People v. Shafer

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Shafer

175 A.D.2d 564, 572 N.Y.S.2d 231, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10061

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 12, 1991

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 175 A.D.2d 564 (People v. Shafer) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Shafer, 175 A.D.2d 564, 572 N.Y.S.2d 231, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10061 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1991).

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Opinion

— Judgment unanimously af[565]*565firmed. Memorandum: We reject defendant’s contention that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial (see, CPL 30.20). Although nearly 23 months elapsed between defendant’s arrest and his trial date, the record demonstrates that most of that time was attributable to court scheduling and delay in addressing his suppression motion, "an excuse which fweighs less heavily’ against the State” (People v Watts, 86 AD2d 964, 964-965, affd 57 NY2d 299; see, People v Johnson, 38 NY2d 271, 279). Moreover, defendant was not incarcerated during the delay, and he has failed to establish any substantial prejudice resulting from the delay. After considering all of the relevant factors (see, People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445), we find that defendant’s constitutional rights were not abridged (see, People v Watts, supra).

We have examined defendant’s other contention and find it to be without merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Steuben County Court, Finnerty, J. — Felony Driving While Intoxicated.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Lawton, Lowery and Davis, JJ.

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— Judgment unanimously af[565]*565firmed. Memorandum: We reject defendant’s contention that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial (see, CPL 30.20). Although nearly 23 months elapsed between defendant’s arrest and his trial date, the record demonstrates that most of that time was attributable to court scheduling and delay in addressing his suppression motion, "an excuse which fweighs less heavily’ against the State” (People v Watts, 86 AD2d 964, 964-965, affd 57 NY2d 299; see, People v Johnson, 38 NY2d 271, 279). Moreover, defendant was not incarcerated during the delay, and he has failed to establish any substantial prejudice resulting from the delay. After considering all of the relevant factors (see, People v Taranovich, 37 NY2d 442, 445), we find that defendant’s constitutional rights were not abridged (see, People v Watts, supra).

We have examined defendant’s other contention and find it to be without merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Steuben County Court, Finnerty, J. — Felony Driving While Intoxicated.) Present — Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Lawton, Lowery and Davis, JJ.

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Bluebook (online)

175 A.D.2d 564, 572 N.Y.S.2d 231, 1991 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 10061, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-shafer-nyappdiv-1991.

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