People v. Sands

1 Johns. 78
New York Supreme Court·Decided February 15, 1806·Published·Cited by 22 cases

Opinion

Spencer, J.

On the part of the defendants, it has been contended,

1. That to keep powder under the circumstances stated in the Indictment is not a nuisance.

2. That the offence consists only in its being carelessly kept.

It is a settled principle in the criminal law, that nothing can be intended in support of an indictment; and é con-verso, nothing can be intended, after a trial and conviction, against the facts charged, or that they exist otherwise than they are stated. I dismiss, therefore, all that was said relative to the great security of the house in which this powder was kept, as also every circumstance tending to shew that it was carelessly kept, and proceed solely on the facts, that the defendants kept in an ordinary house, fifty barrels of gun-powder, near the dwelling-houses of divers citizens, and near a certain public street at Brooklyn, to the common nuisance of the good people there, if, in point of law, powder thus kept, can be a common nuisance.

“ Common nuisances (says Judge Blackstone in his commentaries) are a species of offences against the public order and economical regimen of the State; being either the doing of a thing to the annoyance of all the King’s subjects, or the neglecting to do a thing which the common good requires.” Under this head, he refers the making, keeping, or carriage of too large a quantity of gun-powder at one time, or in one place, or vehicle, which he says, “though not declared a common nuisance, is prohibited by the 12th Geo. 3, c. 61, under heavy penalties and forfeitures.” He gives no direct opinion, whether the keeping too large a quantity of it in one place was a nuisance or not, at common law. When he says “ though not declared a common nuisance,” I understand him to refer to this statute which has not eo nomine, declared it a nuisance, and not as speaking in reference to the common law. If, however, he infers, as the defend[80] ants’ counsel have done, that it was not a common law of - fence, because the legislature have prohibited it under super added penalties, with all deference, I cannot subscribe to the conclusion. We know that statutes have frequently been passed in aid of the common law, and to render the of-fence more penal. This is the case, as it respects Champerty and Maintenance; so in the statute of the 2d William and Mary, sess. 2d, chap. 8, sect. 2, against keeping hogs in the streets of London. A variety of other cases might be stated.

The statute to prevent the storing of gun-powder within parts of the city of Nexo-York, has been mentioned, in support of the position, that anterior to that statute, there existed no restraint. It is liable to the same answer, that has already been given to the statute of George III. that it creates specific, and additional penalties, and goes into a variety of detail; but it by no means proves that it was not an offence at common law. In a case in 12 Mod. 343,* cited by the counsel for the people, it appears that “ a person was indicted for a nuisance for keeping several barrels of gun-powder, in a house in Brentford Tozvn, sometimes two days, sometimes a week, until he could conveniently send them to Londond’ Among other resolutions of Chief Justice Holt, are these, “ that to support that indictment, there must be apparent danger, or mischief already done, and that though gunpowder be a necessary thing, and for defence of the kingdom ; yet if it be kept in such a place as is dangerous to the inhabitants, or passengers, it will be a nuisance.”

The principles here laid down are supported by considering the definition of this offence, and the decisions in analagous cases. In the case of the King v. White and Wzrdfi* which was an indictment for manufacturing offensive liquors, near the King’s highway, and near the dwelling-houses of several of the inhabitants, Lord Mansfield says, “ it is not necessary that the smell should be unwholesome, it is enough if it renders the enjoyment of life and property uncomfortable.”

Would it admit of a doubt whether there was any existing remedy, if a powder-mill should be erected, for the manu[81] facture of that article in a large and populous town ? It appears to me impossible to say, that our citizens are remediless, in such a case. If the law yields them protection from a communis rixalrix, can it withhold protection where ' their lives and their properties are jeopardized ? I cannot hesitate to conclude that powder may be kept in such quantity, and in such manner, as to render the person keeping it guilty of a nuisance.

If this be so, from what circumstance are we to infer, that the defendant is not culpable ? In examining this point, the place, and quantity kept, are alone to be enquired into, because, ifit is to be intended, as I think it is, that the defendants are not to be considered as remiss in their attention to the powder, it does not follow that under the custody of even prudent and careful persons, disasters might not happen, or that this house, the receptacle of the powder, might not be struck with lightning. The place, as stated in the indictment, is a house near the dwelling-houses of divers citizens, and near a certain public street at Brooklyn. In the case already citedfrom Burrows, Ld. Mansjicld considered the term near as a sufficient laying of the offence, and he adds “ the very existence of the nuisance depends on the number of houses, and concourse of people, and this is a matter of fact to be judged of by the jury.” So here, whether this depot of the powder, as proved, would render this a nuisance, was matter for the jury, and we are not to suppose their finding against the truth of the facts. The quantity, I think was also matter for the consideration of the jury, depending on various circumstances, of which it is impossible for us to judge.— Though we have the opinion of our legislature, who interdict the keeping of more than twenty-eight pounds in any one place in the city of Netv-Tork, except in magazines, and even that is to be separated into four parcels in stone jugs, or tin canisters, I can find no objection to the indictment in respect to the quantity.

The defendants’ counsel have urged, that we are to intend, that this is a powder-house well protected, or that it Vas a house used by the defendants, for storing powder, be[82] fore the other houses at Brooklyn were erected. It is uéJ , / , , cessary only to say, that such intendments would be Without any basis to support them, and directly against the findingoftlie jury.

consider the defendants as convicted legally of anuis-• anee, and that judgment should pass on them for this offence.

Thompson, J.

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People v. Sands, 1 Johns. 78 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1806).

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