People v. Sipas

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Sipas

246 A.D.2d 408, 668 N.Y.S.2d 31, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 267

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJanuary 15, 1998

StatusPublished

Cited by8 cases

This text of 246 A.D.2d 408 (People v. Sipas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Sipas, 246 A.D.2d 408, 668 N.Y.S.2d 31, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 267 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1998).

Pincite

Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Harold Silverman, J.), rendered March 6, 1996, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 2 to 6 years, unanimously affirmed.

The trial court properly admitted uncharged crime evidence for the purpose of establishing motive and intent in light of the defense claim that the shooting was accidental (People v Molineux, 168 NY2d 264). None of the People’s rebuttal evidence involved collateral matters (see, People v Knight, 80 NY2d 845; People v Cade, 73 NY2d 904, 905), and, to the extent that it included matters that could have been introduced on the People’s direct case, it was properly admitted in the court’s discretion (People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 248). None of the challenged evidence constituted hearsay, because it was offered for relevant purposes other than its truth. The fact that a conversation involving defendant, and highly relevant to motive, also made reference to an equally admissible conversation between defendant and the complainant did not constitute “bolstering” of the complainant’s testimony. Defendant’s remaining challenges to evidentiary rulings are without merit.

The court properly discharged a sworn juror over defense objection following a “probing and tactful inquiry” where the juror unequivocally informed the court that, if forced to miss classes necessary for a job promotion, he could not give the attention the case required and would not be able to be a fair juror (see, People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299; CPL 270.35).

The court’s summary of the expert testimony during its instructions to the jury on that subject, when read as a whole, was fair and appropriate.

We perceive no abuse of discretion in sentencing or denial of youthful offender treatment. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Andrias and Colabella, JJ.

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Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Harold Silverman, J.), rendered March 6, 1996, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of assault in the first degree, and sentencing him to a term of 2 to 6 years, unanimously affirmed.

The trial court properly admitted uncharged crime evidence for the purpose of establishing motive and intent in light of the defense claim that the shooting was accidental (People v Molineux, 168 NY2d 264). None of the People’s rebuttal evidence involved collateral matters (see, People v Knight, 80 NY2d 845; People v Cade, 73 NY2d 904, 905), and, to the extent that it included matters that could have been introduced on the People’s direct case, it was properly admitted in the court’s discretion (People v Alvino, 71 NY2d 233, 248). None of the challenged evidence constituted hearsay, because it was offered for relevant purposes other than its truth. The fact that a conversation involving defendant, and highly relevant to motive, also made reference to an equally admissible conversation between defendant and the complainant did not constitute “bolstering” of the complainant’s testimony. Defendant’s remaining challenges to evidentiary rulings are without merit.

The court properly discharged a sworn juror over defense objection following a “probing and tactful inquiry” where the juror unequivocally informed the court that, if forced to miss classes necessary for a job promotion, he could not give the attention the case required and would not be able to be a fair juror (see, People v Buford, 69 NY2d 290, 299; CPL 270.35).

The court’s summary of the expert testimony during its instructions to the jury on that subject, when read as a whole, was fair and appropriate.

We perceive no abuse of discretion in sentencing or denial of youthful offender treatment. Concur—Sullivan, J. P., Rosenberger, Andrias and Colabella, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

246 A.D.2d 408, 668 N.Y.S.2d 31, 1998 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 267, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-sipas-nyappdiv-1998.

Opinion

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