2023 IL App (2d) 220414 No. 2-22-0414 Opinion filed December 19, 2023 ______________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Kane County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 20-CF-160 ) FRANK E. RYAN, ) Honorable ) David P. Kliment, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE MULLEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justices Jorgensen and Birkett concurred in the judgment and opinion.
OPINION
¶1 Following a bench trial in the circuit court of Kane County, defendant, Frank E. Ryan, was
found guilty of two counts of attempted first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/8-4(a), 9-1(a)(1) (West
2020)) based on evidence that he rerouted a natural gas line into the home of Richard Rittgarn,
while Rittgarn and his son were sleeping. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent six-year prison
terms. Defendant argues on appeal that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
acted with the intent to kill. Defendant alternatively argues that the trial court erred in requiring
him to be shackled during trial. We affirm.
¶2 I. BACKGROUND 2023 IL App (2d) 220414
¶3 Kelsey Pranaitis married Rittgarn in 2021. Before then, Kelsey had been in a relationship
with defendant from 2012 to late 2019, at which point she began, or was already in, a relationship
with Rittgarn. In the early morning of January 19, 2020, Rittgarn and his son were asleep on the
second floor of Rittgarn’s house in Elburn. Rittgarn awoke at about 2:15 a.m. to the smell of natural
gas. Rittgarn fell asleep again but reawoke, still smelling gas. Rittgarn discovered that gas was
flowing into the house from tubing that was run through a hole in the outside wall of his first-floor
office. Rittgarn used a pen to plug the opening of the tubing. Rittgarn went outside to the gas meter
and discovered that tubing had been crudely attached to the natural gas line with clamps and a
block of wood. The tubing had been fed into the house. After pulling the tubing out of the house,
Rittgarn called 911. Rittgarn noticed that his Ring doorbell camera had been covered with duct
tape.
¶4 Michael Huneke, the duty chief with the Elburn and Countryside Fire Protection District,
testified that he arrived at the scene at 2:27 a.m., at which point he turned off the gas. Lieutenant
Matt Linden also responded to the 911 call, arriving at the scene at about 2:30 a.m. After the gas
was turned off, firefighters entered the house with equipment to measure the level of natural gas
inside. They determined the level was 2 to 3% on the first floor and 2% upstairs. Linden testified
that he had never heard of a higher gas level in a home. Huneke further testified that the methane
in natural gas becomes explosive at a level of 5% if exposed to an ignition source. If an explosion
had occurred in Rittgarn’s house, the damage would have been catastrophic and Huneke would
not have expected any house occupants to survive. Huneke also testified that natural gas is an
asphyxiant.
¶5 John Shepard, a detective with the Elburn Police Department, investigated the incident.
Shepard testified that the tubing used to pipe the gas into the house had sequential foot markers.
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The police found a spool of the same tubing at a hardware store in Sugar Grove. The tubing had
been cut at the marker next in the sequence of markers on the tubing found at Rittgarn’s home.
Surveillance video from the store showed defendant purchasing the tubing. A receipt from the
transaction also showed defendant purchasing, inter alia, duct tape and a 12-inch drill bit.
¶6 Shepard and Commander Brandon McKiness of the Kane County Sheriff’s Office
conducted a video-recorded interview with defendant, which was admitted into evidence. During
the interview, defendant indicated that, in November 2019, he learned that Kelsey was having an
affair with Rittgarn. Defendant initially indicated that the items he purchased at the hardware store
were for use at his home and that he would be shocked to learn that they had been found at
Rittgarn’s home. Defendant showed the officers data from his Fitbit showing that he was asleep at
the time of the incident. Eventually, however, defendant admitted that he attached the tubing to
the gas line at Rittgarn’s house and fed it into the house through a hole he drilled in the wall.
Defendant indicated that he intended only to scare the occupants of the house. He explained that
he lent his Fitbit to his father so that it would appear to show that defendant was sleeping at the
time of the incident. Defendant arrived at Rittgarn’s house at about 1 a.m. and was there for about
40 minutes. He admitted covering the doorbell camera with duct tape. Defendant did research on
whether natural gas would rise or fall. Defendant wanted the gas to rise so that the upstairs
occupants would smell the gas odor. When asked about the possibility that a spark might ignite
the gas, defendant responded that he knew the Rittgarns got up at about 5 a.m. and that not enough
gas would have accumulated by then to cause an explosion. He explained that, in every story he
had heard about homes with gas leaks, it took a day or two before “something happen[ed].”
Defendant also indicated that he did not think an explosion would occur, because, at the connection
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between the gas line and the tubing, the tubing was “shooting gas out through everything,”
including toward the ground, and thus would probably not pump any gas into the house.
¶7 McKiness testified that defendant gave the impression during the interview that he believed
that the smell of the gas would wake the house’s occupants and they would leave.
¶8 After the trial court found him guilty of attempted first degree murder, defendant filed a
posttrial motion. The court denied the motion. Following his sentencing, defendant filed this timely
appeal.
¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶ 11 Defendant first argues that the State failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A
reviewing court will not set aside a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so improbable or
unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt. People v. Collins, 106 Ill.
2d 237, 261 (1985). When the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged, “ ‘the relevant question
is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ”
(Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “[A] reviewing
court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of
evidence or the credibility of witnesses.” People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 224-25 (2009).
¶ 12 Section 8-4(a) of the Criminal Code of 2012 (Code) (720 ILC 5/8-4(a) (West 2020))
provides, “A person commits the offense of attempt when, with intent to commit a specific offense,
he or she does any act that constitutes a substantial step toward the commission of that offense.”
(Emphasis added.) Under section 4-4 of the Code (id. § 4-4), “[a] person intends, or acts
intentionally or with intent, to accomplish a result or engage in conduct described by the statute
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defining the offense, when his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that result or engage
in that conduct.” In People v. Petermon, 2014 IL App (1st) 113536, ¶ 39, the court observed that,
“[t]o support a conviction for attempted murder, the State must establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that: (1) the defendant performed an act constituting a ‘substantial step’ toward the
commission of murder, and (2) the defendant possessed the criminal intent to kill the victim.”
Intent to kill “may be inferred when it has been demonstrated that the defendant voluntarily and
willingly committed an act, the natural tendency of which is to destroy another’s life.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. In Petermon, where the defendant shot, but did not kill, another
individual, the court affirmed the defendant’s attempted murder conviction, noting that “an intent
to kill may be proven where the surrounding circumstances show that the defendant fir[ed] *** a
gun at or towards another person with either malice or a total disregard for human life.” (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶¶ 39, 44. We see no reason to limit this principle to cases involving
firearms, as opposed to other dangerous instrumentalities. Hence, proof that a defendant committed
potentially lethal acts with a total disregard for human life is sufficient to establish the intent
element of the offense of attempted first degree murder.
¶ 13 With these principles in mind, we consider defendant’s argument that the State failed to
prove he acted with the requisite intent to kill the occupants of the home. Defendant argues that
the State failed to prove he intended anything other than scaring the occupants. Although that is
what defendant told the police, the trial court was under no obligation to believe defendant’s self-
serving statements that were not made under oath.
¶ 14 Defendant also points out that there is no evidence that he knew natural gas is an
asphyxiant. However, it is a matter of common knowledge that natural gas is an asphyxiant, and it
was reasonable for the trial court to infer that defendant would have been aware of that fact.
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Moreover, there is no question that a home filled with natural gas poses a serious danger of a lethal
explosion. Defendant admitted that he was aware of this danger, although he told police that, in
the accounts of gas leaks he had heard about, it took days before “something happen[ed].”
Defendant claims that “no evidence contradicted his stated belief that this gas leak would not cause
an explosion before the occupants woke up and noticed the odor.” The argument is unpersuasive.
Again, the trial court was not obligated to credit defendant’s self-serving statements to the police.
Moreover, there is a difference between a gas leak (which might be small enough to allow only a
slow buildup) and tubing placed deliberately to allow gas to flow freely into a house. It is entirely
reasonable to infer that defendant would have understood this, notwithstanding his claims to the
contrary.
¶ 15 Defendant points out that he knew the gas would rise, “making it more likely the occupants
would notice the gas before it became dangerous.” However, defendant routed the gas into the
home in the early morning hours when the occupants were sleeping. There is no evidence
suggesting that defendant had any reason to believe that the occupants would notice the gas before
they awoke at their usual time. Although Rittgarn did, in fact, wake up early and notice the odor
of gas, that appears to have been purely fortuitous. There is no evidence that defendant could have
anticipated that Rittgarn would not continue sleeping (as his son did) while gas filled the house.
Although defendant notes that there was evidence that a person can smell a small quantity of
natural gas, there was no evidence that the smell would necessarily wake a person from sleep.
¶ 16 Defendant stresses that he believed the house’s occupants generally woke up at about 5
a.m., so the gas would flow for only a few hours before it was detected. However, the evidence
shows that defendant rerouted the natural gas line into the house sometime between 1 and 2 a.m.
By 2:30 a.m., the gas level was about 2 or 3%. At a level of 5%, an explosion could have occurred.
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Even assuming the gas would have continued to flow until no later than 5 a.m., it seems likely that
it would have reached the 5% level, creating a risk of a deadly explosion.
¶ 17 In support of his argument that he intended only to scare the occupants of the house,
defendant notes that an explosion would require an ignition source and that he did not supply one.
However, it is not clear that defendant had any practical way of supplying an ignition source.
Rather, it is reasonable to conclude that defendant was relying on a spark from static electricity or
an electronic device to ignite an explosion. In any event, the possibility that a spark would ignite
the gas is enough to establish that defendant’s acts had a natural tendency to destroy another’s life
and that he showed, at best, a total disregard for the lives of the house’s occupants.
¶ 18 The trier of fact is not required to abandon common sense when assessing a criminal
defendant’s mental state. It was a matter of sheer luck that Rittgarn and his son did not die of
asphyxiation or an explosion from the natural gas defendant diverted directly into their home while
they slept. The suggestion that defendant was unaware of the magnitude of the danger of his actions
strains credulity. The evidence of intent was not merely sufficient but overwhelming.
¶ 19 B. Shackling of Defendant During Trial
¶ 20 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to hold a hearing or make findings on
whether it was necessary to shackle him during trial. According to defendant, the trial court
“abdicat[ed] [its] responsibilities” by accepting the opinion of court security and not making its
own determination on the need for restraints.
¶ 21 Physical restraints affect several interests, including the defendant’s presumption of
innocence, the ability to assist counsel, and the dignity of the court proceedings. People v. Reese,
2017 IL 120011, ¶ 51. Moreover, “[t]here can be no doubt that shackles impose physical burdens,
pains, and restraints that tend to confuse and embarrass a defendant, burden his mental faculties
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and thereby materially abridge and prejudicially affect his constitutional rights.” People v.
Rippatoe, 408 Ill. App. 3d 1061, 1067 (2011). Accordingly, in People v. Boose, 66 Ill. 2d 261, 266
(1977), our supreme court held as follows:
“A defendant may be shackled when there is reason to believe that he may try to
escape or that he may pose a threat to the safety of people in the courtroom or if it is
necessary to maintain order during the trial. [Citations.] The determination is left to the
discretion of the trial judge, and he may select the physical restraints most suitable in light
of all the circumstances. [Citation.] The trial judge should state for the record his reasons
for allowing the defendant to remain shackled, and he should give the defendant’s attorney
an opportunity to present reasons why the defendant should not be shackled. These
proceedings should take place outside the presence of the jury. [Citations.]”
Boose identified various factors that are germane to the determination of whether a defendant may
be placed in restraints during trial.
¶ 22 Illinois Supreme Court Rule 430 (eff. July 1, 2010), which codified Boose, provides as
follows:
“An accused shall not be placed in restraint of any form unless there is a manifest
need for restraint to protect the security of the court, the proceedings, or to prevent escape.
Persons charged with a criminal offense are presumed innocent until otherwise proven
guilty and are entitled to participate in their defense as free persons before the jury or bench.
Any deviation from this right shall be based on evidence specifically considered by the
trial court on a case-by-case basis. The determination of whether to impose a physical
restraint shall be limited to trial proceedings in which the defendant’s innocence or guilt is
to be determined, and does not apply to bond hearings or other instances where the
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defendant may be required to appear before the court prior to a trial being commenced.
Once the trial judge becomes aware of restraints, prior to allowing the defendant to appear
before the jury, he or she shall conduct a separate hearing on the record to investigate the
need for such restraints. At such hearing, the trial court shall consider and shall make
specific findings as to:
(1) the seriousness of the present charge against the defendant;
(2) defendant’s temperament and character known to the trial court either
by observation or by the testimony of witnesses;
(3) defendant’s age and physical attributes;
(4) defendant’s past criminal record and, more particularly, whether such
record contains crimes of violence;
(5) defendant’s past escapes, attempted escapes, or evidence of any present
plan to escape;
(6) evidence of any threats made by defendant to harm others, cause a
disturbance, or to be self-destructive;
(7) evidence of any risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others;
(8) evidence of any possibility of any attempt to rescue the defendant by
others;
(9) size and mood of the audience;
(10) physical security of the courtroom, including the number of entrances
and exits, the number of guards necessary to provide security, and the adequacy
and availability of alternative security arrangements.
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After allowing the defendant to be heard and after making specific findings, the trial judge
shall balance these findings and impose the use of a restraint only where the need for
restraint outweighs the defendant’s right to be free from restraint.”
Moreover, we have specifically held that a trial court errs when it simply defers to security
personnel and does not exercise its independent discretion in deciding the need for restraints. In re
Mark P., 402 Ill. App. 3d 173, 177 (2010).
¶ 23 At the beginning of the second day of trial, just before McKiness’s testimony, defendant’s
attorney advised the trial court that “[defendant] would like to have one arm free to take notes with
me. I don’t know if that’s a possibility. There is [sic] not many people in the courtroom.” The court
replied, “[t]hat’s up to security. I think they need a second person here for that.” Thus, the court
denied counsel’s request that defendant be partly unshackled.
¶ 24 The State argues that defendant failed to object sufficiently to the use of restraints. Quoting
Mark P., the State asserts that, “[w]here an attorney merely objects to handcuffing ‘without
requesting that the trial court enunciate its rationale or its independent judgment,’ the issue of
restraint is forfeited.” Id. at 179. The State misunderstands the scope and underlying rationale of
the forfeiture in Mark P.
¶ 25 Mark P. was a civil proceeding for involuntary commitment under the Mental Health and
Developmental Disabilities Code (405 ILCS 5/1-100 et seq. (West 2008)). At the time of the trial
court proceedings in Mark P., Rule 430 had not yet taken effect. See Mark P., 402 Ill. App. 3d at
175. Moreover, we observed that
“there is no precedent as to whether a Boose hearing is appropriate in a civil proceeding of
this type, held in an essentially closed courtroom without a jury and, further, before a judge
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who has expressed in open court that the handcuffs would have no effect on his judgment
of the merits.” Id. at 176.
The respondent’s attorney in Mark P. vehemently objected to the respondent being restrained
during the proceedings, but counsel did not request a hearing under Boose. Id. at 174, 177. Rather
than make an independent determination of the need to restrain the respondent, the trial court
simply deferred to security personnel. Id. We held that, by failing to request a Boose hearing, the
respondent failed to preserve the question of whether such a hearing was required in the
respondent’s case. Id. at 177.
¶ 26 Unlike in Mark P., both Boose and Rule 430 (which codified Boose) clearly apply to this
proceeding. Thus, in contrast to the respondent in Mark P., defendant is not asking us to consider
an unsettled question of law that was not raised in the trial court. Moreover, given that Rule 430
was not even in effect during the trial court proceedings in Mark P., our decision there has no
bearing on whether a defendant must specifically request a hearing under that rule. Contrary to the
State’s position, Rule 430 makes it abundantly clear that, once apprised that a defendant has been
placed in restraints, it is the trial court’s responsibility to conduct a hearing on the need for
restraints. Nothing in the rule’s language requires the defendant to request a hearing. A court that
blithely ignores that requirement in deference to security personnel risks depriving the defendant
of a fair trial.
¶ 27 In re Benny M., 2017 IL 120133, cited by the State, does not alter our conclusion. That
case involved the use of restraints during a hearing on a petition to administer psychotropic
medication without the respondent’s consent. Id. ¶¶ 3, 6-8, 23. The respondent’s attorney objected
in the trial court to the use of restraints but did not request either an opportunity to be heard or
specific findings from the trial court pursuant to Boose. Id. ¶¶ 6-7, 45. The Benny M. court held
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that “a more specific objection was required to preserve respondent’s procedural arguments for
review given that the procedure for allowing restraints in involuntary treatment proceedings was
not established at the time of the hearing in this case.” (Emphases added.) Id. ¶ 45. This reasoning
does not apply here, because the procedure for allowing restraints in criminal trials was well settled
at the time of defendant’s trial. 1
¶ 28 We also stress that the scope of the forfeitures in both Mark P. and Benny M. was limited
to procedural issues. In each case, the court reviewed the merits of the respondent’s arguments
that the trial court erred by deferring to security personnel. Id. ¶ 26, 39; Mark P., 402 Ill. App. 3d
at 177. In Benny M., the court concluded that the trial court did, in fact, make an independent
determination. Benny M., 2017 IL 120133, ¶¶ 39-41. In Mark P., we concluded that the trial court
improperly deferred to security personnel, but we found the error to be harmless because (1) the
trial court assured the respondent that his appearance in restraints would not affect the court’s
decision, (2) the restraints could not have affected the respondent’s ability to participate in the
hearing, and (3) the evidence “clearly established the need for respondent’s institutionalization.”
Mark P., 402 Ill. App. 3d at 178-79.
¶ 29 Here, as in Mark P., the trial court failed to make an independent determination of the need
to place defendant in restraints. Instead, the trial court unequivocally deferred to security
1 We note that, in his posttrial motion, defendant did not challenge the use of restraints.
Ordinarily, to preserve an issue for appellate review, the defendant must make a contemporaneous
objection and raise the issue in his or her posttrial motion. People v. Guerrero, 2021 IL App (2d)
190364, ¶ 60. However, the failure to raise in a posttrial motion an objection to the use of restraints
at trial does not forfeit appellate review. People v. Shafer, 2020 IL App (4th) 180343, ¶ 60.
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personnel. Doing so was clearly error subject to review under both Mark P. and Benny M.
Nonetheless, we conclude that the error was harmless. To establish that the error in placing
defendant in restraints was harmless, “[t]he State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the
[shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” (Internal quotation
marks omitted.) Reese, 2017 IL 120011, ¶ 50. Here, because the evidence against defendant was
overwhelming, we cannot see how the outcome would have been any different if the restraints had
been removed during trial. Accordingly, the use of restraints on defendant is not grounds for a new
trial.
¶ 30 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 31 For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Kane County.
¶ 32 Affirmed.
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People v. Ryan, 2023 IL App (2d) 220414
Decision Under Review: Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kane County, No. 20-CF-160; the Hon. David P. Kliment, Judge, presiding.
Attorneys Gilbert C. Lenz, of DePaul University Legal Clinic (Sarah for Van Pelt, law student), of Chicago, for appellant. Appellant:
Attorneys Jamie L. Mosser, State’s Attorney, of St. Charles (Patrick for Delfino, Edward R. Psenicka, and Max C. Boose, of State’s Appellee: Attorneys Appellate Prosecutor’s Office, of counsel), for the People.
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