2019 IL App (3d) 180227
Opinion filed October 1, 2019 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit, ) Whiteside County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-18-0227 v. ) Circuit No. 14-CF-307 ) JORDAN A. SCHERER, ) Honorable ) Stanley B. Steines, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Schmidt and Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 The defendant, Jordan Scherer, appeals from his conviction of resisting or obstructing a
peace officer.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 After the defendant damaged a park fence with his vehicle and then ran away from his
vehicle, the defendant was charged with criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(a)(1)
(West 2014)) and resisting or obstructing a peace officer (id. § 31-1(a)). ¶4 At the jury trial, Officer Jacob Reul, of the Sterling Police Department, testified that he
was parked in a parking lot across the street from the entrance to Sinnissippi Park in Sterling,
Illinois, on September 1, 2014. Reul was in full uniform in an unmarked squad car. Reul
observed a vehicle come toward the entrance from inside the park at around 11:37 p.m. The gate
was closed, and the park had been closed since dusk. Reul observed the vehicle strike the gate,
back up, and attempt to go around the gate. It hit something else, backed up, and then went
around the gate. Reul exited the parking lot and followed the vehicle up Sinnissippi Park Road,
onto Woodlawn Road, and then onto Mineral Springs Road. Reul wanted to stop the vehicle so
that he could investigate why the driver damaged the park gate, so he activated his lights while
making the turn onto Mineral Springs Road. Reul ran a license plate check and determined that
the registered owner of the vehicle was the defendant. Reul testified that it was about a quarter of
a mile from Sinnissippi Park Road to the location of the stop. When Reul activated his lights, the
video recording system in his car activated, which shows the final few feet of the traffic stop. 1
After the vehicle pulled over, Reul observed the driver’s door open, and a male exited the vehicle
and immediately ran away. Reul exited his vehicle and ran after the driver. Reul told the driver to
get back in his vehicle, but the driver kept running, even after falling down. Reul identified the
driver as the defendant. Reul attempted to use his Taser, but one of the prongs hit a tree. After
Reul deployed his Taser, he stopped the chase and returned to the vehicle to interview the
passenger.
¶5 The director of parks and planning of the Sterling Park District, Doug Jacobs, testified
that he inspected the gate after September 1, 2014, after he was informed of the damage by the
1 The video recording of the stop was not contained in the record on appeal. 2 police. Jacobs had the fence taken down and then repaired by a fence company for a total cost of
$1271.80.
¶6 The defendant testified that he drove into the park after dusk, that the gate was open, and
that he drove around with his passenger, who was his friend. The defendant had been in the park
at other times at night, including two nights before the incident in question, and the gate was
open at night on those occasions. The defendant testified that, as he was leaving the park, his cell
phone fell off the console and he accidently hit the gate. The defendant reversed and tried to
drive around the gate, but he hit a wooden pylon next to the gate. Neither he nor his passenger
was injured, and the airbags did not deploy. The defendant then drove down Sinnissippi Park
Road, turned onto Woodlawn Road, and then turned onto Mineral Springs Road and pulled to a
stop at the dead end. The defendant testified that, as he was pulling to a stop, he noticed that
there was a police vehicle behind him with its emergency lights on. The defendant testified that
he was already opening his door to exit his vehicle when he saw the emergency lights and he
made the decision to run away because he was “spooked.” The defendant does not remember the
police officer telling him to get back in his vehicle, but after viewing the video of the stop in
court, the defendant was reminded that the officer did tell the defendant to return to his vehicle.
The defendant did not return to his vehicle but proceeded to run and continued running even after
he fell down. The defendant recalled being hit by the Taser, and he thought he had been shot.
The defendant testified that he was not thinking clearly. The defendant called his attorney, and
his attorney contacted the police. The defendant turned himself in about two weeks later.
¶7 The jury found the defendant guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer but not
guilty of criminal damage to property. The defendant’s posttrial motion was denied, and he was
sentenced to 226 days in jail, with credit for time served. The defendant appealed.
3 ¶8 ANALYSIS
¶9 The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him guilty of
restricting or obstructing a peace officer. The defendant admits that he ran from Reul but argues
that was not sufficient because the officer was not making an arrest and did not tell the defendant
that he intended to arrest the defendant. The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the conviction. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the
reviewing court considers “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261
(1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
¶ 10 Section 31-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) states that “A person who
knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer
*** of any authorized act within his or her official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.”
720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2014). To sustain a conviction of knowingly resisting or obstructing a
peace officer, the State had the burden of proving that: “(1) [the] defendant knowingly obstructed
a peace officer; (2) the officer was performing an authorized act in his official capacity; and
(3) [the] defendant knew he was a peace officer.” People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (3d) 110477,
¶ 20. In Smith, the defendant was pulled over for speeding in front of his own home. While the
officer was writing the ticket, the defendant exited his car to go into his home and ignored the
officer’s commands to return to the vehicle. Id. ¶ 21. This court upheld the defendant’s
conviction for obstruction under section 31-1(a) of the Code, finding that the defendant knew the
officer was a peace officer who was performing an act within his official capacity—writing a
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
2019 IL App (3d) 180227
Opinion filed October 1, 2019 ____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 14th Judicial Circuit, ) Whiteside County, Illinois. Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. 3-18-0227 v. ) Circuit No. 14-CF-307 ) JORDAN A. SCHERER, ) Honorable ) Stanley B. Steines, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Schmidt and Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion. ____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 The defendant, Jordan Scherer, appeals from his conviction of resisting or obstructing a
peace officer.
¶2 FACTS
¶3 After the defendant damaged a park fence with his vehicle and then ran away from his
vehicle, the defendant was charged with criminal damage to property (720 ILCS 5/21-1(a)(1)
(West 2014)) and resisting or obstructing a peace officer (id. § 31-1(a)). ¶4 At the jury trial, Officer Jacob Reul, of the Sterling Police Department, testified that he
was parked in a parking lot across the street from the entrance to Sinnissippi Park in Sterling,
Illinois, on September 1, 2014. Reul was in full uniform in an unmarked squad car. Reul
observed a vehicle come toward the entrance from inside the park at around 11:37 p.m. The gate
was closed, and the park had been closed since dusk. Reul observed the vehicle strike the gate,
back up, and attempt to go around the gate. It hit something else, backed up, and then went
around the gate. Reul exited the parking lot and followed the vehicle up Sinnissippi Park Road,
onto Woodlawn Road, and then onto Mineral Springs Road. Reul wanted to stop the vehicle so
that he could investigate why the driver damaged the park gate, so he activated his lights while
making the turn onto Mineral Springs Road. Reul ran a license plate check and determined that
the registered owner of the vehicle was the defendant. Reul testified that it was about a quarter of
a mile from Sinnissippi Park Road to the location of the stop. When Reul activated his lights, the
video recording system in his car activated, which shows the final few feet of the traffic stop. 1
After the vehicle pulled over, Reul observed the driver’s door open, and a male exited the vehicle
and immediately ran away. Reul exited his vehicle and ran after the driver. Reul told the driver to
get back in his vehicle, but the driver kept running, even after falling down. Reul identified the
driver as the defendant. Reul attempted to use his Taser, but one of the prongs hit a tree. After
Reul deployed his Taser, he stopped the chase and returned to the vehicle to interview the
passenger.
¶5 The director of parks and planning of the Sterling Park District, Doug Jacobs, testified
that he inspected the gate after September 1, 2014, after he was informed of the damage by the
1 The video recording of the stop was not contained in the record on appeal. 2 police. Jacobs had the fence taken down and then repaired by a fence company for a total cost of
$1271.80.
¶6 The defendant testified that he drove into the park after dusk, that the gate was open, and
that he drove around with his passenger, who was his friend. The defendant had been in the park
at other times at night, including two nights before the incident in question, and the gate was
open at night on those occasions. The defendant testified that, as he was leaving the park, his cell
phone fell off the console and he accidently hit the gate. The defendant reversed and tried to
drive around the gate, but he hit a wooden pylon next to the gate. Neither he nor his passenger
was injured, and the airbags did not deploy. The defendant then drove down Sinnissippi Park
Road, turned onto Woodlawn Road, and then turned onto Mineral Springs Road and pulled to a
stop at the dead end. The defendant testified that, as he was pulling to a stop, he noticed that
there was a police vehicle behind him with its emergency lights on. The defendant testified that
he was already opening his door to exit his vehicle when he saw the emergency lights and he
made the decision to run away because he was “spooked.” The defendant does not remember the
police officer telling him to get back in his vehicle, but after viewing the video of the stop in
court, the defendant was reminded that the officer did tell the defendant to return to his vehicle.
The defendant did not return to his vehicle but proceeded to run and continued running even after
he fell down. The defendant recalled being hit by the Taser, and he thought he had been shot.
The defendant testified that he was not thinking clearly. The defendant called his attorney, and
his attorney contacted the police. The defendant turned himself in about two weeks later.
¶7 The jury found the defendant guilty of resisting or obstructing a peace officer but not
guilty of criminal damage to property. The defendant’s posttrial motion was denied, and he was
sentenced to 226 days in jail, with credit for time served. The defendant appealed.
3 ¶8 ANALYSIS
¶9 The defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient for the jury to find him guilty of
restricting or obstructing a peace officer. The defendant admits that he ran from Reul but argues
that was not sufficient because the officer was not making an arrest and did not tell the defendant
that he intended to arrest the defendant. The State argues that the evidence was sufficient to
sustain the conviction. When a defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the
reviewing court considers “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261
(1985) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
¶ 10 Section 31-1(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) states that “A person who
knowingly resists or obstructs the performance by one known to the person to be a peace officer
*** of any authorized act within his or her official capacity commits a Class A misdemeanor.”
720 ILCS 5/31-1(a) (West 2014). To sustain a conviction of knowingly resisting or obstructing a
peace officer, the State had the burden of proving that: “(1) [the] defendant knowingly obstructed
a peace officer; (2) the officer was performing an authorized act in his official capacity; and
(3) [the] defendant knew he was a peace officer.” People v. Smith, 2013 IL App (3d) 110477,
¶ 20. In Smith, the defendant was pulled over for speeding in front of his own home. While the
officer was writing the ticket, the defendant exited his car to go into his home and ignored the
officer’s commands to return to the vehicle. Id. ¶ 21. This court upheld the defendant’s
conviction for obstruction under section 31-1(a) of the Code, finding that the defendant knew the
officer was a peace officer who was performing an act within his official capacity—writing a
4 speeding ticket—and the defendant’s refusal to follow the officer’s commands to return to the
vehicle was obstructing conduct. Id.
¶ 11 In this case, the State proved that Reul was a peace officer, performing an act within his
official capacity by following and activating his lights to stop the defendant to investigate
damage to the park fence. Reul had blue and red lights on his unmarked police car and was in
full police uniform. The defendant admitted that he saw the emergency lights and the officer.
While, at the time that the defendant initially started running, the defendant was not under arrest
or already involved in a traffic stop, the defendant continued to run after Reul told him to return
to his vehicle numerous times. If the defendant did not know that the officer wanted to stop and
question him when the defendant initially started running, the defendant definitely acquired that
knowledge while he was running away, and the defendant did not stop but continued to run
away. At that time, the defendant was knowingly obstructing a peace officer. See People v.
Holdman, 73 Ill. 2d 213, 222 (1978) (“[f]light *** is definitely a physical act within the purview
of this statute”). Thus, the evidence was sufficient to prove the defendant guilty of obstructing a
peace officer beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 12 The defendant argues that his motion for a directed verdict, and his posttrial motion,
should have been granted because the jury could not have found the elements of resisting or
obstructing a peace officer beyond a reasonable doubt. As we have already found, the elements
were proven beyond a reasonable doubt, so there was no error in the denial of those motions.
¶ 13 CONCLUSION
¶ 14 The judgment of the circuit court of Whiteside County is affirmed.
¶ 15 Affirmed.
5 No. 3-18-0227
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Whiteside County, No. 14-CF- 307; the Hon. Stanley B. Steines, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Michael J. Greco, of Chicago, for appellant. for Appellant:
Attorneys Terry A. Costello, State’s Attorney, of Morrison (Patrick for Delfino, Thomas D. Arado, and Stephanie L. Raymond, of Appellee: State’s Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.