People v. Sample

2025 IL App (3d) 250302-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: September 19, 2025
• Docket: 3-25-0302
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

2025 IL App (3d) 250302-U

Order filed September 19, 2025 ____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ILLINOIS, ) of the 21st Judicial Circuit, ) Kankakee County, Illinois, Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) Circuit No. 25-CF-315 ) TROY A. SAMPLE, ) Honorable ) William S. Dickenson, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ANDERSON delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Holdridge concurred in the judgment. Justice Davenport dissented. ____________________________________________________________________________

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err by detaining defendant prior to trial because it found that no conditions would prevent him from presenting a continuing threat.

¶2 Defendant, Troy A. Sample, was charged with three counts of aggravated child

pornography for recording his minor daughters while they were in the bathroom. The trial court

granted the State’s verified petition to deny pretrial release, finding that the State had offered clear

and convincing evidence sufficient to support defendant’s continued detention. We affirm. ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On April 25, 2025, defendant was charged with three counts of aggravated child

pornography (Class X) (720 ILCS 5/11-20.3(a)(3) (West 2024)), 1 child pornography (Class 3) (id.

§ 11-20.1(a)(6)(vii), (c)), grooming (Class 4) (id. § 11-25), and unauthorized videotaping (Class

4) (id. § 26-4(a-5), (d)(2)). The State filed a verified petition to deny pretrial release, alleging

defendant was charged with a detainable offense and he posed a real and present threat to the safety

of any person, persons, or the community pursuant to section 110-6.1(a) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/110-6.1(a) (West 2024)).

¶5 A pretrial investigation report indicated that defendant had previously received court

supervision for unlawful possession of cannabis, driving on a suspended license, and leaving the

scene of an accident. Defendant declined to complete an interview so a pretrial risk assessment

was unable to be conducted.

¶6 On April 25, 2025, the court held a temporary detention hearing as defendant indicated that

he was going to be retaining private counsel. After hearing a brief factual recitation, the court

found probable cause to temporarily detain defendant until the full detention hearing was held.

¶7 The full detention hearing was held on May 5, 2025. The State provided the factual basis

as follows: On April 22, 2025, officers were dispatched for a call of juveniles being recorded in a

bathroom. The officers made contact with Kimberly N., who indicated that the two juvenile girls,

ages 16 and 17, were defendant’s daughters, and she was the mother of one girl. The girls were at

defendant’s house when they found a cell phone in the bathroom. The phone was positioned in

1 While it appears that this statutory section contained in the charging instrument and indictment has been repealed, neither party has raised this issue either in the circuit court or on appeal. Considering the factual recitation and record before us, the accuracy of the charged statute has no bearing on our decision. 2 such a way that it would capture people using the bathroom and shower. The girls looked through

the phone and found photographs and videos of themselves they had no knowledge of. Within the

photographs were zoomed-in screenshots of their genitals. “The girls and the mother were too

upset to continue to go through the phone ***,” and it was turned off to preserve any evidence.

Officers obtained a search warrant for the phone and found the photographs and videos showing

the girls undressing, including screenshots from the videos depicting their breasts and genitals.

Defendant can be seen in the videos setting the cell phone camera up in the bathroom and starting

the recording.

¶8 The State argued that defendant was a danger to his children and traumatized them through

these acts. The State further indicated that home confinement or GPS monitoring were not

appropriate conditions as they would not protect the public from defendant. Defense counsel noted

that defendant was a semitruck driver and could continue to work, did not commit an act of

violence or use a weapon, and did not have a significant criminal history. Counsel further argued

that conditions could be placed on defendant as “[t]here [are] no allegations that he’s doing this to

any other children.” Counsel noted the children lived in Kankakee and defendant lived in Manteno

with his father. The court found the State met its burden by clear and convincing evidence. In

doing so, the court discussed the statutory factors it was to consider. Defendant filed a motion for

relief, solely arguing that there were conditions available to mitigate the threat defendant posed.

After a hearing, the court denied the motion. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶9 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 10 On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove that he posed a real and present

threat and there were no conditions available to mitigate any threat he posed. However, we note

that defendant’s motion for relief solely challenged the court’s determination that no conditions

3 were available. Defendant did not challenge the court’s finding that he posed a real and present

threat. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(h)(2) (eff. Apr. 15, 2024) provides,

“As a prerequisite to appeal, the party taking the appeal shall first present to the

trial court a written motion requesting the same relief to be sought on appeal and

the grounds for such relief. The trial court shall promptly hear and decide the

motion for relief. Upon appeal, any issue not raised in the motion for relief, other

than errors occurring for the first time at the hearing on the motion for relief, shall

be deemed waived.”

As defendant could have challenged the second proposition in his motion for relief and failed to

do so, he has waived that argument. See People v. Jackson, 2024 IL App (3d) 240479-U, ¶¶ 11-

14. Therefore, we will only consider whether the court erred in finding that there were no

conditions available to mitigate the threat defendant posed.

¶ 11 Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be denied

in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2024). The State must file a verified

petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of

proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that

defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any

person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this

threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and the

conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can consider. Id.

§§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5; People v. Mikolaitis, 2024 IL 130693, ¶¶ 20-21. Where the hearing on the

State’s petition to detain contains no live witness testimony our review is de novo. People v.

Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 54.

4 ¶ 12 We find the court did not err in detaining defendant. The State presented evidence there

were no conditions available to mitigate the threat defendant posed. The statute provides factors

the court can consider when considering the conditions of release, and the State presented evidence

of such factors, including the nature and circumstances of the offense. See 725 ILCS 5/110-5 (West

2024). While defendant did not have a significant violent history,

“the evidence of a defendant’s charged conduct, even if it took place on a single

occasion, may reflect such a departure from the basic expectations of civil society

that it becomes difficult to predict the defendant’s compliance with court orders—

or even societal norms regarding the safety of others—if the defendant is placed on

pretrial release. The presumption in favor of pretrial release *** does not obligate

a trial court to release such a defendant in the hopes that his otherwise spotless

record will negate the real and present threat he poses to the safety of the

community as shown by the State’s evidence.” People v. Romine, 2024 IL App

(4th) 240321, ¶ 20.

¶ 13 Here, defendant set up a cell phone camera in the bathroom of his home to take

pornographic photographs and videos of his minor daughters. The acts defendant allegedly

committed happened in his own home. There was no way to monitor defendant to determine that

nothing similar happened again. Therefore, the court did not err when it found no conditions would

prevent defendant from continuing to be a threat and detaining him.

¶ 14 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 15 For the reasons stated, the judgment of the circuit court of Kankakee County is affirmed.

¶ 16 Affirmed.

¶ 17 JUSTICE DAVENPORT, dissenting:

5 ¶ 18 The majority concludes that because the alleged offense occurred in defendant’s own

home, “[t]here was no way to monitor defendant to determine that nothing similar happened

again.” In so doing, the majority commits a series of fundamental errors.

¶ 19 First, the majority substitutes a per se rule for the individualized analysis the law requires.

See 725 ILCS 5/110-6.1 (West 2024) (“Decisions regarding release, conditions of release, and

detention prior to trial must be individualized, and no single factor or standard may be used

exclusively to order detention.”). Article 110 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (Code)

(725 ILCS 5/110-1 et seq. (West 2024)) directs courts to consider, among other factors, the nature

and seriousness of the safety threat posed by defendant’s release. Id. § 110-5(a). This

consideration, however, must be tethered to “the specific articulable facts of the case.” Id. By

suggesting that home-based offenses are inherently unmonitorable, the majority reduces an

individualized statutory inquiry into a categorical rule unsupported by statute. This is in clear

violation of Article 110 and contrary to this court’s role under a de novo standard of review. See

People v. Morgan, 2025 IL 130626, ¶ 51; People v. Tyler, 2015 IL App (1st) 123470, ¶ 151.

¶ 20 Second, the majority misstates the applicable standard by demanding the ability to

“monitor defendant to determine that nothing similar happened again.” Article 110 does not

require that the court devise conditions to eliminate all possibility of misconduct. Rather, it directs

the court to impose conditions designed to “reasonably ensure” defendant’s appearance in court

and the “protection of the safety of any other person or the community.” 725 ILCS 5/110-2(e),

110-5(a) (West 2024). The statute thus contemplates supervision calibrated to reasonable

assurance, not absolute prevention. Indeed, every defendant on pretrial release retains some

theoretical opportunity to reoffend. Article 110 requires the court to determine whether that risk

6 can be mitigated through appropriate conditions, not whether it can be eradicated altogether. See

id. § 110-6.1(e).

¶ 21 Third, the majority relieves the State of its statutory burden. Article 110 of the Code

presumes all defendants are eligible for pretrial release and places the burden of proof on the State

to prove detention is necessary. Id. § 110-6.1(e). Specifically, the State must prove by clear and

convincing evidence that no condition or combination of conditions can mitigate the real and

present threat to the safety of any persons or the community, based on the specific articulable facts

of the case. Id. § 110-6.1(e)(3). “Clear and convincing evidence is more than a preponderance of

the evidence and not quite approaching the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard necessary to

convict a person of a criminal offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Morales,

2024 IL App (2d) 230597, ¶ 15. The State argued in the circuit court as follows:

“The State does not believe that home confinement or GPS are appropriate

solutions for detention in this case because the defendant still has the opportunity

to come into contact with unsuspecting, unknowing other individuals; that he could

continue to record even if the Court tells him not to do it, the law itself tells him not

to do it, and he did it anyways.”

This argument lacks any basis in the specific articulable facts of the case. Beyond conjecture, the

State proffered no evidence of a risk to “unsuspecting, unknowing other individuals” and no

evidence tending to show that defendant ever recorded anyone besides the alleged victims in this

case. The State took a narrow proffer—that defendant secretly recorded his daughters in his own

bathroom—and painted defendant as a safety threat to the community at large. The gap between a

proffer of intrafamilial misconduct and a generalized threat to “unsuspecting, unknowing

individuals” is too wide to ignore.

7 ¶ 22 The State’s showing was patently deficient in other respects. The State proffered no

evidence of defendant’s dissemination of the recordings or screenshots to others. See, e.g., People

v. Schulz, 2024 IL App (1st) 240422, ¶ 31. It proffered no evidence tying the speculative

“opportunity to come in contact” with unsuspecting victims to defendant’s actual routines or social

relationships. It proffered no evidence of defendant’s attempts to target unsuspecting members of

the public. It proffered no evidence of defendant’s access to minors. It proffered no evidence of

stealth cameras or calculated attempts to evade detection. See, e.g., People v. Currier, 2024 IL

App (2d) 240478-U, ¶ 30. Compounding matters still, the State’s argument before the trial court

mentioned only two of the six conditions defendant himself suggested. Collectively, these

deficiencies demonstrate the State relied on conjecture, rather than specific articulable facts, to

meet its burden of proof.

¶ 23 The specific articulable facts of this case reflect an abhorrent, but unsophisticated, crime.

According to the State’s proffer, defendant left his camera phone, unlocked, in his own bathroom

where his daughters discovered it. On this record, the claimed risk of undetectable recidivism is

overstated. This is especially true considering defendant would no longer have access to the alleged

victims. The State does not dispute that while defendant lives with his father in one city, his

daughters live with their mother in another city. On balance, the State fell short of proving, by

clear and convincing evidence, that no condition or combination of conditions could mitigate a

real and present threat to the safety of any persons or the community based on the specific

articulable facts of this case.

¶ 24 Thus, because the State has failed to meet its burden of proof, I respectfully dissent. I would

reverse the detention order and remand for a hearing on appropriate conditions of pretrial release.