People v. Scattareggia

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Scattareggia

2017 NY Slip Op 3978, 150 A.D.3d 1033, 55 N.Y.S.3d 144

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMay 17, 2017

Docket2013-03376

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 2017 NY Slip Op 3978 (People v. Scattareggia) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Scattareggia, 2017 NY Slip Op 3978, 150 A.D.3d 1033, 55 N.Y.S.3d 144 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2017).

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Opinion

Appeal by the defendant from an order of the County Court, Rockland County (Apotheker, J.), dated February 14, 2013, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the timing of the proceedings held pursuant to the provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA) did not violate his constitutional due process rights. The appellant concedes that the SORA hearing was held in compliance with the provisions of Correction Law § 168-n. Cor *1034 rection Law § 168-n (2) states that the court shall make its determination “thirty calendar days prior to [the offender’s] discharge, parole or release.” Correction Law § 168-1 (8) states: “A failure by a state or local agency or the board to act or by a court to render a determination within the time period specified in this article shall not affect the obligation of the sex offender to register or verify under this article nor shall such failure prevent a court from making a determination regarding the sex offender’s level of notification and whether such offender is required by law to be registered for a period of twenty years or for life.”

Under the circumstances of this case, there is no basis upon which to conclude that any perceived delay in commencing the SORA proceedings or in conducting the SORA hearing was “so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority” (People v Gonzalez, 138 AD3d 814, 815 [2016]; see People v Gallagher, 129 AD3d 1252, 1253 [2015]; People v Martin, 119 AD3d 1385 [2014]; People v Wilkes, 53 AD3d 1073, 1074 [2008]; People v Meyers, 16 Misc 3d 115, 117-118 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]; cf. People v Gregory, 71 AD3d 1559 [2010]).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit.

Rivera, J.R, Hall, LaSalle and Connolly, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by the defendant from an order of the County Court, Rockland County (Apotheker, J.), dated February 14, 2013, which, after a hearing, designated him a level three sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.

Contrary to the appellant’s contention, the timing of the proceedings held pursuant to the provisions of the Sex Offender Registration Act (see Correction Law art 6-C; hereinafter SORA) did not violate his constitutional due process rights. The appellant concedes that the SORA hearing was held in compliance with the provisions of Correction Law § 168-n. Cor *1034 rection Law § 168-n (2) states that the court shall make its determination “thirty calendar days prior to [the offender’s] discharge, parole or release.” Correction Law § 168-1 (8) states: “A failure by a state or local agency or the board to act or by a court to render a determination within the time period specified in this article shall not affect the obligation of the sex offender to register or verify under this article nor shall such failure prevent a court from making a determination regarding the sex offender’s level of notification and whether such offender is required by law to be registered for a period of twenty years or for life.”

Under the circumstances of this case, there is no basis upon which to conclude that any perceived delay in commencing the SORA proceedings or in conducting the SORA hearing was “so outrageously arbitrary as to constitute a gross abuse of governmental authority” (People v Gonzalez, 138 AD3d 814, 815 [2016]; see People v Gallagher, 129 AD3d 1252, 1253 [2015]; People v Martin, 119 AD3d 1385 [2014]; People v Wilkes, 53 AD3d 1073, 1074 [2008]; People v Meyers, 16 Misc 3d 115, 117-118 [App Term, 2d Dept, 9th & 10th Jud Dists 2007]; cf. People v Gregory, 71 AD3d 1559 [2010]).

The appellant’s remaining contentions are without merit.

Rivera, J.R, Hall, LaSalle and Connolly, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

2017 NY Slip Op 3978, 150 A.D.3d 1033, 55 N.Y.S.3d 144, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-scattareggia-nyappdiv-2017.

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