People v. Segar

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Segar

137 A.D.3d 821, 25 N.Y.S.3d 685

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 24, 2016

Docket2013-05611

StatusPublished

This text of 137 A.D.3d 821 (People v. Segar) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Segar, 137 A.D.3d 821, 25 N.Y.S.3d 685 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2016).

Pincite

Opinion

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.), rendered January 7, 2013, convicting him of burglary in the second degree and robbery in the second degree, *822 upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to consecutive determinate terms of imprisonment of 15 years on the conviction of burglary in the second degree and 7 years on the conviction of robbery in the second degree, followed by a period of postrelease supervision.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of burglary in the second degree from 15 years to 11 years; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s arguments regarding the legal sufficiency of the identification evidence are un'preserved for appellate review (see People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484 [2008]; People v Phillips, 123 AD3d 1146 [2014]; People v Jean-Marie, 67 AD3d 704 [2009]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The sentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated herein (see People v Delgado, 80 NY2d 780 [1992]; People v Dell, 11 AD3d 631 [2004]; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 86 [1982]).

Rivera, J.P., Sgroi, Miller and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Marrus, J.), rendered January 7, 2013, convicting him of burglary in the second degree and robbery in the second degree, *822 upon a jury verdict, and sentencing him to consecutive determinate terms of imprisonment of 15 years on the conviction of burglary in the second degree and 7 years on the conviction of robbery in the second degree, followed by a period of postrelease supervision.

Ordered that the judgment is modified, as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of burglary in the second degree from 15 years to 11 years; as so modified, the judgment is affirmed.

The defendant’s arguments regarding the legal sufficiency of the identification evidence are un'preserved for appellate review (see People v Hawkins, 11 NY3d 484 [2008]; People v Phillips, 123 AD3d 1146 [2014]; People v Jean-Marie, 67 AD3d 704 [2009]). In any event, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution (see People v Contes, 60 NY2d 620 [1983]), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence (see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342 [2007]), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury’s opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor (see People v Mateo, 2 NY3d 383 [2004]; People v Bleakley, 69 NY2d 490 [1987]). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see People v Romero, 7 NY3d 633 [2006]).

The sentence imposed was excessive to the extent indicated herein (see People v Delgado, 80 NY2d 780 [1992]; People v Dell, 11 AD3d 631 [2004]; People v Suitte, 90 AD2d 80, 86 [1982]).

Rivera, J.P., Sgroi, Miller and Hinds-Radix, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

137 A.D.3d 821, 25 N.Y.S.3d 685, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-segar-nyappdiv-2016.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack