2020 IL App (1st) 180886-U
Fifth Division September 11, 2020
No. 1-18-0886 NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 15 CR 9789 ) WOJCIECH SADELSKI, ) Honorable ) Charles P. Burns, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE DELORT delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Hoffman and Rochford concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm defendant’s convictions for first degree murder and attempt murder. The circuit court’s findings that defendant was guilty but mentally ill were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶2 At the time of his arrest, Wojciech Sadelski was in the middle of a residential street,
wrestling with his brother Piotr for control of a bloody claw hammer. Shortly thereafter, police
found the body of their mother, Maria, half naked and lying facedown in a pool of blood.
Defendant was subsequently tried and found guilty but mentally ill of first degree murder and No. 1-18-0886
attempt murder, over his contention that he was not guilty by reason of insanity. We affirm the
convictions.
¶3 BACKGROUND
¶4 The first witness at defendant’s bench trial was his brother Piotr. Piotr testified that, he
was living in the basement of his parents’ house. Defendant used to live in the house as well, but
had moved out several weeks earlier. Piotr testified that although he and defendant had a normal
relationship as children, they had not been on speaking terms for the last several years.
¶5 On the night in question, Piotr returned home after work. He noticed that his mother’s car
was parked near the house, but the lights were off and the front door was locked. When there was
no response to his knocks at a front window, Piotr walked around to the back door and let
himself in. As he entered the kitchen, he felt a hammer blow on his head. Piotr testified that he
immediately recognized defendant and that defendant then hit him repeatedly with the hammer.
Piotr attempted to fight back, and after almost ten minutes of fighting, Piotr was able to knock
defendant to the ground and break for the door. Defendant grabbed at his shirt, but Piotr was able
to slip out of it and run to a neighbor’s house.
¶6 Piotr testified that after he called the police from the neighbor’s phone, he realized that he
should check on his mother, so he started walking back to the house. As he approached, he saw
that defendant was now behind the wheel of their mother’s car. He heard a “big acceleration”
and had to jump over the hood of the car to avoid being run over. The car went past Piotr,
through the wall of a neighbor’s garage, and into the adjacent yard.
¶7 Piotr testified that defendant climbed out of the car with the hammer still in his hand and
began chasing him down the street. Piotr eventually fell, and defendant caught up to him and
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resumed beating him with the hammer. Piotr was able to grab the hammer, and for some time
each man had one hand on the hammer. Then, a police car arrived. Defendant immediately
stopped attacking Piotr and released the hammer. Defendant then told Piotr that he was lucky
that the police arrived.
¶8 Still worried about his mother, Piotr led a police officer to the house. The two separated
and searched the house for Maria. Piotr soon overheard the police officer use his radio to report
“a person dead, a female.”
¶9 On cross-examination, Piotr testified that he and defendant had previously been
employed as construction workers by their older brother Mariuz. During that time, defendant
accused Piotr of urinating in his shoes. Piotr also testified that defendant “chang[ed]
emotionally” during that time. Piotr had, around that time, told his parents that defendant was a
“ticking time bomb” and that “he is going to kill us some day.” Piotr said that defendant “acted
like a psychopath”.
¶ 10 The next witness was Officer Rodrigo Lopez of the Chicago Police Department. Lopez
testified that, on the night in question, he received a dispatch about a “domestic disturbance with
a mental.” On his way to the Sadelski house, Lopez was “waved down” by two people who had
seen “two guys * * * fighting with a hammer.” When Lopez came upon the brothers, each had
one hand on the hammer. Defendant was using his free hand to punch Piotr. Lopez drew his
sidearm and ordered the men to drop the hammer. Defendant immediately complied and Piotr
threw the hammer aside. As he was being arrested, defendant said to Lopez, “He did it.”
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¶ 11 Lopez then followed Piotr to the house to check on Maria. While Piotr searched on the
first floor, Lopez went down into the basement. There, he found a woman, lying facedown in a
puddle of blood, wearing nothing but denim pants.
¶ 12 The parties then stipulated that, if called, a forensic investigator would testify that he
recovered two lengths of metal pipe, a blood-stained boning knife, and a blood-stained hammer
from the scene of the crimes. The parties further stipulated that, if called to testify, forensic
scientists would testify that blood on the recovered items and on defendant’s shoes matched
Maria’s DNA.
¶ 13 The final witness in the State’s case-in-chief was Dr. Benjamin Soriano of the Cook
County Medical Examiner’s Office. Dr. Soriano testified that he examined the body of Maria and
identified several blunt-force and puncture injuries to the head, consistent with blows from both
ends of a claw hammer. Dr. Soriano also identified injuries consistent with blows with a pipe or
other cylindrical object, as well as injuries consistent with defensive wounds.
¶ 14 After the court denied defendant’s motion for a directed verdict, he called forensic
psychiatrists Dr. Fidel Echevarria and Dr. Roni Seltzberg to testify in support of his insanity
defense. In rebuttal, the State called psychologists Dr. Brian Curran and Dr. Christopher Cooper
who opined that defendant was not insane at the time of the crimes. Each of the four experts had
personally examined defendant and had reviewed defendant’s previous medical records, an
electronic recorded interview (ERI) of defendant after his arrest, and each other’s reports.
¶ 15 The medical experts testified that defendant’s medical records indicated that he was
hospitalized approximately a year before the date in question because he had called 911 to report
that he was suicidal. When he arrived at the hospital, defendant was “aggressive, agitated and
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screaming,” and was given antipsychotic medication. At the hospital, defendant tested positive
for cannabis, and his brother reported he “had been paranoid and was having some anger issues.”
Defendant reported that he had called 911, not because he was suicidal, but because he harbored
a belief that the police and FBI were spying on him. Defendant was examined by a psychiatrist,
prescribed antipsychotic medication, and released after a few days because he did not qualify for
involuntary admission.
¶ 16 Through the testimony of the medical experts, the circuit court heard defendant’s own
account of the alleged crimes and the events leading up to them. Defendant variously told the
doctors that he began hearing voices in his head “some time prior to the murder,” when he was
15 or 16 years old, or “every day since he was 17 or 18.” There appeared to be at least two
different voices, one male and one female. Defendant also reported to the doctors that he had an
extensive history of drug use, although his reports to the various doctors were not identical. He
admitted to using cannabis daily, as well as drinking alcohol and experimenting with PCP,
cocaine, and hallucinogens. To Dr. Cooper, although not to the other doctors, he admitted that he
had previously been addicted to cocaine but had quit due to its effect on his exercise routine. He
told Dr. Cooper that “had money but *** didn’t want to spend it on rent.” Rather, he preferred to
spend the money on cannabis.
¶ 17 Defendant told the doctors that some weeks before the alleged crimes, he had moved out
of his parents’ house and began living in a park. He had left the family home because he believed
that Piotr had urinated in his shoes and his iced tea, and that his family always sided with Piotr
when they fought. He also claimed that he had severe, recurring headaches when in the presence
of his brothers. While living under a bridge in the park, defendant used park facilities to shower
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and groom himself. All the while, defendant paid his cellphone bill, took care of his belongings,
and played pick-up basketball. He also remained employed in construction and regularly took
public transportation to work.
¶ 18 On the morning of the crimes, defendant took Chicago Transit Authority (CTA) trains to
his employer’s house. He told two of the doctors that he had decided to quit his job because he
had formed the belief that if he went to Canada, the voices and his headaches would stop. He
claimed that, on the way to his employer’s house to pick up his final paycheck, he heard a voice
telling him to kill his boss. Defendant, however, decided not to kill his employer; he collected his
check and took the CTA back to his parents’ house. On the way, defendant called and left a
message for his drug dealer.
¶ 19 Defendant told the doctors that, while on the train, he thought he heard a woman tell him
to kill his brother Piotr. He concluded that if he killed Piotr, the voices and the headaches would
stop. Defendant went to his parents’ house to lie in wait for Piotr. After some time, the drug
dealer returned defendant’s call. He left the house to meet with the dealer and buy $20 worth of
cannabis. Defendant then returned to the house, smoked the cannabis, and watched music videos.
¶ 20 While waiting for his brother, defendant heard his mother enter the house. He hid from
her, but eventually came out of his hiding spot when he thought that she had gone. Defendant
told Dr. Curran that his mother asked him to move back into the family home, but that he still
had a “grudge” against his brother for urinating in his shoes. Defendant also claimed to hear
voices telling him “to hit [his mother], to hurt her, to kill her.” He did not remember hitting her,
but he knew that he was bloody and that he had killed her.
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¶ 21 Defendant told Dr. Seltzberg that, after he killed his mother, he looked out a window and
saw a little girl who told him that Piotr had molested her. He also claimed to have heard a voice
telling him that Piotr was on his way home and that he should wait for him with the hammer.
Defendant related that he attacked Piotr when he came in the back door, and that after wrestling
for some time, Piotr was able to get away.
¶ 22 Defendant claimed that a voice then told him to get into his mother’s car and leave. Once
in the car, however, he saw Piotr and decided to run him down. He tried to hit Piotr with the car
but crashed into a neighboring garage. He told the doctors that he got out of the crashed car and
chased Piotr on foot and caught up to him when he fell. He continued to fight with Piotr until the
police arrived. He reported that a voice told him to hit the police officers, but he decided not to.
Defendant reported to Dr. Cooper that, after his arrest, a voice told him to lie to the police and
tell them that Piotr had killed Maria.
¶ 23 Dr. Echevarria diagnosed defendant with “schizophrenia multiple episodes” that was
“currently in partial remission with medication” as well as cannabis use disorder. He opined that
defendant was insane at the time he committed the crimes. In his opinion, defendant’s actions
were “psychotically motivated” and were the result of defendant’s “persecutorial delusional
thoughts.” When questioned by the court, Dr. Echevarria acknowledged that, at no point during
the ERI did defendant appear to be reacting to hallucinations.
¶ 24 Dr. Seltzberg, opined that defendant suffered from a “chronic psychotic mental illness,”
specifically, schizophrenia. She also opined that he suffered from cannabis use disorder.
Although she acknowledged that a person with schizophrenia may “absolutely” be legally sane,
she opined that defendant was not sane at the time of the crimes.
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¶ 25 Dr. Curran diagnosed defendant with “[u]nspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other
psychotic disorder, currently in remission” as well as cannabis use disorder, but opined that
defendant was legally sane at the time of the crimes. In particular, he found it noteworthy that
defendant “provided a very detailed logical and goal directed account of his movements and
activities” on the day of the crimes. Dr. Curran also noted that the ERI, having occurred so close
in time to the crimes, was the best evidence of defendant’s mental state at the time. Dr. Curran
opined that defendant did not show any signs of psychotic symptoms during the ERI. Moreover,
Dr. Curran expressed doubt that defendant suffered from “true auditory hallucinations” at all,
based on his apparent lack of distress during his self-reported hearing of voices. He also opined
that defendant’s apparent remission may be attributable to his sobriety from cannabis rather than
his current regimen of medication. Dr. Curran administered a written test called the Minnesota
Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI) to evaluate Wojciech for personality disorders.
Although that test usually takes thirty minutes to complete, defendant took nearly two hours.
Concerned by the length of time defendant spent on the test, Dr. Curran also tested defendant’s
reading comprehension level. Although English is not defendant’s first language and his reading
and comprehension levels were at second and sixth grade levels, respectively, Dr. Curran stated
that the MMPI results were not invalid. He did state, however, that the test results should be
interpreted with caution.
¶ 26 Dr. Cooper also opined that defendant was legally sane at the time of the crimes. Dr.
Cooper diagnosed defendant with “cannabis use disorder; second, stimulant or cocaine use
disorder; third, unspecified personality disorder with antisocial and paranoid features” and
“finally fourth rule out history of substance induced psychotic disorder.” Dr. Cooper put great
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weight on defendant’s inconsistent self-reporting of drug use. He also relied on statements by
Piotr and defendant’s sister that they had never heard defendant complain of hearing voices until
after the crimes. Like Dr. Curran, Dr. Cooper also administered a version of the MMPI. Dr.
Cooper testified that the MMPI has built-in validity scales to help identify malingering or
inconsistent responses, whether intentional or as the result of reading or comprehension
difficulties. Dr. Cooper testified that the validity scales did not indicate any particular reading or
comprehension problems, but did show that defendant approached the test in “a significantly
defensive manner in that he attempted to portray himself in an unusually favorable light by
claiming to be unrealistically virtuous.” Consequently, he explained, the MMPI results had to be
“interpreted with great caution if at all.” Ultimately, he “made the determination to interpret [the
results] very conservatively so as to not misconstrue the information.” He explained that the
results were consistent with “a very severe personality disorder such as antisocial personality
disorder or paranoid personality disorder.”
¶ 27 Aside from the results of the MMPI, Dr. Cooper relied on defendant’s own account of his
actions that day. He found it significant that defendant was able to navigate public transportation
and conduct a drug deal without any problems. “Somebody who is acutely and floridly and
significantly psychotic as indicated by some of the other examiners,” Dr. Cooper opined, “would
likely have difficulty taking a train, switching train lines, interacting with people.” He also
interpreted defendant’s responses to the police in the ERI “as facetious, oppositional,
inconsistent, sarcastic responses.”
¶ 28 Dr. Cooper also relied on an interview of Piotr by a social worker. Piotr reported to the
social worker that he had considered defendant “a ticking time bomb” and that they frequently
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got into “nasty fights.” Piotr reported that defendant had threatened to kill him several times over
the preceding few years. He also told the social worker that defendant had a poor relationship
with Maria. Defendant believed that Maria always sided with Piotr, and he argued with her
frequently about defendant’s cannabis use in the house. Piotr had also reported that, when
defendant confronted him about urinating in his shoes and iced tea, Piotr had told him that he
“loved it”. Dr. Cooper testified that this reaffirmation of defendant’s belief about Piotr harassing
him changed defendant’s belief from a paranoid delusion to a reality based belief. Dr. Cooper
opined that this longstanding pattern of enmity cut against defendant’s claim that he was acting
on insane delusions on the day of the crimes.
¶ 29 The State also called Roger Murphy, one of the Chicago police detectives who had
conducted the ERI. He testified that, during the interview, defendant did not appear to be
responding to anyone who was not in the room. He also testified that defendant never mentioned
Piotr urinating in his shoes. The State also introduced the ERI into evidence and played portions
of it in open court.
¶ 30 The approximately six-hour ERI shows detectives questioning defendant about the
crimes. During the first part of the interview, defendant looks at the ground and often does not
respond to questions. For the most part, his responses are that he does not know or does not
remember. Defendant also responds with occasional outbursts, such as “why don’t you just
throw me in jail?” After the detectives leave, defendant lies down and appears to sleep until they
return.
¶ 31 When the detectives return and continue the interview, defendant jokes with them about
letting him go and saying that he “jumped them”. Unlike during the first portion, he looks at the
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detectives during this part of the interview. When asked about crashing the car through the
neighbor’s garage, defendant laughs and says, “I think I’m possessed or something.” Then, when
asked if he remembered killing his mother, he responds, “I think you guys killed her.” When
asked how he feels about his mother being murdered, he responds “why does there have to be an
emotion? I have no reaction.” Defendant goes on to say that the detectives made him do it by
putting something in his head and that he wants a brain scan “to check if there’s been anything
unusual in [his] head.”
¶ 32 Later in the interview, defendant says that killing his mother “was the time of [his] life.”
He goes on to repeat his claim that the detectives put something in his head. He then asks for a
gun and to be let go, requests which the detectives deny. When asked if he remembers attacking
Piotr, he responds “I don’t have a f*** brother.” Again, he states that the detectives “set [him]
up.” Shortly before the end of this portion of the interview, defendant says that he remembers a
voice, but does not elaborate. A while after the detectives leave the room, defendant says to
himself, “why do you bother me, man?”
¶ 33 When the detectives return, they ask defendant about previous threats against Piotr. When
offered the chance to speak to Piotr, defendant says that he can come into the interrogation room.
Piotr enters with the detectives, his hair still matted with blood. Defendant stands up and
advances toward Piotr. The detectives tell him repeatedly to sit down, but he continues to move
forward. The detectives hurry Piotr out of the room and defendant says, “You guys are f***
sick.”
¶ 34 The detectives return without Piotr, and ask why defendant is so angry with him.
Defendant mocks Piotr for crying and repeatedly calls him a “f*** scumbag” and child molester.
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He also alleges that his mother was a “sick f*** whore” who knew about Piotr molesting
children and protected him. When asked why he did not report Piotr’s alleged child molestation
to the police, he replies that “police are p***”. He claims that Piotr molested a child who lived
down the street from his parents and that he knew because she told him.
¶ 35 Defendant eventually tells the detectives, “I guess I lost it”. When asked what happened
when he lost it, defendant says, “you see what happened.” When pressed for details about the
crimes, he repeatedly states that it does not matter and gives no substantive answers. He repeats
his claim that his mother was a whore, and that she was cheating on his father with “big
Mexicans.” The detectives ask if defendant has anything else to tell them and he repeats his
statement that they are “f*** sick.” The detectives then leave once again.
¶ 36 When the detectives return, they are accompanied by a forensic investigator who
photographs defendant and collects his shoes, shirts, and shorts. They give defendant a pair of
pants, but when he learns that they were taken from his parents’ house he tells the detectives that
they are sick. After the detectives leave the room, defendant loudly says “mother f***” three
times. In the final portion of the ERI, the detectives show defendant photographs of a hammer
and a knife. Defendant claims not to recognize either.
¶ 37 After the State rested in rebuttal, the court found defendant guilty but mentally ill of the
murder of Maria and the attempt murder of Piotr. The court relied heavily on Piotr’s testimony,
which the court found very persuasive. The court found that Piotr’s testimony showed a serious
and longstanding enmity between the brothers. Moreover, the court made the following findings:
“[E]ven though I do not believe *** the defense has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality
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of his conduct, I do believe that the defendant has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant was mentally ill as defined under the statute *** .
It’s also stated in [the statute] *** mental illness or mentally ill means a
substantial disorder of thought, mood or behavior which afflicted a person at the time of
the commission of the offense which impaired that person’s judgment but not to the
extent that he is unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior. I do believe, most
likely because of his cannabis abuse, that he did have a disorder of mood, thought or
behavior. He chose to be homeless. He apparently was paranoid with regard to his family
and particularly his participation with Piotr. He believed that people were -- particularly
family members were harassing him and hassling him. And, again, as I stated, peeing in
his shoes and also peeing in his iced tea.”
¶ 38 Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that the court erred in finding that he
had failed to meet his burden to show that he was legally insane at the time of the crimes. The
court denied the motion.
¶ 39 This appeal follows.
¶ 40 ANALYSIS
¶ 41 On appeal, defendant raises a single issue, contending that the court’s finding that he was
guilty but mentally ill was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In particular, he argues
that the evidence established that (1) he suffered from schizophrenia at the time of the offense,
and (2) that he lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. He
therefore asks us to overturn his convictions.
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¶ 42 In Illinois, it is presumed that all defendants are sane. People v. Romero, 2018 IL App
(1st) 143132, ¶ 62. Under the insanity defense, a person is not criminally responsible for his
conduct if, at the time, he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct
due to mental disease or defect. 720 ILCS 5/6-2(a) (West 2014). When a defendant raises the
insanity defense, it is his burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he is not guilty
by reason of insanity, while the State retains the burden of proving him guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt of the charged offenses. 720 ILCS 5/6-2(e) (West 2014). Evidence is “clear and
convincing” if it “leaves no reasonable doubt in the mind of the fact finder.” Bazydlo v. Volant,
164 Ill. 2d 207, 213 (1995). “Although stated in terms of reasonable doubt, courts consider clear
and convincing evidence to be more than a preponderance while not quite approaching the
degree of proof necessary to convict a person of a criminal offense.” Id.
¶ 43 A person who was not insane at the time he committed a criminal offense, but was
suffering from a mental illness, is criminally responsible for his conduct and may be found
“guilty but mentally ill.” 720 ILCS 5/6-2(c) (West 2014). “Mental illness” is statutorily defined
as “a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behavior which afflicted a person at the time he
committed an offense, and which impaired his judgment, but not to the extent that he was unable
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his behavior.” 720 ILCS 5/6-2(d) (West 2014). “Bizarre
behavior or delusional statements do not compel an insanity finding as a defendant may suffer
mental illness without being legally insane.” People v. McCullum, 386 Ill. App. 3d 495, 504
(2008).
¶ 44 The first half of defendant’s argument relates to the specific nature of his mental
condition. He argues that the manifest weight of the evidence showed that he suffered from
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schizophrenia at the time of the offenses. Defendant makes much of the court’s apparent
preference for Dr. Cooper’s diagnosis of drug use disorder over Dr. Echevarria’s and Dr.
Seltzberg’s diagnoses of schizophrenia. He points to testimony by his own experts, as well as the
testimony of Dr. Curran, who diagnosed him with “unspecified schizophrenia spectrum
disorder.”
¶ 45 The circuit court, however, did not—and was not asked to—make a specific finding on
whether defendant was schizophrenic. Mirroring the language of the insanity statute, the court
found, “most likely because of his cannabis abuse, that [defendant] did have a disorder of mood,
thought, or behavior.” See 720 ILCS 5/6-2(d) (West 2014). That finding was clearly consistent
with the expert testimony. All four experts diagnosed defendant with cannabis use disorder, as
well as at least one other condition, be it schizophrenia, unspecified schizophrenia spectrum
disorder, or “unspecified personality disorder with antisocial and paranoid features.”
¶ 46 The key question, therefore, is not the specific nature of defendant’s mental condition,
but whether “he lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct” because
of that condition. This point was made abundantly clear in Dr. Seltzberg’s testimony that one
may “absolutely” suffer from schizophrenia and still be legally sane. So even if we were to
accept, arguendo, that the court erred in not specifically finding that defendant suffered from
schizophrenia, that would not be the end of our inquiry.
¶ 47 We turn then to the question of whether the court erred in finding that defendant, despite
his mental condition, was still able to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Whether a
defendant was legally insane or mentally ill at the time he committed an offense is a factual
question that is generally determined by the trier of fact. Romero, 2018 IL App (1st) 143132,
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¶ 63. The fact finder’s determination of these issues will not be disturbed on review unless it is
against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Urdiales, 225 Ill. 2d 354, 428 (2007). A
finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only where the opposite conclusion is
clearly evident, or where the finding is arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on the evidence
presented. Romero, 2018 IL App (1st) 143132, ¶ 64 (citing People v. Deleon, 227 Ill. 2d 322,
332 (2008)). When confronted with a battle of the experts, it is “for the trier of fact to evaluate
the expert testimonies and weigh their relative worth in context.” People v. Sims, 374 Ill. App. 3d
231, 251 (2007). That is, the circuit court was not required to accept the testimony of defendant’s
experts over the State’s experts.
¶ 48 The heart of defendant’s argument on this point is that the defense experts were more
credible than the State’s experts, particularly Dr. Cooper. Defendant attacks Dr. Cooper’s
credibility on several grounds. First, he argues that Dr. Cooper’s diagnosis was not credible
because he was the only expert who did not opine that defendant suffered from schizophrenia.
Additionally, defendant questions the validity of Dr. Cooper’s methods, including his reliance on
the MMPI despite defendant’s apparent language difficulties.
¶ 49 It is the responsibility of the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the witnesses, the
weight given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the evidence. Sims, 374 Ill.
App. 3d at 251. The trier of fact is in the best position to observe a witness as he testifies, and
may accept as much or as little of his testimony as it sees fit. Id. “This rule also applies to expert
opinions on sanity, and the weight of such an opinion is to be determined by the reasons given
and the facts supporting the opinion.” Id. The trier of fact may entirely reject an expert’s
testimony if it concludes that the defendant was sane based on factors including lay testimony
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from witnesses who observed the defendant around the time of the offense, whether the
defendant planned the crime, and any attempt by the defendant to conceal the crime. Romero,
2018 IL App (1st) 143132, ¶ 63.
¶ 50 Defendant argues that Dr. Cooper was the only expert who did not diagnose defendant
with schizophrenia, and that, given the other doctor’s competent explanation for their diagnoses,
Dr. Cooper must therefore be unreliable. However, the mere fact that Dr. Cooper’s diagnosis
differs from those of defendant’s witnesses is neither dispositive nor surprising. As the State
points out Dr. Curran did not actually diagnose defendant with schizophrenia; he diagnosed
defendant with “[u]nspecified schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorder.” The
distinction is not explored in the record, but it is important to note that, in crafting his diagnosis,
Dr. Curran observed that defendant did not appear to suffer from “true auditory hallucinations.”
Both Dr. Curran and Dr. Cooper expressed doubt on this issue primarily because defendant’s
self-reporting of auditory hallucinations was not inherently reliable.
¶ 51 As to the reliability of Dr. Cooper’s methods, defendant puts a great deal of emphasis on
the fact that Dr. Cooper relied on the MMRI, despite defendant’s apparent language difficulties.
He points out that Dr. Curran testified that the MMRI results had to be interpreted with caution
for that very reason. This ignores, however, that Dr. Cooper himself testified that the results of
the test must be considered with caution and that he did exercise caution by interpreting the
results of the exam “very conservatively so as to not misconstrue the information.” Moreover,
Dr. Cooper explained that the diagnosis was not simply taken from the computer readout from
the exam, but was also the result of his own examination of defendant, defendant’s previous
medical records, and the ERI—in short, the same materials relied upon by the other experts. To
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the extent that Dr. Cooper’s reliance on the MMRI undercut his credibility as a witness, it
remained the purview of the circuit court to weigh that credibility. See People v. Johnson, 318
Ill. App. 3d 281, 287 (2000) (“Issues concerning the quality of the testing process itself” go to
the weight of an expert’s testimony). We cannot say that Dr. Cooper’s testimony was so
unreliable that the circuit court should have disregarded it entirely.
¶ 52 People v. Wilhoite, 228 Ill. App. 3d 12, (1991), is instructive on this issue. In that case,
this court overturned the defendant’s conviction because the State’s lone expert on the issue of
sanity lacked proper foundation for his opinion. Id. at 21. The State’s expert opined that
defendant was not insane, but merely intoxicated on cannabis. Id. However, the expert admitted
that he had not made any inquiry into how much cannabis defendant had consumed. Id. With no
information on that essential question, the witness lacked any foundation for his opinion that
defendant was intoxicated rather than insane. Id. In this case, defendant can point to no such
foundational flaw in Dr. Cooper’s expert opinion. As discussed above, Dr. Cooper offered a
detailed explanation of his methods and reasoning. Whatever credibility questions defendant can
raise as to Dr. Cooper’s testimony, they do not rise to the level of those in Wilhoite, where the
trial court improperly considered the expert’s testimony at all.
¶ 53 Moreover, Dr. Cooper’s opinion was far from the only opinion evidence that the court
had to consider. In this case, there were a total of four expert witnesses: two who opined that
defendant was insane and two who opined that he was not insane. In making its determination on
this issue, the court was free to accept the opinion of one expert witness over another, or accept
part and reject part of each expert’s testimony. See People v. Baker, 253 Ill. App.3d 15, 27-28
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(1993). However, a fact finder may only disregard expert testimony if there is sufficient contrary
evidence. People v. Kando, 397 Ill. App. 3d 165, 197 (2009).
¶ 54 Defendant relies on Baker, Kando, and People v. Arndt, 86 Ill. App. 3d 744 (1980) in
support of his argument that the court inappropriately disregarded his experts’ testimony. These
cases, however, are easily distinguished from the present case. In Baker, “four expert witnesses
testified that defendant was insane at the time of the crime and *** no expert witnesses testified
on behalf of the State.” Baker, 253 Ill. App.3d at 27. In Arndt, two doctors testified for the
defense; none testified for the State. Arndt, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 750. Similarly, in Kando, the
defense introduced two experts and the State introduced none. Kando, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 197.
¶ 55 The State is not required to present any expert testimony to defeat an insanity defense and
may reject a defense expert’s opinion on the issue if the other evidence in the case tends to show
that defendant was sane. Romero, 2018 IL App (1st) 143132, ¶ 63. In this case, the State
presented two expert witnesses who both opined that defendant was not legally insane at the time
of the crimes. Even if Dr. Cooper’s testimony was entirely incredible—an argument that we have
already rejected—Dr. Curran testified credibly for the State. He opined, based on interviews with
defendant, review of medical records, and review of the other experts’ reports, that defendant
was legally sane at the time of the crimes. Among other things, Dr. Curran questioned whether
the voices that defendant reported hearing were “true auditory hallucinations.”
¶ 56 Defendant also argues that, even independent of the expert testimony, none of the other
evidence in the case could support a finding that he was legally sane at the time of the crimes. He
contends that the State presented no evidence of a motive other than his own paranoid delusions.
He also argues that State offered no evidence that he appreciated the criminality of his acts.
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¶ 57 Regarding the presentation of a rational motive, the State rightly points out that motive is
not an element of either crime with which defendant was charged and that it was defendant’s
burden to overcome the presumption of his sanity. Romero, 2018 IL App (1st) 143132, ¶ 62.
Even so, the circuit court heard plenty of evidence to conclude that defendant’s motive stemmed
from long-standing enmity towards Piotr and the fact that defendant had been threatening to kill
Piotr for years. See People v. Taylor, 110 Ill. App. 3d 112, 118 (1982) (prior threats to kill victim
are evidence of planning, which supports a finding of sanity). The court also heard evidence that
defendant’s relationship with his mother was strained and that she encountered defendant while
he was lying in wait to attack Piotr. It may be tempting to say that no sane person could bludgeon
his own mother to death with a hammer and then attempt to do the same to his brother. This is
not, however, the state of the law. See People v. Skorka, 147 Ill. App. 3d 976, 982 (1986)
(“defendant’s murdering two neighbors is bizarre and unusual behavior, [but] does not constitute
proof of legal insanity.”).
¶ 58 Despite defendant’s argument to the contrary, the record provides ample non-opinion
evidence that shows that defendant appreciated the criminality of his actions. Defendant reported
that he went to the house specifically to kill Piotr and that he hid in the basement with his
hammer for over an hour before Maria found him. He also told at least one of the experts that he
had intended to kill Piotr and then drive his mother’s car to Canada. Such planning could be
interpreted by a finder of fact as indicative of sanity. See Skorka, 147 Ill. App. 3d at 982 (“the
existence of a plan or design for a crime *** are factors relevant to a determination of
defendant’s sanity.”). Moreover, upon his arrest, defendant made a false exculpatory statement to
the police, telling them that “he [Piotr] did it.” See People v. Ford, 118 Ill. App. 3d 59, 63-64
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(1st Dist. 1983) (citing false exculpatory statements as evidence of sanity). Defendant attempts to
recast this statement as possibly referring to his alleged delusions about Piotr molesting children,
but this is undercut by his own statement to Dr. Cooper that he had lied to the police that Piotr
had killed Maria. Moreover, the court was able to observe defendant’s ERI, which as several of
the experts explained, was particularly probative of defendant’s mental state because of how
close it was in time to the crimes. Although defendant argues that his behavior during the ERI
clearly shows that he was insane, the court observed, as did Drs. Echevarria, Curran and Cooper,
that defendant does not appear to be responding to any hallucinations during the ERI. And, as
noted above, Dr. Cooper characterized the defendant’s behavior during the ERI “as facetious,
oppositional, inconsistent, [and] sarcastic” rather than insane, and the circuit court could have
come to that conclusion as well.
¶ 59 Considering all the State’s rebuttal evidence, a reasonable fact finder certainly could have
concluded that defendant’s expert witnesses were sufficiently rebutted. There was ample
evidence in the record to support the circuit court’s decision to reject, in whole or in part, the
defendant’s experts. See Kando, 397 Ill. App. 3d at 200 (rejection of defendant’s experts’
opinions is error if the rejection is “unsubstantiated by the record”). The question of defendant’s
sanity was a very close one, as is evidenced by the fact that the four expert witnesses who
examined him were evenly split on this ultimate issue. However, this is precisely why this court
cannot and will not substitute its own judgment for that of the circuit court. See People v.
Manion, 67 Ill. 2d 564, 578 (1977) (“A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that
of the trier of fact on questions involving the weight of the evidence or the credibility of the
witnesses” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It was the circuit court’s responsibility to
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consider all of the evidence presented and determine whether defendant was legally insane at the
time he committed the offenses. Having carefully reviewed the evidence, the circuit court found
that defendant was guilty but mentally ill.
¶ 60 CONCLUSION
¶ 61 Defendant argues forcefully that his experts were more credible than the State’s experts
and that the evidence supported his claim of insanity. We cannot say, however, that the
conclusion that he was legally insane was clearly evident, or that the circuit court’s finding was
arbitrary, unreasonable, or not based on the evidence presented. See Romero, 2018 IL App (1st)
143132, ¶ 64. Accordingly, the court’s finding the defendant was guilty but mentally ill was not
against the manifest weight of the evidence. Consequently, we affirm the judgment of the Circuit
Court of Cook County.
¶ 62 Affirmed.
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