NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 250044-U
Order filed December 22, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit, ) La Salle County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0044 v. ) Circuit No. 19-CF-514 ) DAMON J. SHERRER, ) Honorable ) Howard C. Ryan Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. __________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Anderson and Bertani concurred in the judgment. ___________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not conduct an adequate preliminary Krankel inquiry.
¶2 Defendant, Damon J. Sherrer, appeals his convictions, arguing the court did not conduct
an adequate preliminary inquiry under People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), into his
complaints of his counsel’s performance. We remand with directions.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On December 11, 2019, defendant was charged with burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West
2018)) and two counts of armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)). On October 25, 2021, before voir dire,
the State informed the court that defendant was given an offer that was lower than what he would
be sentenced to if he was convicted after a trial. The court admonished defendant that the
sentencing ranges for armed robbery and burglary were 21 to 45 years’ imprisonment and 3 to 7
years’ imprisonment, respectively. The court informed defendant, “if you’re found guilty, they did
attempt to negotiate this for you to have a lesser charge and a lesser sentence than you’re going to
get if you’re found guilty here.” Defendant stated he understood. Defense counsel then stated,
“[N]ot to get into the specifics, but just to put it out there, the offer is still a double-digit term in
the Department of Corrections, without getting anything more than that.”
¶5 The evidence introduced at a jury trial showed that at approximately 1 a.m. on November
22, 2019, defendant approached a clerk at a gas station in Streator and drew a “rifle” from his
jeans. The clerk entered the store but did not have time to lock the doors. Defendant followed the
clerk inside and walked up to the counter. Defendant demanded the contents of the clerk’s pockets
before stealing cash from drawers, several lottery tickets, and liquor. A video recording showing
multiple angles of the robbery was played for the jury and admitted into evidence. The rifle used
during the robbery and depicted in the video was not recovered during a subsequent search of
defendant’s home. Defense counsel attempted to call his “paralegal/investigator” as “a witness on
a couple of issues.” The court precluded the testimony and commented the issue should have been
addressed before trial instead of “last-minute.” Defendant was found guilty on all counts.
¶6 At a sentencing hearing on May 18, 2022, defendant stated he never intended to proceed
to trial, and if he had known the offer from the State was 11½ years’ imprisonment, he would have
accepted. Defendant stated, “I actually asked for, you know, to come out and negotiate, and I
2 was—I was told that’s not what we’re here for, we’re here for trial, it’s too late for that.” Neither
defense counsel nor the State commented on defendant’s statement regarding the State’s offer or
counsel’s failure to convey the offer. The court sentenced defendant to the minimum 21 years’
imprisonment for armed robbery, concurrent with a 7-year term for burglary.
¶7 On direct appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he used a firearm in the commission of the offense and counsel was ineffective for
failing to inform him of the State’s 11½-year offer. People v. Sherrer, 2024 IL App (3d) 230001-
U, ¶ 33. We affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded for the limited purpose of conducting
a preliminary Krankel inquiry. Id. ¶ 2. In doing so, we stated, “Apart from defendant’s unsworn
statement, there is nothing in the record which would allow us to determine whether such an offer
was actually made by the State, whether the offer was not conveyed to defendant by counsel, or
whether defendant would have accepted the offer.” Id. ¶ 35. Moreover, we declined to consider a
photograph of a BB gun defendant alleged looked like the one he used as it was not part of the
record in the circuit court. Id. ¶ 24.
¶8 On remand, a preliminary Krankel inquiry was held at which defendant claimed he told
counsel multiple times he wanted to negotiate with the State as opposed to proceeding to trial.
Defendant believed the strategy was to make it appear like they were prepared to proceed with a
trial in order to negotiate a better deal from the State. At the start of trial, defendant asked counsel
to take an offer of 10 years’ imprisonment to the State but was told they were going through with
the trial and defendant did not have a choice. Defendant was unaware he was facing a minimum
of 21 years’ imprisonment prior to the court’s admonishments. He believed the Class X charges
were “off the table.” Defendant again alleged counsel failed to inform him that the State made an
offer of 11½ years’ imprisonment in exchange for a guilty plea.
3 ¶9 Defendant further complained that “[t]he stuff regarding the shoes and the shoe print was
never brought up. The main thing is the gun.” Defendant stated he informed counsel that the rifle
used during the robbery was a broken BB gun and defendant could produce the BB gun. Defendant
believed the trial strategy was to introduce evidence, through the testimony of an investigator, that
the rifle used during the robbery was a broken BB gun. However, counsel did not introduce
testimony from the investigator or any other evidence to establish the rifle was not a firearm.
¶ 10 Counsel responded he only received a “double digit offer,” from the State and defendant
had insisted on going to trial. Counsel further stated he “never had an investigator that said
anything about it being a different [rifle] but so we had a question, and it was raised on the primary
appeal which was denied.” The court did not ask any questions of either counsel or defendant at
the hearing. The court determined defendant failed to present sufficient facts which warranted
further inquiry and dismissed defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. This appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues the court failed to conduct an adequate preliminary Krankel
inquiry into his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, defendant argues the court
did not sufficiently inquire into the facts necessary to determine whether counsel was ineffective
for failing to (1) inform defendant the State made an offer for 11½ years’ imprisonment in
exchange for his guilty plea and (2) introduce evidence that the rifle used during the robbery was
a broken BB gun.
¶ 13 A defendant has the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const.,
amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art.
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NOTICE: This order was filed under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
2025 IL App (3d) 250044-U
Order filed December 22, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 13th Judicial Circuit, ) La Salle County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-25-0044 v. ) Circuit No. 19-CF-514 ) DAMON J. SHERRER, ) Honorable ) Howard C. Ryan Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. __________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Anderson and Bertani concurred in the judgment. ___________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court did not conduct an adequate preliminary Krankel inquiry.
¶2 Defendant, Damon J. Sherrer, appeals his convictions, arguing the court did not conduct
an adequate preliminary inquiry under People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), into his
complaints of his counsel’s performance. We remand with directions.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 On December 11, 2019, defendant was charged with burglary (720 ILCS 5/19-1(a) (West
2018)) and two counts of armed robbery (id. § 18-2(a)(2)). On October 25, 2021, before voir dire,
the State informed the court that defendant was given an offer that was lower than what he would
be sentenced to if he was convicted after a trial. The court admonished defendant that the
sentencing ranges for armed robbery and burglary were 21 to 45 years’ imprisonment and 3 to 7
years’ imprisonment, respectively. The court informed defendant, “if you’re found guilty, they did
attempt to negotiate this for you to have a lesser charge and a lesser sentence than you’re going to
get if you’re found guilty here.” Defendant stated he understood. Defense counsel then stated,
“[N]ot to get into the specifics, but just to put it out there, the offer is still a double-digit term in
the Department of Corrections, without getting anything more than that.”
¶5 The evidence introduced at a jury trial showed that at approximately 1 a.m. on November
22, 2019, defendant approached a clerk at a gas station in Streator and drew a “rifle” from his
jeans. The clerk entered the store but did not have time to lock the doors. Defendant followed the
clerk inside and walked up to the counter. Defendant demanded the contents of the clerk’s pockets
before stealing cash from drawers, several lottery tickets, and liquor. A video recording showing
multiple angles of the robbery was played for the jury and admitted into evidence. The rifle used
during the robbery and depicted in the video was not recovered during a subsequent search of
defendant’s home. Defense counsel attempted to call his “paralegal/investigator” as “a witness on
a couple of issues.” The court precluded the testimony and commented the issue should have been
addressed before trial instead of “last-minute.” Defendant was found guilty on all counts.
¶6 At a sentencing hearing on May 18, 2022, defendant stated he never intended to proceed
to trial, and if he had known the offer from the State was 11½ years’ imprisonment, he would have
accepted. Defendant stated, “I actually asked for, you know, to come out and negotiate, and I
2 was—I was told that’s not what we’re here for, we’re here for trial, it’s too late for that.” Neither
defense counsel nor the State commented on defendant’s statement regarding the State’s offer or
counsel’s failure to convey the offer. The court sentenced defendant to the minimum 21 years’
imprisonment for armed robbery, concurrent with a 7-year term for burglary.
¶7 On direct appeal, defendant argued, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to
establish that he used a firearm in the commission of the offense and counsel was ineffective for
failing to inform him of the State’s 11½-year offer. People v. Sherrer, 2024 IL App (3d) 230001-
U, ¶ 33. We affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded for the limited purpose of conducting
a preliminary Krankel inquiry. Id. ¶ 2. In doing so, we stated, “Apart from defendant’s unsworn
statement, there is nothing in the record which would allow us to determine whether such an offer
was actually made by the State, whether the offer was not conveyed to defendant by counsel, or
whether defendant would have accepted the offer.” Id. ¶ 35. Moreover, we declined to consider a
photograph of a BB gun defendant alleged looked like the one he used as it was not part of the
record in the circuit court. Id. ¶ 24.
¶8 On remand, a preliminary Krankel inquiry was held at which defendant claimed he told
counsel multiple times he wanted to negotiate with the State as opposed to proceeding to trial.
Defendant believed the strategy was to make it appear like they were prepared to proceed with a
trial in order to negotiate a better deal from the State. At the start of trial, defendant asked counsel
to take an offer of 10 years’ imprisonment to the State but was told they were going through with
the trial and defendant did not have a choice. Defendant was unaware he was facing a minimum
of 21 years’ imprisonment prior to the court’s admonishments. He believed the Class X charges
were “off the table.” Defendant again alleged counsel failed to inform him that the State made an
offer of 11½ years’ imprisonment in exchange for a guilty plea.
3 ¶9 Defendant further complained that “[t]he stuff regarding the shoes and the shoe print was
never brought up. The main thing is the gun.” Defendant stated he informed counsel that the rifle
used during the robbery was a broken BB gun and defendant could produce the BB gun. Defendant
believed the trial strategy was to introduce evidence, through the testimony of an investigator, that
the rifle used during the robbery was a broken BB gun. However, counsel did not introduce
testimony from the investigator or any other evidence to establish the rifle was not a firearm.
¶ 10 Counsel responded he only received a “double digit offer,” from the State and defendant
had insisted on going to trial. Counsel further stated he “never had an investigator that said
anything about it being a different [rifle] but so we had a question, and it was raised on the primary
appeal which was denied.” The court did not ask any questions of either counsel or defendant at
the hearing. The court determined defendant failed to present sufficient facts which warranted
further inquiry and dismissed defendant’s pro se posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. This appeal followed.
¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 12 On appeal, defendant argues the court failed to conduct an adequate preliminary Krankel
inquiry into his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Specifically, defendant argues the court
did not sufficiently inquire into the facts necessary to determine whether counsel was ineffective
for failing to (1) inform defendant the State made an offer for 11½ years’ imprisonment in
exchange for his guilty plea and (2) introduce evidence that the rifle used during the robbery was
a broken BB gun.
¶ 13 A defendant has the constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. U.S. Const.,
amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8. Illinois courts review claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People
4 v. Wise, 2019 IL App (2d) 160611, ¶ 51. Under Strickland, counsel renders ineffective assistance
when (1) counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, the results of the
proceedings would have had a different outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Defendant has a
right to effective assistance throughout plea negotiations. People v. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 15.
¶ 14 If a defendant raises a pro se posttrial claim that he was denied his constitutional right to
the effective assistance of trial counsel, the court must inquire further into defendant’s allegations.
Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 189; People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 34. The first step in hearing the
claims requires that “the circuit court makes a preliminary inquiry to examine the factual basis of
the defendant’s claim.” People v. Horman, 2018 IL App (3d) 160423, ¶ 24. “[I]f the allegations
show possible neglect of the case, new counsel is appointed to represent the defendant in a full
hearing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
¶ 15 A preliminary inquiry requires the court conduct “some type of inquiry into the underlying
factual basis” of defendant’s claims. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Ayres, 2017 IL
120071, ¶ 11. “Specifically, the trial court must conduct an adequate inquiry ***, that is, inquiry
sufficient to determine the factual basis of the claim.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.
Generally, “some interchange between the trial court and trial counsel regarding the facts and
circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation is permissible and usually
necessary.” People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (2003). Where the claims are based on matters
outside the record, an inquiry is incomplete where it fails to develop the factual record needed to
resolve the claims. People v. McLaurin, 2012 IL App (1st) 102943, ¶ 44. “We review whether the
trial court conducted an adequate inquiry de novo.” People v. Rhodes, 2019 IL App (4th) 160917,
¶ 14.
5 ¶ 16 “A defendant has the right to decide whether to plead guilty.” People v. Trujillo, 2012 IL
App (1st) 103212, ¶ 9. “As such, an attorney’s failure to disclose a plea offer to the defendant may
give rise to a constitutional claim ***.” Id. Counsel’s representation falls below an objective
standard of reasonableness if they fail to inform their client of “offers from the prosecution ***
that may be favorable to the accused.” Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 145 (2012). To establish
prejudice, defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability he would have accepted the
offer but for counsel’s unreasonable representation. Hale, 2013 IL 113140, ¶ 18.
¶ 17 Decisions regarding which witnesses to call or what evidence to present at trial are
ultimately left to trial counsel as matters of trial strategy and generally not subject to attack on the
grounds of ineffective assistance. People v. Reid, 179 Ill. 2d 297, 310 (1997). However, only sound
trial strategy is afforded this protection. Id. Whether counsel’s evidentiary decision was sound trial
strategy will sometimes depend on facts not in the record. See, e.g., People v. Tillmon, 2024 IL
App (3d) 220528-U, ¶ 22.
¶ 18 Here, the inquiry was inadequate as to both issues raised by defendant. First, the record is
still underdeveloped as to whether counsel was ineffective during plea negotiations. As we stated
in defendant’s direct appeal, “there is nothing in the record which would allow us to determine
whether such an offer was actually made by the State, whether the offer was not conveyed to
defendant by counsel, or whether defendant would have accepted the offer.” Sherrer, 2024 IL App
(3d) 230001-U, ¶ 35. On remand, the court did not inquire into these points. Counsel’s only
comment at the hearing on this issue was a reiteration that the State only ever made a “double digit
offer.” As a result, we are still unable to discern whether counsel showed possible neglect by failing
to inform defendant of the alleged offer. Counsel’s assertion that defendant insisted on going to
trial is insufficient to resolve the issue due to the lack of clarity as to whether such an offer was
6 made, defendant’s assertion he would have accepted the offer, the disparity between the offer and
the minimum sentence defendant faced, and other facts not in the record.
¶ 19 Second, the inquiry into the rifle issue was insufficient. At the hearing, defendant alleged
counsel failed to introduce evidence which would have been relevant in negating an essential
element of the armed robbery charges. Counsel did not directly address defendant’s complaint,
and the court did not ask any follow-up questions to ensure counsel’s decision was the result of
sound trial strategy. Counsel instead stated that this court addressed the issue on direct appeal.
However, on direct appeal, this court only determined that there was sufficient evidence to sustain
defendant’s convictions. Id. ¶ 23. In coming to that conclusion, we expressly declined to consider
a photograph of a BB gun included in defendant’s brief because it was not part of the record. Id.
¶ 24. Whether defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to introduce evidence under
Strickland is a different analysis than whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s
convictions. See People v. Davis, 2023 IL App (1st) 220231, ¶¶ 28, 47. The facts necessary to
resolve the former remain outside of the record. We therefore remand to allow the parties to
develop “a factual record bearing precisely on the issue[s].” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
People v. Kindle, 2021 IL App (1st) 190484, ¶ 56.
¶ 20 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 21 For the reasons stated, we remand with directions the judgment of the circuit court of
La Salle County.
¶ 22 Remanded with directions.