NOTICE 2021 IL App (4th) 190667-U FILED This Order was filed under August 23, 2021 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is NO. 4-19-0667 Carla Bender not precedent except in the 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Champaign County SAMUEL SAULS, ) No. 18CF1153 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) Thomas J. Difanis, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cavanagh and Steigmann concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding (1) the State presented sufficient evidence to sustain defendant’s conviction, (2) the trial court did not err in quashing his subpoena to DCFS without first reviewing in camera the requested records, and (3) defendant forfeited his claim the court’s voir dire examination violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012).
¶2 A jury found defendant, Samuel Sauls, guilty of one count of predatory criminal
sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2016)), and the trial court sentenced
him to twenty years’ imprisonment. Defendant appeals, arguing (1) the State failed to prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court erred in quashing his subpoena requesting
records from the Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) without first reviewing
in camera the requested records, and (3) the court’s voir dire examination violated Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012). We affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 A. The Charges
¶5 The State charged defendant by information with two counts of predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2016)). Because the jury
acquitted defendant of count II involving J.G.P., we discuss only the facts relevant to count I
relating to L.G.P., J.G.P.’s sister. Count I alleged that “on or about August of 2017, ***
defendant, who was 17 years of age or older, committed an act of contact, however slight,
between [his] sex organ *** and the hand of [L.G.P.], who was under 13 years of age when the
act was committed, and was for the purpose of sexual gratification or arousal ***.”
¶6 B. Pretrial Motions
¶7 1. The State’s Section 115-10 Motion
¶8 Prior to trial, the State filed a motion to allow out-of-court statements by L.G.P.
into evidence under section 115-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS
5/115-10 (West 2018)). The trial court granted the motion after a hearing.
¶9 2. Defendant’s Motion for Discovery
¶ 10 In March 2019, defendant filed a supplemental motion for discovery pursuant to
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412 (eff. Mar. 1, 2001). Defendant requested documents pertaining
to a DCFS investigation into allegations of abuse lodged against L.G.P.’s mother, Mercedes, and
Angel Walker, “the live-in girlfriend of Mercedes ***.” The record does not reflect the nature of
the alleged abuse or the identity of the victim or victims. At a hearing on the motion, the State
asserted DCFS refused to turn over the requested records. The court responded, “we’ll do a
subpoena duces tecum for that report.”
-2- ¶ 11 Defendant subsequently served a subpoena duces tecum on DCFS for “[a]ll
records of investigations” related to Mercedes or Walker. DCFS, through the Attorney General,
moved to quash the subpoena. In its motion to quash, DCFS asserted the subpoena sought
information contained in an “unfounded DCFS report,” which was “confidential and
inadmissible” under the Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (Reporting Act). See 325
ILCS 5/7.14 (West 2016) (providing unfounded reports are inadmissible in all judicial
proceedings except under limited circumstances not relevant here). Alternatively, DCFS
indicated it would comply with an order to produce a “redacted copy of the investigation” for
in camera review.
¶ 12 The trial court conducted a hearing on the motion to quash. Defendant made the
following argument against quashing the subpoena:
“MISS WYMAN [(DEFENSE COUNSEL)]: [DCFS] want[s] to quash
this essentially claiming that it is—well, that it is seeking unfounded DCFS
reports. I understand that and think that’s accurate, that it’s unfounded, but I—the
information could be relevant in several ways in this trial. Certainly showing
interest and bias of one of the—well, the mother of the accuser and her girlfriend,
both of which defense, based on our research believes—well, it goes to interest
and bias of the—of the mother of the children who allegedly made these or who
made these allegations, and her girlfriend who we believe are playing a part in—
in this, and that goes to not only interest and bias, but if there’s contradictory
statements, that would certainly be Brady material as well.”
The State responded the Reporting Act made clear that unfounded reports were confidential, and
it contained no provision allowing for disclosure to criminal defendants for the purpose of
-3- impeaching a State witness. The court agreed with the State and granted the motion to quash
without reviewing in camera the requested records.
¶ 13 C. Jury Trial
¶ 14 Defendant’s jury trial began on July 29, 2019, and concluded on August 1, 2019.
¶ 15 1. Voir Dire Examination
¶ 16 During voir dire, the court separated the venire into three groups and admonished
each group regarding the principles enumerated in Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July
1, 2012), as follows:
“THE COURT: All right. For Jurors No. 72, 89, 12, and 31, the four of
you understand that the Defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charges
against him, that before the Defendant can be convicted the State must prove him
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, that the Defendant is not required to offer any
evidence on his own behalf and if the Defendant does not testify that fact cannot
be held against him in any way? The four of you understand those instructions; is
that correct?
[PROSPECTIVE JURORS:] (Jurors respond affirmatively.)
THE COURT: And they answer in the affirmative. And the four of you
accept those instructions; is that correct?
[PROSPECTIVE JURORS:] (Jurors answer affirmatively.)”
¶ 17 2. Evidence Presented
¶ 18 a. Francisco G.
¶ 19 Francisco G., who is L.G.P.’s father and Mercedes’s husband, testified that in
August 2017, he attended a birthday party for defendant’s daughter and L.G.P.’s cousin, N.S.,
-4- who was turning three years old. “All the family members” were at the party. This included
Desiree P., who is defendant’s wife and Mercedes’s sister, and Rose P., who is L.G.P.’s
grandmother and Mercedes’s mother.
¶ 20 Francisco testified defendant called Mercedes after the party to invite L.G.P. and
her younger sister, J.G.P., to his house for a sleepover with N.S. Francisco and Mercedes
dropped off the two children at defendant’s house around 10 p.m. They picked up the girls the
following morning, and L.G.P. told them “she didn’t want to go back [to defendant’s house].”
When Francisco asked why, “she just looked down *** but she didn’t say—she wouldn’t say
why.”
¶ 21 b. L.G.P.
¶ 22 L.G.P. (born September 7, 2009), testified that she stayed the night at defendant’s
house in August 2017 because it was N.S.’s birthday and she wanted to spend the night with her.
L.G.P. thought her grandmother dropped her off, but she was not certain. L.G.P. testified she fell
asleep watching a movie in defendant’s bedroom along with J.G.P., N.S., and defendant. L.G.P.
and J.G.P. were on the floor, while defendant and N.S. were on defendant’s bed. At some point
during the night, L.G.P. and J.G.P. ended up in defendant’s bed, but she did not know how.
When L.G.P. later awoke in defendant’s bed in the middle of the night, she initially thought she
was holding her fingers but realized defendant’s “private” was in her hand. She stated defendant
“was just laying down right there and just on his phone I think.” She thought defendant was
wearing a T-shirt and nothing else. L.G.P. testified her hands were “sticky” so she went to the
bathroom to wash them and then went back to sleep. L.G.P. did not tell her mother about the
incident right away because she was scared defendant would get mad at her mother. On
cross-examination, she said she could not remember the color of the sheets or the number of
-5- pillows on the bed. When asked if she remembered telling someone defendant’s hands were
under his head and not holding his phone, L.G.P. responded, “I don’t know if he had a phone or
not, but I think he did [because], like—I can’t really remember that good. I could just remember,
like, the bedroom stuff and, like, what happened.”
¶ 23 c. Mercedes G.P.
¶ 24 Mercedes G.P., L.G.P.’s mother and defendant’s sister-in-law, testified defendant
called her the day after N.S.’s birthday party to invite L.G.P. and J.G.P. to a sleepover at his
house with N.S. Mercedes and Francisco dropped the girls off at defendant’s house later that day
and picked them up during the early afternoon of the following day. Mercedes testified the girls
were quiet in the car but neither of them made any disclosures on the drive home. According to
Mercedes, L.G.P. told her “a couple days later” that she did not “ever want to spend the night
with [defendant] again.” Mercedes asked why, and L.G.P. explained she woke up with
defendant’s finger in her hand and then asked to use the bathroom to wash her hands. L.G.P.
further explained defendant was not wearing a shirt or boxers. Mercedes then asked if anything
felt “not normal” to her or if she had been touched, but L.G.P. said no.
¶ 25 Mercedes testified that on May 30, 2018, she had a family gathering at her house
and N.S. attended. Mercedes’s brother wanted to meet defendant, so she told her brother that he
had to meet him on the street because she did not want defendant near her house. L.G.P. later
saw N.S. getting into defendant’s car and told Mercedes: “Mama, please. Don’t let her go with
him [because] he’s going to do what he did to me. It wasn’t his finger, *** it was his private
part.” After this disclosure, Mercedes scheduled a doctor’s appointment for L.G.P.
¶ 26 d. Dr. Mary Buetow
-6- ¶ 27 Dr. Buetow, a licensed pediatrician specializing in child abuse and neglect,
testified she met with L.G.P. and Mercedes on June 26, 2018. Dr. Buetow and a clinical social
worker interviewed L.G.P. in an exam room outside the presence of her mother. During the
interview, L.G.P. explained that she had stayed the night with defendant because she wanted to
have a sleepover with N.S. L.G.P. told Dr. Buetow she slept in the same room as N.S., J.G.P.,
and defendant; L.G.P. and defendant slept in the bed, while J.G.P. and N.S. slept on a “pallet” on
the floor. L.G.P. continued: “[W]hen I woke up I thought I was holding [defendant’s] finger, but
it wasn’t his finger. It was his private part. It was his penis, and my hand was wet so I got up and
went to the bathroom and washed my hand.” Dr. Buetow reported the allegations to DCFS
“because of [her] concerns ***.”
¶ 28 e. Chad Turner
¶ 29 Chad Turner, a child protective investigator for DCFS, testified that he conducted
a forensic interview with L.G.P. at the Children’s Advocacy Center (CAC) on July 17, 2018. The
interview was recorded. The recording was admitted into evidence and played for the jury.
¶ 30 In her CAC interview, L.G.P. stated that she spent the night at defendant’s house
after N.S.’s birthday party. L.G.P. said there was a bed and a pallet in defendant’s room, and she
slept on the bed. She later said that she fell asleep on the pallet but woke up in the bed. In
describing the relevant event, L.G.P. stated, “I was lying down, and I thought I was holding his
finger, and I woke up and it was his private. So, I said, ‘can I go to the bathroom?’ I went to the
bathroom and washed my hands. I came back and laid down.” L.G.P. explained that she washed
her hands because they were “like wet kind of.” L.G.P. said defendant was wearing a shirt but
“his underwear was pulled down.” She also stated that defendant was “laying on his hands.”
-7- Turner asked L.G.P. to indicate on an anatomical diagram which part of defendant’s body was in
her hand. L.G.P. pointed to the penis.
¶ 31 On cross-examination, Turner acknowledged that defendant’s wife, Desiree, had
told him about a “physical altercation” between defendant and Mercedes that occurred shortly
before L.G.P. “started to appear to be afraid of [defendant].” However, Turner testified that this
did not give him cause to believe “the kids had been coached.” Following Turner’s testimony,
the State rested.
¶ 32 f. Rose P.
¶ 33 Rose P., L.G.P. and N.S.’s grandmother and defendant’s mother-in-law, testified
that N.S. and Desiree had lived with her since early 2017. Rose attended N.S.’s birthday party in
2017 and dropped off clothes for her at defendant’s house the next day. According to Rose, N.S.
was the only child present. Rose stated that defendant had a positive relationship with L.G.P. and
J.G.P. She explained the girls were “always glad” to see defendant and he would “pick them up
and hug them and put them down.”
¶ 34 Rose testified that over the Memorial Day weekend in 2018, Mercedes and her
friend, Angel Walker, were at her house with L.G.P. and other family members. Rose left briefly
and when she returned, “everyone was hollering.” Rose walked up to the porch, “and that’s when
[L.G.P.] was standing on the porch and Angel was to the side and she was, like, and what’s next,
[L.G.P.] Tell them, [L.G.P.] Tell them what’s next, and she kept doing that over and over.” Rose
testified that she did not see L.G.P. and J.G.P. as frequently after this event.
¶ 35 g. Desiree P.S.
¶ 36 Desiree testified that she had been separated from defendant since 2015. Desiree
attended N.S.’s birthday party in 2017, and she said N.S. stayed with defendant for a few days
-8- after the party. In March or April 2018, Desiree and defendant “weren’t on the best of terms” due
to a tax dispute in which defendant claimed N.S. as a dependent even though she lived with
Desiree. As a result, Desiree stopped allowing defendant to see N.S.
¶ 37 On one occasion during this time period, defendant showed up at Desiree’s house
and asked to see N.S. N.S. was outside at the time, so Desiree picked her up and took her inside.
While Desiree was doing this, Mercedes “got in front” of defendant and told him he could not
see N.S. When asked if “anything physical” happened, Desiree testified, “It was pretty much he
was walking forward. She tried to, like, push him—push him back. *** She pushed him back,
and he was just like—he kind of yelled, like, I want to see my daughter ***.” Desiree further
testified that L.G.P. and J.G.P. witnessed the altercation and they were shocked by it.
¶ 38 Desiree and defendant later resolved the tax dispute, and defendant began coming
over more often to pick up N.S. Desiree testified she never observed L.G.P. exhibit any signs of
“fear or reticence” towards defendant. On cross-examination, Desiree said that she was not at
defendant’s house after N.S.’s birthday party so she did not know if L.G.P. and J.G.P. stayed
overnight at defendant’s house.
¶ 39 h. Defendant
¶ 40 Defendant testified that N.S. stayed with him after her birthday party but L.G.P.
and J.G.P. did not. According to defendant, the last time any of his nieces stayed overnight at his
house was in the summer of 2017 before school started. Defendant testified that when his nieces
did stay overnight, they would sleep in his bedroom and he would sleep on the couch in the
living room. He asserted he had never set up a pallet for them and they had never slept on the
floor at his house. Defendant also stated he had not shared a bed with his nieces since they were
“in diapers.” Defendant testified he did not put his penis in L.G.P.’s hand.
-9- ¶ 41 3. Finding of Guilt
¶ 42 The jury found defendant guilty of count I beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 43 D. Posttrial Proceedings
¶ 44 Defendant filed a timely posttrial motion, arguing, in relevant part, the State failed
to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and the court erred in quashing his subpoena
duces tecum. The trial court denied defendant’s motion and subsequently sentenced him to 20
years’ imprisonment.
¶ 45 This appeal followed.
¶ 46 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 47 Defendant argues (1) the State presented insufficient evidence to prove him guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, (2) the trial court deprived him of his right to material evidence by
quashing his subpoena duces tecum without first reviewing in camera the requested records, and
(3) the court’s voir dire examination violated Illinois Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1,
2012).
¶ 48 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 49 Defendant argues the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction for
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child because the State failed to prove he committed an act
of contact between his penis and a part of L.G.P.’s body. In support of his argument, defendant
points to a lack of detail and inconsistencies in L.G.P.’s various statements, as well as a conflict
in the testimony of Mercedes and Francisco. Defendant also highlights his “history of animosity”
with Mercedes to imply Mercedes coached L.G.P. to accuse him of sexual assault.
¶ 50 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the question is “whether, after
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact
- 10 - could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in
original.) Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). A court of review “will not substitute
its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues of the weight of evidence or the credibility of
witnesses.” People v. Cooper, 194 Ill. 2d 419, 431, 743 N.E.2d 32, 40 (2000). “The weight to be
given the witnesses’ testimony, the credibility of the witnesses, resolution of inconsistencies and
conflicts in the evidence, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony are the
responsibility of the trier of fact.” People v. Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d 187, 242, 860 N.E.2d 178,
217 (2006). We will not set aside a conviction on appeal “unless the evidence is so improbable or
unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Collins, 106
Ill. 2d 237, 261, 478 N.E.2d 267, 276 (1985).
¶ 51 Here, the question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the State, any rational juror could have found defendant committed an act of contact
between his penis and a part of L.G.P.’s body beyond a reasonable doubt. L.G.P. testified that at
some point during the sleepover at defendant’s house, she woke up in his bed thinking she was
holding her fingers but realized it was defendant’s “private.” She further testified her hands were
“sticky” so she went to the bathroom to wash them. Mercedes and Dr. Buetow testified L.G.P.
gave them the same account she gave at trial. Additionally, L.G.P.’s description of the incident
during her CAC interview mirrored her testimony at trial. This evidence was sufficient to sustain
defendant’s conviction. See, e.g., People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228, 920 N.E.2d 233,
243 (2009) (“It remains the firm holding of this court that the testimony of a single witness, if
positive and credible, is sufficient to convict, even though it is contradicted by the defendant.”).
¶ 52 We find defendant’s argument to the contrary unpersuasive. As noted above, in
challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, defendant points to (1) a lack of detail and
- 11 - inconsistencies in L.G.P.’s various statements, (2) conflicting testimony between Mercedes and
Francisco, and (3) his “history of animosity” with Mercedes.
¶ 53 Although L.G.P. could not recall certain details about the event in question, and
minor inconsistencies appeared in her various statements, these were factors for the jury, not this
court, to weigh and resolve. See Sutherland, 223 Ill. 2d at 242 (“The weight to be given the
witnesses’ testimony, the credibility of the witnesses, resolution of inconsistencies and conflicts
in the evidence, and reasonable inferences to be drawn from the testimony are the responsibility
of the trier of fact.”). Further, L.G.P. was seven years old at the time and had just awoken in the
middle of the night, making it reasonable to believe she would not remember every detail
surrounding the event—an event that occurred two years prior to her testimony. As for
defendant’s second contention, again, it was for the jury to consider and resolve the conflict in
Francisco’s and Mercedes’s testimony regarding L.G.P.’s initial disclosure. See id. As for
defendant’s third contention, regarding his hostile relationship with Mercedes, we find it also
fails to raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt. Defendant points to his contentious relationship with
Mercedes and implies she coached L.G.P. to make a false accusation against him. While a
reasonable juror could arguably draw this conclusion, it certainly is not the only reasonable
conclusion that could be drawn. A juror could just as reasonably conclude the hostility between
the two played no role in L.G.P. making these allegations. We will not draw a contrary inference
in favor of defendant on review. See People v. Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280, 818 N.E.2d
304, 308 (2004) (“[I]f only one conclusion may reasonably be drawn from the record, a
reviewing court must draw it even if it favors the defendant.”). Accordingly, for the reasons
discussed, we find the evidence was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction for predatory
criminal sexual assault of a child.
- 12 - ¶ 54 B. Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum
¶ 55 Defendant next argues the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to
material evidence by quashing his subpoena duces tecum to DCFS. Citing Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987), and People v. Escareno, 2013 IL App (3d) 110152, 982 N.E.2d 277,
defendant asserts the court was obligated to review the requested records in camera and disclose
any evidence it deemed material to his defense. The State maintains that because section 7.14 of
the Reporting Act (325 ILCS 5/7.14 (West 2016)) makes unfounded reports statutorily
privileged, the information defendant seeks is inadmissible and, by extension, necessarily
immaterial. The State further contends Ritchie and Escareno are factually distinguishable and
inapplicable to this case.
¶ 56 In Ritchie, the Supreme Court addressed the question of “whether and to what
extent a State’s interest in the confidentiality of its investigative files concerning child abuse
must yield to a criminal defendant’s *** Fourteenth Amendment right to discover favorable
evidence.” Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 42-43. There, the defendant was charged with several sexual
offenses against his minor daughter. Id. at 43. During pretrial discovery, he served the state
agency responsible for investigating allegations of child abuse with a subpoena, “seeking access
to the records concerning the daughter.” Id. The agency refused to comply, arguing the records
were statutorily privileged—the relevant statute provided all information obtained during the
investigation must remain confidential, subject to several enumerated exceptions, including when
a court order directs the agency to disclose confidential information. Id. The trial court agreed
with the agency and declined to order disclosure. Id. at 44. A jury subsequently found the
defendant guilty on all counts. Id. at 45.
- 13 - ¶ 57 On appeal, the Supreme Court held the defendant had a limited due process right
to the requested records, the statutory privilege notwithstanding. Id. at 56-60. The Court
provided two bases for its holding. First, it pointed to the well-settled legal principle that “the
government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the
accused and material to guilt or punishment.” Id. at 57. Second, it noted the statute at issue did
not grant the agency “absolute authority to shield its files from all eyes.” Id. The Court added
that although the defendant had a right to the privileged material, the right “does not include the
unsupervised authority to search through the [State’s] files.” Id. at 59. Instead, the Court found
the defendant’s interest in a fair trial “can be protected fully by requiring that the *** files be
submitted only to the trial court for in camera review.” Id. at 60. However, to be entitled to an
in camera review of privileged information, a criminal defendant must “first establish[ ] a basis
for his claim that it contains material evidence.” Id. at 58 n.15; see also United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982) (stating a criminal defendant cannot establish he
was unconstitutionally denied access to evidence without at least making “some plausible
showing” of how the evidence “would have been both material and favorable to his defense”).
According to the Supreme Court, “evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability
that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 57.
¶ 58 In reviewing whether the trial court erred in determining an in camera review of
the unfounded report by DCFS was unnecessary and quashing the subpoena duces tecum, we
examine the court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., People v. Hanson, 238 Ill. 2d
- 14 - 74, 121, 939 N.E.2d 238, 265 (2010) (noting a subpoena is a judicial process and trial court
decisions regarding subpoenas are reviewed for an abuse of discretion).
¶ 59 In Escareno, the defendant issued a subpoena to DCFS requesting “confidential
DCFS records relating to the victim’s accusations against” him. Escareno, 2013 IL App (3d)
110152, ¶ 18. DCFS asserted the requested information was contained in an unfounded report
and therefore privileged under section 7.14 of the Reporting Act. Id. The trial court quashed the
subpoena without reviewing the records in camera. Id. ¶ 4. On appeal, the defendant argued the
trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to present a defense by quashing the subpoena
without first conducting an in camera review of the records. Id. ¶¶ 1, 16. Relying on Ritchie, the
Third District agreed. Id. ¶ 20. In doing so, the Escareno court explicitly acknowledged that the
Reporting Act is “different than the statute in Ritchie.” Id. Nonetheless, the Third District could
not “ignore the due process concerns raised by failing to determine whether material information
is contained within statutorily privileged records.” Thus, the Escareno court held that “even
though unfounded DCFS reports are made privileged by section 7.14 of the [Reporting] Act
[citation], defendant has a constitutional right to all material information contained within the
report.” Id. (citing People v. Bean, 137 Ill. 2d 65, 97, 560 N.E.2d 258, 272 (1990)).
¶ 60 Here, defendant has failed to establish a basis for his claim that the unfounded
report by DCFS contained material evidence. At the hearing on the motion to quash, defendant
argued the information in the report “could be relevant in several ways ***.” Specifically,
defendant asserted the report could show “interest and bias *** of the mother of the children ***
who made these allegations.” Defendant additionally maintained that “if there’s contradictory
statements, that would certainly be Brady material as well.” However, defendant failed to
describe how the report might establish interest or bias on Mercedes’s part or explain how the
- 15 - presence of “contradictory statements” by Mercedes could constitute material evidence. Even if
defendant had provided further explanation as to how the unfounded report could bolster his
claim of Mercedes’s interest or bias, given the nature of the evidence in this case—primarily
L.G.P.’s trial testimony and CAC statement directly implicating defendant of the crime—it
appears unlikely that disclosure of the report would have resulted in a reasonable probability the
jury would have found defendant not guilty. Thus, we do not find defendant made the requisite
showing that the unfounded report was material evidence, which is necessary in order to
implicate a defendant’s constitutional right to discover privileged information. See
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 867 (stating a criminal defendant cannot establish he was
unconstitutionally denied access to evidence without at least making “some plausible showing”
of how the evidence “would have been both material and favorable to his defense”).
Accordingly, because defendant failed to establish a basis for his claim he was entitled to an
in camera review of the DCFS records, we conclude the trial court’s decision to quash the
subpoena was not an abuse of discretion. See Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n.15.
¶ 61 C. Voir Dire Examination
¶ 62 Defendant also argues the trial court’s voir dire examination violated Illinois
Supreme Court Rule 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012), because the court grouped the four principles into
one broad statement of law, thereby failing to implement the “precise question-and-response
framework required by [Rule 431(b)].” Defendant acknowledges he forfeited this argument but
contends we may review it under the first prong of the plain-error doctrine. See People v.
Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 615, 939 N.E.2d 403, 414 (2010) (concluding a Rule 431(b) claim is
reviewable under the first prong of the plain-error doctrine). Defendant further acknowledges in
his reply brief that the supreme court recently rejected the same argument he now raises. See
- 16 - People v. Birge, 2021 IL 125644, ¶ 34 (“[T]here is no requirement that the trial court recite the
four principles separately.”). However, defendant maintains he is nonetheless entitled to relief
because of the “leading nature” of the court’s questioning of jurors which he claims was error.
He suggests this was somehow violative of Rule 431(b)’s requirement that the court “ask”
prospective jurors whether they understand and accept the specified legal principles. Defendant
provides no legal or logical support for his argument, and we find it is meritless. Therefore,
defendant has failed to establish plain error occurred, and his claim is forfeited.
¶ 63 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 64 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 65 Affirmed.
- 17 -