People v. Seminario CA4/3

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 13, 2014
DocketG049064
StatusUnpublished

This text of People v. Seminario CA4/3 (People v. Seminario CA4/3) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Seminario CA4/3, (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).

Opinion

Filed 6/13/14 P. v. Seminario CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G049064

v. (Super. Ct. No. 13NF0659)

JAMES RANDALL SEMINARIO, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Roger B. Robbins, Judge. Affirmed. Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Karl T. Terp, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. * * * INTRODUCTION Defendant James Randall Seminario pled guilty to possessing child pornography. As part of his probation, he was required to participate in a treatment program, including periodic polygraph examinations. Defendant challenges this probation condition as requiring the waiver of his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and as overbroad. We reject the challenges. Defendant’s probation conditions specifically noted that the polygraph examination requirement did not constitute a waiver of his right against self-incrimination. Settled law holds required participation in polygraph examinations does not violate the privilege conferred by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Polygraph examinations are a necessary part of the state’s containment model for ensuring the public’s safety from sex offenders. The examinations are related to the subject crime and to defendant’s future criminality. We therefore affirm the judgment.

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Defendant was charged with one count of possessing child pornography, in violation of Penal Code section 311.11, subdivision (a). (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.) Defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement. The trial court placed defendant on five years’ formal probation, subject to terms and conditions, including that defendant serve 365 days in county jail, less presentence custody credits. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION Section 1203.067, subdivision (b), provides, in relevant part: “On or after July 1, 2012, the terms of probation for persons placed on formal probation for an offense

2 that requires registration pursuant to Sections 290 to 290.023, inclusive, shall include all of the following: [¶] . . . [¶] (2) Persons placed on formal probation on or after July 1, 2012, shall successfully complete a sex offender management program, following the standards developed pursuant to Section 9003, as a condition of release from probation. The length of the period in the program shall be not less than one year, up to the entire period of probation, as determined by the certified sex offender management professional in consultation with the probation officer and as approved by the court. [¶] (3) Waiver of any privilege against self-incrimination and participation in polygraph examinations, which shall be part of the sex offender management program.” Defendant’s conviction required him to register under section 290 et seq., and he was placed on probation after July 1, 2012, making section 1203.067, subdivision (b) applicable. Probation condition No. 20 required defendant to “[e]nroll in and complete and pay all costs of an outpatient and/or residential treatment program as directed by program provider, including psychological and psycho physical testing, to include periodic polygraph examinations. This does not constitute a waiver of your right against self-incrimination.”1 Defendant challenges section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) and probation condition No. 20 on the grounds they (1) impermissibly interfere with or compel the waiver of his constitutional right against self-incrimination, and (2) are unconstitutionally overbroad, both in general and as applied to defendant. The Attorney General argues

1 Although defendant entered a guilty plea, he objected to “the term and condition of probation that includes the polygraph,” preserving the issue for appeal. We reject the Attorney General’s argument that defendant forfeited this argument. Defendant’s probation conditions are at odds with section 1203.067, subdivision (b)(3) because the statutory requirement that defendant waive his right against self-incrimination has been specifically excluded. The Attorney General did not appeal from the probation conditions, so the issue of the propriety of that part of the probation conditions is not before us on appeal.

3 defendant’s constitutional argument regarding the right against self-incrimination is not yet ripe because there is no actual controversy involving defendant’s waiver of his Fifth Amendment privilege. Whether section 1203.067’s requirement that a probationer waive his or her right against self-incrimination is constitutional is not before us on this appeal, as the trial court specifically exempted defendant from that part of the statute. “‘[W]e do not reach constitutional questions unless absolutely required to do so to dispose of the matter before us.’ [Citations.]” (Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino (1995) 11 Cal.4th 220, 230.)2 Does the requirement that defendant complete a sex offender management program, and participate in polygraph examinations as part of that program, unconstitutionally force a waiver of defendant’s right against self-incrimination? No. This question was resolved more than 20 years ago. “Defendant asserts the polygraph requirement violates his privilege against self-incrimination. Defendant misconstrues the nature of the privilege. The privilege against self-incrimination is not self-executing; it must be claimed. [Citation.] Although defendant has a duty to answer the polygraph examiner’s questions truthfully, unless he invokes the privilege, shows a realistic threat of self-incrimination and nevertheless is required to answer, no violation of his right against self-incrimination is suffered. [Citation.] The mere requirement of taking the test in itself is insufficient to constitute an infringement of the privilege.” (People v. Miller (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1311, 1315; see Brown v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, 320 [“The fact that [the defendant] has a duty to answer the polygraph examiner’s question truthfully does not mean his answers are compelled within the meaning of the

2 We note that three published cases, all from the Sixth Appellate District, have reached differing conclusions on this issue. (People v. Klatt (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 906; People v. Friday (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 8; People v. Garcia (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1283.)

4 Fifth Amendment”].) In Minnesota v. Murphy (1984) 465 U.S. 420, 427, the United States Supreme Court held that the Fifth Amendment is not implicated when a probationer is required to participate in treatment and respond truthfully to any and all questions by his or her probation officer. We see no appreciable difference between the requirement that the defendant in Minnesota v. Murphy respond truthfully to his probation officer as a part of his treatment plan following a sexual offense, and the requirement here that defendant submit to polygraph examinations as part of his treatment following a sexual offense.

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Related

Minnesota v. Murphy
465 U.S. 420 (Supreme Court, 1984)
People v. Lent
541 P.2d 545 (California Supreme Court, 1975)
People v. Miller
208 Cal. App. 3d 1311 (California Court of Appeal, 1989)
Santa Clara County Local Transportation Authority v. Guardino
902 P.2d 225 (California Supreme Court, 1995)
Brown v. Superior Court
101 Cal. App. 4th 313 (California Court of Appeal, 2002)

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Bluebook (online)
People v. Seminario CA4/3, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-seminario-ca43-calctapp-2014.