People v. Schinzel

296 N.W.2d 85, 97 Mich. App. 508

• Court: Michigan Court of Appeals
• Decided: May 19, 1980
• Docket: Docket 44156
• Status: Published

Opinions

On Remand

J. H. Gillis, J.

The defendant was convicted of second-degree murder, MCL 750.317; MSA 28.549, by a Detroit Recorder’s Court jury on May 23, 1977. He appealed to this Court arguing, inter alia, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction due to the asserted violation of the 180-day rule. MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1).

In a 2-to-l opinion, this‘Court reversed the defendant’s conviction and dismissed the charges against him, MCL 780.133; MSA 28.969(3), ruling that more than 180 days had elapsed from the time of the charge to the trial and that the people had not met the burden of establishing good faith action to comply with MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1). People v Schinzel, 86 Mich App 337; 272 NW2d 648 (1978) (J. H. Gillis, J., dissenting).

The people thereafter sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In an order dated March 13, 1979, that Court, in lieu of leave to appeal, reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for the making of a testimonial record to determine the cause of the delay between defendant’s arraignment and trial. The order further stated that "[a]fter the testimonial record is prepared, the Court of Appeals shall determine whether or not MCL 780.131; MSA 28.969(1) has been violated”. People v Schinzel, 406 Mich 888 (1979).

Pursuant to that order, testimonial hearings were held on April 18 and 25 and May 1, 1979. The transcripts of those hearings having been made available to this Court, we proceed to determine whether the statute has been violated.

Jurisdiction is not lost if the defendant does not go to trial within 180 days. The statutes, MCL 780.131 and 780.133, require only that good faith action to commence proceedings be initiated within the six-month time limit, People v Castelli, 370 Mich 147; 121 NW2d 438 (1963). Thereafter, jurisdiction is lost only if the initial action is followed by an "inexcusable delay”. People v Hendershot, 357 Mich 300, 303-304; 98 NW2d 568 (1959).

Here, the prosecutor took sufficient good faith action to commence proceedings within the statutory period. The parties do not argue the contrary. The question presented, thus, is whether the delay which followed was such as to excuse compliance with the 180-day limitation. The answer is that it was.

The delay in the present case was occasioned by docket congestion in Detroit Recorder’s Court. A delay which results from chronic docket congestion alone constitutes an inexcusable delay.¹ People v Forrest, 72 Mich App 266; 249 NW2d 384 (1976). A delay which results from short-term docket congestion, attributable to exceptional circumstances which hamper the normally efficient functioning of the trial court, constitutes an excusable delay. People v Forrest, supra, at 273, ABA Standards, Speedy Trial, § 2.3(b) (1968), People v Asher, 32 Mich App 380; 189 NW2d 148 (1971). We find that the delay here falls within the latter category.

The delay between the original trial date of November 15, 1976, and the eventual trial date of May 17, 1977, was occasioned by the decision of the Recorder’s Court bench, with the approval of the Supreme Court, to return to the individual docket system of case assignments.

For the first ten months of 1976, Recorder’s Court utilized the central docket system. Under that system, the examining magistrate, after binding a defendant over, would assign the case to a Recorder’s Court judge for the purpose of conducting all pretrial proceedings. The case remained on that judge’s docket until the parties were prepared to sign a ready-for-trial certificate. The filing of the signed certificate concluded that judge’s involvement with the case. The case was then transferred to the central docket and assigned a trial date. On the trial date, the presiding judge would assign the case for trial to any judge who was then available.

The central docket system proved ineffective. In October, 1976, the decision was made to return Recorder’s Court to the individual docket system. Under that system the pretrial judge retained the case until trial or other final disposition. The effect of this change in docketing systems was to transfer back to each pretrial judge those of his cases which had been transferred to the central docket. During the three-month period which followed this change, the trial judge in the instant case received back at least 400 pending cases. This influx of cases, of which the defendant’s was one, caused the six-month delay in question.

On these facts, we are satisfied that the delay was an excusable one. The people have made an "affirmative showing of exceptional and unavoidable circumstances which hamper the normally efficient functioning of the trial courts”. People v Forrest, 273. There was no violation of the 180-day rule. The defendant’s conviction is affirmed.

Bronson, J., concurred.

1 The people, by way of supplemental brief, argue, as they argued when the matter was originally before this Court, that delays attributable to the judiciary are not to be charged against the prosecution. The argument was and still is without merit. People v Forrest, 72 Mich App 266; 249 NW2d 384 (1976).