People v. Skelton

2024 IL App (1st) 240168-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 29, 2024
• Docket: 1-24-0168
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2024 IL App (1st) 240168-U FIRST DISTRICT, FIRST DIVISION April 29, 2024

No. 1-24-0168B

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). _____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT _____________________________________________________________________________

) Appeal from the THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of ) Cook County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) v. ) No. 22110666801 ) CAMERON SKELTON, ) ) Honorable Defendant-Appellant. ) Barbara Dawkins, Judge Presiding. _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant pretrial release.

¶2 Defendant Cameron Skelton appeals from the trial court’s order denying him pretrial

release pursuant to the amendments to article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963

(Code) (725 ILCS 5/100-1 et seq. (West 2022)), commonly known as the Safety, Accountability,

Fairness and Equity-Today (SAFE-T) Act or Pretrial Fairness Act (Act). See Pub. Act 101-652

(eff. Jan. 1, 2023); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting effective date as

September 18, 2023). For the following reasons, we affirm. No. 1-24-0168B

¶3 BACKGROUND

¶4 Defendant was arrested on January 19, 2024, and charged with the offense of armed

habitual criminal (AHC) relating to an incident that occurred on April 25, 2022. 720 ILCS 5/24-

1.7 (West 2022). The State filed a petition for pretrial detention on January 22, 2024. A pretrial

detention hearing was held. According to the State’s proffer, on April 8, 2022, “representatives

from the Sheriff’s police” called defendant to see if he was “willing to consent for Aaron

Faulkner to live at [his] house” while Faulkner was on electronic monitoring (EM). Since

defendant was in Miami, his uncle met with investigators at defendant’s home. The investigators

spoke to defendant over Facetime. Defendant gave his “verbal consent” to allow Faulkner to use

his home as a host site while on EM, which was captured on body-worn camera footage. The

investigators verified defendant’s identity and address with a copy of his ID and a ComEd bill.

¶5 On April 25, 2022, investigators responded to defendant’s home because Faulkner was in

violation of his EM conditions. Defendant answered the door and led them to the basement to

speak to Faulkner. The investigators sat Faulkner on a couch and searched under the cushions to

“ensure there was no weapon.” They found three loaded firearms.

¶6 Defendant “became agitated and began charging toward the investigator.” He refused to

comply with commands to “back off” and place his hands behind his back, and instead, “ran

towards his bedroom.” The investigators chased him into the bedroom, where there “were two

additional loaded firearms.” Defendant “refused verbal commands to stop” and “fled the

residence with officers chasing him.” Defendant “made good his escape.” “Numerous”

ammunition magazines and a ComEd bill in defendant’s name were also recovered from the

residence. A warrant for defendant’s arrest was issued on that same date.

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¶7 Defendant was not arrested until January 19, 2024, when he was pulled over for driving a

car with a suspended registration.1 The police recovered a loaded firearm behind the driver’s seat

and a magazine in the center console. Defendant was the sole occupant of the vehicle.

¶8 Defendant has four prior felony convictions, including: a 1998 conviction for attempted

murder, for which he was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment in the Illinois Department of

Corrections (IDOC); a 2005 conviction for possession of a controlled substance, for which he

received two years in the IDOC; a 2009 conviction for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon, for

which he received three years in the IDOC; and a 2014 conviction for possession of a controlled

substance, for which he successfully completed probation. Defendant also failed to appear for a

“domestic case,” which was dismissed in 2021.

¶9 The State argued that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the

community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case. The State also verbally amended

its petition, seeking to detain defendant “on the basis of willful flight.”

¶ 10 Defense counsel maintained that while defendant “frequented” the residence, it “wasn’t

his house” and “wasn’t in his name.” Additionally, the vehicle that he was driving when he was

pulled over was “not his vehicle.” After the officers activated their lights, the car “became

inoperable,” causing defendant to run a red light and crash. He was not evading police, was

unaware that there was a warrant issued for his arrest, and went “into custody without incident.”

¶ 11 Counsel further asserted that defendant is 44 years old and went “may years *** without

any run-ins with the police” since his last conviction in 2014. Defendant has a bachelor’s degree,

has owned his own business since 2016, takes care of his five children, and is a vendor for

1 The State’s petition for pretrial detention in the case related to the traffic stop was denied in a separate proceeding before a different trial judge. In that case, the trial court considered the facts relating to the April 25, 2022 incident “in aggravation as it relates to the traffic stop.” -3- No. 1-24-0168B

Chicago Public Schools. Counsel requested that the trial court place defendant on any

“monitoring services that the Court finds fit,” which would “secure his presence [at] each and

every court date.”

¶ 12 The State responded that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate the

threat defendant posed to the safety of the community or his risk of willful flight because when

he was confronted by investigators, he “[ran]out of there” and “continue[d] to run until he [was]

arrested in a traffic stop with, yet, another gun.” The State argued that EM “can be walked away

from, can be cut off, guns can be possessed, people can be at risk.” There are also “two days

required by statute that this [d]efendant would have access to the community and that is a safety

concern for the community at large.”

¶ 13 The trial court found that the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that the

proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant committed AHC, which is a detainable

offense under the Act. Given defendant’s prior criminal history, the State had to show that

defendant was “in possession of a firearm.” The State provided evidence “to at least tie

[defendant] to the residence” because he agreed to let Faulkner stay there, mail with his name

and address was recovered, and he was present when the premises check occurred. Additionally,

when confronted by investigators, defendant “ran *** to [his] place of safety and seclusion

within [his] home, [his] bedroom,” where two additional guns were recovered.

¶ 14 In making its dangerousness determination, the trial court considered the facts in

“significant mitigation,” including, defendant’s “moderate” Pretrial Services Assessment (PSA)

scores of 4 for new criminal activity, 3 for failure to appear, and a “corresponding monitoring

level of 2.” The court also considered defendant’s age, business ownership, and “strong ties to

the community.” However, the court balanced these mitigation factors with the fact that

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“multiple firearms” were recovered from defendant’s residence, two of which were “recovered

from a bedroom that is being attributed to [him].” Defendant also has four prior felony

convictions, and this is his “fourth allegation of *** being in possession of illegal firearms.”

Moreover, defendant was combative, fled from police, and was not apprehended “until two years

later when [he was] found to be in possession of another firearm.” Weighing these factors, the

court concluded that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community,

based on the specific articulable facts of the case.

¶ 15 The trial court also found that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate

that threat, considering that defendant is a “convicted felon found to be in possession of multiple

firearms in [his] residence,” was combative, fled from the police, and was arrested while in

possession of another firearm. The court found pretrial supervision to be inadequate, as it would

leave defendant “unmonitored” except for phone calls or in-person visits. The court also rejected

home confinement or curfew because they “would not give a timely reporting to the Court of any

violations,” which “would not suffice” for someone who “has been found to be a danger to the

community.” Under EM, defendant would be unmonitored for two days, as required by statute,

which would be inappropriate for defendant, who has a “violent conviction for attempt murder,”

“another gun conviction,” was in possession of multiple firearms, and fled from the police.

¶ 16 The trial court also found that no less restrictive conditions could prevent defendant’s

willful flight from prosecution where he was combative toward investigators, ran to his bedroom,

“escaped from the residence where it was clear *** that [he was] to be detained,” and was “in the

wind for two years.”

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¶ 17 ANALYSIS

¶ 18 Defendant argues that the State failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the

proof is evident or the presumption great that he committed the offense of AHC; that he posed a

real and present threat to the safety of the community; and that no condition or combination of

conditions could mitigate that threat or his willful flight.

¶ 19 Pursuant to article 110 of the Code, as amended, “[a]ll defendants shall be presumed

eligible for pretrial release” and pretrial release may only be denied in certain statutorily limited

situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e) (West 2022). After filing a timely verified petition requesting

denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence

that: the proof is evident or the presumption great that defendant has committed a qualifying

offense; defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or

the community, based on the specific articulable facts of the case, or that defendant has a high

likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution; and less restrictive conditions would not

mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or prevent

defendant’s willful flight. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(e), (f) (West 2022).

¶ 20 Factors that the trial court may consider in making a “dangerousness” determination, i.e.,

that the defendant poses a real and present threat to any person or the community (725 ILCS

5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022)), include, but are not limited, to (1) the nature and circumstances of

any offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence, involving a weapon,

or a sex offense; (2) the history and characteristics of the defendant; (3) the identity of any

person or persons whose safety the defendant is believed to pose a threat, and the nature of the

threat; (4) any statements made by, or attributed to, the defendant; (5) the age and physical

condition of the defendant; (6) the age and physical condition of any victim or complaining

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witness; (7) whether the defendant is known to possess or have access to any weapons; (8)

whether at the time of the current offense or any other offense, the defendant was on probation,

parole, or supervised release from custody; and (9) any other factors, including those listed in

section 110-5 of the Code (725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West 2022)). 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(g) (West 2022).

¶ 21 If the trial court finds the State proved a threat to the safety of any person or the

community, the court must then determine which pretrial release conditions, “if any, will

reasonably ensure the appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or

the community and the likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of

pretrial release.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022); see also 725 ILCS 5/110-10 (a), (b) (West

2022) (listing both mandatory and permissible conditions of pretrial release). In making this

determination, the trial court “shall” consider: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense

charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the defendant; (3) the history and characteristics

of the defendant;2 (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real and present threat to any

person that would be posed by the defendant’s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of the

risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)

(West 2022). No singular factor is dispositive. Id. “The conditions of release imposed shall be

the least restrictive conditions or combination of conditions necessary to reasonably ensure the

appearance of the defendant as required or the safety of any other person or persons or the

community.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(c) (West 2022).

2 The defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A), (B) (West 2022). -7- No. 1-24-0168B

¶ 22 We review the trial court’s ultimate determination regarding pretrial release for an abuse

of discretion (People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th) 230864, ¶ 10 (citing People v. Simmons, 2019

IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9)), while we review the trial court’s factual findings under the manifest

weight of the evidence standard (People v. Rodriguez, 2023 IL App (3d) 230450, ¶ 8). 3 See also

People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. An abuse of discretion occurs only when the

court’s judgment is fanciful, arbitrary, or unreasonable, or when no reasonable person would

agree with the court’s position. Simmons, 2019 IL App (1st) 191253, ¶ 9. “A finding is against

the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or the

finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the evidence presented.” People v.

Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008).

¶ 23 Based on our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion

in denying defendant pretrial release. The State’s proffer proved by clear and convincing

evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant committed AHC,

where: defendant allowed Faulkner to live at the residence; defendant was present and opened

the door to the residence during the premises check; a ComEd bill bearing defendant’s name and

address was found on the premises; and two loaded firearms were recovered from the bedroom

that defendant fled to when confronted by investigators. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7 (West 2022) (an

individual commits the offense of AHC by possessing a firearm after having been convicted of 2

or more qualifying offenses); People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200345, ¶¶ 39, 41 (possession

can be actual or constructive and “[h]abitation in the premises where the contraband is

3 There has been considerable disagreement regarding which standard of review applies to pretrial detention orders. See, e.g., People v. Whitmore, 2023 IL App (1st) 231807, ¶ 18 (applying only an abuse of discretion standard); People v. Pitts, 2024 IL App (1st) 232336, ¶ 29 (applying exclusively a manifest weight standard); People v. Sorrentino, 2024 IL App (1st) 232363, ¶ 34 (reviewing the denial of pretrial release de novo, but findings of historical fact for manifest error). Our conclusion would be the same under any of these standards. -8- No. 1-24-0168B

discovered is sufficient to constitute constructive possession”). Defendant takes issue with the

fact that the State “did not provide the address of the residence, where the bill was from, or any

details relating to this alleged bill.” However, at this stage, the State need only proceed by

proffer “based upon reliable information” (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (f)(2) (West 2022)) and does not

need to prove defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt (People v. Clay, 361 Ill. App. 3d 310,

322 (2005) (the “clear and convincing” standard of proof requires more than a preponderance of

the evidence but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt)).

¶ 24 In finding that defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety of the community,

the trial court properly considered factors in “significant mitigation,” including defendant’s age,

ties to the community, and “moderate” PSA score. However, the court found that these factors

were outweighed by defendant’s possession of multiple loaded firearms, his four prior felony

convictions (including attempted murder and unlawful use of a weapon by a felon), and the fact

that he was arrested while in possession of another loaded firearm. We cannot say that the trial

court’s conclusion was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 25 Nor was the trial court’s finding that no condition or combination of conditions could

mitigate defendant’s real and present threat to safety of the community or his willful flight

against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court concluded that less restrictive

conditions would not sufficiently monitor defendant. This was not “unreasonable, arbitrary, or

not based on the evidence presented” (Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d at 332), considering defendant’s

possession of multiple loaded firearm; his past criminal history; his aggression toward, and flight

from, the investigators when it was “clear *** that [he was] to be detained”; and the fact that he

was “in the wind for two years,” and was arrested in possession of another loaded firearm.

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¶ 26 Defendant’s reliance on People v. Stock, 2023 IL App (1st) 231753, is misplaced. There,

the State presented “no evidence” regarding whether a “condition or combination of conditions

*** can mitigate the real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community” and

the trial court’s written and oral rulings “did not contain any such reasoning” as to this finding.

Id. ¶¶ 15-17, 20. Whereas, here, as outlined above, the State argued, and the trial court

thoroughly explained, why no other condition or combination of conditions would mitigate the

threat of safety to the community or defendant’s willful flight.

¶ 27 Finally, defendant argues that the trial court “erred in its determination that there were no

conditions that could ensure [his] appearance for later hearings or prevent [him] from being

charged with a subsequent felony or Class A Misdemeanor.” However, the trial court did not

make such a determination in this case, as this standard is only applicable to a petition to revoke

or modify pretrial release under section 110-6 of the Code. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6(a) (West

2022).

¶ 28 CONCLUSION

¶ 29 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 30 Affirmed.

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