People v. Romero

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Romero

167 A.D.2d 923, 562 N.Y.S.2d 591, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14496

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedNovember 16, 1990

StatusPublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 167 A.D.2d 923 (People v. Romero) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Romero, 167 A.D.2d 923, 562 N.Y.S.2d 591, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14496 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1990).

Pincite

Opinion

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Special Agent Tillery’s testimony regarding Davila’s translation of defendant’s statements to him. Davila was selected by defendant to act as his agent to effectuate the drug transaction with Tillery. The fact that Davila was also employed by the police as an informant does not alter his status as defendant’s agent and the admissibility of this testimony (see, United States v Alvarez, 755 F2d 830, cert denied sub nom. Hernandez v United States, 474 US 905; United States v Da Silva, 725 F2d 828, 831-832). Davila, by acting as defendant’s translator, was his agent and provided “no more than a ’language conduit’ ” for him (United States v Da Silva, supra, at 832). We additionally note that Davila testified to defendant’s statements. Since Davila acted by common consent of the parties as their translator and agent and testified to defendant’s statements, thereby verifying his translation, the trial court correctly admitted Special Agent Tillery’s testi[924]*924mony of Davila’s translation of defendant’s statements to him (see, People v Randazzio, 194 NY 147; cf., People v Chin Sing, 242 NY 419, 423).

Defendant further contends that his due process rights were violated because the agreement with the paid informant Davila constituted an unlawful contingent fee arrangement. From our review of the contingent fee agreement, we conclude that it did not violate defendant’s due process rights (see, People v Thomasula, 158 AD2d 126).

We have reviewed the remaining contentions of defense counsel and defendant pro se and find them to be without merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Mulroy, J.—criminal sale of controlled substance, first degree.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Judgment unanimously affirmed. Memorandum: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in admitting Special Agent Tillery’s testimony regarding Davila’s translation of defendant’s statements to him. Davila was selected by defendant to act as his agent to effectuate the drug transaction with Tillery. The fact that Davila was also employed by the police as an informant does not alter his status as defendant’s agent and the admissibility of this testimony (see, United States v Alvarez, 755 F2d 830, cert denied sub nom. Hernandez v United States, 474 US 905; United States v Da Silva, 725 F2d 828, 831-832). Davila, by acting as defendant’s translator, was his agent and provided “no more than a ’language conduit’ ” for him (United States v Da Silva, supra, at 832). We additionally note that Davila testified to defendant’s statements. Since Davila acted by common consent of the parties as their translator and agent and testified to defendant’s statements, thereby verifying his translation, the trial court correctly admitted Special Agent Tillery’s testi[924]*924mony of Davila’s translation of defendant’s statements to him (see, People v Randazzio, 194 NY 147; cf., People v Chin Sing, 242 NY 419, 423).

Defendant further contends that his due process rights were violated because the agreement with the paid informant Davila constituted an unlawful contingent fee arrangement. From our review of the contingent fee agreement, we conclude that it did not violate defendant’s due process rights (see, People v Thomasula, 158 AD2d 126).

We have reviewed the remaining contentions of defense counsel and defendant pro se and find them to be without merit. (Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Onondaga County, Mulroy, J.—criminal sale of controlled substance, first degree.) Present—Dillon, P. J., Doerr, Pine, Lawton and Davis, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

167 A.D.2d 923, 562 N.Y.S.2d 591, 1990 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 14496, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-romero-nyappdiv-1990.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack