People v. Snookers Sports Bar & Grill, Inc.

2020 IL App (1st) 192493-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: November 6, 2020
• Docket: 1-19-2493
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2020 IL App (1st) 192493-U Order filed November 6, 2020

FIRST DISTRICT FIFTH DIVISION

1-19-2493

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ex rel. ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) No. 2018-CH-13483 v. ) ) SNOOKERS SPORTS BAR AND GRILL, INC., ) an Illinois Corporation, and ROBERT KOZEL, ) jointly and individually, ) Honorable ) Michael T. Mullen, Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court. Justice Hoffman and Justice Cunningham concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: We struck defendant’s appellant’s brief and dismissed its appeal for multiple violations of Rule 341(h) that hindered our review.

¶2 Della Haynes Varga filed a wage claim with the Illinois Department of Labor (Department)

alleging that her former employer, Snookers Sports Bar and Grill (Snookers) violated the Illinois 1-19-2493

Wage Payment and Collection Act (Act) (820 ILCS 115/1 (West 2018)) by failing to compensate

her for outstanding wages. Following a hearing, the Department entered an order in January 2018

requiring Snookers to pay Varga $7,947.81. When Snookers failed to make any payments to Varga

or seek judicial review, the Department filed a petition in the circuit court for an order requiring

Snookers to pay Varga the amounts owed plus statutory penalties under section 14 of the Act for

its delay in compensating her. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the Department

and against Snookers in November 2019 in the amount of $45,855.96, which consisted of the

$7,947.81 that the Department ordered Snookers to pay in January 2018 plus statutory penalties

under section 14 of the Act for Snookers’ almost two-year delay in complying with the order and

compensating her. On appeal, Snookers argues that the statutory penalties violated the eighth

amendment. We strike Snookers’ appellant’s brief and dismiss its appeal for failure to comply with

Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. May 25, 2018). 1

¶3 First, we set forth the relevant provisions of the Act. The Act directs that “[e]very employer

shall pay the final compensation of separated employees in full, at the time of separation, if

possible, but in no case later than the next regularly scheduled payday for such employee.” 820

ILCS 115/5 (West 2018). “Final compensation” includes outstanding wages and “any other

compensation owed the employee by the employer pursuant to an employment contract or

agreement.” Id. § 2.

¶4 If an employer violates the Act, the employee may pursue her own claim or file a wage

claim complaint with the Department, which is “authorized to assist any employee and act on [her]

1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order stating with specificity why no substantial question is presented.

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behalf in the collection of wages or final compensation due [her].” Id. § 6. One way for the

Department to do so is by holding an administrative hearing, which may result in a final decision

directing the employer to pay the final compensation plus a penalty of 2% of the underpayment

per month and an administrative fee. Id. § 11(d), § 14(a), § 14(b).

¶5 If the employer does not comply with the final administrative decision within 35 days or

file a timely complaint for judicial review in the circuit court, the Department may file a verified

petition in the court “to enforce the final administrative decision and to collect any amounts due

in connection therewith.” Id. § 11(d). If the court rules in favor of the Department, it may order

the employer to pay the employee the amount determined by the Department in its final

administrative decision, plus the 2% monthly penalty and a daily penalty of 1% of the

underpayment until payment is made. Id. § 14. The court may also order the employer to pay a

penalty to the Department of 20% of the amount found owing. Id.

¶6 Next, we set forth the relevant facts in this case. In 2016, Varga worked as a manager and

bartender for Snookers. After separating from her employment in August 2016, she filed her wage

claim with the Department, alleging that Snookers owed her wages for 588 hours of work as a

manager and 24 hours as a bartender, as well as $1,045 for monies that it had deducted from her

pay to cover cash register shortages.

¶7 In January 2018, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) from the Department held a hearing

on Varga’s claim. Varga appeared at the hearing and testified in support of her claim, but Snookers

failed to appear. On January 29, 2018, the ALJ entered an order defaulting Snookers for failing to

appear at the hearing even though it had been duly notified. On the merits, the ALJ concluded that

Snookers violated the Act by failing to pay Varga final compensation for 588 hours worked as a

manager at the rate of $8.25 per hour (a total of $4,851) and by deducting $1,045 from her pay

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without authorization. The ALJ ordered Snookers to pay Varga $5,896 ($4,851 + $1,045) plus the

statutory 2% monthly penalty of $2,051.81, for a total of $7,947.81. The payment due date was

March 5, 2018. If payment was not made by March 5, 2018, Snookers would be subject to the 20%

penalty of $1,179.20 plus the daily 1% penalty of $58.96 until payment was made. The ALJ also

ordered Snookers to pay the Department a $500 administrative fee for conducting the hearing. No

award was made for Varga’s unpaid hours of work as a bartender because Varga failed to establish

that there was an agreement between the parties as to the pay she would receive for such work.

¶8 The ALJ’s order stated that it was the Department’s final administrative decision within

the provisions of the Administrative Review Law and was subject to judicial review in accordance

with section 3-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/3-101 (West 2018)). The ALJ

informed the parties that they had 15 days to file a motion to reconsider.

¶9 On February 7, 2018, Snookers timely filed a motion for reconsideration which the

Department denied on March 16, 2018. Snookers did not seek judicial review or make any

payments to Varga as ordered by the Department.

¶ 10 On October 29, 2018, the Department filed a verified petition in the circuit court pursuant

to sections 6, 11, and 14 of the Act (820 ILCS 115/6, 115/11, and 115/14 (West 2018)) to enforce

its January 29, 2018, decision ordering Snookers to pay Varga $7,947.81 and to pay the

Department a $500 administrative fee. The Department also asked the court to impose additional

statutory penalties under section 14 of the Act including 2% per month of the amount of wages

that Snookers owed Varga from the date wages were due to the date of the court’s order, as well

as 1% per day of the amount of wages owed for the same time period.

¶ 11 The Department filed a motion for summary judgment. In response, Snookers cursorily

argued in pertinent part that the statutory penalties of 1% per day and 2% per month violated the

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eighth amendment, although it cited no relevant authority in support thereof. On November 7,

2019, the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Department and against Snookers

in the amount of $45,855.96, which represented the amount that the Department had ordered

Snookers to pay in the January 2018 order plus the 20% penalty for failing to timely comply with

the Department’s order, and the 1% daily penalty and the 2% monthly penalty. Snookers appeals

the November 7, 2019, summary judgment order, contending that the circuit court erred in

rejecting its eighth amendment challenge to the penalties imposed against it under the Act.

¶ 12 Upon review, we find that Snookers’ appellant’s brief fails to conform with several

provisions of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (eff. May 25, 2018), thereby hindering our

review and necessitating dismissal of its appeal. Rule 341 governs the form and contents of

appellate briefs. McCann v. Dart, 2015 IL App (1st) 141291, ¶ 12. Compliance with Rule 341 is

mandatory. Rosestone Investments, LLC v. Garner, 2013 IL App (1st) 123422, ¶ 18. Where an

appellant’s brief contains numerous Rule 341 violations that impedes our review of the case, we

may strike the brief and dismiss the appeal (id.), as we are “not a depository in which the appellant

may dump the burden of argument and research.” Thrall Car Manufacturing Co. v. Lindquist, 145

Ill. App. 3d 712, 719 (1986).

¶ 13 First, Snookers’ appellant’s brief violates Rule 341(h)(5), which provides that in a case

involving the construction or validity of a statute, the appellant must provide the pertinent parts of

the provision verbatim, with a citation of the place where it may be found, under an appropriate

heading such as “Statutes Involved.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(5). Here, Snookers argues that the Act’s

1% daily penalty provision and 2% monthly penalty provision are invalid as they violate the eighth

amendment, yet it never presents the pertinent provisions of the Act verbatim under an appropriate

heading as required by Rule 341(h)(5).

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¶ 14 Snookers’ appellant’s brief also fails to comply with Rule 341(h)(6), which requires that

the appellant must provide a statement of facts containing the facts necessary to an understanding

of the case, with appropriate references to the pages of the record on appeal. Ill. Sup. Ct. R.

341(h)(6). Snookers’ appellant’s brief omitted much of the procedural history of this case and

failed to cite to the record on appeal as required by Rule 341(h)(6).

¶ 15 Snookers’ appellant’s brief fails to comply with Rules 341(h)(2) and (h)(3), which provide

that the appellant must provide a statement of the issues on review and include a concise statement

of the applicable standard of review for each issue. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 341(h)(2), (h)(3). Snookers

failed to include a separate section with a statement of the issues on review, making it unclear as

to whether Snookers is asserting a facial or an as-applied eighth amendment challenge. Snookers

also failed to include a statement of the standard of review for either such challenge.

¶ 16 Finally, Snookers’ appellant’s brief fails to comply with Rule 341(h)(7), which requires

that the appellant must provide argument with citation of the authorities and pages of the record

relied on. Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 341(h(7). Snookers cursorily contends that the 2% monthly penalty and

1% daily penalty imposed on it under the Act violates the excessive fines provision of the eighth

amendment, which states: “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor

cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” (U.S. Const., amend.VIII). Snookers’ argument is that:

“There exists no legal means by which an individual would be able to acquire interest of 1% per

day. As such, the government should not create nor enforce such a penalty. The same can be said

for the 2% per month penalty. These statutory penalties individually are excessive, combined, they

are unconstitutional.” However, Snookers cites no authority to show that this statement is correct

or that the lack of comparable penalties outside of a violation of the Act renders the penalty

provisions of the Act violative of the eighth amendment. Snookers cites no case law as to how to

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analyze a claim under the excessive fines clause of the eighth amendment and cites no case law

applying the excessive fines clause to the types of penalties involved here under the Act. The one

case that Snookers cites that purportedly shows that the penalties here are unconstitutional, Timbs

v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682 (2019), holds only that the eighth amendment’s excessive fines clause

is an incorporated protection applicable to the States under the fourteenth amendment’s due

process clause, but it in no way addresses whether the penalties here imposed under the Act violate

the eighth amendment. Snookers again does not cite to the record on appeal when making its

argument. In short, Snookers offers virtually no analysis in support of its eighth amendment

argument in violation of Rule 341(h)(7).

¶ 17 Snookers cursorily states in the final paragraph of its appellant’s brief that “the statutory

post-judgment rate of nine (9%) percent *** should be the only interest applied to the judgment.”

Snookers has again failed to cite to the statute or to any authorities in support of this argument in

violation of Rule 341(h)(7).

¶ 18 The Department has filed an appellee’s brief asking us to strike Snookers’ appellant’s brief

and dismiss its appeal for failing to comply with Rule 341(h). In response, Snookers filed a reply

brief containing four short paragraphs repeating its cursory argument (without citation to the record

or any relevant authorities) that the 1% daily penalty and 2% monthly penalty imposed against it

under section 14 of the Act violate the eighth amendment; the reply brief otherwise does not

respond to the Department’s argument that its appellant’s brief should be stricken and its appeal

dismissed for its multiple failures to comply with Rule 341(h).

¶ 19 As recounted, Snookers has committed multiple violations of Rule 341(h) in its appellant’s

brief that has impeded our review of the case. Accordingly, we strike Snookers’ appellant’s brief

and dismiss its appeal.

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¶ 20 Before concluding, we note that in the last sentence of its appellant’s brief, Snookers prays

that “this Court find that the [Department] be ordered to reopen the hearing due to [its owner’s]

medical condition at the time of the original [hearing] scheduled on January 25, 2018.” Snookers

failed to timely seek judicial review under the Administrative Review Law of the Department’s

January 2018 decision in favor of Varga, and therefore we lack jurisdiction to consider Snookers’

belated appeal of that administrative decision more than two years later. See Carroll v. Department

of Employment Security, 389 Ill. App. 3d 404, 408 (2009). Even if jurisdiction was not lacking, we

would dismiss Snookers’ appeal of the Department’s January 2018 decision for the same reasons

that we are dismissing its appeal of the circuit court’s 2019 summary judgment order, specifically,

that its one-sentence argument failed to comply with Rule 341(h).

¶ 21 Appellant’s brief stricken; appeal dismissed.

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