People v. Salisbury
This text of People v. Salisbury (People v. Salisbury) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
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Bureau Thomas J.K. Smith, State Reporter
People v Salisbury
2026 NY Slip Op 04442
July 15, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department
Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.
This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.
The People of State of New York, respondent,
v
Brandon Salisbury, appellant.
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department
Decided on July 15, 2026
2025-11139
Cheryl E. Chambers, J.P.
Barry E. Warhit
Laurence L. Love
Susan Quirk, JJ.
Jillian S. Harrington, Staten Island, NY, for appellant.
Anne T. Donnelly, District Attorney, Mineola, NY (Monica M.C. Leiter and Antonella Karlin of counsel), for respondent.
DECISION & ORDER
Appeal by the defendant from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Tammy S. Robbins, J.), dated September 2, 2025, which, after a hearing, designated him a level two sex offender pursuant to Correction Law article 6-C.
ORDERED that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements.
The defendant was convicted, upon his plea of guilty, of one count of sexual misconduct (Penal Law § 130.20[1]). After a hearing pursuant to the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (Correction Law art 6-C), the Supreme Court assessed the defendant a total of 80 points on the risk assessment instrument, denied the defendant's application for a downward departure from his presumptive risk level, and designated him a level two sex offender. The defendant appeals.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court properly assessed 20 points under risk factor 7, as the People established, by clear and convincing evidence, that the defendant's crime arose in the context of a professional or vocational relationship with the victim and was an abuse of that relationship (see Sex Offender Registration Act: Risk Assessment Guidelines and Commentary at 12 [2006] [hereinafter Guidelines]). The defendant met the victim while she was a 15-year-old patient at a residential treatment facility and the defendant was employed at the facility. Under these circumstances, the court properly concluded that the relationship between the defendant and the victim constituted a "professional relationship" within the meaning of SORA (see People v Laboriel, 210 AD3d 916, 916; People v Moore-Johnson, 178 AD3d 1102).
A defendant seeking a downward departure from the presumptive risk level has the initial burden of (1) identifying, as a matter of law, an appropriate mitigating factor, namely, a factor which tends to establish a lower likelihood of reoffense or danger to the community and is of a kind, or to a degree, that is otherwise not adequately taken into account by the Guidelines; and (2) establishing the facts in support of its existence by a preponderance of the evidence (see People v Williams, 248 AD3d 1146, 1147; People v Siler, 247 AD3d 1226, 1229). If the defendant makes that twofold showing, the SORA court must exercise its discretion by weighing the mitigating factor to determine whether the totality of the circumstances warrants a departure to avoid an overassessment of the defendant's dangerousness and risk of sexual recidivism (see People v Williams, 248 AD3d at 1147; People v Laboriel, 210 AD3d at 917).
Here, the defendant failed to establish that the assessment of points under risk factor 9 for his prior youthful offender adjudication resulted in an overassessment of his risk level. The temporal remoteness of that adjudication was adequately taken into account by risk factor 9 (number and nature of prior crimes) and risk factor 10 (recency of prior felony or sex crime) (see People v Prince, 243 AD3d 698, 700; People v Emery, 204 AD3d 944, 944-945). The defendant's further contention that consideration of his youthful offender adjudication resulted in an overassessment of points because of his young age of 18 at the time of the underlying offense is without merit (see People v Medina, 209 AD3d 775, 776; People v Kennedy, 160 AD3d 671, 671-672).
CHAMBERS, J.P., WARHIT, LOVE and QUIRK, JJ., concur.
ENTER:
Darrell M. Joseph
Clerk of the Court
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