People v. Santiago

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Santiago

78 A.D.2d 666, 432 N.Y.S.2d 216, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13163

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedOctober 14, 1980

StatusPublished

Cited by19 cases

This text of 78 A.D.2d 666 (People v. Santiago) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Santiago, 78 A.D.2d 666, 432 N.Y.S.2d 216, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13163 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1980).

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Opinion

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered September 21, 1977 and October 4, 1977, convicting him of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and new trial ordered. Defendant was charged, inter alia, with assault in the first degree as a result of a stabbing incident. The defendant testified in his own defense and, on cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly tried to have him state that a police witness was a liar. On summation, the prosecutor commented that if the defendant stuck to his story "he would be calling Detective Doyle a liar”. Thereafter, he proceeded to vouch for the officer’s testimony. This court has repeatedly condemned such questions and comments by the prosecution as prejudicial (see, e.g., People v Yant, 75 AD2d 653; People v Diaz, 73 AD2d 604; People v Lopez, 73 AD2d 676). Besides improperly questioning the defendant as to whether the police were lying, the prosecutor’s vouching for the police officer’s testimony constituted improper bolstering (see People v Perez, 69 AD2d 891; People v Webb, 68 AD2d 331). In addition, the prosecutor’s denigration of the defense witnesses’ testimony was improper (see People v Shanis, 36 NY2d 697; People v Webb, supra). The fact that defense counsel failed to object to some of the prosecutor’s questions or comments does not preclude this court from ordering a new trial as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see People v Butler, 57 AD2d 931). In addition, we note that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined the defendant’s character witness as to his actual knowledge of particular acts of misconduct (see People v Kennedy, 47 NY2d 196; People v Alamo, 23 NY2d 630, cert den 396 US 879) and the trial court improperly questioned the defendant and made comments concerning an alleged eyewitness (cf. People v De Jesus, 42 NY2d 519; People v Bell, 38 NY2d 116). Damiani, J. P., Gulotta, Martuscello and O’Connor, JJ., concur.

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Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, rendered September 21, 1977 and October 4, 1977, convicting him of assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the fourth degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. Judgment reversed, on the law and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, and new trial ordered. Defendant was charged, inter alia, with assault in the first degree as a result of a stabbing incident. The defendant testified in his own defense and, on cross-examination, the prosecutor repeatedly tried to have him state that a police witness was a liar. On summation, the prosecutor commented that if the defendant stuck to his story "he would be calling Detective Doyle a liar”. Thereafter, he proceeded to vouch for the officer’s testimony. This court has repeatedly condemned such questions and comments by the prosecution as prejudicial (see, e.g., People v Yant, 75 AD2d 653; People v Diaz, 73 AD2d 604; People v Lopez, 73 AD2d 676). Besides improperly questioning the defendant as to whether the police were lying, the prosecutor’s vouching for the police officer’s testimony constituted improper bolstering (see People v Perez, 69 AD2d 891; People v Webb, 68 AD2d 331). In addition, the prosecutor’s denigration of the defense witnesses’ testimony was improper (see People v Shanis, 36 NY2d 697; People v Webb, supra). The fact that defense counsel failed to object to some of the prosecutor’s questions or comments does not preclude this court from ordering a new trial as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice (see People v Butler, 57 AD2d 931). In addition, we note that the prosecutor improperly cross-examined the defendant’s character witness as to his actual knowledge of particular acts of misconduct (see People v Kennedy, 47 NY2d 196; People v Alamo, 23 NY2d 630, cert den 396 US 879) and the trial court improperly questioned the defendant and made comments concerning an alleged eyewitness (cf. People v De Jesus, 42 NY2d 519; People v Bell, 38 NY2d 116). Damiani, J. P., Gulotta, Martuscello and O’Connor, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

78 A.D.2d 666, 432 N.Y.S.2d 216, 1980 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 13163, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-santiago-nyappdiv-1980.

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