People v Sean S.
2026 NY Slip Op 04678
July 24, 2026
Appellate Division, Fourth Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT,
v
SEAN S., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
Decided on July 24, 2026
505 KA 22-00397
Present: Lindley, J.P., Montour, Ogden, Nowak, And Delconte, JJ.
ERICKSON WEBB SCOLTON & HAJDU, LAKEWOOD (LYLE T. HAJDU OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
MICHAEL J. KEANE, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BUFFALO (HARMONY A. HEALY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (M. William Boller, A.J.), entered December 15, 2021. The order denied defendant's application to be resentenced pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act.
[*1]
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from an order that denied his application for resentencing pursuant to the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) (see CPL 440.47; Penal Law § 60.12, as amended by L 2019, ch 31, § 1; L 2019, ch 55, § 1, part WW, § 1). We affirm.
The record establishes that, in November 1999, when defendant was 14 years old, he suggested to codefendant Benjamin Sweetwine that they rob Mario Sheppard because Sheppard had been " 'messing' " with defendant and had jewelry. Armed with loaded handguns, defendant and Sweetwine followed Sheppard down a street, pointed their guns at him, and forced him to hand over various items of jewelry and a jacket. During the ongoing armed robbery, a woman—Georgia Woods—pulled up in a van and questioned why defendant and Sweetwine were engaged in such conduct when they had just recently been released from a detention center. Defendant and Sweetwine each ran away, and Woods, now joined by Sheppard, pursued them in the van. After cornering defendant, Woods and Sheppard told him that they had called the police. Defendant implored Woods to pull away because he had a gun, although he reportedly assured her that it was not real. Sheppard ducked, and defendant fired two shots from his handgun, one of which fatally struck Woods in the right temple.
Defendant was subsequently indicted on various charges as a juvenile offender. Pursuant to a plea agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of robbery in the first degree (Penal Law § 160.15 [1]) and one count of murder in the second degree (§ 125.25 [3]). At the time that the presentence investigation report was prepared, defendant denied having any physical or sexual abuse issues in his past, although he did report being struck in the buttocks with a belt, which he did not consider to be physical abuse. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent sentences consisting of an indeterminate sentence of 3⅓ to 10 years of imprisonment on the robbery count and an indeterminate sentence of 9 years to life imprisonment on the murder count.
In July 2021—after having served over 20 years in prison—defendant filed an application for resentencing under the DVSJA, claiming that he was a victim of domestic violence at the time of the instant offenses, that the abuse was a significant contributing factor to his criminal behavior, and that the sentence previously imposed was unduly harsh in light of all the circumstances. Supreme Court conducted a hearing at which defendant presented no witnesses and instead relied exclusively on documentary evidence. Among his various submissions, defendant primarily relied on his own affidavit in which he described the poor conditions of his [*2]upbringing. Defendant averred, inter alia, that his father would occasionally beat him before the father was incarcerated when defendant was nine years old, which was about five years before the instant offenses; he additionally averred that his mother, at unspecified times, mistreated him whenever she could not obtain drugs and also engaged in physical violence against him. With respect to the criminal incident itself, defendant stated only that he had consumed so much alcohol and drugs that day that he was "in a pretty messed up state." The affidavit of defendant's half-sister also indicated that defendant grew up in abusive environments and further stated that defendant had been exposed to gangs and had access to guns at a young age.
The court determined that, at the time of the offenses, defendant had been the victim of physical, mental, and emotional abuse, although the severity of that abuse could not be determined. The court further held, however, that the abuse was not a significant contributing factor to defendant's criminal behavior. The court instead concluded that the unfortunate circumstances of defendant's upbringing without parental support, his unstable living situation, and his involvement with gangs were the only contributing factors in his criminal behavior.
Pursuant to the DVSJA, "[t]he court may impose an alternative sentence where it determines, upon a preponderance of the evidence following [a] hearing, that '(a) at the time of the instant offense, the defendant was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of the same family or household as the defendant . . . ; (b) such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior; [and] (c) having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, that a sentence of imprisonment pursuant to [Penal Law §§ 70.00, 70.02, 70.06 or 70.71 (2) or (3)] would be unduly harsh' " (People v Wendy B.-S., 229 AD3d 1317, 1319 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1022 [2024], quoting Penal Law § 60.12 [1]). As particularly relevant to the present appeal, in evaluating whether the abuse was "a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior" under the second prong of the DVSJA analysis (§ 60.12 [1] [b]), "a court should consider the cumulative effect of the abuse together with the events immediately surrounding the crime, paying particular attention to the circumstances under which [the] defendant was living and adopting a full picture approach in its review" (Wendy B.-S., 229 AD3d at 1319 [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Here, we agree with the People that, although defendant's proof established a less than ideal upbringing that was marked by earlier incidents of physical and mental abuse and parental neglect, his submissions fell short of establishing by the requisite preponderance of the evidence that his childhood trauma was a significant contributing factor in his criminal behavior against the victims (see People v Krista M.G., 228 AD3d 1300, 1301-1302 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1036 [2024]). Indeed, defendant "did not offer any proof [at the] hearing . . . or in [his] affi[davit], which was admitted in evidence, explaining how the alleged abuse influenced [his] behavior against the victim[s] on the [day] of the [robbery and] killing" (id. at 1302). To the contrary, when addressing the circumstances surrounding the criminal episode, defendant in his affidavit attributed the criminal behavior to his consumption of alcohol and drugs on the day of the incident, and the other evidence he submitted suggests that his criminal behavior against Sheppard was influenced by vindictive and materialistic concerns and that his criminal behavior against Woods was influenced by a desire to get away with the robbery (see People v Riley, 221 AD3d 1162, 1163-1164 [3d Dept 2023], lv denied 40 NY3d 1094 [2024]). Although defendant now attempts on appeal to create—through assertion alone—a plausible link between his childhood abuse and his psychological response when cornered by Woods, those assertions are without evidentiary support inasmuch as defendant "called no . . . witnesses at the hearing and provided no evidence of a medical, psychiatric or psychological nature indicating that his criminal actions were somehow related to [the] abuse" (People v Boyd P., 232 AD3d 1000, 1002 [3d Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 1006 [2025]).
The dissent responds by asserting that we are "impos[ing] a heightened standard here requiring that defendant refute every other cause." That accusation is demonstrably incorrect. As the foregoing analysis shows, we are requiring defendant to establish precisely and only what the second prong of the DVSJA analysis demands: that the subject "abuse was a significant contributing factor to the [applicant's] criminal behavior" (Penal Law § 60.12 [1] [b]). Although the applicant need not establish that the abuse was "the sole or even the primary cause" of the criminal behavior (People v Ava OO., 233 AD3d 1186, 1188 [3d Dept 2024]; see Wendy B.-S., 229 AD3d at 1320), the applicant must nonetheless demonstrate by a preponderance of the [*3]evidence that the abuse significantly influenced their criminal behavior against the victim or victims and, for the reasons previously set forth, defendant's proof failed to establish that link here (see Krista M.G., 228 AD3d at 1301-1302).
As the People point out, there are a limited number of cases in which courts have concluded that domestic abuse suffered by an applicant was a significant contributing factor to a crime that the applicant committed against a non-abuser third party, but those cases involve circumstances in which the abuser significantly influenced the applicant's criminal behavior (see e.g. Ava OO., 233 AD3d at 1188-1190; Wendy B.-S., 229 AD3d at 1320; People v Burns, 207 AD3d 646, 648-649 [2d Dept 2022]). Those cases align with the legislative intent underlying the enactment of the DVSJA, which was "primarily intended to apply in circumstances where domestic violence survivors committed a crime to protect themselves from their abuser, or because they were coerced by their abuser" (People v Croney, — AD3d —, —, 2026 NY Slip Op 00630, *1 [1st Dept 2026]).
In contrast, a conclusion that defendant here is entitled to resentencing under the DVSJA would align with neither the text of the statute nor its underlying legislative intent. Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, " '[t]he DVSJA was meant to target a specific type of unjust sentencing—not to provide a mechanism for all victims of childhood trauma to escape responsibility for their actions. Carrying psychological scars from the past and acting under the present influence of ongoing abuse are inherently different. It is only the latter which serves to reduce culpability, and which potentially qualifies for relief under the DVSJA' " (id.). "[T]he DVSJA's legislative history confirms that the statute was intended for a narrow set of circumstances involving a more direct connection between a defendant's abuse and the underlying crime"—as relevant here, a significant contributing factor to the criminal behavior against the victims—"which are not present" in the case before us (id.). In our view, to require that defendant be resentenced under the DVSJA on the proof before us, as proposed by the dissent, "would dramatically expand the universe of individuals for whom DVSJA resentencing would be possible, in contravention of the legislative intent" (id.).
Montour, Nowak, and Delconte, JJ., concur; Lindley, J.P., concurs in the result in the following memorandum: I agree with the majority that Supreme Court properly denied defendant's request for resentencing under the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA) (see CPL 440.47; Penal Law § 60.12). For the reasons articulated by the majority, I conclude that the court properly determined that defendant failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the abuse he suffered as a child was a "significant contributing factor" to his criminal behavior, as required for relief under the DVSJA (Penal Law § 60.12 [1] [b]; see People v Jazmine D.S., 243 AD3d 1204, 1206 [4th Dept 2025], lv denied 45 NY3d 937 [2026]; People v Gause, 230 AD3d 1573, 1576 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 43 NY3d 930 [2025]).
I write separately only to express my view that, even assuming, arguendo, that defendant met his burden of proof on the second prong of the DVSJA analysis by sufficiently linking his childhood abuse to the murder of the victim in this case, I would nevertheless deny the application for resentencing on the ground that, considering "the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant," the aggregate sentence imposed on defendant—nine years to life—is not "unduly harsh" (Penal Law § 60.12 [1] [c]). As the majority notes, defendant robbed someone at gunpoint and then shot a 40-year-old woman in the right temple, causing her death. The sentence imposed on defendant as a juvenile offender rendered him eligible for parole at age 23. Defendant has since been released from prison and is now under parole supervision, which would end if he were resentenced under the DVSJA. Under the circumstances, I conclude that defendant's application for resentencing fails at prongs two and three of the analysis (see § 60.12 [1][b], [c]).
Ogden, J., dissents and votes to reverse in accordance with the following memorandum: I respectfully dissent. This case arises from a 1999 crime during which defendant, then 14 years old, and a codefendant forcibly stole jewelry and a jacket from another person at gunpoint. During that incident, defendant shot and killed a woman who had called the police and then pursued defendant in her vehicle. In July 2021, defendant filed an application pursuant to CPL 440.47 seeking to be resentenced under Penal Law § 60.12 as a victim of domestic violence. I conclude that defendant is entitled to resentencing pursuant to section 60.12.
At the hearing, defendant was required to establish "that (a) at the time of the instant offense, the defendant was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of the same family or household as the defendant . . . ; (b) such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior; [and] (c) having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant," a standard sentence of imprisonment would be "unduly harsh" and a reduced sentence warranted (Penal Law § 60.12 [1]; see CPL 440.47 [2] [e]; People v Angela VV., 44 NY3d 1061, 1062 [2025]).
In reviewing Supreme Court's findings in this case, this Court may "substitute its own discretion regardless of any abuse of discretion by the lower court" and may "exercise 'independent fact-finding powers' to review a lower court's findings as to whether the evidence is sufficient to satisfy the DVSJA requirements" (People v Brenda WW., 44 NY3d 594, 601 [2025]; see People v Brown, 25 NY3d 973, 976 [2015]).
Although I agree with the finding that defendant "[a]t the time of the offense . . . had been the victim of physical, mental, and emotional abuse," I disagree with the finding of the hearing court and the majority with respect to the second prong. In my view, the physical, mental, and emotional abuse suffered by defendant was a significant contributing factor to his criminal behavior (seePenal Law § 60.12 [1] [b]).
When considering the second prong of the analysis, a court should "consider the cumulative effect of the abuse together with the events immediately surrounding the crime, paying particular attention to the circumstances under which [the] defendant was living and adopting a full picture approach in its review" (People v Wendy B.-S., 229 AD3d 1317, 1319 [4th Dept 2024], lv denied 42 NY3d 1022 [2024] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Here, I conclude that defendant established by a preponderance of the evidence the "significant" nexus between his abuse and his actions at the time of the crime (People v Burns, 207 AD3d 646, 648 [2d Dept 2022]). Defendant established that the abuse took place at a time when his "decision-making skills were still developing from adolescence through young adulthood" (People v Liz L., 221 AD3d 1288, 1292 [3d Dept 2023]). His chances at stability and compassion were consistently "frustrated by [his parents'] repeated misconduct" and abuse (id.). The connection between the abuse that defendant suffered, his missing decision-making skills, and his criminal actions are clear from the transcript of the sentencing proceeding and corroborated by a letter from his teacher that defendant submitted with his application for resentencing. At sentencing, defendant reflected on his growth since being in detention and confirmed that he had lacked certain skills. In her letter, the teacher indicated that defendant had "raised himself and didn't do a very good job" and further noted that he had no adult to support or guide him. She explained that she had been able to "establish a positive relationship with him" and that he was "willing to consider other ways of dealing with life."
In reaching this conclusion, I am mindful that the abuse need not be the "primary cause" of the criminal behavior (People v Ava OO., 233 AD3d 1186, 1188 [3d Dept 2024]). The majority, however, seeks to impose a heightened standard here requiring that defendant refute every other cause. Applying this Court's "full picture approach" (Wendy B.-S., 229 AD3d at 1319), I conclude that the abuse suffered by defendant at such a young age was a significant contributing factor to his criminal conduct. Under the circumstances of this case, "having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant," I further conclude that a standard sentence of imprisonment is unduly harsh and a reduced sentence is warranted (Penal Law § 60.12 [1] [c]). The majority's result ignores what I believe is the only logical conclusion that can flow from this record. I would therefore reverse the order, grant defendant's application, and remit the matter to Supreme Court for resentencing in accordance with Penal Law § 60.12.
Entered: July 24, 2026
Ann Dillon Flynn
Clerk of the Court