People v. Rounds

CourtCalifornia Court of Appeal
DecidedJune 5, 2024
DocketG063593
StatusPublished

This text of People v. Rounds (People v. Rounds) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering California Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
People v. Rounds, (Cal. Ct. App. 2024).

Opinion

Filed 6/5/24

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063593

v. (Super. Ct. No. FELSB21000174)

GEORGE DENNIS ROUNDS, JR., OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, J. David Mazurek, Judge. Reversed. David R. Greifinger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal and Randall D. Einhorn, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. George Dennis Rounds, Jr., challenges the trial court’s denial of his petition 1 for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. (Pen. Code, § 4852.01 et seq.) We conclude the court erred. In evaluating the petition, the trial court considered multiple factors that have no bearing on the statutory criteria for evaluating a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation, including the nature of the underlying crime, the unfairness to the victims of granting the petition, and Rounds’s failure to plead guilty to a more serious charge. The remaining reason cited by the court for denying the petition—Rounds’s purported refusal to take responsibility for his conduct based on a supposed inconsistency between his statements to the Board of Parole Hearings (Parole Board) and those in his petition and at the hearing thereon—is not fairly supported by the record. With this single exception, the court did not address the relevant statutory factors, and did not so much as mention Rounds’s character and conduct in the nearly 40 years following the crime. The trial court’s abuse of discretion amounts to a miscarriage of justice. We reverse. We publish this opinion to clarify the factors the trial court may consider when evaluating a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY In February 1983, Rounds pled guilty to one count of second degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and one count of attempted murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced him to an indefinite term of 15 years to life, plus a concurrent definite term of seven years. The court also imposed and stayed two two-year firearm sentencing enhancements. Twenty-seven years later, in 2010, Rounds was found suitable for parole, and he was paroled on August 3, 2010. Rounds was discharged from parole on October 3, 2014.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Seven years after being discharged from parole, and more than 38 years after committing the underlying crimes, Rounds filed a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon on December 27, 2021. A public defender was appointed to represent him, but a later request by Rounds to represent himself was granted. In February 2022, the trial court referred the matter to the district attorney for a background investigation. The investigative report from the district attorney’s office was filed with 2 the court in October 2022. It concluded Rounds was statutorily eligible for a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon. The trial court conducted a hearing on Rounds’s petition in November 2022. The district attorney opposed the petition because Rounds allegedly had failed to demonstrate insight, accountability, and restoration. On December 19, 2022, the court issued a written order denying the petition. Rounds filed a timely notice of appeal, and the trial court granted his request for a certificate of probable cause. DISCUSSION I. STANDARD OF REVIEW “[R]eview of a grant or denial of a certificate of rehabilitation is confined to an abuse of discretion standard.” (People v. Lockwood (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 222, 226.) A trial court abuses its discretion when the decision exceeds the bounds of reason (People v. Blocker (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 438, 444), or when the court is mistaken about the scope of its discretion (People v. Zeigler (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 638, 668). “‘“‘“The discretion of a trial judge is not a whimsical, uncontrolled power, but a legal discretion, which is subject to the limitations of legal principles governing the subject of its action, and to reversal on appeal where no reasonable basis for the action is shown.”’”’” (Id. at

2 In addition to the investigative report, the district attorney submitted to the trial court Rounds’s records from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation and records relating to Rounds’s parole hearings.

3 p. 667.) “‘“‘The discretion intended, however, is not a capricious or arbitrary discretion, but an impartial discretion, guided and controlled in its exercise by fixed legal principles. It is not a mental discretion, to be exercised ex gratia, but a legal discretion, to be exercised in conformity with the spirit of the law and in a manner to subserve and not to impede or defeat the ends of substantial justice.’”’” (Ibid.) Only if we can conclude as a matter of law that the court’s expressed concerns regarding the lack of Rounds’s rehabilitation “was not a legitimate consideration in the exercise of its discretion” may we conclude the court exceeded the bounds of reason in denying the petition. (People v. Blocker, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 445.) II. PETITION FOR A CERTIFICATE OF REHABILITATION “‘To enter an order known as a certificate of rehabilitation, the superior court must find that the petitioner is both rehabilitated and fit to exercise the rights and privileges lost by reason of his conviction.’ [Citations.] The overall goal of the statutory scheme is ‘to restore civil and political rights of citizenship to ex-felons who have proved their rehabilitation.’” (People v. Ziegler, supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 653.) A petitioner for a certificate of rehabilitation “shall live an honest and upright life, shall conduct himself or herself with sobriety and industry, shall exhibit a good moral character, and shall conform to and obey the laws of the land.” (§ 4852.05.) A court considering a petition for a certificate may request that the district attorney investigate the petitioner’s residence, criminal record, representations in the petition, and conduct during the rehabilitation period. (§ 4852.12, subd. (a).) The court also may require testimony and/or the production of records and reports relating to the petitioner and the crime, which may include the record of trial, and the petitioner’s prison, parole, and probation records. (§ 4852.1, subd. (a).) Section 4852.13 gives courts discretion to decide whether a petitioner has demonstrated by “his or her course of conduct his or her

4 rehabilitation and his or her fitness to exercise all of the civil and political rights of citizenship.” (Id., subd. (a).) “The hurdles erected by the Legislature to obtain a certificate of rehabilitation are not intended to be easily surmounted. The trial courts are entrusted with the responsibility, in the exercise of a sound discretion, to ensure that the strict statutory standards for rehabilitation are maintained.” (People v. Blocker, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 445.) The issuance of a certificate of rehabilitation must be immediately reported to the Department of Justice, which in turn must immediately record the facts on the petitioner’s criminal record and transmit them to the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (§ 4852.17.) A certificate of rehabilitation, when transmitted to the Governor, constitutes an application for a full pardon; the Governor may issue a pardon based on the certificate of rehabilitation without further investigation. (§ 4852.16, subd. (a).) To grant a petition for a certificate of rehabilitation is in essence “a personal representation to the Governor” by the court that the petitioner is worthy of pardon. (People v. Blocker, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

People v. Lockwood
77 Cal. Rptr. 2d 769 (California Court of Appeal, 1998)
People v. Stamps
467 P.3d 168 (California Supreme Court, 2020)
People v. Blocker
190 Cal. App. 4th 438 (California Court of Appeal, 2010)
People v. Zeigler
211 Cal. App. 4th 638 (California Court of Appeal, 2012)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
People v. Rounds, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-rounds-calctapp-2024.