson County” and “the
proceedings giving rise to the filing of the detainer against the
defendant related to Jefferson County.” Id. The court noted that,
21 unlike the Jefferson County cases, “[t]he Arapahoe County
proceedings were made possible by . . . [the defendant’s] return to
the Arapahoe County District Court . . . as a result of the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to authorities who had
custody of him.” Id.; see also Mauro, 436 U.S. at 361 (“[A] writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum is not a detainer for purposes of
the [IAD].”).
¶ 42 So we aren’t persuaded that it would violate or undermine the
purposes of the IAD to determine the arrest warrant in Spomer’s
Jefferson County case wasn’t a detainer. Instead, we conclude that
the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the case
against Spomer because its findings that the arrest warrant was a
detainer that triggered application of the IAD and that the IAD had
been violated was a misapplication of the law. Because of our
holding, we don’t reach the People’s alternative contention that the
court erred by finding that the IAD violations required the dismissal
of the case against Spomer.
¶ 43 Lastly, we decline Spomer’s invitation to affirm the district
court’s dismissal of the case on the alternative basis that his
constitutional rights had been violated. Because the district court
22 didn’t rule on this issue, it should be addressed on remand in the
first instance. See LTCPRO, LLC v. Johnson, 2024 COA 123, ¶¶ 46-
47 (declining to address issues in the first instance on appeal
because, “[i]n light of [its] ruling, the district court did not consider”
or make factual findings on those issues, and “[a]lthough we have
discretion to affirm on any ground supported by the record, ‘we are
a court of review, not of first view’” (quoting Doe v. Wellbridge Club
Mgmt. LLC, 2022 COA 137, ¶ 31)).
IV. Disposition
¶ 44 We reverse the district court’s judgment of dismissal and
remand the case to the district court to reinstate the charges and
consider Spomer’s contention that his constitutional rights were
violated.
JUDGE BROWN and JUDGE HAWTHORNE concur.