NOTICE 2025 IL App (5th) 230321-U NOTICE Decision filed 01/28/25. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-0321 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Effingham County. ) v. ) No. 20-CF-256 ) DEREK D. SCHORMAN, ) Honorable ) Allan F. Lolie Jr., Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE CATES delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and Sholar concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The circuit court’s denial of reputation testimony was harmless error. The State had proven the essential elements of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and defense counsel was not ineffective in eliciting additional testimony regarding the defendant’s age.
¶2 After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual abuse and
sentenced to four years of probation and 180 days in jail. The defendant appeals the circuit court’s
decision to exclude a defense witness who would have testified that the victim had a reputation for
dishonesty. The defendant additionally argues that he received ineffective assistance where
defense counsel presented testimony of the defendant’s age, an essential element of aggravated
criminal sexual abuse, after the State failed to prove that the defendant was over 17 years old at
the time of the offense. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant’s convictions and
sentence. 1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 On October 5, 2020, Derek Schorman, the defendant, was charged by information with
aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(c)(1)(i) (West 2020)). He had allegedly
touched the vagina of 10-year-old M.W. with his hand. The defendant, born on December 26,
1976, was M.W.’s uncle.
¶5 The three-day jury trial began on January 23, 2023, with jury selection. On that same day,
the State filed a motion in limine to bar testimony of M.W.’s reputation for truthfulness.
Specifically, the State sought to exclude the reputation testimony of one of M.W.’s aunts, Sarah
Flowers.
¶6 On the second day of trial, January 24, 2023, the circuit court addressed the pending
motions in limine, including the State’s motion to bar reputation testimony, in chambers and
outside of the presence of the jury. The State argued that the defense only disclosed Flowers’s
personal experiences of M.W.’s dishonesty. The State additionally argued that Flowers lived in a
different community than M.W. and Flowers was without knowledge of M.W.’s general reputation
within her own community. The circuit court reserved its ruling until the defense presented an
offer of proof.
¶7 After the circuit court addressed the motions in limine, the jury trial resumed, and the
parties presented opening statements. The State presented testimony from David Kinkelaar, a
deputy with the Effingham County Sheriff’s Department. Kinkelaar was dispatched to respond to
the complaint of sexual assault involving M.W. Kinkelaar spoke to M.W.’s mother, Nicole
Westendorf (Mother), regarding the complaint that M.W. had been inappropriately touched by her
uncle, the defendant, on several occasions during the time period of July of 2020 to August of
2 2020. Because M.W. was a minor, Kinkelaar refrained from interviewing M.W. Rather, she was
interviewed at the Child Advocacy Center (CAC) by a forensic interviewer.
¶8 Mother testified next and explained that the defendant was married to her husband’s sister.
At family functions, M.W. enjoyed spending time with the defendant’s oldest daughter, O.S., who
was three or four in 2020. Mother testified that on July 12, 2020, the defendant’s youngest
daughter, D.S., was baptized. Fifteen to 20 family members gathered at the defendant’s house after
the baptism to celebrate.
¶9 Approximately a month after the baptism, M.W. told Mother that the defendant had
touched her “no-no parts” when she was watching television in the defendant’s basement on the
day of the baptism. The defendant had “rubbed” M.W.’s vagina over her underwear.
¶ 10 M.W. had also informed Mother that the defendant had touched her multiple times during
a weekend camping trip. Mother testified to the details of what occurred including that the
defendant rubbed M.W.’s vagina when he tucked her in the first night of the camping trip. He also
asked M.W. if it “tickled.” The next day, the defendant rubbed M.W.’s nipples under her shirt
when she was watching a movie with the defendant and O.S. M.W. also told Mother that the
defendant had placed M.W.’s hand on his “private parts” three or four times. M.W. kept pulling
her hand away and the defendant would move it back. On the second evening of the camping trip,
the defendant tucked the children into bed and touched M.W. again, even though M.W. had tried
to tuck her blanket tightly around herself to prevent the defendant from touching her.
¶ 11 After M.W. told Mother about the incidents, Mother had M.W. repeat the allegations to
M.W.’s father and grandparents. Mother additionally video recorded M.W. describing the
incidents. Mother used the recording to confront the defendant, and he denied the allegations. The
video recording of M.W. was published for the jury and admitted into evidence.
3 ¶ 12 Mother reported the defendant to law enforcement and the Department of Children and
Family Services (DCFS) approximately a month after M.W. had informed her about the incidents.
Mother testified that she did not immediately report the defendant because he was family. Mother’s
family had attended another baptism and the defendant was present, but otherwise Mother and her
family stopped attending most family functions.
¶ 13 After Mother’s testimony concluded, M.W. testified that she was 12 years old and in the
seventh grade at the time of the trial. The defendant was her uncle, and she had not been allowed
to see the defendant for two years because she had been “touched inappropriately.”
¶ 14 M.W. testified that when she was 10 years old, she attended her cousin’s baptism. She had
worn a dress to the baptism. After D.S. was baptized and everyone returned to the defendant’s
house, the children played in the defendant’s basement and watched a movie. The children watched
the movie from in front of the couch in the basement, but M.W. stayed behind the couch. M.W.
explained that she laid inside of a foldable tube that children crawl through, which was covered in
blankets, and the tube was on top of a small trampoline.
¶ 15 M.W. testified that the defendant appeared in the basement while they watched the movie,
and he had looked inside the tube. The defendant touched M.W. for a few seconds on her “lower
inappropriate part,” under her dress and over her underwear. M.W. did not immediately tell anyone
about being touched by the defendant.
¶ 16 M.W. testified to additional incidents where she was inappropriately touched by the
defendant. M.W. had joined the defendant, his two children, and his wife on a two-day camping
trip approximately a month after the initial incident. M.W. testified that during the first evening,
the defendant had touched her on top of her underwear “in the lower private area while tucking
4 me in.” M.W. further testified that when the defendant was touching her vagina inappropriately,
he had asked her if it “tickled.”
¶ 17 The following afternoon, on the camping trip, M.W. watched a movie with O.S. and the
defendant inside of the camper. M.W. testified that the defendant was sitting next to her, and he
rubbed her chest. She could not remember if he touched her on top or underneath of her shirt.
M.W.’s aunt who was married to the defendant began to open the door of the camper, and the
defendant stopped touching M.W. before the door fully opened. Her aunt was inside the camper
for approximately a minute. After she left, defendant grabbed M.W.’s hand and put it “on his
private part.” When M.W. removed her hand, he placed it back. After the defendant repeated
placing M.W.’s hand on his private area, M.W. took O.S. outside to get away from the defendant.
¶ 18 M.W. further testified that on the second night of camping, she tried to tuck the blankets
underneath herself to prevent the defendant from touching her. M.W. was unable to prevent the
defendant from touching her again on her vagina. After he touched her, the defendant said
goodnight and left the sleeping area.
¶ 19 Approximately a month later, M.W. told Mother about the multiple incidents. M.W.
explained that she was afraid to say anything initially, and she did not know how to tell anyone.
M.W. was asked to identify her uncle in the courtroom and she pointed to the defendant.
¶ 20 On cross-examination, the defense emphasized discrepancies between M.W.’s trial
testimony and the CAC interview regarding the incident that occurred in the defendant’s basement
on the day of the baptism. The State stipulated to those discrepancies that M.W. made during the
CAC interview, which were contrary to M.W.’s trial testimony. The State additionally stipulated
that during the CAC interview, M.W. had stated that the defendant touched her for “a great while”
and she had also stated that it was for “a minute or two.” The circuit court explained that a
5 stipulation meant that the State agreed with what was said during the CAC interview, and that the
CAC interview video would be shown to the jury in its entirety.
¶ 21 The defense then questioned M.W. about the camping incident. M.W. could not recall
information from the CAC interview regarding where the defendant had touched her. The State
stipulated that during the CAC interview, M.W. stated that the defendant touched her breast area
and her vagina in the afternoon. The State also stipulated that during the CAC interview, M.W.
had stated that the defendant touched her breasts and vagina Saturday evening, which was contrary
to M.W.’s trial testimony.
¶ 22 The defense then questioned M.W. on the video recording made by Mother that had
previously been published to the jury. M.W. was aware of the video but she could not recall
statements made on the video. The State stipulated that on the video, M.W. stated that on Friday
night the defendant had touched her when he tucked her in, then he tucked his daughter in, and
then he stood up and had inappropriately touched M.W. again. M.W. additionally testified that the
incidents occurred over two years prior to the trial date, and she could not recall all the details.
M.W. remembered that the defendant had touched her and that she was telling the truth to the best
of her recollection.
¶ 23 After M.W.’s testimony concluded, Amber Edmonds, the CAC forensic interviewer,
testified that she interviewed M.W. in September of 2020. Edmonds testified that the interview
was video recorded, and the CAC interview, which was previously referenced during M.W.’s
cross-examination, was published to the jury. Edmonds also testified that M.W. was consistent
with her statements during the interview.
¶ 24 Joseph Solan, a detective with the Effingham County Sheriff’s Department, testified that
he was involved in the investigation related to M.W.’s allegations against the defendant. Because
6 the events had occurred over a month prior to the reporting, no physical evidence was obtained.
Solan had interviewed Mark Westendorf, an uncle of M.W.’s, who had attended the baptism and
family gathering at the defendant’s house. Mark provided a statement that M.W. was downstairs
with the other children on the day of the baptism. The defendant went downstairs “to let the kids
know it was time for cake and ice-cream.” Solan found this information significant because it was
consistent with M.W.’s statement of why the defendant went downstairs.
¶ 25 The State rested at the end of the second day of trial. The defense moved for a directed
verdict and argued that no evidence demonstrated any type of sexual gratification. The defense
further argued that there were contradictions in the witness testimony and mere suspicion was not
sufficient to satisfy the legal requirements in this matter. The State argued that sufficient evidence
was presented for the jury to find all of the elements of the offense. The circuit court denied the
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict.
¶ 26 On the third day of trial, the defense informed the circuit court that it intended to call
Flowers as an impeachment witness. The defense proceeded with an offer of proof outside the
presence of the jury. The defense stated that it expected Flowers to testify that she was a member
of M.W.’s family, that M.W. and Flowers were members of the same community, and Flowers
was familiar with M.W.’s reputation in the community for embellishing stories to become the
center of attention. The State responded that the only information the defense had disclosed on
Flowers failed to include M.W.’s reputation in the community. Rather, the disclosed statements
included specific examples of personal experiences which shaped Flowers’s opinion of M.W.
¶ 27 The circuit court then proceeded with an inquiry of Flowers, outside of the presence of the
jury. Flowers testified that M.W. was her niece, she had known M.W. for her entire life, and they
spend time together several times a year at family gatherings.
7 ¶ 28 The defense asked Flowers is she was “familiar with [M.W.’s] reputation amongst family
members, friends, other members of the community for truthfulness?” The State objected and the
circuit court sustained the objection. The defense rephrased the question and asked if Flowers was
familiar with M.W.’s reputation in the community for truthfulness. Flowers answered that she was
familiar with M.W.’s reputation and explained that they were “in the same family within the
community” and that M.W. was “a frequent topic of conversation.” The defense then inquired if
that conversation was about M.W.’s reputation for truthfulness. The State objected and the circuit
court sustained the objection. The defense proceeded to rephase its questions and asked Flowers
about the time frame regarding M.W.’s reputation for truthfulness. Flowers responded that there
were “several instances within the family discussing it.” Flowers was asked about other members
of the community, besides family, and Flowers responded,
“I’m not dialing in on one particular person that has come forward to me, but just I mean she is just a topic at school children or my niece or my cousin will talk about. I have had her brother spend the night at my house before and he’s talked about her.”
¶ 29 The defense further questioned Flowers on whether she had knowledge of anyone besides
family members who had discussed M.W.’s reputation. Flowers responded that she was related to
a “lot of people within the community” and she had “2 to 3,000” family members in the
surrounding counties. According to Flowers, M.W.’s reputation in the community was that
“[M.W.] likes to make up stories to be the center of attention” and that it was more than immediate
family who were aware of M.W.’s reputation for truthfulness. Flowers testified that she was aware
of M.W.’s reputation in 2019, 2020, and that “this has been ongoing it’s kinda talked about as
well.”
¶ 30 Flowers named Angie Sipes, as an unrelated person who was familiar with M.W.’s
reputation. Sipes worked with Flowers in 2019 and 2020. Flowers could not remember when she
8 had a conversation with Sipes about M.W.’s reputation, but Flowers believed it occurred within a
year of July of 2020. Flowers testified that Sipes shared information when they were in “public.”
Flowers was further questioned on the context of her conversation with Snipes regarding M.W.’s
reputation and Flowers responded,
“Just topic of conversation while working. Just she had seen her out and about in public or a dance recital that was going on and just started conversation.”
Flowers then testified that she was “not sure” if anyone besides Sipes had discussed M.W.’s
reputation for truthfulness with Flowers.
¶ 31 Flowers additionally testified that she lived in Mason, Illinois, and not in Heartville,
Illinois, where M.W. lived. Flowers acknowledged that the testimony of M.W.’s character was
based on family discussions and personal experiences, except for the conversation that Flowers
had with Sipes.
¶ 32 The defense argued that Flowers had a large family, and her family members were
members of the community. Flowers’s blood relationship with members of the community should
not disqualify her testimony about M.W.’s reputation in the community. The State argued that
Flowers testified to discussions with immediate family members and testimony on M.W.’s
reputation in the community was vague. Flowers was unable to remember when she had
conversations with Sipes and provided no context regarding those conversations. The State further
argued that a conversation with one person who may have been a member of the community was
insufficient to qualify Flowers to provide testimony of M.W.’s reputation in the community.
¶ 33 The circuit court found that Flowers was evasive when she testified and never stated that
she knew of M.W.’s reputation in her community. Flowers had only testified that Sipes had said
“something,” but testimony of M.W.’s reputation in the community was never developed. The use
of reputation testimony by Flowers was denied.
9 ¶ 34 The trial resumed and B.M. testified for the defense. B.M. was 15 years old, and the
defendant was B.M.’s godfather. B.M. attended D.S.’s baptism and was in the basement with the
other children on the day of the baptism. They had made a fort out of the trampoline, and they
watched a movie. B.M. testified that she could not see the television from the trampoline because
it was behind the couch. The defendant was in the basement for less than a minute, to tell the
children that it was time for cake and ice cream. B.M. additionally testified that M.W. never
appeared upset that day. Photographs of the defendant’s basement were taken approximately two
weeks prior to trial based on B.M.’s recollection of the event and admitted into evidence.
¶ 35 Laura Schorman, the defendant’s wife, testified that she had been in a relationship with the
defendant for 15 years and they were married for 11 of those years. They had two daughters and
their youngest, D.S., was baptized on July 12, 2020. After the church service, family members and
other guests went to the Schormans’ home for lunch and cake and ice cream. Eight children were
at the gathering, and they were in the basement before the defendant went downstairs to the
basement to ask the children to join for cake and ice cream. He was in the basement for less than
a minute. Laura testified that nothing appeared unusual about the defendant’s behavior or M.W.’s
behavior during the gathering.
¶ 36 Laura was present for the camping trip that occurred a couple weeks after the baptism.
Laura’s daughters and M.W. slept in a 53-foot fifth wheel camper with Laura and the defendant.
Laura testified that the defendant had hurt his back when they were setting up the campsite. The
defendant tucked the children in at night and Laura was in the main area of the camper
approximately five feet from the beds. Laura testified that the defendant was in the bunk bed area
for less than a minute.
10 ¶ 37 Laura testified that the following day, the defendant was watching television from the
couch inside the camper because his back was bothering him. The children went in and out of the
camper all day and had watched television with the defendant. Laura testified that she was caring
for D.S., her baby that had been baptized a few weeks before the camping trip. Laura was going
in and out of the camper all day long to change D.S.’s diaper, grab items for D.S., or to help the
other children. That evening, the defendant tucked the girls into bed again. Laura testified that he
was in the back bedroom for a shorter amount of time than Friday night because his back pain had
increased. M.W. never mentioned anything to Laura about the defendant and Laura testified that
M.W. never appeared upset during the camping trip.
¶ 38 Laura testified that she was present when Mother confronted the defendant about the
allegations made by M.W. Mother had shown a video of M.W. stating what had happened. Laura
testified that the video from that day was different from the video that was played in the courtroom.
Laura additionally testified to the defendant’s reputation in the community. She testified that the
defendant “would do anything for anyone,” and he had a reputation for honesty and truthfulness.
¶ 39 The defense rested after Laura’s testimony concluded. The defendant did not testify. After
the parties presented closing arguments, the jury deliberated and found the defendant guilty of
aggravated criminal sexual abuse.
¶ 40 The defendant filed a posttrial motion and argued that the State failed to prove the main
elements of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, the State failed to prove the
defendant’s age as no witnesses had testified to the defendant’s age and no circumstantial evidence
was presented which would have proven the defendant’s age. The defendant additionally argued
that the circuit court erred by denying the defense the opportunity to present character evidence of
M.W.
11 ¶ 41 The State responded that it was required to prove that the defendant was over the age of 17
and were not required to prove the defendant’s actual age. The facts showed there was adequate
evidence presented regarding the witness in general, including that he was married to Laura, which
was sufficient for the jury to infer that the defendant was over 17 years old. Additionally, the jury
was able to observe the defendant in the courtroom.
¶ 42 The State also argued that the circuit court made the correct ruling regarding the testimony
of M.W.’s reputation for truthfulness where Flowers was found to be evasive during the in camera
examination. The circuit court denied the defendant’s posttrial motion and proceeded to
sentencing.
¶ 43 The defendant was sentenced to the maximum four years of probation, and 180 days in jail,
subject to work release. This appeal followed.
¶ 44 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 45 On appeal, the defendant argues that the circuit court erred in excluding a defense witness’s
testimony of the victim’s reputation for dishonesty. The defendant additionally argues that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel where trial counsel presented testimony of the
defendant’s age, an essential element of the charge of aggravated criminal sexual abuse, after the
State failed to prove that the defendant was over 17 years old at the time of the offense.
¶ 46 A. Reputation Testimony
¶ 47 A witness may be impeached by testimony showing a bad reputation for truthfulness.
People v. Clauson, 261 Ill. App. 3d 373, 377 (1994). An offer of proof regarding reputation
testimony, outside of the presence of a jury, must be made to establish the foundation prerequisite
to the admission of the testimony during trial. Clauson, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 377. “The reputation
witness must be shown to have adequate knowledge of the subject.” People v. Bascomb, 74 Ill.
12 App. 3d 392, 395 (1979). For reputation testimony to be allowed at trial, the general reputation of
the defendant’s truthfulness in the neighborhood in which the defendant lives or at the defendant’s
workplace must be established. People v. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d 1, 21 (1990). Reputation testimony
cannot be based on the witness’s observations or opinions. People v. Dorff, 77 Ill. App. 3d 882,
888 (1979).
¶ 48 Impeachment of a witness’s reputation for truthfulness is allowed regardless of the age of
the witness. People v. Cookson, 215 Ill. 2d 194, 213 (2005). Additionally, the reputation testimony
“must relate to the witness’ reputation at the time of trial.” People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 173
(1998). The circuit court has discretion to determine whether a witness is sufficiently qualified to
testify to the reputation of another witness and that decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse
of discretion. Clauson, 261 Ill. App. 3d at 377.
¶ 49 The defense presented the testimony of Flowers, outside of the presence of the jury, to
establish that M.W. had a reputation in the community “to make up stories to be the center of
attention.” Flowers’s testimony was mainly based on her personal knowledge of M.W.’s reputation
prior to July of 2020, and was derived from conversations with relatives. Flowers also testified
that conversations regarding M.W. were ongoing and she considered a large amount of people in
the community to be relatives. Flowers testified that she was familiar with M.W.’s reputation in
the community.
¶ 50 The circuit court determined that the defense had not developed a proper foundation to
impeach M.W. regarding her reputation for truthfulness where Flowers was evasive during her
testimony. While the circuit court has discretion to admit such testimony, we find that the circuit
court abused its discretion by not admitting the testimony of Flowers.
13 ¶ 51 We also consider whether the error, if any, was harmless. If the evidence supporting the
conviction of a defendant is so overwhelming that the defendant would have been convicted
without the error, then the error may be deemed harmless. People v. Kucharski, 346 Ill. App. 3d
655, 663 (2004). The jury viewed M.W.’s video interview from the CAC, the video taken by
Mother, and M.W. testified at trial. M.W. consistently explained the incidents where she was
inappropriately touched by the defendant. Witnesses confirmed that the defendant and M.W. were
together during the incidents as described by M.W. The evidence against the defendant was
overwhelming. Allowing Flowers to testify that M.W. had a reputation of making up stories to be
the center of attention would not have had an impact on the outcome of the trial. Because the
outcome of the trial would not have been different, we find that the error was harmless.
¶ 52 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶ 53 The defendant was charged with aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-
1.60(c)(1)(i) (West 2020)). Aggravated criminal sexual abuse is committed when a “person is 17
years of age or over” and “commits an act of sexual conduct with a victim who is under 13 years
of age.” 720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(c)(1)(i) (West 2020). The State has the burden to prove the elements
of the charge including that the defendant is 17 years old or over. People v. D’Angelo, 30 Ill. App.
3d 86, 90 (1975).
¶ 54 Although the record indicates that the defendant was in his 40s when the conduct occurred,
the defendant claims that the State failed to prove that the defendant was over 17 years old at trial.
The defendant further claims that the evidence necessary to prove the defendant’s age beyond a
reasonable doubt was elicited by defense counsel. The defendant, therefore, argues that defense
counsel provided ineffective assistance where the defendant was prejudiced by defense counsel’s
deficient performance for proving the essential element of the offense.
14 ¶ 55 When determining whether a defendant was denied effective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must demonstrate that defense counsel’s performance was deficient where it fell below
an objective standard of reasonableness, and the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant
such that he was deprived of a fair trial. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984).
Both prongs of the Strickland test must be satisfied by the defendant for a finding of
ineffectiveness. People v. Veach, 2017 IL 120649, ¶ 30. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims
are generally reviewed de novo. People v. Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 91.
¶ 56 To establish deficient performance, the defendant must demonstrate that counsel’s
performance at trial was “objectively unreasonable under prevailing professional norms.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 94. The defendant must overcome
a strong presumption that defense counsel’s actions were based on sound trial strategy. People v.
Perry, 224 Ill. 2d 312, 341-42 (2007).
¶ 57 When considering the second prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must demonstrate
that there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Gunn, 2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 96. Prejudice is
established where the defendant would not have been found guilty without the defense counsel
eliciting testimony which proved an essential element of the State’s crime that the State had failed
to prove. People v. Jackson, 318 Ill. App. 3d 321, 328 (2000). Where the evidence against the
defendant is overwhelming, the reviewing court will not be persuaded that it is reasonably probable
that a jury would have acquitted the defendant in the absence of counsel’s alleged errors. Gunn,
2020 IL App (1st) 170542, ¶ 96.
¶ 58 “The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution
requires that a person may not be convicted in state court ‘except upon proof beyond a reasonable
15 doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.’ ” People v.
Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 278 (2004) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). When
reviewing a conviction, the question is “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d at 278
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
¶ 59 The State may rely upon circumstantial evidence to prove essential elements of a crime as
long as the State provides proof beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Laubscher, 183 Ill. 2d 330,
335 (1998). In D’Angelo, the defendant was described as an “adult” and that testimony was
considered tantamount to an expression of an opinion that the defendant was at least 17 years old.
D’Angelo, 30 Ill. App. 3d at 90. This testimony along with additional factors concerning the
defendant’s age were considered when determining the defendant’s age. D’Angelo, 30 Ill. App. 3d
at 90.
¶ 60 In this case, the State relied on circumstantial evidence through the testimony of multiple
witnesses to prove that the defendant was an adult, at least 17 years old. The State’s evidence
regarding the first incident included that family members had gathered at the defendant’s house
after the defendant’s youngest child was baptized. Witness testimony distinguished “children”
from the “adults” as the children played in the defendant’s basement during the event. The
defendant went downstairs “to let the kids know it was time for cake and ice-cream.” The second
set of incidents occurred when M.W. joined the defendant’s family on a camping trip where M.W.
slept in the defendant’s camper with the defendant, his wife, and their two children. The
defendant’s oldest daughter was three or four when the incidents against M.W. had occurred. M.W.
16 testified that the defendant was her uncle, and M.W.’s in-court identification of the defendant was
admitted into evidence.
¶ 61 The jury could have concluded from the evidence presented by the State that the defendant
was an adult who was married with two children. The defendant also owned a home and camper.
The circumstantial evidence presented by the State was sufficient for the jury to conclude that the
defendant was at least 17 years old. The defense counsel’s performance was therefore not deficient
where the defendant was not prejudiced.
¶ 62 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 63 For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s convictions and sentence are affirmed.
¶ 64 Affirmed.