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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 ) PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) 3 ) vs. ) BY F COURT 4 ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 JUNIOR SIREN, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on January 23,2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is 10 represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are represented by II Assistant Attorney General James Collins. Having considered the arguments and briefs herein, 12 the Court DENIES the motion. 13 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 On March 12, 2011, at approximately 1:37 a.m., Officers of the Guam Police 15 Department (hereinafter "Officers") effected a traffic stop of the Defendant (hereinafter "Siren") 16 along Route #1 and Ypao Road, Tamuning. Siren had been observed weaving in and out of 17 traffic, and striking lane markers. The Officers approached Siren's vehicle and requested his 18 driver's license and vehicle registration. Siren admitted he did not have a valid Guam driver's 19 license. The Officers noted a strong odor of intoxicants, and when asked Siren admitted to 20 drinking a six (6) pack of beer. At approximately 1:42 a.m. Siren agreed to perform the 21 Standardized Field Sobriety Test ("SFST"), which he failed. A test of his blood alcohol content 22 ("BAC") was administered with a reading of 0.150 by the Intox. EC/IR-II. Siren was arrested at 23 1:55 a.m. There is no dispute as to these facts. On March 12, 2011, Siren was charged with 1) 24 Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC); 2) Driving While 25 Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; and 3) Operating a Motor Vehicle without a 26 Valid License, as a petty misdemeanor. 27
Page 1 of 4 DISCUSSION 2 Siren moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result of an 3 unlawful detention of his person in violation of8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60, Guam's 4 "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under the 5 provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that section, 6 and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Siren argues that he was 7 detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for violation 8 should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Siren cites the Court to an earlier decision 9 of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), wherein this 10 Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than lawfully permitted II under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning its ruling in 12 Santos based on the following analysis. 13 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 14 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 15 offense. 8 G.c.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 16 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. If probable 17 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 18 individual. See §30AO The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 19 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 20 At 1:37 a.m. on March 12, 2011, Officers pulled over the Defendant for an 21 'investigatory stop' because he was weaving in and out of traffic. At 1:42 a.m. the Officers 22 requested Siren to submit to the SFST based on the reasonable suspicion Defendant was Driving 23 under the Influence of Alcohol. Sometime between 1:37 a.m. and 1:42 a.m. the Officers asked 24 Siren if he had consumed alcohol, to which he admitted to having drunk a six (6) pack of 25 BudLight. Decl. to Magistrate Compl. (Mar. 12, 2011). Siren failed the SFST. He was arrested 26 at 1:55 a.m. During this investigatory stop, the Officers had probable cause to arrest Siren 27 shortly before 1:42 a.m. based on his admission to having drunk alcohol. Once probable cause is 28 formed during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) minute time limit for purposes of section
Page 2 of5 30.10 no longer governed. The "investigatory stop", then becomes a detention and need only 2 pass constitutional muster against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth 3 Amendment. 4 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 5 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Shame, 470 U.S. 675, 685 6 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 7 investigative detention is unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 8 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[ s]uch a 9 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 10 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). 11 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 12 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 13 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 14 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 15 not address the suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 16 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 17 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 18 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 19 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.c.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 20 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 21 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 22 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 23 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 24 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 25 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 26 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 27 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long 28 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing
Page 3 of 4 a means of investigation that was likely to confinn or dispel their suspicions" People v. 2 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 3 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santo, CM 0332-11, Superior l 4 Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos wherein it concluded 5 police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause 6 following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. 7 People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11, 2010; People v. Tedtaotao, 8 CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 9 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppressIOn IS not an 10 appropriate remedy.
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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 2 ) PEOPLE OF GUAM, ) 3 ) vs. ) BY F COURT 4 ) DECISION AND ORDER 5 JUNIOR SIREN, ) (Motion to Suppress) Defendant. 6
8 This matter came on for hearing on January 23,2012 before the HONORABLE JUDGE 9 ELIZABETH BARRETT-ANDERSON, on Defendant's Motion to Suppress. Defendant is 10 represented by Assistant Public Defender Suresh Sampath. The People are represented by II Assistant Attorney General James Collins. Having considered the arguments and briefs herein, 12 the Court DENIES the motion. 13 FACTUAL BACKGROUND 14 On March 12, 2011, at approximately 1:37 a.m., Officers of the Guam Police 15 Department (hereinafter "Officers") effected a traffic stop of the Defendant (hereinafter "Siren") 16 along Route #1 and Ypao Road, Tamuning. Siren had been observed weaving in and out of 17 traffic, and striking lane markers. The Officers approached Siren's vehicle and requested his 18 driver's license and vehicle registration. Siren admitted he did not have a valid Guam driver's 19 license. The Officers noted a strong odor of intoxicants, and when asked Siren admitted to 20 drinking a six (6) pack of beer. At approximately 1:42 a.m. Siren agreed to perform the 21 Standardized Field Sobriety Test ("SFST"), which he failed. A test of his blood alcohol content 22 ("BAC") was administered with a reading of 0.150 by the Intox. EC/IR-II. Siren was arrested at 23 1:55 a.m. There is no dispute as to these facts. On March 12, 2011, Siren was charged with 1) 24 Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor (BAC); 2) Driving While 25 Under the Influence of Alcohol, as a misdemeanor; and 3) Operating a Motor Vehicle without a 26 Valid License, as a petty misdemeanor. 27
Page 1 of 4 DISCUSSION 2 Siren moves to suppress "any and all evidence" obtained by the Officers as a result of an 3 unlawful detention of his person in violation of8 Guam Code Annotated § 30.10-30.60, Guam's 4 "Stop and Frisk" statute. Guam law provides that "[n]o person shall be detained under the 5 provisions of § 30.10 longer than is reasonable necessary to effect the purposes of that section, 6 and in no event longer than fifteen (15) minutes .... " 8 GCA § 30.30. Siren argues that he was 7 detained more than the permitted fifteen (15) minutes, and therefore, the remedy for violation 8 should be suppression of any and all evidence seized. Siren cites the Court to an earlier decision 9 of this Court in People v. Santos, CM 805-09 (Super. Ct. Guam July 2, 2010), wherein this 10 Court concluded the police officers had detained the defendant longer than lawfully permitted II under the facts of the case. For the following reason, the Court is abandoning its ruling in 12 Santos based on the following analysis. 13 The purpose for Guam's "Stop and Frisk Act" is for 'investigatory stops' where the 14 police officer has reasonable suspicion that a person has, is, or is about to commit a criminal 15 offense. 8 G.c.A. §30.20. A police officer then has fifteen (15) minutes to ascertain the identity 16 of individual and determine the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.30. If probable 17 cause arises during the 'investigatory stop' the police officer is permitted to arrest the 18 individual. See §30AO The time limitation for the statute's 'brief detention' under section 30.10 19 no longer governs once probable cause has been formed. 20 At 1:37 a.m. on March 12, 2011, Officers pulled over the Defendant for an 21 'investigatory stop' because he was weaving in and out of traffic. At 1:42 a.m. the Officers 22 requested Siren to submit to the SFST based on the reasonable suspicion Defendant was Driving 23 under the Influence of Alcohol. Sometime between 1:37 a.m. and 1:42 a.m. the Officers asked 24 Siren if he had consumed alcohol, to which he admitted to having drunk a six (6) pack of 25 BudLight. Decl. to Magistrate Compl. (Mar. 12, 2011). Siren failed the SFST. He was arrested 26 at 1:55 a.m. During this investigatory stop, the Officers had probable cause to arrest Siren 27 shortly before 1:42 a.m. based on his admission to having drunk alcohol. Once probable cause is 28 formed during the "investigatory stop", the fifteen (15) minute time limit for purposes of section
Page 2 of5 30.10 no longer governed. The "investigatory stop", then becomes a detention and need only 2 pass constitutional muster against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by the Fourth 3 Amendment. 4 The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected the application of a bright-line 5 time limit for Fourth Amendment detentions. See United States v. Shame, 470 U.S. 675, 685 6 (1985). Although having a 'bright-line' rule would be helpful in evaluating whether an 7 investigative detention is unreasonable, a police officer's common sense and judgment must 8 ultimately govern their conduct. In United States v. Place, the Court reasoned that "[ s]uch a 9 limit would undermine the equally important need to allow authorities to graduate their 10 responses to the demands of any particular situation." Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709, n.10 (1983). 11 The Guam legislature has provided clear framework for 'stops' for the purposes of section 12 30.30 and the facts in this case do not trigger its application. 13 Accordingly, this Court does not agree with Defendant's assertion that "all and any" 14 evidence from a detention should be suppressed under §30.60. Although the Court in Santos did 15 not address the suppression issue, the Court will do so now. Guam law provides that "[n]othing 16 seized by a peace officer in the search authorized by §30.50 [Weapons Search Permitted] shall 17 be admissible against any person in any court of this Territory unless both the detention and the 18 search which disclosed its existence was authorized by and conducted in compliance with the 19 provisions of this Chapter" 8 G.c.A. §30.60. In the present case, there is no evidence to 20 suppress from a search of the Defendant based on the following analysis. 21 A "detention" for purposes of section 30.30 is limited to ascertaining the identity of the 22 person and the circumstances surrounding his presence. See §30.20. A request for identification 23 and investigation does not generally constitute a seizure under Terry, and more importantly, 24 does not implicate the Fourth Amendment. Under Terry, a 'detention' occurs when a "police 25 officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 26 1, 16 (1968); see also People v. Santos, 2003 Guam 1, ~ 52 (Sup. Ct. Guam 2003) The Court of 27 Appeals in Michigan found the determining factor in assessing whether a "detention is too long 28 in duration to be justified as an investigatory stop is whether the police were diligently pursuing
Page 3 of 4 a means of investigation that was likely to confinn or dispel their suspicions" People v. 2 Chambers, 489 N.W.2d 168, 125, (1992). 3 Defendant urges the Court to rely on its ruling in People v. Santo, CM 0332-11, Superior l 4 Court of Guam, July 2, 2010. This Court abandons its ruling in Santos wherein it concluded 5 police officers have fifteen (15) minutes to make an arrest after the onslaught of probable cause 6 following an initial investigatory stop. This Court has not previously adhered to such analysis. 7 People v. Pascual CF 370-08, Superior Court of Guam, January 11, 2010; People v. Tedtaotao, 8 CF 50-09, Superior Court of Guam, April 20, 2009. 9 Even if Section 30.30 was violated, this Court finds that suppressIOn IS not an 10 appropriate remedy. The fifteen (15) minute limitation is a statutory right prescribed by the 11 Guam legislature, not a constitutional right. The Fourth Amendment protects against 12 unreasonable searches and seizures applies pursuant to § 1421 b( c) of the Organic Act of Guam; 13 however, nothing in the Act incorporates the fifteen (15) minute limitation as a constitutionally- 14 afforded right to the people of Guam. In addition, Section 30.50 only applies to weapons search 15 and is inapplicable to the present case, as no weapons search occurred. Section 30.60 provides 16 the admissibility of seized evidence found in searches authorized by § 30.50 to be limited to 17 weapons searches. Since no weapons search occurred, this Court finds the suppression of 18 evidence not an appropriate remedy. Based on the foregoing analysis the Defendant's Motion to 19 Suppress is DENIED. 20 This matter is set for Criminal Trial Setting on JUNE 4,2012 at 9:30 a.m. 21 SO ORDERED 22
23 HONOBLEELIABElIBARREDERSON Judge, Superior Court of Guam 24
27 I More specifically, this Court abandons its faulty logic in Decision & Order (July 2,2010) on p. 5'12. "The existence of probable cause does not alter the time and place limitations of 8 G.c.A. §30.20" Instead, the Court finds 28 the existence of probable cause does alter the time and place limitations of Section 30.20. If probable cause is foun during the "investigatory stop", the exclusionary rule is not triggered even after the expiration of the fifteen (15) minute time limitation.
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