People v. South P. R. Sugar Co.

56 P.R. 633
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedApril 30, 1940
DocketNo. 4
StatusPublished

This text of 56 P.R. 633 (People v. South P. R. Sugar Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. South P. R. Sugar Co., 56 P.R. 633 (prsupreme 1940).

Opinion

Mr. Justice De Jesús

delivered the opinion of the conrt.

• The Attorney General of Puerto Rico filed in this court a petition for the granting of an information in the nature of quo warranto in behalf of The People of Puerto Rico, against the three respondents in the above entitled case, in which it was alleged that the first named, a foreign corporation, South P. R. Sugar Co. (New Jersey), which herein[634]*634after shall he called “the New Jersey corporation,” through the co-respondents, South P. R. Sugar Co. (P. R.), which hereinafter shall he called “the domestic corporation,” and the partnership Russell & Co. Succrs., which shall be known as Russell & Co., in contravention of the Organic Act of Puerto Rico (section 39) and of Act No. 47 of August 7, 1935 (Special Session Laws of 1935, p. 530), owns in this island 24,000 acres of land. The Attorney General further alleged that “the New Jersey corporation” owns the stock and interest or capital, respectively, of “the domestic corporation” and of “Russell & Co.,” which it controls or manages, and that the latter are mere tools created hy “the New Jersey corporation” for the purpose of evading the laws above cited prohibiting corporations from owning land in this Island in excess of 500 acres.

Upon the granting of leave to file the petition, the service of process on the respondents was ordered, which the marshal returned as served, as evidenced by the following certificate :

“Supreme Court of Puerto Rico — Office of the Marshal — I, William G. Latimer, Marshal of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, do HEREBY Certiey : That the present summons was delivered, to me at 11 a. m. of November 25, 1938, and that I served the same on the dates hereinafter stated, by delivering faithful copies thereof, of the quo warranto petition, of exhibits A, B, C, C-1, C-2, C-3, C-4, C-5, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, W, X, T, Z, and AA, attached to said petition, and of the order of the Supreme Court dated November 23, 1938, on the following persons:
“On attorney James R. Beverley, as vice-president of ‘The South Porto Rico Sugar Company’ (domestic corporation), personally in his office at 1 Tetuán St., on this the 25th of November, 1938.
‘ ‘ On Carl S. Nadler, as managing partner of- Successors of Russell & Co., personally in his office at Ensenada, Puerto Rico, on this the 29th of November, 1938.
“On Carl S. Nadler, as managing partner of Successors of Russell & Co., a firm which, according to allegations 8 and 9 of the petition is the agent in Puerto Rico of ‘The South P. R. Sugar Co.’, [635]*635a foreign corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of New Jersey. Carl S. Nadler refused to be served with this summons on the grounds that Successors of Russell & Co., of which he is managing partner, is not agent in Puerto Rico for the aforesaid South Porto Rico Sugar Co., of New Jersey, and stated that he would return to the Supreme Court the above papers to stress his refusal to be served therewith; this the 29th of November, 1938.
“San Juan, Puerto Rico, December 2, 1938. (Signed) 'William G-. Latimer, Marshal.”

The three respondents appeared on December 20, 1938, and without submitting to the jurisdiction of this court, moved for the removal of the case to the District Court of the United States for Puerto Rico, on the ground that the present is a proceeding of a civil nature in which the amount involved, without including interest and costs, exceeds $3,000, and arises under the laws of the United States. Upon refusal to remove the case on January 24, 1939 (54 P.R.R. 122), “the New Jersey corporation,” through a special appearance, filed a motion seeking to quash the service of process on the ground that the same is a foreign corporation, that many years ago it ceased to do business in this Island, that it has no official or agent in this jurisdiction to be served with process in its behalf, and that neither Russell & Co. nor Carl S. Nadler is or has ever been its agent in Puerto Rico, and that for many years back the petitioner has not done any business in this Island, either directly or through any other person or entity, and that under such facts, should tliis court assume jurisdiction and enter judgment against petitioner, it would deprive it of its property without due process of law. The motion closes with a prayer for quashing the summons and dismissing the complaint.

On January 10, 1939, a hearing took place in which the parties submitted evidence for and against the motion and were allowed ten days each for the filing of briefs, which was duly done. In the meantime, Rubert Hermanos, Inc., defendant in another quo warranto proceeding similar to [636]*636the- one under consideration, appealed from an adverse judgment of this court to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, and as the latter court decided that our court was without jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case, we left pending the questions herein involved until a final determination of our jurisdiction. However, as the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico acted within its powers in enacting Act No. 47, supra, and that this court, when deciding said case, acted with jurisdiction validly conferred by the Legislative Assembly (The People of Puerto Rico v. Rubert Hermanos, Inc., decided on the 25th of last month), we shall proceed to a determination of the point raised by “the New Jersey corporation” regarding the validity of the service of summons.

The issue here is this: Is “the New Jersey corporation” doing business in Puerto Rico, through its agents and trustees, in such a manner and to such an extent as to warrant the inference that it is present in this Island and has subjected itself to its jurisdiction and its laws? Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264; 18 Fletcher Cyclopedia Corporations, Revised, and Permanent Edition, p. 351, sec. 8713; Boise Flying Service Inc. v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 55 Idaho 5, 36 P. (2d) 813, 817.

There is no inflexible rule for determining what is meant by the phrase “doing business” so as to consider the foreign corporation as being present in the jurisdiction and subject to process through its agents. Each case.must be determined on its own facts. Fletcher, volume cited, p. 338, sec. 8711; International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579.

Having established the legal rule for our guidance in order to determine whether “the New Jersey corporation” is doing business in Puerto Rico in such a manner and to such an extent to enable us to assume that it has subjected itself to process in this Island, we will examine the evidence submitted by both sides regarding the issue before us.

[637]*637“The New Jersey corporation” was incorporated nnder the laws of New Jersey on November 16, 1900, some months after there went into effect the Joint Resolution of the Congress of the United States, approved on May 1, 1900, which forbids corporations to own in this Island land in excess of 500 acres.

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Related

International Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky
234 U.S. 579 (Supreme Court, 1914)
Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co. v. McKibbin
243 U.S. 264 (Supreme Court, 1917)

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Bluebook (online)
56 P.R. 633, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-south-p-r-sugar-co-prsupreme-1940.