NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 250175-U NOTICE Decision filed 06/11/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-25-0175 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Madison County. ) v. ) No. 24-CF-52 ) ADONIS L. SHEPARD, ) Honorable ) Timothy D. Berkley, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MOORE delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice McHaney and Justice Boie concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s orders granting the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release and denying the defendant’s motion for relief are affirmed.
¶2 The defendant, Adonis L. Shepard, appeals the March 5, 2025, denial of his motion for
relief and the January 11, 2024, order of the circuit court of Madison County that granted the
State’s petition to deny him pretrial release. For the following reasons, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On January 8, 2024, the defendant was charged by information with four counts. That same
day, the State filed a verified petition to deny the defendant pretrial release based upon the
defendant being charged with a qualifying offense and that the defendant would pose a real and
present threat to the physical safety of any person or persons of the community. A warrant for the
1 defendant’s arrest was issued. On January 9, 2024, the defendant was arrested and made an initial
appearance before the circuit court. During this proceeding, the defendant was informed of the
State’s petition and a hearing on the matter was scheduled for January 11, 2024.
¶5 On January 10, 2024, the State filed a motion for leave to file an amended information,
which the circuit court granted. The State subsequently filed an amended information alleging six
counts. Count I alleged that on January 5, 2024, the defendant committed the offense of unlawful
use of weapons, in that he knowingly possessed on his person, a machine gun, a Glock 26 9-
millimeter (mm) handgun, modified with an auto sear to make the weapon automatically fire more
than one shot without manually reloading by a single function of the trigger. Count II alleged that
on January 5, 2024, the defendant committed the offense of armed violence, in that while armed
with a dangerous weapon, a Glock 26 9mm handgun, the defendant possessed methamphetamine
with the intent to deliver. Count III alleged that on January 5, 2024, the defendant committed the
offense of unlawful delivery or possession with the intent to deliver methamphetamine or a
substance containing methamphetamine, in that he knowingly possessed with the intent to deliver
15 or more grams but less than 100 grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. Count IV
alleged that on January 5, 2024, the defendant committed the offense of unlawful possession of a
stolen firearm, in that he, a person not entitled to the possession of a firearm, possessed a firearm,
a Glock 26 9mm handgun, knowing it to have been stolen. Count V alleged that on January 5,
2024, the defendant committed the offense of unlawful possession of weapons by a felon, in that
he knowingly possessed a firearm, a Glock 26 9mm handgun, and had been previously convicted
of a felony offense, unlawful possession of a stolen firearm, in Madison County, Illinois, cause
No. 21-CF-3. Count VI alleged that on January 5, 2024, the defendant committed the offense of
aggravated fleeing or attempting to elude a peace officer, in that he knowingly failed to obey and
2 attempted to flee and elude a police officer after the officer had given the defendant a visual or
audible signal to stop the vehicle driven by the defendant, and the defendant’s flight or attempt to
elude was at a rate of speed of at least 21 miles over the legal speed limit.
¶6 On January 11, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing on the State’s petition. During the
hearing, the State proffered evidence of the charged offenses and submitted five photograph
exhibits to support its petition. The State indicated that Granite City police officers attempted to
conduct a lawful traffic stop of the defendant’s vehicle, a white Nissan, during which the defendant
fled from officers, leading them on a pursuit as he attempted to drive towards the city of Madison,
Illinois. The pursuit reached speeds of 85 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour residential zone.
The white Nissan became disabled after losing control on a set of railroad tracks. The defendant
and a passenger then exited the vehicle and fled on foot. Officers were able to apprehend the
passenger near the location where he and the defendant fled from the vehicle. The passenger,
Demontre Fair, was armed with a “rifle” at the time of his arrest. Officers reported seeing the
defendant with a firearm in his possession during his flight. A K-9 unit was deployed, and the
defendant was later apprehended. A Glock 9mm handgun was discovered along his flight path.
The State highlighted that the handgun was modified to be fully automatic. After apprehending
the defendant, the State indicated that officers searched the Nissan and discovered 9mm
ammunition as well as 26.1 grams of a substance that field-tested positive for methamphetamine.
The State argued that, based on this evidence, there is a strong presumption that the defendant
committed the charged offenses. In addition, the State argued that the defendant had a prior felony
conviction for possession of a stolen firearm and was sentenced to the Illinois Department of
Corrections (IDOC). Based on the above, including the defendant’s flight, the State argued that he
3 poses an ongoing threat to the community. The State maintained that no conditions or combination
of conditions could adequately mitigate this risk.
¶7 Defense counsel proffered a video recording of the chase that led to the defendant’s arrest.
Defense counsel emphasized that the State has the burden to show that the proof is evident and the
presumption is great that the defendant committed the offenses charged. Defense counsel noted
that the police radios specified they were searching for a black male in a white hoodie, arguing the
possibility of a third person in the car since the defendant was not wearing a white hoodie. Further,
defense counsel argued that the officers could not have known what the defendant had in his hands
or on his person, meaning that they had no reasonable basis to assume he was carrying a firearm.
In addition, counsel mentioned that a K-9 unit was used to locate the defendant. Counsel contended
that it was reasonable to assume that the K-9 unit correctly followed the defendant’s actual flight
path. Following the defendant’s flight path, counsel argued that the K-9 unit did not find a firearm.
Rather, the firearm discovered was found by another officer who was canvassing the area. Defense
counsel contended that even if the defendant had a firearm on his person, he did not attempt to
cause reasonable apprehension in the officers nor attempt to threaten them, as the video shows the
defendant was not running towards the patrol car but rather trying to avoid being hit by it.
¶8 Defense counsel informed the court that it should take note that there is no allegation that
the defendant fired a firearm, pointed a firearm, or threatened any individual in any way when
assessing dangerousness. Additionally, counsel informed the court that the defendant, who was 21
years old, was suffering from a dog bite on his leg that required daily medical attention. He lived
with his mother and two younger sisters in East Saint Louis, while his father resides in Saint Louis.
Counsel highlighted the defendant’s criminal history, noting that he had two separate cases in
Madison County and had never missed a court date. Additionally, counsel emphasized that the
4 defendant’s criminal history does not reflect any violent or abusive behavior. Further, counsel
indicated that the defendant was not under any bond condition. Defense counsel mentioned that,
although not necessary, the defendant would be willing to agree to electronic monitoring.
¶9 In response, the State argued that the video proffered by defense counsel clearly showed
that the defendant’s vehicle was fleeing from officers at a high rate of speed, thereby putting the
public at risk during the pursuit. The State noted, again, that the defendant’s vehicle eventually
came to a stop only because it was disabled by railroad tracks. Additionally, the State argued that
the video showed the defendant and his passenger fled on foot. Further, the State highlighted that
the defendant had a prior conviction for possession of a stolen firearm, for which he had received
a three-year sentence in the IDOC. The State then pointed out that the defendant faces Class X
felony charges in this case, involving both stolen firearms and modified firearms. For this reason,
the State argued that the defendant posed an ongoing risk of harm to the community at large.
¶ 10 Having considered the information, including the proffer from both parties, as well as the
video and photographic evidence, the circuit court found, by clear and convincing evidence, that
the defendant committed the charged offenses. Further, considering the defendant’s prior criminal
history, the circuit court determined that the defendant posed a real and present threat to the safety
of others in the community and that there are no conditions or combination of conditions that could
mitigate the real and present safety threat, as the defendant demonstrated a disregard for the law.
That same day, the circuit court entered an order granting the State’s petition.
¶ 11 On September 19, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for hearing on detention. In the
motion, the defendant requested immediate release. In support, the motion stated:
“1. The defendant is charged with one count of Unlawful Use of Weapons, one
count of Unlawful Possession of a Stolen Firearm, one count of Unlawful Possession of
5 Weapons by a Felon and one count of Aggravated Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a Police
Officer.
2. The defendant is detained in the Madison County Jail.
3. Effective September 18, 2023, the Illinois SafeT Act abolished cash bond in
the state of Illinois, and there is a presumption of pretrial release. [Citation.]
4. The defendant does not pose a real and present threat to the safety of any person
or persons in the community.
5. The defendant does not pose a real and present threat of willful flight.”
¶ 12 On October 18, 2024, the circuit court held a hearing regarding the defendant’s motion.
Defense counsel began by arguing that the State had not met its burden under the statute. He
suggested that it was important to examine whether the standards for continued detention were
met, “starting with the first prong.” The following colloquy then occurred:
“THE COURT: Wait. Let me stop you. You and I have been down this road
before.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And we indicated that first prong you’re referring to have [sic]
already been determined. They were determined at the last detention hearing. Only thing
I’m concerned about is what conditions exist now that would satisfy the statutory
requirements and still protect the public. So that’s what I want you to focus on.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I understand your Honor. The reason I bring it up, I
think a full understanding of what the facts are will lead the court to understand a review
of whether or not Mr. Shepard needs to be detained. And if—if the Court understands a
few facts, the court will have a fuller understanding.
6 THE COURT: That’s fine. You can do that.”
¶ 13 Defense counsel reiterated most of his argument from the initial detention hearing.
Additionally, he stated that the defendant lacks any psychological or psychotic history and does
not own or possess any weapons. Counsel also informed the circuit court that the defendant turned
22 while detained in the Madison County jail, during which the defendant has complained about
chest and rib pain, joint pain in his knees and lower back, and headaches. Defense counsel
indicated that if the court were to release the defendant, he planned to consult a doctor about these
complaints. The circuit court then asked:
“THE COURT: Okay. For the previous judge who entered the detention order to
detain Mr. Shepard, that judge made a finding that there was clear and convincing evidence
of the offenses that are charged, right?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And that includes possessing [sic] of a weapon?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Correct.”
Later, the court inquired about the location of the firearm. Defense counsel explained:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The firearm was found a couple blocks away from him
down another street.
THE COURT: Okay.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: The only firearm that was found on a person was on his
codefendant.
THE COURT: And the firearm that was found down the street from him, was it
loaded?
7 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: It was not loaded. Did not have a magazine in it, Your
Honor.
[THE STATE]: He had the magazine on him, Your Honor. Sorry.
THE COURT: What’s that?
[THE STATE]: He had the magazine on him.”
Defense counsel clarified that a magazine had been discovered “underneath [the defendant’s] body
when they moved him” during his arrest, and that the magazine was loaded. Counsel also informed
the court that the defendant had been indicted by the federal government in case No. 24CR00116-
SPM, which included a release order with specific conditions. 1 Defense counsel noted that the
federal release order stipulated that the defendant must attend federal court, and failing to do so
would result in a longer sentence in the federal system, which would be added to the sentence he
might receive in this case. Additionally, the federal court would cover the costs of the defendant’s
monitoring and services.
¶ 14 Regarding flight risk, defense counsel argued that a defendant evading arrest would not
trigger willful flight under 110-6.1(a)(8) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code). See
725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(8) (West 2022). To support this argument, counsel proffered two 2
unpublished rule 23 cases.
1 The conditions outlined in the release order included but were not limited to (1) the defendant reporting to U.S. probation services, (2) travel restrictions and location monitoring, (3) residency with his father, (4) a curfew, and (5) regular substance testing. 2 The cases proffered by the defendant were People v. Sims, 2024 IL App (4th) 231335-U, and People v. Quintero, 2024 IL App (1st) 232129-U. Both cases held that evading arrest, alone, would not constitute willful flight from prosecution under section 110-6.1(a)(8) because attempting to evade arrest does not equate to intentional conduct aimed at thwarting the judicial process. See Sims, 2024 IL App (4th) 231335-U, ¶ 28; see also Quintero, 2024 IL App (1st) 232129-U, ¶¶ 21-22. Here, the circuit court’s finding that the defendant posed a risk of willful flight from prosecution was not based solely on his attempt to evade the police, making the authority proffered by the defense counsel unpersuasive.
8 ¶ 15 In response, the State maintained that the circuit court’s consideration of the defendant’s
evasion of arrest was proper. Further, the State asserted that the court had already made its findings,
emphasizing that the defendant was charged with offenses that were detainable under the Code.
The State summarized the key facts, noting that while fleeing, the defendant was seen holding a
firearm. Officers lost sight of the defendant, but he was later located by a K-9 hiding in a shed.
Near the location where the defendant was found, a 9mm magazine was recovered, and while
following his flight path, the K-9 discovered a firearm. Both the firearm and the magazine were
sent to a forensic lab, where they were field-tested; the firearm was found to be capable of
discharging ammunition from the magazine.
¶ 16 Additionally, the State highlighted the defendant’s criminal history, which included
charges of armed violence and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon in 2020. In 2021, he was
charged with possession of stolen firearms and again with aggravated unlawful use of a weapon.
The State argued that the defendant clearly disregards the law, stating:
“[H]e’s gonna continue possessing guns and possessing drugs despite what we do here.
There are no conditions that we can do to stop him from getting guns, to stop him from
getting drugs. A curfew’s not going to stop him from getting his hands on those things,
especially the federal one where he’s free to do whatever he wants it looks like from 7:00
a.m. to 7:00 p.m.”
Based on these points, the State contended that the defendant posed an ongoing danger to the
community.
¶ 17 The circuit court then asked the State why it believed the federal judge, who presumably
had detailed knowledge of the defendant’s charges, deemed release to be appropriate. The State
indicated that it had been informed by the Attorney General that the defendant was only charged
9 with being a felon in possession of a firearm. The State also informed the circuit court that while
detained on these offenses, the defendant was charged in a new case with threatening a public
official based on an incident that took place in the jail. See 720 ILCS 5/12-9(a) (West 2022).
Defense counsel noted in that case, 3 a release order was entered. At the conclusion of the hearing,
the circuit court informed both parties that it would take the matter under advisement.
¶ 18 On October 21, 2024, the circuit court issued a written order denying the defendant’s
request for release. The written order found that that the defendant continues to pose a real and
present threat to the safety of the community. In reaching this finding, the court emphasized the
seriousness of the underlying, nonprobationable offenses and the previous findings outlined in the
detention order from January 11, 2024. Additionally, the written order set forth that the court
considered the pretrial reports, particularly noting the defendant’s “impulsive, violent, and
unlawful behavior while in pretrial custody in the Madison County Jail, where he threated a
correctional officer.” The court highlighted the specific threats made by the defendant. The court
pointed out that the threats were made after the defendant completed two courses titled “Criminal
process; the Basics” and “In the Courtroom,” which presumably covered appropriate courtroom
conduct. Further, the court acknowledged the defendant’s involvement with the federal court and
the release orders from that court. Specifically, the circuit court noted in its written order that
“federal penalties and sanctions for violation of the federal release conditions are unavailable to
this court. Even with these enhanced federal penalties and sanctions, the court firmly disagrees
with the magistrate judge’s release order.”
¶ 19 On December 3, 2024, the defendant filed a motion for relief and immediate release under
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024). In the motion, the defendant argued
3 Madison County, Illinois, cause No. 24-CF-360. 10 that (1) the circuit court erred during the January 11, 2024, hearing finding that there is clear and
convincing evidence that the offenses occurred; (2) the circuit court erred during the October 18,
2024, hearing when it adopted the prior ruling from the January 11, 2024, hearing that the proof is
evident or presumption is great that the defendant committed a detainable offense; (3) the circuit
court erred during the October 18, 2024, hearing in finding that the defendant remains a real and
present threat to the safety of the community; and (4) the circuit court erred during the October 18,
2024, hearing in ruling that there are no conditions or combination of conditions that would
mitigate the threat of safety the defendant poses.
¶ 20 On March 5, 2025, a hearing on the defendant’s motion for relief was held. At the outset,
the circuit court reviewed the procedural history of the case by noting that the motion filed on
September 19, 2024, contained language that challenged the initial detention order rather than
addressing a change in circumstances. Additionally, the court explained that since that time, the
legal framework surrounding the Code had been clarified. In order to clarify its written order from
October 21, 2024, the court informed the parties that although there had been a presumption in
favor of release during the January 11, 2024, hearing, subsequent hearings had determined that
detention was necessary.
¶ 21 Defense counsel was then allowed to present his argument in support of the defendant’s
motion for relief. Counsel reiterated the points made in the motion for relief. At the conclusion of
his argument, defense counsel informed the circuit court that the defendant had a job opportunity
lined up should he be released. Counsel stated that the defendant would be able to work and
contribute to society, even if only for a short period, until the defendant’s case was set for trial or
he entered a plea. The State responded by indicating that it stood on its previous arguments and
requested that the defendant’s motion be denied.
11 ¶ 22 The circuit court denied the motion for relief and made the following, inter alia, oral
pronouncements:
“Okay. So the Court has considered the arguments of counsel. The Court has reviewed the
transcripts from the previous hearings, including the transcripts from the January 11th
hearing that was conducted by Judge Jumper, as well as reviewed the hearing that was
conducted by myself on October 18th of 2024. I reviewed the transcripts of that hearing as
well. I’ve also gone through the orders that have been entered in the files and the particular
written findings that are contained in those.
The Court is familiar with the facts of this case having thoroughly given it
consideration at the last hearing. The Court has reviewed the claims of error that were
raised in the motion for relief. At this time the Court denies the motion for relief.”
Then, the circuit court admonished the defendant regarding his appeal rights. That same day, the
defendant filed a notice of appeal.
¶ 23 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 24 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h) governs appeals stemming from the enactment of
Public Act 101-652 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). See Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (vacating the stay
of the pretrial release provisions in Public Act 101-652 on September 18, 2023). The relevant
portions of Rule 604(h) provide:
“(1) Orders Appealable. An appeal may be taken to the Appellate Court from an
interlocutory order of court entered under sections 110-5, 110-6, and 110-6.1 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure of 1963 as follows:
(i) by the State and by the defendant from an order imposing conditions of
pretrial release;
12 (ii) by the defendant from an order revoking pretrial release or by the State
from an order denying a petition to revoke pretrial release;
(iii) by the defendant from an order denying pretrial release; or
(iv) by the State from an order denying a petition to deny pretrial release.
(2) Motion for Relief. As a prerequisite to appeal, the party taking the appeal shall
first present to the trial court a written motion requesting the same relief to be sought on
appeal and the grounds for such relief. The trial court shall promptly hear and decide the
motion for relief. Upon appeal, any issue not raised in the motion for relief, other than
errors occurring for the first time at the hearing on the motion for relief, shall be deemed
waived.
***
(7) Memoranda. The motion for relief will serve as the argument of the appellant
on appeal. The appellant may file, but is not required to file, a memorandum not exceeding
4500 words, within 21 days of the filing of the record on appeal. Issues raised in the motion
for relief are before the appellate court regardless of whether the optional memorandum is
filed. If a memorandum is filed, it must identify which issues from the motion for relief are
being advanced on appeal.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024).
In this case, the Office of the State Appellate Defender was appointed to represent the defendant.
The defendant’s appellate counsel did not file a Rule 604(h) memorandum. Instead, on April 10,
2025, appellate counsel filed a “Notice *** in Lieu of Rule 604(h)(7) Memorandum,” informing
this court of the defendant’s intentions to stand on the arguments presented in his motion for relief.
¶ 25 Pretrial release—including the conditions related thereto—is governed by Public Act 101-
652, § 10-255 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023). See Pub. Act 102-1104, § 70 (eff. Jan. 1, 2023) (amending
13 various provisions of the Act); Rowe v. Raoul, 2023 IL 129248, ¶ 52 (lifting stay and setting
effective date as September 18, 2023). A defendant’s pretrial release may be denied only in certain
statutorily limited situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2022). Upon filing a timely, verified
petition requesting denial of pretrial release, the State has the burden to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the proof is evident or the presumption great that the defendant has
committed a qualifying offense, that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or the community or a flight risk, and that less restrictive conditions
would not avoid a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community and/or
prevent the defendant’s willful flight from prosecution. Id. § 110-6.1(e), (f). The State or the
defendant may present evidence to the circuit court by way of proffer based upon reliable
information. Id. § 110-6.1(f)(2). The circuit court may order a defendant detained pending trial if
the defendant is charged with a qualifying offense, and the circuit court concludes the defendant
poses a real and present threat to the safety of any person or the community (id. § 110-6.1(a)(1)-
(7)) or there is a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid prosecution (id. § 110-6.1(a)(8)).
¶ 26 To set appropriate conditions of pretrial release where the State has filed a petition to
detain, the circuit court must determine whether the State has met its burden by clear and
convincing evidence, what pretrial release conditions, “if any, will reasonably ensure the
appearance of a defendant as required or the safety of any other person or the community and the
likelihood of compliance by the defendant with all the conditions of pretrial release.” Id. § 110-
5(a). In reaching its determination, the circuit court must consider (1) the nature and circumstances
of the offense charged; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and
14 characteristics of the person; 4 (4) the nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present threat
to any person that would be posed by the person’s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of
the risk of obstructing or attempting to obstruct the criminal justice process. Id. The statute lists
no singular factor as dispositive. See id.
¶ 27 Our standard of review of pretrial release determinations is twofold. Where the circuit court
is asked to consider the testimony of live witnesses, and make factual findings, such as the State’s
burden of presenting clear and convincing evidence that conditions of pretrial release would not
protect any person or the community, the defendant has a high likelihood of willful flight to avoid
prosecution, or the defendant failed to comply with previously ordered conditions of pretrial
release, our standard of review is the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Morgan, 2025 IL
130626, ¶ 54. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the opposite
conclusion is clearly evident or if the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based on the
evidence presented.” People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322, 332 (2008). Alternatively, where the parties
to a pretrial detention hearing proceed solely by proffer or submission of documentary evidence,
this court stands in the same position as the circuit court and may conduct its own independent
review of the proffered evidence, thus reviewing the record de novo. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626,
¶ 54. In the present matter, the parties proceeded solely by proffer, so we will employ de novo
review.
The defendant’s history and characteristics include: “the defendant’s character, physical and 4
mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past relating to drug or alcohol abuse, conduct, *** criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings,” as well as “whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the defendant was on probation, parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under federal law, or the law of this or any other state.” 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a)(3)(A), (B) (West 2022). 15 ¶ 28 First, the defendant argues that the circuit court committed error during the hearing held
on October 18, 2024, by adopting the prior rulings from the hearing conducted on January 11,
2024. The defendant, however, does not develop this argument and fails to explain how the circuit
court’s adoption constituted error. Further, the defendant does not cite or direct us to any relevant
case law or statutory authority other than the basic principles of law applicable to the proceeding
under the Code. “A reviewing court is not simply a depository into which a party may dump the
burden of argument and research.” People ex rel. Illinois Department of Labor v. E.R.H.
Enterprises, Inc., 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56. This is because a reviewing court “cannot be expected to
formulate an argument for defendant out of whole cloth.” People v. Inman, 2023 IL App (4th)
230864, ¶ 13. The appellant is required to set forth his points and the reasons therefor with citation
to authority, and points not argued are forfeited. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). The
defendant’s failure to develop his argument and direct us to any relevant authority compels us to
find that he has forfeited this claim. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 604(h)(7) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) (“Whether
made in the motion for relief alone or as supplemented by [a] memorandum, the form of the
appellant’s arguments must contain sufficient detail to enable meaningful appellate review,
including the contentions of the appellant and the reasons therefore and citations of the record and
any relevant authorities.”). Forfeiture aside, a review of the record demonstrates that the circuit
court did not restrict defense counsel to advancing arguments limited to dangerousness or
conditions during the October 18, 2024, hearing. In fact, as detailed above, the circuit court did
just the opposite and allowed defense counsel to proceed as requested.
¶ 29 Next, the defendant argues that the circuit court committed error by finding that there is
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed a qualifying offense. Here, in seeking
the denial of the defendant’s pretrial release, the State proceeded under section 110-6.1(a)(6)(O)
16 of the Code. See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a)(6)(O) (West 2022). That section provides for the denial
of pretrial release when
“the defendant is charged with any of the following offenses under the Criminal Code of
2012, and it is alleged that the defendant’s pretrial release poses a real and present threat
to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific articulable
facts of the case:
(O) Non-probationable violations: (i) unlawful use or possession of weapons by
felons or persons in the Custody of the Department of Corrections facilities (Section 24-
1.1), (ii) aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (Section 24-1.6), or (iii) aggravated
possession of a stolen firearm (Section 24-3.9)[.]” Id.
¶ 30 In this case, the defendant was charged with several nonprobationable Class X felonies.
The defendant argues that the State’s evidence consisted solely of a recitation of the charging
document, a brief proffer of minimal facts, and several photographs of a Glock 26 9mm handgun.
¶ 31 We have independently reviewed the evidence presented to the circuit court at the January
11, 2024, hearing on the State’s petition. During the hearing, the State proffered a summary of
information from the Granite City Police Department. It was indicated that the defendant’s vehicle
evaded officers who attempted to initiate a traffic stop, eventually becoming disabled on railroad
tracks. The occupants, including the individual identified by the State as the defendant, fled on
foot. Defense counsel did not contest that the defendant fled from the vehicle. Officers observed
the defendant in possession of a firearm, and during the pursuit, they recovered a Glock 26 9mm
handgun modified to be fully automatic. Additionally, a loaded magazine was located underneath
the defendant at the time of his arrest. Further, officers conducted a search of the vehicle and
17 discovered additional 9mm ammunition. The State also proffered the defendant’s criminal history,
which included a prior felony firearm conviction.
¶ 32 In the defendant’s motion for relief, he denies possession of a firearm and contends that
the video evidence presented by defense counsel identified the individual who fled on foot with a
gun as a “black male with dreadlocks wearing a white hoodie/jacket.” At the time of the
defendant’s arrest, the defendant was wearing a “black/dark hoodie/jacket,” and no firearm was
found in his possession. On this basis, the defendant asserts that a third individual was present in
the back seat of the vehicle and that all property in the back seat of the vehicle belonged to said
individual, who also allegedly fled on foot from the car crash. However, “a fact finder need not
accept the defendant’s version of the events among competing versions.” People v. Ortiz, 196 Ill.
2d 236, 267 (2001). Further, the defendant’s denial is rebutted by the video evidence proffered by
defense counsel, which documents the flight. The video depicts the defendant wearing a jersey-
type t-shirt, the back half of which is completely white, over a black hoodie. Additionally, the
defendant’s denial is further contradicted by the discovery of the firearm along the defendant’s
flight path, as well as the discovery of a loaded magazine underneath his body and bullets for that
magazine found in his vehicle, which contained a large amount of a substance that field-tested
positive for methamphetamine. Based on the foregoing, we cannot conclude that the circuit court
committed error in finding that by clear and convincing evidence the proof is evident, or the
presumption is great that the defendant committed the charged offenses.
¶ 33 Next, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred in finding that the defendant remains
a real and present threat to the community. In looking at the nature and circumstances of the
offenses charged in this case, possessing a firearm when legally barred from doing so is a serious,
dangerous offense. See People v. Parker, 2024 IL App (1st) 232164, ¶¶ 74-77. Again, we note that
18 the firearm discovered while following the defendant’s flight path was modified to be fully
automatic. Additionally, the defendant was charged in 2021 with possession of a stolen firearm,
for which he was convicted and received a three-year IDOC sentence. The defendant’s history
with firearms shows that he is a danger to the community, as it demonstrates that he has the ability
to illegally obtain firearms and a willingness to disobey the law. Equally important and while in
possession of a firearm, the defendant’s vehicle contained a large amount of field-test-positive
methamphetamine. Additionally, he received a separate charge while in detention for threatening
a public official. Specifically, the defendant threatened a guard in the Madison County jail, saying
he would “kick his ass” and that if the guard entered his cell, he would “F him up.” The defendant
further stated that he would kill the guard if he ever saw him on the streets. Therefore, the circuit
court did not err in finding that the defendant remains a real and present threat to the community.
¶ 34 Lastly, the defendant contends that the circuit court committed error by finding that no
conditions or combination of conditions could mitigate the safety threat posed by the defendant.
In his motion for relief, the defendant argues that he has been released with conditions in his
pending federal case. He contends that although federal penalties and conditions are not available
to state courts, the conditions and penalties for noncompliance “are still real and presently active”
should he be released.
¶ 35 Like the circuit court, when considering whether a pretrial condition or combination of
conditions could reasonably ensure the safety of any other person or the community, we consider
the five factors set out in the Code: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged; (2) the
weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person; (4) the
nature and seriousness of the specific, real, and present threat to any person that would be posed
by the person’s release; and (5) the nature and seriousness of the risk of obstructing or attempting
19 to obstruct the criminal justice process. 725 ILCS 5/110-5(a) (West 2022). No singular factor is
dispositive. See id.
¶ 36 To the extent that the defendant is arguing that because he was released on conditions in
his federal case, he should be released in this case, we are not persuaded. The Code requires the
circuit court to make individualized determinations on pretrial release. “Decisions regarding
release, conditions of release, and detention prior to trial must be individualized ***.” Id. § 110-
6.1(f)(7). The circuit court after considering (1) the facts presented; (2) the nature and
circumstances of the offenses, which include multiple, nonprobationable Class X felonies; (3) the
weight of the evidence; and (4) the defendant’s history and characteristics, which include a recent
IDOC sentence for possession of a stolen firearm and his threatening behavior in the jail which
resulted in an additional charge, made an individualized determination to deny pretrial release. The
circuit court, being fully aware of the defendant’s federal release, found that no conditions or
combination of conditions could mitigate the risk posed by the defendant and specifically
considered his federal release stating, “Even with these enhanced federal penalties and sanctions,
the court firmly disagrees with the magistrate judge’s release order.” While the circuit court
considered the defendant’s federal release, that decision was not binding. Accordingly, we agree
with the circuit court that no condition or combination of conditions can reasonably ensure the
safety of the public and pretrial detention is appropriate.
¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 Based on the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s orders of January 11, 2024,
October 21, 2024, and March 5, 2025.
¶ 39 Affirmed.