NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241220-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NOS. 4-24-1220, 4-24-1221 cons. August 5, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Macoupin County TARINA SLAUGHTER, ) Nos. 21CF254 Defendant-Appellant. ) 21CF284 ) ) Honorable ) Joshua Aaron Meyer, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lannerd and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s finding that defendant violated the terms of her probation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In October 2021, defendant Tarina Slaughter entered a negotiated guilty plea to two
counts of unlawful possession of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2020)), and, in
accord with the agreement, she received a $500 fine and two years’ probation. In December 2021,
the State filed two petitions to revoke her probation. The trial court found that the State had proved
defendant violated her probation by both failing to report to the probation department for an intake
appointment and failing to keep the probation department advised of her place of residence. The
court resentenced defendant to concurrent terms of two years’ imprisonment in the Illinois
Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove she violated
a condition of her probation. We affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On July 14, 2021, defendant was charged with one count of unlawful possession of
methamphetamine (count I) (id.) and one count of retail theft (count II) (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1)
(West 2020)) in Macoupin County case No. 21-CF-254. Defendant was later charged with one
count of unlawful possession of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2020)) in
Macoupin County case No. 21-CF-284.
¶5 Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty in October 2021 to count I in case No.
21-CF-254 and the sole count alleged in case No. 21-CF-284 in exchange for the State dismissing
the retail theft charge. Defendant was assessed a $500 fine and sentenced to two years’ probation.
¶6 In December 2021, the State filed petitions to revoke defendant’s probation in case
Nos. 21-CF-254 and 21-CF-284, alleging that she had failed to report to the Macoupin County
Probation Department for an intake interview and that she failed to keep the probation department
advised of her current address. On December 18, 2023, approximately two years after the petitions
were filed, the trial court held a hearing on the petitions to revoke. At the hearing, Susan Dunn,
defendant’s probation officer, testified that defendant had been ordered to report to the probation
department to participate in an intake appointment. Dunn indicated that, as of the hearing,
defendant had still not participated in a formal intake appointment. Dunn also believed that
defendant had failed to provide the probation department with a current address.
¶7 On cross-examination, Dunn clarified that defendant had met with the probation
department “after being released from jail some months after being placed on probation,” at which
time defendant informed the probation department she was homeless and living in Springfield,
Illinois. Defense counsel then inquired whether Dunn knew when defendant reported to probation,
and the following colloquy occurred:
-2- “A. Not without looking at her file. I’m sorry I don’t.
Q. Would you have a file with you that if you looked at it would refresh
your recollection?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Can I get that?
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. GARRISON [(STATE’S ATTORNEY)]: No objection, Your Honor.”
After refreshing her recollection, Dunn stated that the notes of defendant’s previous probation
officer, Cindy Lytle, indicated that defendant went to the probation department after being released
from jail on February 10, 2022. When asked whether defendant had contacted the probation
department to set up an intake appointment, Dunn replied, “[N]obody talked to her until February
10th when she came in from jail.” Despite initially testifying that defendant had not provided the
probation department with an address, after reviewing defendant’s probation file, Dunn stated, “I
don’t know when this was printed. The address in our file now is [an address on] Beecher Road in
Modesto.” When asked whether it was possible that defendant completed an intake appointment
with the Sangamon County Probation Department, Dunn indicated the Macoupin County
Probation Department had not received the requisite paperwork from Sangamon County stating
whether they had accepted “courtesy supervision” over defendant’s case.
¶8 On redirect examination, Dunn stated that even though defendant went to the
Macoupin County Probation Department on February 10, 2022, the initial intake interview still
had not been completed.
¶9 After brief arguments from the parties, the trial court found that the State had
-3- proven by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had violated her probation. The court
began by noting, “[T]he timing is key, and it seems like the thing *** that most likely happened
was [defendant] did eventually meet with somebody, but it was February 10th, 2022. Anything
else is just speculation.” The court continued, “So based on the filing of petitions as of December
17th[,] *** she had not done those things at the time.” Therefore, the court reasoned, the State had
met its burden. In September 2024, the court resentenced defendant to concurrent terms of two
years’ imprisonment.
¶ 10 This consolidated appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in revoking her probation because
the State failed to prove she violated a condition of her probation. Specifically, defendant alleges
Dunn “had no personal knowledge of whether defendant complied with her probation” prior to the
filing of the State’s petitions to revoke. As such, defendant argues Dunn’s testimony was hearsay
and based on hearsay contained within defendant’s probation file.
¶ 13 Probation revocation proceedings “are considered noncriminal, and the [defendant]
is entitled to fewer procedural rights than [she] would receive in a criminal trial.” People v.
Goleash, 311 Ill. App. 3d 949, 955 (2000). The defendant, at the probation revocation stage, has
already been convicted. People v. Henderson, 2 Ill. App. 3d 401, 405 (1971). “[I]t is the violation
of the previously imposed conditions of probation, and not the commission of a culpable offense,
which must be proved,” and “the defendant need not be indicted, prosecuted, or convicted of the
offense supporting the petition for revocation.” People v. Woznick, 278 Ill. App. 3d 826, 828
(1996). The State has the burden of proving that the defendant violated her probation by a
preponderance of the evidence, while using only competent evidence. People v. Renner, 321 Ill.
-4- App. 3d 1022, 1025 (2001).
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NOTICE 2025 IL App (4th) 241220-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NOS. 4-24-1220, 4-24-1221 cons. August 5, 2025 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Macoupin County TARINA SLAUGHTER, ) Nos. 21CF254 Defendant-Appellant. ) 21CF284 ) ) Honorable ) Joshua Aaron Meyer, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lannerd and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court’s finding that defendant violated the terms of her probation was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 In October 2021, defendant Tarina Slaughter entered a negotiated guilty plea to two
counts of unlawful possession of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2020)), and, in
accord with the agreement, she received a $500 fine and two years’ probation. In December 2021,
the State filed two petitions to revoke her probation. The trial court found that the State had proved
defendant violated her probation by both failing to report to the probation department for an intake
appointment and failing to keep the probation department advised of her place of residence. The
court resentenced defendant to concurrent terms of two years’ imprisonment in the Illinois
Department of Corrections. On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove she violated
a condition of her probation. We affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On July 14, 2021, defendant was charged with one count of unlawful possession of
methamphetamine (count I) (id.) and one count of retail theft (count II) (720 ILCS 5/16-25(a)(1)
(West 2020)) in Macoupin County case No. 21-CF-254. Defendant was later charged with one
count of unlawful possession of methamphetamine (720 ILCS 646/60(a) (West 2020)) in
Macoupin County case No. 21-CF-284.
¶5 Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty in October 2021 to count I in case No.
21-CF-254 and the sole count alleged in case No. 21-CF-284 in exchange for the State dismissing
the retail theft charge. Defendant was assessed a $500 fine and sentenced to two years’ probation.
¶6 In December 2021, the State filed petitions to revoke defendant’s probation in case
Nos. 21-CF-254 and 21-CF-284, alleging that she had failed to report to the Macoupin County
Probation Department for an intake interview and that she failed to keep the probation department
advised of her current address. On December 18, 2023, approximately two years after the petitions
were filed, the trial court held a hearing on the petitions to revoke. At the hearing, Susan Dunn,
defendant’s probation officer, testified that defendant had been ordered to report to the probation
department to participate in an intake appointment. Dunn indicated that, as of the hearing,
defendant had still not participated in a formal intake appointment. Dunn also believed that
defendant had failed to provide the probation department with a current address.
¶7 On cross-examination, Dunn clarified that defendant had met with the probation
department “after being released from jail some months after being placed on probation,” at which
time defendant informed the probation department she was homeless and living in Springfield,
Illinois. Defense counsel then inquired whether Dunn knew when defendant reported to probation,
and the following colloquy occurred:
-2- “A. Not without looking at her file. I’m sorry I don’t.
Q. Would you have a file with you that if you looked at it would refresh
your recollection?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
A. Can I get that?
THE COURT: Any objection?
MR. GARRISON [(STATE’S ATTORNEY)]: No objection, Your Honor.”
After refreshing her recollection, Dunn stated that the notes of defendant’s previous probation
officer, Cindy Lytle, indicated that defendant went to the probation department after being released
from jail on February 10, 2022. When asked whether defendant had contacted the probation
department to set up an intake appointment, Dunn replied, “[N]obody talked to her until February
10th when she came in from jail.” Despite initially testifying that defendant had not provided the
probation department with an address, after reviewing defendant’s probation file, Dunn stated, “I
don’t know when this was printed. The address in our file now is [an address on] Beecher Road in
Modesto.” When asked whether it was possible that defendant completed an intake appointment
with the Sangamon County Probation Department, Dunn indicated the Macoupin County
Probation Department had not received the requisite paperwork from Sangamon County stating
whether they had accepted “courtesy supervision” over defendant’s case.
¶8 On redirect examination, Dunn stated that even though defendant went to the
Macoupin County Probation Department on February 10, 2022, the initial intake interview still
had not been completed.
¶9 After brief arguments from the parties, the trial court found that the State had
-3- proven by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant had violated her probation. The court
began by noting, “[T]he timing is key, and it seems like the thing *** that most likely happened
was [defendant] did eventually meet with somebody, but it was February 10th, 2022. Anything
else is just speculation.” The court continued, “So based on the filing of petitions as of December
17th[,] *** she had not done those things at the time.” Therefore, the court reasoned, the State had
met its burden. In September 2024, the court resentenced defendant to concurrent terms of two
years’ imprisonment.
¶ 10 This consolidated appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in revoking her probation because
the State failed to prove she violated a condition of her probation. Specifically, defendant alleges
Dunn “had no personal knowledge of whether defendant complied with her probation” prior to the
filing of the State’s petitions to revoke. As such, defendant argues Dunn’s testimony was hearsay
and based on hearsay contained within defendant’s probation file.
¶ 13 Probation revocation proceedings “are considered noncriminal, and the [defendant]
is entitled to fewer procedural rights than [she] would receive in a criminal trial.” People v.
Goleash, 311 Ill. App. 3d 949, 955 (2000). The defendant, at the probation revocation stage, has
already been convicted. People v. Henderson, 2 Ill. App. 3d 401, 405 (1971). “[I]t is the violation
of the previously imposed conditions of probation, and not the commission of a culpable offense,
which must be proved,” and “the defendant need not be indicted, prosecuted, or convicted of the
offense supporting the petition for revocation.” People v. Woznick, 278 Ill. App. 3d 826, 828
(1996). The State has the burden of proving that the defendant violated her probation by a
preponderance of the evidence, while using only competent evidence. People v. Renner, 321 Ill.
-4- App. 3d 1022, 1025 (2001).
¶ 14 Hearsay is not competent evidence in probation revocation proceedings. Id. at 1026.
The confrontation clause of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8) permits hearsay
evidence to be admitted against a defendant only where the evidence is firmly rooted in a hearsay
exception or particularized guarantees of trustworthiness assure the reliability of the evidence.
Renner, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 1026. “A proposition is proved by a preponderance of the evidence
when the proposition is more probably true than not true.” People v. Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d 784,
787 (2010). This court will not disturb a trial court’s decision in a probation revocation proceeding
unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Williams, 303 Ill. App. 3d 264,
267 (1999).
¶ 15 Initially, the State posits that because defendant both failed to object at the hearing
and include her contentions in a posthearing motion, she has forfeited review of those contentions
on appeal. See People v. Turner, 233 Ill. App. 3d 449, 452 (1992) (concluding that a defendant
must raise an objection both at the hearing and in a posthearing motion). We agree that defendant
has forfeited any objection to the admission of the subject testimony, but defendant makes it clear
in her opening brief that she is challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to prove that she violated
the terms of her probation, as defendant contends Dunn’s testimony had “minimal” probative
effect. A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence can be raised for the first time on appeal.
People v. Woods, 214 Ill. 2d 455, 470 (2005).
¶ 16 Dunn testified that defendant had “not yet met” with the probation department
based on the absence of information in the record prior to her visit of February 10, 2022. We agree
with defendant that Dunn, a witness with no personal knowledge, could not necessarily testify to
the negative, i.e., that an earlier visit had not occurred. However, we note that Dunn testified that
-5- the record showed that the “initial intake” had not yet occurred. This provides a basis to conclude
that defendant had not met with the probation department, as required by the conditions of her
October 2021 probation sentence. Consequently, Dunn’s testimony provided an adequate basis for
the trial court to conclude that defendant violated the terms of her probation.
¶ 17 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 18 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 19 Affirmed.
-6-