2020 IL App (2d) 180395-U No. 2-18-0395 Order filed February 3, 2020
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Du Page County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 17-DV-50 ) JOSEPH LA SPISA, ) Honorable ) Jeffrey S. MacKay Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BRIDGES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Hudson concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court did not improperly limit the complaining witness’s cross- examination nor a defense witness’s direct examination. In addition, the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, we affirmed.
¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant, Joseph La Spisa, was convicted of one count of
domestic battery for making physical contact of an insulting or provoking nature (720 ILCS 5/12-
3.2(a)(2) (West 2016)), one count of domestic battery for causing bodily harm (720 ILCS 5/12- 2020 IL App (2d) 180395-U
3.2(a)(1) (West 2016)), and one count of interfering with the reporting of domestic violence (720
ILCS 5/12-3.5(a) (West 2016)). Defendant appeals from his convictions, and we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 The State filed a complaint against defendant on January 13, 2017, alleging two counts of
domestic battery. The allegations related to defendant’s actions against Janet Bogaert. At the time
of the alleged battery, defendant and Bogaert were in a romantic relationship and had been living
together for approximately four years.
¶5 Counts I and II of the complaint alleged, respectively, domestic battery under sections 12-
3.2(a)(2) and 12-3.2(a)(1) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Criminal Code) (720 ILCS 5/12-
3.2(a)(2), (a)(1) (West 2016)), in that defendant struck Bogaert on the face. The State later added
a third count for interference with the reporting of domestic violence in violation of section 12-
3.5(a) of the Criminal Code (720 ILCS 5/12-3.5(a) (West 2016)).
¶6 The case proceeded to a bench trial.
¶7 A. Bench Trial
¶8 The State called Bogaert, who testified as follows. In January 2017, she and defendant were
living together, and they had been in a dating relationship for about four years. On January 7,
defendant drove to an office Christmas party in Bogaert’s car. Although she had wanted to attend
the party with him, defendant had told her that he did not want her to come. She had placed a
recording device in the backseat of the car before defendant left for the party. Defendant returned
home around 3:30 a.m. on January 8 and went to sleep in the bed that he and Bogaert shared.
¶9 During the morning of January 8, she listened to the audio recording from the night before.
On the recording, she heard defendant having sex with another woman.
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¶ 10 During the afternoon of January 8, Bogaert spoke with defendant about the recording and
being with another woman. He was lying in bed, and she sat on the bed on defendant’s left side.
She had crutches with her because she had recently had surgery on her right foot, which was in a
cast. Their conversation was “tense,” and she was “sad.”
¶ 11 Bogaert cried and asked him why he had had sex with another woman. Defendant answered
because he could and because they were not married, and he demanded to know how she knew
about the other woman. When Bogaert told him about the recording device, he hit her. He “reared
his right hand back first” and smacked her across the left ear before quickly hitting her with his
left hand in the right eye.
¶ 12 Bogaert felt horrible. She was in physical pain and was frightened. She stood up, and he
grabbed her by her arm. He intertwined his fingers with hers and twisted them backwards. Her
fingers still had pain at the time of trial. She then hobbled downstairs to attempt to call 911 on the
house phone because defendant had her cell phone. Before she could make the call, defendant
came up behind her and pulled her by her hair. He kicked her in her cast and told her she was not
going to call anyone.
¶ 13 Bogaert went to the floor, and she was sobbing and in pain. She demanded that he give her
cellphone back to her. Defendant eventually returned her cell phone, but she “knew better” than to
contact the police. She feared for her life. She waited to contact the police until the next morning
when defendant had left for Wisconsin.
¶ 14 Bogaert noticed several bruises, and her foot was in pain. She had a black right eye, redness
on her cheek, and bruising and swelling of her wrists. Several photographs of her injuries were
admitted into evidence.
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¶ 15 Bogaert admitted that she gained access to defendant’s safe at some point between January
6, 2017, and when she left his residence on January 9, 2017, she took “some cash” out of it. She
believed she took less than $10,000.
¶ 16 Leo Elizalde testified next as follows. He was a police officer with the Elmhurst police
department, and he was on duty on January 9, 2017. That day, he responded to Bogaert’s call
reporting a domestic battery. Upon arriving at Bogaert’s address, Elizalde observed that she had
bruising by her eye and that she looked exhausted. Bogaert also showed him an injury to her wrist.
Elizalde spoke with both Bogaert and her daughter, who was also present at the home, and an
evidence technician took some photographs of Bogaert’s injuries.
¶ 17 Elizalde called defendant and left him a voicemail. Defendant responded the next day, and
he came to the police department with his attorney on January 12. Elizalde asked defendant about
Bogaert’s injuries, and he responded that he was not sure how she got her injuries. Elizalde did not
observe any injuries to defendant.
¶ 18 Next, defendant testified as follows. He was an oral and maxillofacial surgeon and had
been practicing for 27 years. He worked out of offices in both Palatine and Wisconsin, working in
Wisconsin Mondays through Thursdays. He and Bogaert began dating in January 2013, and over
their four-year relationship, he financially supported her. Bogaert worked outside of the home for
around one year of their relationship.
¶ 19 Defendant owned a safe that he kept in his home, and he stored around $100,000 in cash
in the safe. He did not believe that Bogaert knew the safe combination, and he never gave her his
password for his telephone. When he checked the safe on or after January 12, 2017, he found over
$60,000 missing. He had not authorized Bogaert to take any money from the safe.
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¶ 20 In the months leading up to January 2017, he and Bogaert’s relationship was “stressed.”
They were not getting along, and he felt he was being used. They had several discussions about
her moving out.
¶ 21 On January 7, 2017, defendant drove to an office party in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and he
did not want Bogaert to go to with him to the party. Later that night, he had sex with a woman in
the car. He was unaware that there was a recording device in the car.
¶ 22 Defendant returned home around 4:30 a.m. on January 8, and Bogaert was awake. They
went to sleep, and he got up the next day around 2:30 p.m. When he awoke, he got up to go to the
bathroom and saw Bogaert going through his suit in the closet. He asked her what she was doing,
and then he went back to bed. She came out of the closet and “started flailing” at him. She was
standing while she hit him with both of her hands. He then grabbed her wrists and told her to stop.
After he grabbed her wrists, she was upset and walked out of the bedroom. He was not upset that
she caught him sleeping with another woman, and he was not bothered that she confronted him
about it. He remained upstairs in bed while she went downstairs. He fell back asleep and remained
upstairs until around 8:30 p.m. when he went downstairs to the kitchen to get something to eat.
¶ 23 That night, Bogaert came back upstairs around 11 p.m. Before she came to bed, he said he
wanted to know how she found out about “this information” and whether she had been tracking
where he went. She said she had an IT guy and that she had “jail broke” his phone.
¶ 24 Defendant denied hitting Bogaert in any way. He also denied pulling her by her hair or
kicking her in her foot.
¶ 25 The final witness was Nicole Gregorio, who testified as follows. She had known Bogaert
for 19 years. Bogaert told her during a January 6, 2017, conversation that she had the combination
to defendant’s safe. She got the combination from an email sent to defendant after he had
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misplaced the combination. On January 9, Bogaert told her that she had taken $60,000 from the
safe, that she was having her daughter come to get the money, and that the police were coming to
defendant’s residence.
B. Trial Court Findings
¶ 26 On November 17, 2017, the trial court found defendant guilty of all three counts. The court
considered the testimony of the witnesses, their demeanor, and the exhibits, which included
photographs of Bogaert’s injuries. The court began by noting that Bogaert and the defendant had
been in a dating relationship and lived together from 2013 to January 2017. The court did not think
there was any dispute that Bogaert was injured or that she had some type of injury to her face, and
the court referenced the photographs of Bogaert. Bogaert had bruising under her eye and redness
to her right cheek. The court disagreed that her injuries were self-inflicted or that they were
inflicted immediately before the police arrived at defendant’s residence.
¶ 27 The court found Bogaert’s testimony credible. The court believed it was reasonable for
someone who “has been threatened, beat two times, have their hair pulled, have a phone wrestled
from their hand and taken away and threated to be killed” to wait until a time when their assailant
was gone to call the police. As for Bogaert taking defendant’s money and property, the court found
that undisputed: Bogaert admitted to taking at least some of defendant’s money. However, the
court explained that “because someone takes money, *** that does not mean that bruising under
somebody’s eye fades, that bruising under somebody’s eyes disappears, that [Bogaert] was not
injured or this never happened.”
¶ 28 On the other hand, the court did not find defendant’s testimony credible. The court
described defendant’s demeanor on the stand as “nervous,” and although the court acknowledged
that testifying can be nerve-racking, it found defendant’s demeanor went beyond having nerves
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about testifying. The court noted that at one point, defendant lashed out at one of the State’s
attorneys, and the court had to remind him to calm down. The court did not think this was the
demeanor of a credible witness. In addition, the court did not believe defendant’s testimony that
Bogaert lacked injuries at the time he left for the office on January 9. Bogaert testified to her
injuries, photographs supported her testimony, and Officer Elizalde, “who has no ax to grind in
this case at all,” testified that Bogaert had injuries on January 9. The court did not believe her
wounds were self-inflicted but instead found her injuries consistent with being punched, slapped,
or hit in the face. The court believed her injuries occurred on January 8 and were caused by
defendant.
¶ 29 The court sentenced defendant to 24 months’ court supervision for interfering with the
reporting of domestic violence and 24 months’ conditional discharge for domestic battery.
¶ 30 Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 31 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 32 Defendant presents three arguments on appeal. We address each in turn.
¶ 33 A. Cross-Examination of Bogaert
¶ 34 Defendant first argues the court erred in limiting his cross-examination of Bogaert’s biases
and ulterior motives. In particular, he argues the court erred in limiting cross-examination of how
Bogaert obtained the combination to defendant’s safe and whether Bogaert was the initial
aggressor. Defendant argues that questioning Bogaert about how she acquired the safe combination
went to her credibility and that examining whether Bogaert was the aggressor would have
demonstrated her bias and inclination to lie.
¶ 35 The State responds that the trial court gave defendant wide latitude to cross-examine
Bogaert. In particular, the State argues defendant cross-examined Bogaert on the nature of her
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intimate relationship with defendant; the nature of her financial and professional relationship with
defendant; her recording of defendant; and the actions she took before and after defendant struck
her. The State continues that, in her cross-examination, Bogaert admitted that she took money from
defendant’s safe, that defendant never gave her the safe combination, and that her feelings were
hurt when she found out defendant had slept with another woman. Finally, the State argues that
defendant testified that Bogaert initially attacked him and that she lacked any visible injuries, but
the trial court found his testimony incredible.
¶ 36 A criminal defendant has a fundamental constitutional right to confront the witnesses
against him, and the right to confront witnesses includes a right to conduct reasonable cross-
examination. U.S. Const., amend VI; People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 337 (1998). An important
function of cross-examination is the exposure of a witness’s motivation. People v. Klepper, 234
Ill. 2d 337, 355 (2009). Nevertheless, a trial judge may limit defense counsel’s cross-examination
without offending the defendant’s sixth amendment right. Id. A trial judge has wide latitude to
impose reasonable limits on cross-examination based on concerns of harassment, prejudice,
confusion of the issues, the witness’s safety, or interrogation that is repetitive. Id. Nonrelevant
evidence that would only confuse or mislead the factfinder is also properly excluded. People v.
Prevo, 302 Ill. App. 3d 1038, 1048 (1999). The scope of cross-examination is within the discretion
of the trial court, and we will not reverse the court absent an abuse of discretion that resulted in
prejudice to the defendant. McDonnell v. McPartlin, 192 Ill. 2d 505, 533 (2000); People v. Boand,
362 Ill. App. 3d 106, 131-32 (2005). An abuse of discretion occurs only when a trial court’s
decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable. People v. Fredericks, 2014 IL App (1st) 122122, ¶
39.
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¶ 37 We note, however, that the trial court’s discretion to restrict the scope of cross-examination
arises only after there is sufficient cross-examination to satisfy the constitutional guarantee to
confront witnesses. People v. Collins, 227 Ill. App. 3d 670, 675 (1992). To determine whether
defendant’s cross-examination was constitutionally sufficient, we look “not to what the defendant
had been prohibited from doing but what he was allowed to do.” People v. Weatherspoon, 265 Ill.
App. 3d 386, 393 (1994). If the record shows that the factfinder was aware of adequate factors
concerning relevant areas of impeachment of the witness, no constitutional question arises. Id.
¶ 38 Here, defendant was afforded a constitutionally sufficient opportunity to cross-examine
Bogaert. Defense counsel questioned Bogaert on myriad issues, such as: her financial dependence
on defendant; the state of her romantic relationship with defendant in the months leading up to
January 2017; the recorder she placed in the car that defendant drove to the Christmas party; the
conversation she had with defendant on the afternoon of January 8; how defendant struck her; and
what she did after defendant struck her. Defense counsel questioned Bogaert about the photographs
of her injuries, and counsel repeatedly asked her whether she was angry with defendant.
¶ 39 Defense counsel also questioned Bogaert about her conversations with Gregorio. Bogaert
admitted she discussed her and defendant’s relationship with Gregorio sometime in the month
before January 8, 2017. She denied telling Gregorio she wanted defendant to hit her so she could
have something on him or that she wanted to ruin his reputation. She denied telling Gregorio she
was going to make up stories about defendant. Regarding a January 9, 2017, conversation with
Gregorio, Bogaert answered it was possible she told her she was leaving defendant that day.
Bogaert denied telling Gregorio she had taken $60,000 from defendant’s safe. Bogaert also denied
telling Gregorio that she called her daughter to pick up money that she had taken from defendant’s
safe. Over the State’s objection, the court allowed Bogaert to answer whether she told Gregorio
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on January 9 that she was taking a painting and some other items from defendant’s house. Bogaert
answered the painting was hers because it was a gift, but she did not recall discussing the painting
with Gregorio.
¶ 40 In addition, defense counsel cross-examined Bogaert about defendant’s safe. While the
court initially sustained an objection to defense counsel’s questioning about how Bogaert obtained
the combination to defendant’s safe based on foundation, defense counsel continued to ask Bogaert
other questions about the safe, and the court allowed Bogaert to answer over the State’s objection.
She did not recall whether she had the safe combination on January 6, and she did not recall when
she accessed the safe. She admitted, however, that she took “some cash out of the safe” between
January 6 and 9, and that the money she took was defendant’s money. She did not recall exactly
how much she took, but she believed it was less than $10,000.
¶ 41 As we have detailed, defense counsel’s cross-examination of Bogaert was robust and wide-
ranging, and therefore the trial court afforded defense counsel a constitutionally sufficient
opportunity to test Bogaert’s potential motivations or biases. Accordingly, the trial court had
discretion to limit Bogaert’s cross-examination. See Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d at 355.
¶ 42 We hold that the court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Bogaert’s cross-examination.
Defendant’s first alleged error regarded how Bogaert obtained the combination to defendant’s safe.
Defendant argues the court improperly ended this line of cross-examination due to a lack of
foundation. While it is true the court initially sustained the State’s objection based on foundation—
specifically, it found a lack of foundation for Bogaert’s conversation with Gregorio about the
safe—it ultimately let defense counsel question Bogaert about her access to the safe. See supra ¶
40. The record further shows that Bogaert suspected defendant’s infidelity and that her feelings
were hurt by defendant’s relations with another woman. We therefore believe counsel had ample
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opportunity to explore Bogaert’s potential bias against defendant or her tendency to fabricate, and
the court did not err in limiting additional questioning of how exactly Bogaert obtained the safe
combination.
¶ 43 Moreover, the relevance of how Bogaert obtained the safe combination was low. The issue
in this case was whether defendant battered Bogaert. As the trial court rightly stated, “[b]ut because
someone takes money, *** that does not mean that bruising under somebody’s eye fades, that
bruising under somebody’s eye disappears, that [Bogaert] was not injured or this never happened.”
We reiterate that the trial court had wide latitude to limit cross-examination based on concerns of
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or the introduction of nonrelevant issues. Klepper, 234 Ill. 2d at
355; Prevo, 302 Ill. App. 3d at 1048. Here, the trial court kept cross-examination focused on
whether defendant battered Bogaert, not whether Bogaert stole money from defendant, by limiting
minimally probative but potentially prejudicial testimony such as how Bogaert obtained the safe
combination. Accordingly, the court did not err in limiting cross-examination of how Bogaert
obtained the safe combination.
¶ 44 Defendant’s second allegation of error pertains to testimony that Bogaert was the initial
aggressor. The first problem with defendant’s argument is that the testimony he identifies was not
testimony from Bogaert’s cross-examination. Rather, defendant identifies his direct testimony
from his case-in-chief. The next problem is that the court allowed him to testify that Bogaert was
the aggressor. Defendant testified that Bogaert attacked him on the afternoon of January 8. The
only precluded testimony that defendant identifies was his testimony that Bogaert told him she
wanted to have sex when he returned home from the Christmas party on January 8. To the extent
defendant was trying to show Bogaert was motivated to physically confront him, the record already
established that she listened to a recording of him having sex with another woman after the
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Christmas party, and defendant admitted to sleeping with another woman. Bogaert’s discovery of
defendant’s infidelity would have been upsetting regardless of whether she said she wanted to have
sex with defendant the night before, and therefore the court did not err in limiting that line of
questioning.
¶ 45 Even if, arguendo, the trial court abused its discretion in limiting cross-examination, any
limitation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See People v. Johnson, 2018 IL App (1st)
140725, ¶ 91 (an improper denial of a defendant’s right to cross-examine a witness regarding bias
does not mandate reversal when the error was harmless). Here, the trial court heard testimony from
defendant that Bogaert was the initial aggressor. Defense counsel did not ask Bogaert whether she
attacked defendant first, but nevertheless, any examination of Bogaert about whether she was the
initial aggressor would have been cumulative with defendant’s testimony that she was the
aggressor. See Davis, 185 Ill. 2d at 338 (explaining that an improper denial of cross-examination
may be harmless for various reasons, including when the excluded testimony was cumulative with
other evidence). In addition, the court heard other evidence about the safe combination. Gregorio
testified in defendant’s case-in-chief about her conversations with Bogaert, including about how
Bogaert obtained the combination to defendant’s safe. She testified that Bogaert told her she
obtained the safe combination through defendant’s email after he had misplaced the combination,
and she also testified that Bogaert told her she took $60,000 and had her daughter pick up the
money. Finally, we would be remiss not to mention the physical evidence, including photographs
of a visible bruise under Bogaert’s right eye, that supported her allegations that defendant struck
her. For all these reasons, we reject defendant’s argument that the trial court erred in limiting cross-
examination of Bogaert.
¶ 46 B. Limitation of Witness Testimony
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¶ 47 Defendant next argues that the court erred in limiting Gregorio’s testimony. Defendant
claims his counsel attempted to elicit evidence from Gregorio, and the trial court did not allow the
testimony. Specifically, defendant argues he tried to elicit testimony on three topics from Gregorio
and Bogaert’s conversations during the 30 days leading up to the alleged battery: (1) whether
Bogaert told Gregorio she wanted defendant to hit her; (2) whether Bogaert told Gregorio she was
going to ruin defendant’s reputation; and (3) whether Bogaert told Gregorio she was going to make
up stories about defendant. Defendant also argues the court effectively limited his examination of
Gregorio to her January 6 conversation with Bogaert, thus limiting his examination on these three
topics.
¶ 48 We disagree that the court limited defendant’s examination of Gregorio regarding these
three topics. In fact, defense counsel never sought to elicit the complained-of testimony. At no
point in the record did defense counsel attempt to question Gregorio about whether Bogaert told
her she wanted defendant to hit her, whether she wanted to ruin his reputation, or whether she was
going to make up stories about him. Cf. McMath v. Katholi, 191 Ill. 2d 251, 255 (2000) (a party
cannot complain of error which he induced the court to make or which he consented). While
defense counsel never asked Gregorio about these three topics, he did ask Bogaert about all three,
and she denied them.
¶ 49 Moreover, we disagree that the court effectively limited Gregorio’s testimony to the
January 6 conversation. Here, the court limited Gregorio’s testimony only on the topic of Bogaert’s
access to defendant’s cell phone. After defense counsel asked Gregorio whether Bogaert told her,
on or prior to January 6, that she had access to defendant’s cell phone code, the court sustained the
State’s objections an explained as follows:
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“You asked [Bogaert] about the combination of the defendant’s safe, on January
6th; and you asked her a series of questions about January 9th of 2017.
The only conversation that I have is regarding the combination of the defendant’s
safe, on January 6th.
If you want to ask about that, that’s fine; but anything else, I’m going to sustain the
objection.”
In context, the court’s statement was not a blanket prohibition on all other topics or conversations
beyond the January 6 conversation. Rather, the court limited what counsel could ask Gregorio
about her January 6 conversation with Bogaert to questions about the safe combination. This is
evident from the fact that the court subsequently allowed Gregorio to testify, over the State’s
objections, on topics beyond the January 6 conversation. Specifically, Gregorio testified that in a
January 9 conversation, Bogaert told her that she took $60,000 from the safe, that her daughter
was coming to pick up the money, and that the police were heading to defendant’s home. After
defense counsel elicited this testimony from Gregorio, he ended his examination without
attempting to ask her about the three complained-of topics. We also note that earlier in Gregorio’s
direct examination, defense counsel asked her whether she had conversations with Bogaert during
the time between the fall of 2016 and January 9, 2017. After Gregorio answered yes, counsel
moved on to their January 6 conversations without asking about any of the three complained-of
¶ 50 C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 51 Defendant’s final argument is that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. First, he argues the State failed to show that he committed a domestic battery involving
bodily harm, failed to show that he committed a domestic battery involving conduct of an insulting
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or provoking nature, and failed to show that he interfered with the reporting of domestic violence.
For domestic battery involving bodily harm, he argues the State did not prove his intent, he was
justified in his actions, and he did not actually cause bodily harm. He argues that Bogaert was the
aggressor, motivated by her anger at defendant’s affair, and defendant acted to protect himself. For
battery involving conduct of an insulating or provoking nature, defendant reiterates his argument
that Bogaert was the initial aggressor. Finally, for interference with reporting of domestic violence,
defendant argues there was no underlying domestic battery, there was a lack of evidence that he
prevented her from calling the police, and the record did not support that Bogaert was afraid of
him.
¶ 52 Second, defendant argues Bogaert’s testimony was so unreasonable, improbable, and
unsatisfactory that it justified reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. Defendant cites to evidence
of Bogaert’s “felonious conduct,” including her admissions that she took money from defendant’s
safe and that she recorded defendant’s sexual encounter by placing a recorder in the car. He argues
she essentially admitted to crimes of theft and eavesdropping. He also argues the evidence showed
Bogaert had motive to be the initial aggressor, that she was impeached via defendant’s and
Gregorio’s testimonies, and that she often could not recall details of certain events or
conversations.
¶ 53 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard is whether, after viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found all
essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Maples, 2018 IL App (2d)
160557, ¶ 30. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we will not substitute our judgment for
that of the trier of fact on the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the witnesses. Id. We do
not retry the defendant, and we will reverse the defendant’s conviction only where the evidence is
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so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies reasonable doubt of the defendant’s
guilt. People v. Lissade, 403 Ill. App. 3d 609, 612 (2010).
¶ 54 We hold that the evidence was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt on all three counts. This case turned on witness credibility. Bogaert testified that defendant
struck her in the face after she told him about the recording device she placed in the car. Both
Bogaert and Elizalde testified to her injuries. Therefore, if the trial court reasonably believed
Bogaert and not defendant, then the evidence supported the two domestic battery convictions. 720
ILCS 5/12-3.2(a) (West 2016) (a person commits domestic battery if he knowingly without legal
justification causes bodily harm to a household member or makes physical contact of an insulting
or provoking nature with a household member).
¶ 55 In addition, Bogaert testified that she was afraid after the attack and “knew better” than to
contact the police right away. She testified that she feared for her life, and she testified that
defendant stopped her from calling 911 on a downstairs land line. This evidence, if reasonably
believed, supported interfering with the reporting of domestic violence. 720 ILCS 5/12-3.5(a)
(West 2016) (the offense is committed when, after committing an act of domestic violence, one
knowingly prevents or attempts to prevent the victim from calling 911 or making any report to law
enforcement).
¶ 56 Here, the trial court found Bogaert’s testimony credible and defendant’s testimony
incredible. With respect to Bogaert’s testimony, the trial court explained:
“Certainly I can understand somebody who has been threatened, beat two times,
have their hair pulled *** might wait until a point when they knew the Defendant was gone
before they called [the] police. *** [Bogaert] even testified at one point that she went back
upstairs with the Defendant to keep the peace. Certainly I think that’s the testimony of
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somebody who’s scared, who’s terrified, who’s afraid of the Defendant. *** I think that’s
justifiable actions by a victim of domestic battery *** that she waited until she knew when
the defendant was leaving on January 9.”
The court noted Bogaert admitted to taking money from defendant’s safe, but it explained that
because someone takes money does not mean they were not battered. It then cited the photographic
exhibits, which showed Bogaert’s injuries, including clear bruising under her right eye. Turning
to defendant’s testimony, the court continued:
“I don’t think the Defendant’s testimony was credible. First off, I was able to watch
him testify. *** He was nervous on the stand. *** I’ve testified in cases and I know it’s
nerve-racking because I’ve been through it myself, but the Defendant went beyond having
just nerves about testifying. He was shaking. He was fidgeting. He was constantly bouncing
his leg. *** At one point he lashed out against one of the Assistant State’s Attorneys and I
had to remind him to calm down. I don’t think that’s the demeanor of somebody who’s
completely credible.”
The court then discussed defendant’s substantive testimony. It did not believe defendant’s
testimony that Bogaert lacked any injuries when he left the house on January 9. It did not believe
Bogaert’s wounds were self-inflicted. The court noted that Officer Elizalde, someone with “no ax
to grind in this case,” testified that he observed Bogaert’s injuries on January 9.
¶ 57 The trial court’s credibility determinations are accorded great deference (People v. Brown,
2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48), and here, the court’s credibility determinations were not unreasonable.
First, the physical evidence supported the court’s credibility determinations. While defendant
claimed Bogaert had no injury when he left for work on January 9, the photographic exhibits
clearly depict bruising under her right eye, and Elizalde’s testimony corroborated her injuries.
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Second, it was reasonable to believe Bogaert waited to contact the police because she was afraid
after defendant struck her and that she feared provoking further aggression. Finally, we reject
defendant’s argument that Bogaert’s testimony was tainted by her “felonious conduct.” She
admitted to recording defendant and taking some money from the safe, and therefore we fail to see
how this conduct shows she lacked credibility as a complaining witness. But more, her actions
recording defendant and taking money from his safe did not directly go toward whether defendant
struck her. Defendant would like us to believe these actions showed her bias or motivation for
framing him, but these actions just as easily show defendant’s motivation for striking Bogaert. In
fact, her testimony was that he struck her immediately after she told him about the recording. It
would be reasonable to believe defendant was angry or upset with Bogaert upon his discovery that
she recorded him having sex with another woman. Accordingly, Bogaert’s admissions to recording
defendant and taking money from his safe do not render her testimony unreasonable, improbable,
or unsatisfactory, and the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 58 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 59 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the Du Page County circuit court.
¶ 60 Affirmed.
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