People v. Santos, Quinata

Opinion

ED SUPER OR COURT rF GUAM

2021 MAY -7 AM 9: 50 CLERK 0 COURT

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAMy :

PEOPLE OF GUAM, Criminal Case No. CF0731-18

vs.

JARED JOHN SANTOS, DOB: 05/12/1997 Defendant, DECISION AND ORDER (Motion for Acquittal) MARIANO ANTHONY SALAS QUINATA DOB: 10/03/1995

Defendant.

INTRODUCTION This matter came before the Honorable Arthur R. Barcinas on January 28, 2021, upon

two separate Motions for Acquittal filed by Defendants Jared John Santos and Mariano

Anthony Salas Quinata ("Defendants"). Defendant Jared John Santos is represented by

Attorneys David Lujan and Clyde Lemons, Jr. Defendant Mariano Anthony Salas Quinata is

represented by Assistant Alternate Public Defender Ana Maria C. Gayle. Assistant Attorney

General Christine Santos Tenorio represents the People of Guam ("the People"). Having

considered the arguments and the applicable law, the Court hereby DENIES the Defendants'

Motions for Acquittal. The Court further ORDERS that Defendant Santos' conviction for

Aggravated Assault (As a 3rd Degree Felony) and Defendant Quinata's conviction for

Aggravated Assault (As a 3rd Degree Felony) via Complicity be vacated.

Page 1 of 8 BACKGROUND

On January 21, 2021, a petit jury returned a guilty verdict against Defendant Jared John

Santos ("Defendant Santos") for Aggravated Assault (As a 2nd Degree Felony), with a special

allegation of Possession or Use of a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony;

Aggravated Assault (As a 3rd Degree Felony), with a special allegation of Possession or Use of

a Deadly Weapon in the Commission of a Felony; and Possession of a Firearm without a

Firearms Identification Card (As a 3rd Degree Felony). Defendant Mariano Quinata

("Defendant Quinata") was found guilty of Aggravated Assault via Complicity (As a 2 nd

Degree Felony) via Complicity and Aggravated Assault via Complicity (As a 3rd Degree

Felony).

At the close of the People's case in chief, and again at the close of trial, Defendants

moved for judgment of acquittal on the basis that there was insufficient evidence to convict

them, of the crimes charged. The court denied both motions. On January 28, 2021, Defendants

filed two separate Motions for Acquittal based on insufficient evidence. Both Defendants also

asserted that the two Aggravated Assault convictions against each of them constituted double

jeopardy. The People filed an Opposition to the Defendants' Motions for Acquittal on February

15, 2021. At a hearing held on March 4, 2021, the Court took the matter under advisement.

DISCUSSION

A court will enter a judgment of acquittal if the evidence presented at trial is

insufficient to sustain a conviction for the crimes charged. 8 G.C.A. § 100.10. "If a verdict of

guilty is returned the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of

acquittal." 8 G.C.A. § 100.30. A motion for acquittal should generally be made within seven

(7) days after the jury is discharged. Id. When making a determination regarding a motion for

judgment of acquittal, the Court must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the

Page 2 of 8 government to determine whether, —any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of

a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. — People v. Quinata, 1999 Guam 6, 1 8 (citing Jackson v.

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).

"'It is not the province of the court, in determining [a motion for a judgment of

acquittal], to resolve conflicts in the evidence, to pass upon the credibility of witnesses, to

determine the plausibility of explanations, or to weigh the evidence; such matters are for the

jury."' People v. Song, 2012 Guam 21 1 29 (quoting State v. Williams, 695 N.W.2d 23, 28

(Iowa 2005). "'Rf there is any direct evidence or any substantial circumstantial evidence

reasonably tending to prove the guilt of the accused, [the court] must find the case was

properly submitted to the jury.— People v. Taisacan, 2018 Guam 23, 1 17 (quoting People v.

Song, 2012 Guam 21, 1 29). "JE]ntirely circumstantial' evidence is sufficient to support a

guilty verdict." People v. McKinney, 2016 Guam 3,1 22.

The critical inquiry is whether the evidence in the record "could reasonably support a

finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt" by a rational trier of fact. People v. Reyes, 1998

Guam 32, 1 7. When making this determination, the court is concerned with the existence or

non-existence of evidence, not its weight. People v. Song, 2012 Guam 21, 1 29. "'The Ninth

Circuit has noted that this is a highly deferential standard.— People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32,1

7.

I. There was sufficient evidence at trial to convict Defendant Santos of the crimes charged.

The first issue is whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to convict Defendant

Santos of the crimes charged. Defendant Santos primarily argues that the Court should grant

the motion for judgment of acquittal, or alternatively set aside the guilty verdict and grant him

a new trial, because he alleges the verdict is contrary to the weight of evidence. See Santos'

Page 3 of 8 Mot. for J. of Acquittal (Jan. 28, 2021). He argues the Court should rule in his favor because

one of the witnesses at trial, Six Paulus ("Paulus"), was drunk at the time of the incident. Id.

Defendant Santos additionally argues that the Court should rule in his favor because the

defense was "sandbagged" with Paulus' written statement identifying Santos as the shooter on

the eve of trial. Id.

However, when reviewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court is

satisfied that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crimes

charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence presented at trial showed that Defendant

Santos had been involved in an altercation with the victim prior to the shooting. Witness

Paulus was familiar with both Defendant Santos and Defendant Quinata. Paulus testified that

there was a verbal exchange between the Defendants and Harry Henry right before the shooting

happened. Because Defendant Santos was seated in the passenger seat of the vehicle, there was

also evidence that Defendant Santos was the shooter. While Paulus was admittedly drunk at the

time of the incident, the jury was provided with instructions on assessing eyewitness credibility

and the jury's role as the trier of fact. After a trial and deliberation, the jury concluded that the

weight of evidence supported Defendant Santos' conviction for the aforementioned charges.

Based on the evidence adduced at trial, when reviewed in a light most favorable to the

government, the Court concludes that a rational trier of fact could have reasonably found the

elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

While Defendant Santos additionally argues that the defense was 'sandbagged' by

Paulus' written statement, this argument is moot as the court suppressed the written statement

and it was not used at trial. Thus, the Court will not disturb the jury's findings as the trier of

fact.

Page 4 of 8 II. There was sufficient evidence at trial to convict Defendant Quinata of the crimes charged.

The second issue is whether there was sufficient evidence at trial to convict Defendant

Quinata of the crimes charged. In Quinata's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, he argues that

the Court should grant a judgment of acquittal on the grounds that evidence adduced at trial

was insufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Quinata's Mot. for

J. of Acquittal (Jan. 28, 2021). Contrary to the verdict, Defendant Quinata asserts that the

evidence presented did not support a finding that Defendant Quinata knew of Santos' plan to

shoot the victim, agreed to the plan, or otherwise induced Santos in the attempt. Id. at 4-6.

According to Guam's complicity statute, a person is guilty of an offense if, "with the

intention of promoting or assisting in the commission of the offense, he induces or aids another

person to commit the offense." 9 G.C.A. § 4.60 (2005). Guam's complicity statute is similar to

that of Pennsylvania. Compare 9 G.C.A. § 4.60 (2005) with 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 306 (Westlaw

2021). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found that "the driver of a 'get away' car can be

found guilty as an accomplice if it is reasonable to infer that he was aware of the actual

perpetrator's intention. His agreement to effectuate the escape aids the perpetrator in the

planning and commission of the actual crime." Com. v. Wright, 344 A.2d 512, 515 (Pa. Super.

Ct. 1975). Because there are few instances when criminal intent will appear of record,

circumstantial evidence can be used to prove shared criminal intent. Wright, 344 A.2d at 514-

515.

However, when reviewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court is

satisfied that any rational trier of fact could have found Defendant Quinata guilty of the crimes

charged beyond a reasonable doubt. The evidence presented at trial showed that while Paulus

did not actually see Quinata driving the car, he did see Defendant Quinata with Defendant

Page 5 of 8 1 Santos at Mobil earlier that night, and thus assumed that Quinata drove the car that shot at the

2 victim. See Quinata's Mot. for J. of Acquittal (Jan. 28, 2021) at 4. Both victim Pedo Peredo

3 and witness Harry Henry did not identify Quinata as the driver of the blue Mitsubishi, and

4 there was no direct evidence that Defendant Quinata knew Defendant Santos intended to fire

5 the gun at the car or agreed to be part of a drive-by shooting with a firearm. Id. 4-5; 7.

6 However, Quinata was driving the car when he heard passenger Santos say, "What's up,

7 blood?" to the occupants of the victim's vehicle. See People's Opp'n at 4 (Feb. 15, 2021).

Defendant Quinata then drove Santos away from the scene. Id. Then, the same vehicle pulled

9 up next to the victim's vehicle. Id. There is sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that

10 Quinata drove Santos, who shot the gun. Id. Here, from the evidence presented at trial, a jury

11 could reasonably infer through circumstantial evidence that Quinata was aware of Santos'

12 intent to shoot the gun, and that he subsequently aided in the commission of the offense by

13 driving away from the scene.

14 The defense argues that this case is similar to Washington v. Asaeli, where the appellate

15 court found that there was insufficient evidence to support a defendant's murder conviction

16 when he drove another defendant to the scene of the shooting. Washington v. Asaeli, 208 P.3d

17 1136, 1152 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)). In Asaeli, the defendant's mere presence at the scene with

18 knowledge that others were looking for the victim was insufficient to support the conviction.

19 Id. The instant case is distinguished because in Asaeli, the defendant was not the getaway

20 driver for the individual who shot the victim, whereas in the current case, Defendant Quinata is

21 alleged to have been the getaway driver in the vehicle at the time of the shooting.

22 The People argue that the facts of this case are more similar to Commonwealth v.

23 Causey, wherein after getting into a fistfight with the victim, the defendant drove back to the

24 scene and his brother shot at the victim from the passenger seat. Commonwealth v. Causey, 833

Page 6 of 8 A.2d 165 (Penn. Super. Ct. 2003). The Cattsey court upheld the defendant's complicity to

aggravated assault convictions, finding that there was sufficient evidence that the defendant

was the getaway driver of the vehicle from which his brother shot. Similarly here, the Court

finds that there was sufficient evidence at trial to establish that Defendant Quinata was the

getaway driver and to establish that he aided Defendant Santos in committing the offense.

Additionally, Defendant Quinata argues that there was no evidence he was in the car,

and that even assuming he was in the car, he cannot be said to have had a duty to act or rectify

the situation of the shooting. See Quinata's Mot. for J. of Acquittal at 5. Guam law states: "A

person is not guilty of an offense if his liability is based solely on an omission unless the law

defining the offense expressly so provides, or a duty to perform the act is otherwise imposed by

law." 9 G.C.A. § 4.20. However, Defendant Quinata's conviction is not merely based on an

omission, but on his actions as the getaway driver of the vehicle. Therefore, Defendant Quinata

is not precluded from criminal responsibility under Guam law.

In sum, when the evidence adduced at trial is reviewed in a light most favorable to the

government, the Court concludes that a rational trier of fact could have found Defendant

Quinata guilty the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt.

III. Certain convictions will be dismissed, so as to not violate double jeopardy.

The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution

provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life

or limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Through the Organic Act, the Double Jeopardy Clause was

made applicable to Guam. People v. Reyes, 1998 Guam 32, (I[ 23. The Organic Act of Guam

provides that, "[n]o person shall be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of

punishment...." 48 U.S.C. § 1421b(d) (1950). The Double Jeopardy Clause protects against

successive prosecutions and successive criminal punishments for the same crime. People v. Page 7 of 8 1 San Nicolas, 2001 Guam 4, 1 8 (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267, 273 (1996) and

2 Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93, 99 (1997)).

3 Pursuant to 9 GCA § 1.22, a defendant cannot be convicted of more than one offense if

4 one is a lesser-included offense of the other. 9 GCA § 1.22(a) (2005). The People also agree

5 that Aggravated Assault as a Third Degree Felony is a lesser-included offense of Aggravated

6 Assault as a Second Degree Felony. See People's Opp'n at 5. Accordingly, the Court finds that

7 the less serious offense should be vacated. For these reasons, the Court will vacate Defendant

8 Santos' conviction for Aggravated Assault (As a 3rd Degree Felony) and Defendant Quinata's

9 conviction for Aggravated Assault (As a 3rd Degree Felony) via Complicity.

10 CONCLUSION

11 For the above reasons, the Court DENIES the Defendants' Motions for Acquittal. The

12 Court further ORDERS that Defendant Santos' conviction for Aggravated Assault (As a 3rd

13 Degree Felony) and Defendant Quinata's conviction for Aggravated Assault (As a 3rd Degree

14 Felony) via Complicity be vacated.

15 MAY 0 7 2U21 16 IT IS SO ORDERED

18 HONORABLE ARTHUR R. BARCINAS 19 Judge, Superior Court of Guam

20 SERVICE VIA EMAIL I acknowledge that an electronic copy Alt the original was elnailed to: el, 21 r Lujetn a,KA (,),/ 11— r 22 R(V Date: 6 2•97.01,_ • 23 16v1-vo,;‘) Deputy Clerk, nor Court of Guam 24

Page 8 of 8