People v. Sparks

2025 IL App (2d) 250090-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: June 11, 2025
• Docket: 2-25-0090
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2025 IL App (2d) 250090-U No. 2-25-0090 Order filed June 11, 2025

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(l). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 25-CF-409 ) ) Honorable DAIDREON SPARKS, ) Betsy Flood and ) Donald Tegeler, Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judges, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Kennedy and Justice Hutchinson concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err in granting the State’s petition to deny defendant pretrial release and ordering defendant detained.

¶2 Defendant, Daidreon Sparks, appeals from orders of the circuit court of Kane County

granting the State’s verified petition to deny him pretrial release pursuant to article 110 of the Code

of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code) (725 ILCS 5/art. 110 (West 2024)), as amended by Public

Acts 101-652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) and 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (we will refer to 2025 IL App (2d) 250090-U

these public acts collectively as the “Acts”). 1 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to

meet its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the

presumption great that he committed the charged detainable offenses. We affirm.

¶3 I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

¶4 A. Background

¶5 On February 22, 2025, defendant was charged by complaint with one count of

manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance (more than 400 grams but less than 900 grams

of cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(C) (West 2024)), a class X felony, and one count of

possession of a controlled substance (more than 400 grams but less than 900 grams of cocaine)

(720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(C) (West 2024)), a class 1 felony. The charges stemmed from a traffic

stop that occurred on February 21, 2025. Count I alleged that defendant knowingly and unlawfully

delivered or manufactured or possessed with the intent to deliver or manufacture more than 400

grams but less than 900 grams of a substance containing cocaine. Count II alleged that defendant

knowingly and unlawfully had in his possession more than 400 grams but less than 900 grams of

a substance containing cocaine.

¶6 Also on February 22, 2025, the State filed a verified petition to deny defendant pretrial

release. In its petition, the State alleged that defendant was charged with a felony offense other

than a forcible felony for which, based on the charge or defendant’s criminal history, a sentence

of imprisonment is required by law upon conviction and that defendant’s pretrial release poses a

real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community. See 725 ILCS

1 Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023), which amended article 110 of the Code, has been referred

to as the “Pretrial Fairness Act” and the “Safety, Accountability, Fairness, and Equity-Today (SAFE-T)

Act.” However, neither title is official. Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 4 n.1.

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5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2024). The State further alleged that defendant has a high likelihood of

willful flight to avoid prosecution. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8) (West 2024).

¶7 The State attached to its petition a sworn synopsis drafted by the arresting agency in this

case. The synopsis provides that at approximately 2:20 p.m. on February 21, 2025, Sergeant

Weston of the Kane County Sheriff’s Department was on patrol when he noticed an SUV bearing

a Tennessee registration plate following a vehicle too closely. Weston attempted to catch up to the

SUV, but it began changing lanes in an attempt to create distance. Weston conducted a traffic stop.

Upon conducting the traffic stop, Weston noticed the front seat passenger “make a furtive

movement towards” defendant, who was seated in the rear passenger seat. Weston noticed a third

passenger as well. As Weston approached the SUV, he requested the occupants to roll down the

rear passenger window. Once the window was rolled down, Weston smelled the odor of cocaine

and raw cannabis emanating from within the vehicle. Defendant and the other two occupants

provided Weston with Indiana driver’s licenses. Weston asked the front passenger where they were

headed. The front passenger advised that the men were going to visit the driver’s son in Madison,

Wisconsin for a couple of days. The driver of the vehicle provided Weston with a rental agreement

for the vehicle. The rental agreement showed that the car was to be returned to Indianapolis,

Indiana, the next day, which contradicted the statement made by the front passenger. While talking

to the driver, Weston noticed that the driver was texting someone. Weston observed that the driver

sent a message telling the recipient to “take it” and another message to “run.” Weston then removed

defendant from the back passenger seat of the SUV. As defendant was exiting the vehicle, Weston

observed him reach towards a bag on the floorboard. At this time, the driver of the SUV retrieved

his phone and called a woman. Weston heard the driver say, “Hey, I’m about to go to jail.” Weston

then conducted a search of the back passenger area. There, he found a gallon Ziploc bag wrapped

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inside two grocery bags. Inside the Ziploc bag was a white powdery substance that later field tested

positive for cocaine. Upon arrest, Weston removed from defendant’s pocket approximately $1,345

in cash of different denominations. Defendant also had two cell phones. The front passenger of the

vehicle did not have a cell phone. The cocaine recovered from the vehicle weighed approximately

760 grams, which Weston reported as having a street value of $76,000.

¶8 As additional grounds upon which the defendant should be denied pretrial release, the State

listed defendant’s criminal history, which included a 2015 conviction for resisting arrest, a 2018

felony of “assisting a criminal felony,” a 2021 misdemeanor gun charge, a 2023 misdemeanor

marijuana charge, and a 2024 felony of “possession of firearm after a felony.” Defendant’s

criminal history was entirely from Indiana, and exact dispositions of the cases were unknown or

left out of the record. Further, the State noted in its petition that defendant “is a resident of Indiana

and was travelling Westbound on I-90 in a rental vehicle with Tennessee registration and other

occupants stated they were headed to Wisconsin. Additionally[,] defendant was in possession of

$1345.00 in cash in various denominations and has no known ties to Illinois or Kane County.”

¶9 B. Detention Hearing

¶ 10 On February 23, 2025, Judge Betsy Flood held a hearing on the State’s petition. At that

hearing, the State submitted the synopsis, defendant’s criminal history, and a Public Safety

Assessment (PSA) Report.

¶ 11 In argument, the State asserted that the proof is evident or the presumption great that

defendant committed the charged offenses. The State noted that, while exiting the vehicle,

defendant reached for the bag in the backseat. The State argued that this meant defendant was

attempting to get the bag, which contained approximately 760 grams of cocaine. Defendant also

had $1,345 in his pocket and was in possession of two cell phones.

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¶ 12 The State next argued that defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of any

person or persons or the community and posed a risk of flight. The State referenced defendant’s

criminal history, noting that he “is committing criminal offenses that involve[] drugs and guns.”

The State asserted that based on the little information it had about the case, defendant would likely

be on probation or parole for his 2024 case of possessing a firearm after a felony. It further noted

that defendant had no ties to Illinois and that it was “unlikely” that defendant was allowed to travel

outside of Indiana based on the 2024 case.

¶ 13 In response, defense counsel first argued that the State did not meet its burden by clear and

convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed

the offenses charged. Defense counsel asserted that the synopsis did not contain any statements by

defendant. Further, defense counsel argued that there was no indication that both phones found on

defendant belonged to him, and that it was not convincing that defendant had a large amount of

cash in his pocket. Additionally, defense counsel contended that whether defendant was a real and

present threat was questionable, as defendant did not appear to have a weapon at the time of the

instant offense. Finally, defense counsel argued that defendant is not a flight risk because

defendant lives in Gary, Indiana, which is a reasonable driving distance from Kane County, and

defendant has the ability to drive to court dates in Kane County as needed.

¶ 14 The trial court denied defendant pretrial release. In her oral findings, Judge Flood

concluded that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the

presumption great that defendant committed the offenses charged. The court noted that based on

the synopsis, the bag of cocaine was found in the backseat where defendant was sitting and

defendant was in possession of a large amount of cash and two cell phones. Judge Flood likewise

found that defendant was a real and present threat to the safety of the community. The trial court

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based its finding on the fact that defendant was transporting a large quantity of cocaine across state

lines and defendant had five separate criminal cases between 2015 and 2024, all from Indiana. The

court noted that defendant’s criminal history showed a “history or pattern of some dangerous

behavior,” with the most recent case involving a weapons charge. Finally, the court found that the

State had proven that defendant posed a high risk of flight. Notably, defendant had no connections

to Illinois and his PSA categorized defendant as a risk level of 5 on a 6 point failure to appear

scale. The court therefore granted the State’s petition and entered a written order summarizing its

oral findings.

¶ 15 C. Motion for Relief and Notice of Appeal

¶ 16 On February 28, 2025, defendant filed a “Motion for Relief Under the Pretrial Fairness

Act.” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). In the motion, defense counsel disputed the

court’s findings that the State met its burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed the offenses charged, that

defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons or the community,

and that no conditions could mitigate any alleged threat. A hearing on defendant’s motion was

held before Judge Donald Tegeler, Jr., on March 6, 2025. At the hearing, defense counsel argued

that based on the information provided in the synopsis, it was unlikely that defendant was aware

that there was cocaine in the vehicle. Defense counsel asserted that the cocaine was double-bagged,

and that it was unlikely that there was an odor emanating from the bag. Further, he contended that

although the bag field-tested positive for cocaine, field tests can be unreliable. Finally, defense

counsel argued that defendant did not pose a threat to the community and there were conditions

that would ensure he would return to court if he was released pending trial.

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¶ 17 Judge Tegeler denied the motion for relief. In his ruling, Judge Tegeler determined that

Judge Flood was correct in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that defendant

committed the offenses charged. Further, he noted that there was additional, circumstantial,

evidence that demonstrated defendant’s knowledge of the cocaine. Specifically, Judge Tegeler

found it noteworthy that the driver of the vehicle attempted to send a text message telling one of

the occupants of the vehicle to “take it” and “run” and defendant had two phones, while the other

occupant did not have a phone. Judge Tegeler also concurred in Judge Flood’s finding that

defendant posed a risk of harm to society and that no less restrictive conditions were available to

mitigate defendant’s risk of flight.

¶ 18 On March 11, 2025, defendant filed a notice of appeal. The court appointed the Office of

the State Appellate Defender (OSAD) to represent defendant. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(3) (eff. Apr.

15, 2024) (providing that a party may initiate an appeal by filing a notice of appeal in the circuit

court at any time prior to conviction). OSAD elected to file a memorandum under Illinois Supreme

Court Rule 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). The State filed a response in opposition to the appeal.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 Article 110 of the Code, as amended by the Acts, abolished traditional monetary bail in

favor of pretrial release on personal recognizance or with conditions of release. 725 ILCS 5/110-

1.5, 110-2(a) (West 2024). In Illinois, all persons charged with an offense are eligible for pretrial

release irrespective of the seriousness or the nature of the offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1(e)

(West 2024); People v. Grayson, 2024 IL App (4th) 241100-U, ¶ 7. To detain a defendant, the

State has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the

presumption great that the defendant has committed a detainable offense (725 ILCS 5/110-

6.1(e)(1) (West 2024)), that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the

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safety of any person or persons or the community based on the specific articulable facts of the case

(725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1)-(7), (e)(2) (West 2024)) or a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid

prosecution (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8), (e)(3) (West 2024)), and that no condition or combination

of conditions can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community

or the risk of the defendant’s willful flight (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(3) (West 2024)). “Evidence is

clear and convincing if it leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the trier of fact as to the truth

of the proposition in question.” Chaudhary v. Department of Human Services, 2023 IL 127712,

¶ 74. The Code further requires that “[d]ecisions regarding release, conditions of release, and

detention prior to trial must be individualized, and no single factor or standard may be used

exclusively to order detention.” 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(7) (West 2022).

¶ 21 The decision to detain a defendant or grant a defendant pretrial release is reviewed under

either the manifest-weight-of-the-evidence standard or the de-novo standard. The Illinois Supreme

Court recently articulated the circumstances under which each standard applies:

“(1)[W]hen live witness testimony is presented at a pretrial detention hearing, the

circuit court’s ultimate detention decision under section 110-6.1 [of the Code (725 ILCS

5/110-6.1 (West 2024))], in addition to any underlying factual findings supporting the

decision, will not be disturbed on review unless found to be contrary to the manifest weight

of the evidence and (2) when the parties to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by

proffer, the reviewing court is not bound by the circuit court’s factual findings and may

therefore conduct its own independent de novo review of the proffered evidence and

evidence otherwise documentary in nature.” People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54.

In this case, no live testimony was presented. The parties proceeded solely by proffer and

documentary evidence. Accordingly, our review of the trial court’s factual findings and its

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detention orders is de novo. Under de novo review, a reviewing court “perform[s] the same analysis

that the trial [court] would perform using the proper standards.” People v. Ruhl, 2021 IL App (2d)

200402, ¶ 69.

¶ 22 At the outset, we note that defendant has forfeited those arguments that he raised in his

motion for relief but abandoned in his memorandum on appeal. Illinois Supreme Court Rule

604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024), provides, in relevant part, that “The motion for relief will serve as

the argument of the appellant on appeal. *** Issues raised in the motion for relief are before the

appellate court regardless of whether the optional memorandum is filed.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7)

(eff. Apr. 15, 2024). Rule 604(h) further provides that “If a memorandum is filed, it must identify

which issues from the motion for relief are being advanced on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff.

Apr. 15, 2024). Where a memorandum fails to provide argument for issues contained in the motion

for relief, those issues will be deemed abandoned and will not be addressed by the appellate court.

People v. Drew, 2024 IL App (5th) 240697, ¶ 21 (“OSAD’s memorandum contained no

identification of the issues from the motion for relief but clearly did not provide argument for three

of the issues raised in defendant’s motion for immediate release. Accordingly, we hold those issues

were abandoned by appellate counsel and will not be addressed.).

¶ 23 In this case, defendant’s memorandum on appeal addresses only one of the issues presented

in his motion for relief: whether the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof

is evident or the presumption great that he committed the charged detainable offenses.

Accordingly, we limit our review to this issue.

¶ 24 We find that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the proof is evident or

the presumption great that defendant committed a detainable offense. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e)(1)

(West 2024). Defendant was charged with manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance

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(more than 400 grams but less than 900 grams of cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(C) (West

2024)) and possession of a controlled substance (more than 400 grams but less than 900 grams of

cocaine) (720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(C) (West 2024)). As charged, manufacturing or delivering a

controlled substance and possession of a controlled substance are detainable offenses under section

110-6.1(a)(1) of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2024) (“Upon verified petition by the

State, the court shall hold a hearing and may deny a defendant pretrial release only if *** the

defendant is charged with a felony offense other than a forcible felony for which, based on the

charge or the defendant’s criminal history, a sentence of imprisonment, without probation, periodic

imprisonment or conditional discharge, is required by law upon conviction, and it is alleged that

the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or persons

or the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case”). A person commits

manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance if he or she knowingly and unlawfully delivered

or possessed with intent to manufacture or deliver 400 grams or more but less than 900 grams of

cocaine. 720 ILCS 570/401(a)(2)(C) (West 2024). A person commits possession of a controlled

substance if he or she knowingly and unlawfully has in his or her possession 400 grams or more

but less than 900 grams of cocaine. 720 ILCS 570/402(a)(2)(C) (West 2024).

¶ 25 Here, the State provided evidence that defendant was seated in the backseat of an SUV

when Weston conducted a traffic stop. Upon approaching the vehicle, Weston smelled the odor of

cocaine. As officers removed defendant from the vehicle, defendant made a movement towards a

bag on the floor. Officers retrieved the bag and found a substance that field-tested positive for

cocaine. Prior to finding the bag in the backseat, Weston noticed the driver of the vehicle texting

someone to “take it” and “run.” Weston presumed that the driver was texting either defendant or

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the other occupant in the vehicle. Upon arrest, officers found that defendant had two cellphones

and $1,345 in his pocket. The other occupant in the vehicle did not have a cellphone.

¶ 26 On appeal, defendant argues that Weston’s proffered testimony was “contrary to human

experience and not credible” and thus, the State failed to prove that defendant was aware that there

was cocaine in the vehicle to support a finding that defendant committed the offenses charged.

Specifically, defendant rejects Weston’s statement that the vehicle had an odor of cocaine and that

defendant reached for the bag containing cocaine as he was removed from the vehicle.

¶ 27 Regarding Weston’s proffer that defendant made a furtive movement, defendant argues

that the idea that he would reach for a bag on the floorboard, knowing that it contained cocaine, at

the same time that he was being observed by a police officer is “so irrational as to be incredible,

and to throw significant doubt on any portion of Weston’s testimony that is not independently

verifiable.” In support of his contention, defendant cites People v. Shaw, 2015 IL App (1st)

123157, ¶ 20, for the proposition that eyewitness testimony cannot sustain a conviction where it is

improbable, unconvincing, or contrary to human experience. In Shaw, the appellate court reversed

a conviction that relied solely on the witness’s testimony that the defendant had a gun, pressed it

into the witness’s side, and threatened to shoot the witness. Id., ¶ 22. The witness testified to the

type, color, and size of the gun. Id. However, according to the unimpeached testimony of an officer

who frisked the defendant, the defendant in Shaw did not have a gun. Id. Shaw presents a vastly

different set of circumstances than the present case, where Weston’s proffered testimony states

that he observed defendant reach towards a bag and later discovered that bag contained cocaine.

¶ 28 Defendant also cites People v. Sowers, 36 Ill. App. 3d 599 (1976), for this same proposition

he cites to Shaw. In Sowers, the witness testified that a masked robber came into the gas station he

worked at with a sawed-off shotgun. Id. at 600. After the witness gave the robber the contents of

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the cash register, the robber then unmasked himself to the witness, whom he knew, negating the

purpose of the disguise, and began counting the money in front of the witness. Id. The robber

stayed for the duration of two transactions, gave money to the witness to make change, and never

attempted to flee. Id. Finally, after the second transaction, the robber took $60, gave the witness

back $140 from the register, and walked away. Id. at 601. The witness did not call the police and

only reported the robbery when he saw a police car on his way home from the gas station. Id. When

the witness could not pick out the robber from a lineup, he named the defendant as the robber. Id.

The police found the defendant at a hotel. Id. None of the clothing found at the hotel matched what

the witness described, there was no cap that matched what the robber was wearing, the defendant

did not have any money, and the police did not find a gun. Id. at 602. No evidence that the crime

had occurred was found during a two-and-a-half-month investigation. Like Shaw, the facts of

Sowers present a vastly different set of circumstances where there was no evidence to support the

testimony of the witness. While the Sowers court noted that the testimony regarding the robber’s

removal of his disguise seemed improbable, that alone was not the sole basis to refute the witness’s

testimony. Id. at 606. Additionally, the facts here do not seem entirely improbable. Defendant

could have reached towards the bag as he was exiting for any number of reasons—for example to

better conceal it as he exited the vehicle, or if he were considering whether to “take it” and “run.”

¶ 29 Defendant also attempts to refute Weston’s testimony that there was an odor of cocaine in

the car. Even if there was an odor, defendant argues, that does not mean that he himself was aware

that it was an odor of cocaine and that there was cocaine in the vehicle. Defendant argues that it is

improbable that Weston smelled cocaine, as cocaine is “nearly odorless” in its pure form. M.

Siegrist, T.J. Weigand, Encyclopedia of Toxicology 999 (3d 2014) available at

https://www.sciencedirect.com/topics/chemistry/cocaine-hydrochloride (last visited May 28,

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2025). However, defendant notes that street cocaine does have a smell, but each brick smells

different due to the agent it is “cut” with, and common processing and cutting agents often have

“a sharp, chemical-like smell that can remind people of cleaning products.” Does Cocaine Have a

Scent? Breaking Down Different Cocaine Smells,

https://www.renaissancerecovery.com/drug/cocaine/what-does-cocaine-smell-like/ (last visited

May 28, 2025). Thus, defendant argues, the smell could have been attributable to cleaning products

used in a rental car. Accordingly, he contends that “a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that

any passenger in the car with a normal nose would necessarily have had to know that cocaine was

in the car.” We find these arguments unconvincing. First, Weston could have smelled the cocaine.

“While pure cocaine may have little to no scent, what people typically encounter on the street has

a harsh, artificial odor due to *** additives.” Id. There was a large amount of cocaine found in the

vehicle, and it is entirely possible that Weston could have smelled “a harsh, artificial odor.”

Second, even if the alleged scent was attributable to the cleaning products used in a rental car,

defendant’s action of reaching for the bag as he exited the vehicle casts such a conclusion into

doubt.

¶ 30 Finally, defendant argues that the State’s proffer did not reasonably establish that the driver

of the SUV texted defendant during the traffic stop and that the messages Weston saw advising

the recipient to “take it” and “run” were likely to someone else. Thus, he argues, there is little

evidence that defendant knew of the cocaine in the vehicle. Weston’s proffered testimony did not

explicitly state that the messages were sent from the driver of the vehicle to defendant. Rather, out

of concern that the messages were sent to defendant or the other occupant in the vehicle, Weston

and other officers had everyone step out of the vehicle. It was at this time that Weston saw

defendant reach for the bag which contained cocaine. Defendant was then found to have two

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cellphones and $1,345 in cash. Accordingly, the text messages alone are not the sole reason to find

that defendant had knowledge of the cocaine. Rather, the circumstances as a whole point to such

a conclusion.

¶ 31 The quantum of evidence required to detain a defendant pending trial is less than what is

required at trial to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(f)(2), (f)(4)-

(f)(6) (West 2024); People v. Santiago, 2024 IL App (2d) 240499-U, ¶ 28. Given the record before

us, we conclude that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that that the proof is evident

or the presumption great that defendant committed the charged offenses.

¶ 32 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 33 For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.

¶ 34 Affirmed.

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