People v. Shelton

2019 IL App (2d) 170453-U

Opinion

2019 IL App (2d) 170453-U No. 2-17-0453 Order filed December 18, 2019

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 10-CF-3 ) JOEL D. SHELTON, ) Honorable ) Donna R. Honzel, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hudson and Bridges concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defense counsel was not ineffective for failing to move to suppress, as a 911 call reporting that defendant was asleep at the wheel at an intersection provided reasonable suspicion to stop him.

¶2 Defendant, Joel D. Shelton, contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file

a motion to suppress, because a 911 call did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle.

Because the 911 caller reported that defendant was asleep at the wheel at an intersection, there was

reasonable suspicion to stop defendant for driving under the influence. Thus, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND 2019 IL App (2d) 170453-U

¶4 Defendant was charged in the circuit court of Winnebago County with, among other things,

one count of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2),

(d)(1)(A), (d)(2)(E) (West 2010)). Defendant opted for a jury trial.

¶5 Before trial, defendant moved in limine to bar admission of the arresting officer’s

testimony that he was dispatched to investigate a 911 report of someone “asleep behind the wheel

at a light or intersection.” The trial court ruled that the officer could testify that he was dispatched

because someone was stopped at the intersection but not because the driver was asleep behind the

wheel. The court explained that it was concerned about the implication that defendant was “drunk

and sleeping behind the wheel like sometimes drunks do.”

¶6 The following relevant facts were established at the trial. On January 1, 2010, at about

9:55 p.m., Officer Stacey Beaman of the Rockford Police Department was dispatched to the

intersection of North Main Street and Riverside Boulevard. According to Officer Beaman, the

dispatch “was in reference to a welfare check.” The 911 caller stated that a vehicle was stopped

at the intersection. As Officer Beaman drove to that location, the dispatcher advised her that the

caller had reported that the vehicle was now moving and that the caller had followed it to a nearby

Culver’s restaurant. The caller described the vehicle and its license plate number.

¶7 When she arrived in the area, Officer Beaman saw the described vehicle in the Culver’s

drive-through lane. The vehicle then exited onto Bennington Road. Officer Beaman followed the

vehicle and conducted a traffic stop. After driving about 25 to 30 feet on Bennington Road, the

vehicle pulled back into the Culver’s lot and parked.

¶8 As she approached the vehicle, Officer Beaman saw defendant, the only occupant, in the

driver’s seat. As she stood next to the driver’s window, Officer Beaman smelled a strong odor of

an alcoholic beverage on defendant’s breath and burnt cannabis coming from the vehicle’s interior.

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¶9 Officer Beaman had defendant exit the vehicle and walk back to the squad car. Defendant

stumbled several times, requiring Officer Beaman to hold defendant’s right arm to steady him.

Officer Beaman had defendant sit in the squad car. While defendant sat in the squad car, he offered

that he had been at a bar but had not consumed any alcohol. Defendant later admitted to another

officer that he had drunk 2½ alcoholic beverages. Defendant refused to complete any field sobriety

tests.

¶ 10 Officer Beaman then requested that a traffic investigator come to the scene. Several

officers arrived and assisted in searching defendant’s vehicle. Officer Beaman found a half-empty

bottle of vodka next to the driver’s seat and two clear plastic baggies containing cannabis, one on

the dash and the other between the front seats.

¶ 11 After several other witnesses testified, including defendant, the jury found defendant guilty

of, among other things, aggravated DUI. The trial court sentenced defendant to eight years’

imprisonment on the DUI conviction. Defendant, in turn, filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 12 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13 On appeal, defendant contends that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

motion to suppress. Specifically, defendant asserts that the 911 call, that defendant was asleep at

the wheel at the intersection, was insufficient, standing alone, to provide reasonable suspicion to

stop his vehicle. The State responds that the call provided reasonable suspicion to stop defendant

for DUI.

¶ 14 Before we address the merits of defendant’s contention, we note that defendant raises the

ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal, as opposed to a postconviction proceeding. Most often, a

postconviction proceeding is the more appropriate mechanism for challenging the effectiveness of

trial counsel, because the defendant would have the opportunity to develop a record specifically

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addressing the merits of a motion to suppress. People v. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶¶ 21-22.

However, where there are sufficient record facts to resolve the defendant’s ineffectiveness claim,

we will address it on direct appeal. Henderson, 2013 IL 114040, ¶¶ 22, 24.

¶ 15 Here, although the record does not show whether the 911 caller provided additional

relevant information, the parties agree that the caller reported that defendant was asleep at the

wheel while sitting in his vehicle at an intersection. Defendant relies exclusively on that fact in

arguing that there was no reasonable suspicion to stop him. More importantly, the State does not

suggest that there was any other information provided by the caller that was relevant to whether

there was reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. 1 Thus, we will address the issue.

¶ 16 To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show that (1) his counsel’s

performance was so deficient that it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the

deficient performance prejudiced the defendant, in that, but for counsel’s deficient performance,

there is a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different. People

v. Houston, 226 Ill. 2d 135, 144 (2007) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)).

Decisions involving trial strategy generally will not support an ineffectiveness claim. People v.

Lindsey, 324 Ill. App. 3d 193, 197 (2001).

¶ 17 Whether to move to suppress evidence generally is a matter of trial strategy. People v.

Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d 607, 611 (2001). Courts will presume that trial counsel had a legitimate

strategy for filing or not filing a motion to suppress. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 611. To overcome

1 We note that the State has not argued that there was some other basis for stopping

defendant, such as community caretaking. See People v. McDonough, 239 Ill. 2d 260, 268-275

(2010).

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that presumption, and prevail on a claim of ineffectiveness for failing to file a motion to suppress,

a defendant must show that (1) the unargued motion to suppress would have succeeded, and

(2) there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different had the

evidence been suppressed. Little, 322 Ill. App. 3d at 611. If filing a motion to suppress would

have been futile, then the failure to do so would not constitute the ineffective assistance of counsel.

People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 331 (2010).

¶ 18 Here, defendant relies solely on Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393 (2014), for his

argument that the 911 call did not provide reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. The State, in

turn, contends that Navarette supports the stop. Thus, we will focus on the import of that case.

¶ 19 In Navarette, a 911 caller reported having recently been run off the road by another vehicle.

After holding that the call was reliable, the Court addressed whether the information provided by

the call constituted reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 401. In doing

so, the Court noted that it must determine whether the 911 report created reasonable suspicion of

an ongoing crime such as drunk driving, as opposed to an isolated episode of past recklessness.

Navarette, 572 U.S. at 401.

¶ 20 The Court emphasized that the commonsense approach of reasonable suspicion depends

on the factual and practical considerations of everyday life upon which reasonable and prudent

people, not legal technicians, act. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 402. The Court distinguished certain

driving behaviors that indicate drunk driving from other traffic infractions that are too tenuously

connected to drunk driving to give rise, alone, to reasonable suspicion to stop a vehicle. Navarette,

572 U.S. at 402. The Court added that a report of driving behavior that suggests decreased

vigilance, impaired judgment, or some combination of those drunk-driving cues gives rise to

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reasonable suspicion that the driver is under the influence. Navarette, 572 U.S at 403. Ultimately,

the Court validated the stop.

¶ 21 Applying the reasoning of Navarette, we conclude that the 911 report that defendant was

asleep at the wheel at an intersection provided reasonable suspicion to stop defendant. Clearly, a

driver who falls asleep at an intersection is experiencing decreased vigilance and impaired

judgment commonly associated with drunk driving. That is particularly so at 10 p.m., not an

unusually late hour. Sleeping at the wheel at an intersection also creates several dangers associated

with drunk driving. For instance, a vehicle unexpectedly stopped at an intersection could cause

other drivers to suddenly swerve to avoid the stopped vehicle, thereby colliding with other vehicles

or leaving the roadway and striking a pedestrian or object. As defendant’s reported conduct was

a significant indicator of DUI, we cannot say that Officer Beaman acted unreasonably in stopping

defendant.. See Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403.

¶ 22 Although the reported behavior might have been explained by, for example, extreme

tiredness or medication, the Supreme Court has consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion

need not rule out the possibility of an innocent explanation. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403. Nor did

the absence of additional suspicious conduct before the stop dispel the reasonable suspicion of

drunk driving. See Navarette, 572 U.S. at 403. Indeed, an officer who already has reasonable

suspicion need not surveil a vehicle at length in order to personally observe suspicious driving.

Navarette, 572 U.S. at 404. Further, once reasonable suspicion of drunk driving exists, the

reasonableness of the officer’s decision to stop the suspect does not depend on the availability of

less-intrusive investigative techniques. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 404. Thus, because the 911 call

provided reasonable suspicion of drunk driving, Officer Beaman was justified in stopping

defendant at the first opportunity.

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¶ 23 Because the 911 call provided reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s vehicle, a motion

to suppress would not have succeeded. Thus, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file

such a motion.

¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 25 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County.

¶ 26 Affirmed.

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