People v. Sierra
This text of 37 Cal. App. 4th 1690 (People v. Sierra) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
Opinion
Statement of the Case
On April 27,1994, an information was filed in the Tulare County Superior Court charging appellant, Robert Sierra, with three counts. In count I appellant was charged with transportation of methamphetamine in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11379, subdivision (a). Appellant was charged in count II with transportation of marijuana in violation of Health and Safety Code section 11360, subdivision (a). In count III appellant was charged with driving under the influence and refusing a chemical test in violation of Vehicle Code sections 23152, subdivision (a), 23157 and 23159.
On May 27, 1994, appellant filed a motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. The motion was argued on June 8, 1994, and denied.
A jury trial began on June 20, 1994. On June 22, 1994, appellant was found guilty of count I and acquitted on counts II and m.
On August 3, 1994, appellant was placed on three years’ probation and ordered to serve one hundred eighty days in Tulare County jail. He was given one day of presentence credit. The court, having determined that appellant had the “ability to pay these amounts,” further ordered appellant to pay the following monetary sums specifying individualized payment methods;
1. $200 restitution payable at $25 a month.
2. A $100 fine plus a $170 penalty assessment thereon, for a total of $270, payable at $25 a month.
3. A $50 criminal laboratory analysis fee and a $100 Health and Safety Code section 11372.7 program fee, plus a $255 penalty assessment on the *1693 total of the two, 1 plus a $30 installment fee, for a total of $435, all payable at $50 a month.
4. A $200 restitution fine pursuant to former Government Code section 13967, stayed pending successful completion of probation and permanently thereafter.
5. Three hundred thirty dollars pursuant to Penal Code section 1203.1, subdivision (b) for the cost of the presentence probation report, payable to the probation officer.
Appellant raises two issues on appeal. In the unpublished portion of this opinion we will set forth the facts leading to appellant’s traffic stop and reject his contention that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5. In the published portion we will conclude that the trial court properly imposed a penalty assessment upon the imposed drug program fee. 2
Facts *
Discussion
I.
Suppression Motion*
*1694 II.
Penalty Assessment on Drug Program Fee
Appellant contends that the trial court improperly imposed a penalty assessment of $255 on the drug program fee imposed pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.7. Appellant argues that the drug program fee imposed pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.7, subdivision (a) “shall be in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law” and should therefore be imposed only as the last fee or charge after all others have been imposed. Under this interpretation, he argues no penalty assessment can be charged on a drug program fee.
Health and Safety Code section 11372.7, subdivision (a) provides: “(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivision (b) or (e), each person who is convicted of a violation of this chapter shall pay a drug program fee in an amount not to exceed one hundred fifty dollars ($150) for each separate offense. The court shall increase the total fine, if necessary, to include this increment, which shall be in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law.”
Additional penalties, or assessments, are imposed under California law upon every fine, penalty or forfeiture imposed and collected by the courts for criminal offenses. This requirement is mandated by Penal Code section 1464 and Government Code section 76000. 5
*1695 Appellant argues that the drug program fee pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.7 is a specific fee created by the Legislature for a specific purpose and from the language of the statute is imposed in addition to a base fine. Appellant contends that the sanction of levying any additional penalty assessment on top of the drug program fee would permit an absurd result because the last sentence of this section provides that the drug program fee be imposed after all other fees because it “shall be in addition to any other penalty prescribed by law.”
The problem with appellant’s construction of Health and Safety Code section 11372.7, subdivision (a) is that the very sentence appellant attempts to interpret defines the drug program fee as an increase to the “total fine” and later as a fine in addition “to any other penalty.” (Italics added.) In other words, section 11372.7, subdivision (a) describes itself as both a fine and/or a penalty.
Government Code section 76000 creates a mandatory levy in dollars prescribed by law that must be imposed pursuant to Penal Code section 1464 “upon every fine, penalty, or forfeiture.” (Italics added.) This is the identical language used in subdivision (a) of Penal Code section 1464. Health and Safety Code section 11372.7, subdivision (a) is simply one more fine and/or penalty prescribed by law. As such, it is subject to the mandatory penalty assessments set forth in Government Code section 76000 and Penal Code section 1464.
Furthermore, the imposition of a penalty assessment pursuant to Penal Code section 1464, subdivision (a) is mandatory. Trial courts are given discretion under subdivision (d) of section 1464 not to impose the penalty assessment where an inmate remains in prison and the payment of the assessment “would work a hardship on the person convicted or his or her immediate family.” Otherwise, the trial court has an obligation to impose a penalty assessment. (People v. Heisler (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 504, 506-507 [237 Cal.Rptr. 452].)
The fundamental purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. In order to *1696 determine such intent, courts begin by examining the language of the statute. It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that the language of the statute should not be given a literal meaning if doing so would result in absurd consequences which the Legislature did not intend. (People v. Thomas (1992) 4 Cal.4th 206, 210 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 841 P.2d 159].)
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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack
37 Cal. App. 4th 1690, 44 Cal. Rptr. 575, 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 575, 95 Daily Journal DAR 11800, 95 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6912, 1995 Cal. App. LEXIS 849, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-sierra-calctapp-1995.