NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 180100-U March 10, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in th the limited circumstances allowed NO. 4-18-0100 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County MICHAEL SEAL, ) No. 09CF998 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) John Madonia, ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s posttrial mo- tion.
¶2 In November 2017, a jury found defendant, Michael Seal, guilty of first degree
murder, and the trial court later sentenced him to 40 years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing
only that the trial court failed to conduct (1) a pretrial Krankel inquiry and (2) a posttrial Krankel
inquiry. See People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984). We disagree and af-
firm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In November 2009, the State charged defendant with first degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2008)). The November 2017 jury trial at issue in this appeal at
which defendant was convicted was his second trial on that charge. Defendant’s first trial was an August 2012 bench trial at which the trial court found defendant guilty of first degree murder and
later sentenced him to 40 years in prison.
¶5 Because defendant’s arguments on appeal do not involve either the adequacy or
the nature of the evidence presented against him at trial, we refer to that evidence only to the ex-
tent necessary to put defendant’s arguments in the appropriate context.
¶6 A. Defendant’s First Trial
¶7 After the State charged defendant in November 2009 with first degree murder, the
Sangamon County public defender was appointed to represent him. As the parties prepared for
trial, defendant filed pro se numerous letters, affidavits, and motions complaining of the repre-
sentation provided for him by his attorney from the public defender’s office. Part of the diffi-
culty between defendant and his counsel, as counsel explained to the trial court in March 2011,
was that defendant wanted counsel to file motions counsel deemed frivolous and counsel refused
to file them.
¶8 Between February 2011 and March 2012, defendant pro se filed many motions
complaining about counsel, one of which asserted that his counsel “must abide by the client[’]s
decision as to how the representation is handled.” In March 2012, defendant pro se filed a “mo-
tion of ineffective assistance of counsel,” which contained numerous complaints about his coun-
sel’s representation.
¶9 Ultimately, in April 2012, defendant filed a “motion to proceed pro se,” alleging
that he was forced to represent himself because the court had refused to appoint new counsel, co-
counsel, or advisory counsel. In May 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s
motion, purportedly admonished him pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1,
1984), and additionally admonished him at length in accordance with the suggestions of this
-2- court in People v. Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1056-57, 661 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (1996). The
court thereafter accepted defendant’s waiver of counsel, and in July 2012, defendant waived his
right to a trial by jury.
¶ 10 In August 2012, the trial court conducted a bench trial at which defendant did not
testify. The court found defendant guilty of first degree murder and appointed counsel to assist
defendant with posttrial motions and at sentencing. In July 2013, the court conducted a sentenc-
ing hearing and sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison.
¶ 11 B. Defendant’s First Appeal
¶ 12 Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that his pretrial waiver of counsel was
invalid because the trial court did not provide him with the admonitions required by Rule 401 be-
fore accepting that waiver. This court agreed with defendant’s argument, reversed his convic-
tion, and remanded for a new trial. People v. Seal, 2015 IL App (4th) 130775, 38 N.E.3d 642
(Seal I). In so concluding, this court noted that in November 2009 defendant (1) first appeared
on this charge, (2) was provided with a copy of the charge against him, and (3) was advised of
the possible penalties he faced. However, nearly 2½ years after defendant was initially so ad-
vised, the trial court did not again admonish him regarding these matters pursuant to Rule 401
when defendant stated he wished to proceed pro se. Instead, the court only advised defendant of
the problems he would likely face as a pro se defendant as this court described them in Williams.
¶ 13 The flavor of the trial court proceedings at defendant’s first trial was captured in a
special concurrence written in Seal I by this order’s author:
“Defendant, convicted of first degree murder, gamed the system and got
away with it. Although I agree with the majority opinion, I write this special con-
currence to emphasize the mistakes the trial court made in this case. I do so in the
-3- hope that this discussion will keep other trial courts from committing the same er-
rors.
The fundamental error the trial court committed was granting credence to
defendant’s unceasing complaints about his court-appointed lawyers and then
changing those lawyers in a predictably vain effort to somehow assuage defend-
ant.
***
The trial court’s other key error in the handling of this difficult defendant
was the court’s indulging him with regard to his spurious pro se motions. Having
once explained to defendant that there was no such thing as hybrid representation
and that he could either have the services of court-appointed counsel or represent
himself, the court (at a hearing with defendant present) should have routinely
stricken all pro se motions filed by defendant that his counsel did not adopt and
pursue. The court was under no obligation to consider any of these motions and
erred by doing so.” Seal I, ¶¶ 38-39, 47 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring).
¶ 14 C. Defendant’s Second Trial
¶ 15 On remand, the trial court granted defendant’s request to be represented by court-
appointed counsel and again appointed the Sangamon County public defender to represent de-
fendant. Defendant again began to file pro se various motions, including one that complained it
was prejudicial and a “conflict of interest” to force him to accept as counsel an attorney that de-
fendant had previously fired. He also complained about that attorney’s failure to raise certain
factual issues.
¶ 16 Months later, defendant’s counsel indicated that defendant had a change of heart
-4- and was then consenting to his representation. However, after defendant’s counsel informed the
court that due to his caseload with respect to other clients charged with murder, he would not be
able to proceed with defendant’s case for at least five months, defendant then stated he wished to
proceed pro se. Ultimately, the trial court granted defendant’s request to represent himself, and
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOTICE FILED This order was filed under Supreme 2020 IL App (4th) 180100-U March 10, 2020 Court Rule 23 and may not be cited Carla Bender as precedent by any party except in th the limited circumstances allowed NO. 4-18-0100 4 District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). Court, IL IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee ) Circuit Court of v. ) Sangamon County MICHAEL SEAL, ) No. 09CF998 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) John Madonia, ) Judge Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Knecht and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s posttrial mo- tion.
¶2 In November 2017, a jury found defendant, Michael Seal, guilty of first degree
murder, and the trial court later sentenced him to 40 years in prison. Defendant appeals, arguing
only that the trial court failed to conduct (1) a pretrial Krankel inquiry and (2) a posttrial Krankel
inquiry. See People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984). We disagree and af-
firm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In November 2009, the State charged defendant with first degree murder (720
ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1), (2) (West 2008)). The November 2017 jury trial at issue in this appeal at
which defendant was convicted was his second trial on that charge. Defendant’s first trial was an August 2012 bench trial at which the trial court found defendant guilty of first degree murder and
later sentenced him to 40 years in prison.
¶5 Because defendant’s arguments on appeal do not involve either the adequacy or
the nature of the evidence presented against him at trial, we refer to that evidence only to the ex-
tent necessary to put defendant’s arguments in the appropriate context.
¶6 A. Defendant’s First Trial
¶7 After the State charged defendant in November 2009 with first degree murder, the
Sangamon County public defender was appointed to represent him. As the parties prepared for
trial, defendant filed pro se numerous letters, affidavits, and motions complaining of the repre-
sentation provided for him by his attorney from the public defender’s office. Part of the diffi-
culty between defendant and his counsel, as counsel explained to the trial court in March 2011,
was that defendant wanted counsel to file motions counsel deemed frivolous and counsel refused
to file them.
¶8 Between February 2011 and March 2012, defendant pro se filed many motions
complaining about counsel, one of which asserted that his counsel “must abide by the client[’]s
decision as to how the representation is handled.” In March 2012, defendant pro se filed a “mo-
tion of ineffective assistance of counsel,” which contained numerous complaints about his coun-
sel’s representation.
¶9 Ultimately, in April 2012, defendant filed a “motion to proceed pro se,” alleging
that he was forced to represent himself because the court had refused to appoint new counsel, co-
counsel, or advisory counsel. In May 2012, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s
motion, purportedly admonished him pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 401 (eff. July 1,
1984), and additionally admonished him at length in accordance with the suggestions of this
-2- court in People v. Williams, 277 Ill. App. 3d 1053, 1056-57, 661 N.E.2d 1186, 1189 (1996). The
court thereafter accepted defendant’s waiver of counsel, and in July 2012, defendant waived his
right to a trial by jury.
¶ 10 In August 2012, the trial court conducted a bench trial at which defendant did not
testify. The court found defendant guilty of first degree murder and appointed counsel to assist
defendant with posttrial motions and at sentencing. In July 2013, the court conducted a sentenc-
ing hearing and sentenced defendant to 40 years in prison.
¶ 11 B. Defendant’s First Appeal
¶ 12 Defendant appealed his conviction, arguing that his pretrial waiver of counsel was
invalid because the trial court did not provide him with the admonitions required by Rule 401 be-
fore accepting that waiver. This court agreed with defendant’s argument, reversed his convic-
tion, and remanded for a new trial. People v. Seal, 2015 IL App (4th) 130775, 38 N.E.3d 642
(Seal I). In so concluding, this court noted that in November 2009 defendant (1) first appeared
on this charge, (2) was provided with a copy of the charge against him, and (3) was advised of
the possible penalties he faced. However, nearly 2½ years after defendant was initially so ad-
vised, the trial court did not again admonish him regarding these matters pursuant to Rule 401
when defendant stated he wished to proceed pro se. Instead, the court only advised defendant of
the problems he would likely face as a pro se defendant as this court described them in Williams.
¶ 13 The flavor of the trial court proceedings at defendant’s first trial was captured in a
special concurrence written in Seal I by this order’s author:
“Defendant, convicted of first degree murder, gamed the system and got
away with it. Although I agree with the majority opinion, I write this special con-
currence to emphasize the mistakes the trial court made in this case. I do so in the
-3- hope that this discussion will keep other trial courts from committing the same er-
rors.
The fundamental error the trial court committed was granting credence to
defendant’s unceasing complaints about his court-appointed lawyers and then
changing those lawyers in a predictably vain effort to somehow assuage defend-
ant.
***
The trial court’s other key error in the handling of this difficult defendant
was the court’s indulging him with regard to his spurious pro se motions. Having
once explained to defendant that there was no such thing as hybrid representation
and that he could either have the services of court-appointed counsel or represent
himself, the court (at a hearing with defendant present) should have routinely
stricken all pro se motions filed by defendant that his counsel did not adopt and
pursue. The court was under no obligation to consider any of these motions and
erred by doing so.” Seal I, ¶¶ 38-39, 47 (Steigmann, J., specially concurring).
¶ 14 C. Defendant’s Second Trial
¶ 15 On remand, the trial court granted defendant’s request to be represented by court-
appointed counsel and again appointed the Sangamon County public defender to represent de-
fendant. Defendant again began to file pro se various motions, including one that complained it
was prejudicial and a “conflict of interest” to force him to accept as counsel an attorney that de-
fendant had previously fired. He also complained about that attorney’s failure to raise certain
factual issues.
¶ 16 Months later, defendant’s counsel indicated that defendant had a change of heart
-4- and was then consenting to his representation. However, after defendant’s counsel informed the
court that due to his caseload with respect to other clients charged with murder, he would not be
able to proceed with defendant’s case for at least five months, defendant then stated he wished to
proceed pro se. Ultimately, the trial court granted defendant’s request to represent himself, and
this time the court correctly admonished defendant pursuant to Rule 401.
¶ 17 At defendant’s October 2017 jury trial, the State presented essentially the same
evidence that it presented at defendant’s first trial, and the jury convicted defendant of first de-
gree murder.
¶ 18 Defendant pro se filed several posttrial motions, and in some of them, he com-
plained about his court-appointed counsel at his original trial (before he elected to proceed pro se
in that proceeding). At the hearing on defendant’s posttrial motions, the trial court did not ask
him any questions about his complaints about his trial counsel from his first trial and later sen-
tenced him again to 40 years in prison.
¶ 19 This appeal followed.
¶ 20 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 21 On appeal, defendant argues only that the trial court failed to a conduct (1) a pre-
trial Krankel inquiry and (2) a posttrial Krankel inquiry. For the reasons that follow, we reject
both of these contentions and affirm.
¶ 22 A. Defendant’s Claim That The Trial Court Failed To Conduct a Pretrial Krankel Inquiry
¶ 23 Defendant first argues that the trial court failed to conduct a pretrial Krankel hear-
ing. Defendant bases this claim upon his contention that on remand for a new trial, defendant
asserted (1) he had a “potential conflict of interest” with the assistant public defender who was
representing him and (2) the trial judge, who did not preside over his first trial, therefore should
-5- have conducted a limited inquiry into the nature of any possible conflict by questioning defend-
ant or his counsel or both. Defendant asserts the following in support of his contention:
“While [defendant] eventually elected to forego counsel and proceed
pro se, the record demonstrates that he felt he was forced to do so. [Defendant]
expressed that he wanted the assistance of counsel, but he did not believe that [his
court-appointed counsel] had his best interests in mind because he had previously
fired him.”
We conclude that defendant’s claims are totally without merit.
¶ 24 The first problem with defendant’s claim is that it violates the holding of People
v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 22, 88 N.E.3d 732, in which the Illinois Supreme Court recently had
occasion to address when a Krankel hearing should be held and wrote the following: “The State
argues a claim of ineffective assistance in any communication to the court would necessitate an
inquiry and, thus, a circuit court would be required to ‘minutely scrutinize’ every pro se filing for
such a complaint. We disagree. Krankel is limited to posttrial motions.” (Emphasis in original.)
¶ 25 Defendant’s rather weak response to this holding by the Illinois Supreme Court is
to argue that the above quote “was dicta.” We find that contention singularly unpersuasive given
that the Illinois Supreme Court has always described the need for a Krankel hearing as occurring
when a defendant raises a question posttrial as to whether his trial counsel was ineffective; that
court has never held that a Krankel hearing was needed or appropriate when, as here, a defendant
has raised a pretrial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d at 189. See
also People v. Patrick, 2011 IL 111666, ¶ 32, 960 N.E.2d 1114 (“Following Krankel, this court
clarified that newly appointed counsel is not automatically required in every case when a defend-
ant presents a pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel”) (emphasis
-6- added)); People v. Jocko, 239 Ill. 2d 87, 92, 940 N.E.2d 59, 62 (2010) (“because Strickland
claims cannot be resolved prior to trial, Krankel is inapposite in that context”). Just a few weeks
ago, the Illinois Supreme Court reiterated this point in People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352 ¶ 34,
wherein the court wrote the following: “A pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance
of counsel is governed by the common-law procedure developed by this court in Krankel, [cita-
tion] and refined by its progeny.” (Emphasis added.)
¶ 26 What makes defendant’s claim even more peculiar is that he elected to represent
himself at trial, so essentially he is asserting that his claimed problems with his then-court-ap-
pointed counsel (before he elected to proceed pro se) somehow can now be obliquely resurrected
so that he can claim he was forced to proceed pro se because of disagreements with that counsel.
None of this makes any legal sense, and we reject it all.
¶ 27 B. Defendant’s Claim That The Trial Court Failed To Conduct A Posttrial Krankel Inquiry
¶ 28 As meritless as defendant’s former argument was, this argument has even less
merit, bordering on the bizarre. Defendant’s fundamental problem with this claim is that he
elected to go to trial pro se; thus, his claim that the trial court should have conducted a Krankel
inquiry—apparently to inquire into his claims of ineffective assistance of the counsel he did not
have—simply makes no sense at all.
¶ 29 In this regard, we refer again to the special concurrence that we earlier quoted,
noting how the defendant successfully had gamed the system with regard to his initial conviction
for first degree murder. With our rejection of his arguments now on appeal, his days of gaming
the system are over.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
-7- ¶ 32 Affirmed.
-8-