People v. Rogers

2026 IL App (5th) 231246-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: February 25, 2026
• Docket: 5-23-1246
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 231246-U NOTICE Decision filed 02/25/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-23-1246 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Massac County. ) v. ) No. 16-CF-66 ) DAVID I. ROGERS, ) Honorable ) William J. Thurston, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SHOLAR delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Boie and Vaughan concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The trial court did not err by summarily dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition where defendant forfeited any claim that his attorney prevented him from accepting the State’s offer to plead guilty in exchange for a 10-year sentence.

¶2 Defendant, David I. Rogers, entered an open plea of guilty to one count of predatory

criminal sexual assault. The trial court sentenced him to 17 years in prison. Defendant filed a

motion to withdraw his guilty plea, which the court denied. Defendant appealed, and this court

affirmed. See People v. Rogers, 2021 IL App (5th) 190203-U. Defendant then filed a petition for

postconviction relief, which the trial court dismissed at the first stage. Back before us on appeal,

defendant argues that he stated an arguable claim that his attorney was ineffective for preventing

him from accepting the State’s offer to plead guilty in exchange for a 10-year sentence. For the

reasons that follow, we affirm.

1 ¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On May 18, 2016, the defendant was charged with four counts of predatory criminal sexual

assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (West 2016)), all Class X felonies. Prior to jury trial, the trial

court inquired whether any plea negotiations took place in this matter. On the record, defendant

acknowledged that he was aware of offers by the State. The State explained:

“The offer of the State was the defendant would plead guilty to Count I, predatory

criminal sexual assault, be sentenced to ten years in the Illinois Department of Corrections,

three years to natural life, mandatory supervised release, that he serve 85 percent of his

sentence, that he pay the costs and surcharges of the proceedings, and that he receive credit

for time served. Remaining counts would be dismissed.

There was also a case pending in Graves County, Kentucky. The prosecutor in that

case agreed by writing to our office that he would amend his case to a Class B felony, offer

ten years to serve and run concurrent with Illinois, and agree he could serve his time in

Illinois.”

¶5 The trial court asked defendant whether he understood the offer, and defendant indicated

that he understood. On the record, defendant noted that he “declined” the offer. Defendant

indicated that he went through the charges with his attorney, and his attorney communicated the

offer to defendant. Defense counsel added that defendant had almost two years of custody credit

which could have applied to his sentence had he accepted the offer.

¶6 On August 15, 2018, a jury trial commenced with voir dire and jury selection. On August

17, the parties gave their opening statements, and the State began presenting its case. As part of

the State’s case, the victim, A.C., testified in detail about the circumstances surrounding all four

2 charges, and an interview of A.C. by an advocate at the Two Rivers Child Advocacy Center (CAC)

was introduced into evidence and played for the jury.

¶7 In the midst of the State’s case, defendant chose to stop the trial and enter into an open

guilty plea to one count of predatory criminal sexual assault (count IV). In exchange for pleading

guilty, the remaining criminal sexual assault charges were dismissed.

¶8 During the guilty plea hearing, the trial court admonished defendant as to his rights and

that the sentencing range for predatory criminal sexual assault was 6 to 60 years in prison. The

court also indicated that, since defendant was entering into an open guilty plea, it would determine

the proper sentence after reading the presentence investigation (PSI) report and hearing the

evidence and arguments presented at the sentencing hearing. The State offered its factual basis,

and the court admonished defendant. The court accepted defendant’s guilty plea, finding that it

was made freely and voluntarily, and defendant understood the nature of the charge and the

possible penalties.

¶9 In defendant’s statement of allocution, he apologized to A.C. and her family and expressed

remorse for his actions. He indicated that he never wanted the case to go to trial and put A.C.

through having to testify about what happened. He also indicated that his counsel assured him that

if he pled guilty, he would be sentenced to less than 24 years and possibly less than 10 years. He

noted that there was a lack of communication between him and his attorneys and expressed some

dissatisfaction with their representation. He also indicated that he was told that the State was

offering him six years in prison if he pled guilty, but the State never mentioned that to his attorneys.

¶ 10 The State offered evidence in aggravation, along with a sentencing recommendation.

Before defendant’s counsel presented any argument in mitigation, the trial court questioned

defendant about his complaints about his counsel. After talking with defendant, the court stated

3 that it was not hearing anything to indicate that his attorneys were ineffective in their representation

of him. The court then heard arguments in mitigation from defense counsel. After hearing

argument, the trial court sentenced defendant to 17 years in prison.

¶ 11 On October 31, 2018, defendant filed a pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing

that his plea was not intelligently, knowingly, and voluntarily made because, at the time that he

entered his plea, he believed that the allegations contained in the dismissed charges could not be

used against him at sentencing. He also claimed that his counsel was ineffective because they told

him that the evidence could not be used against him.

¶ 12 Thereafter, on January 9, 2019, defendant obtained new counsel to represent him on the

motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On March 25, 2019, his new counsel filed a first amended

motion to withdraw the guilty plea in which similar allegations to those in the initial motion were

made. In addition, the motion asserted that defendant suffered from a misapprehension of fact, he

would not have pled guilty if he had known that the evidence relating to the dismissed charges

would be considered at sentencing, his trial counsel was ineffective, and he was prejudiced by his

trial counsel’s ineffectiveness in that he pled guilty on counsel’s assurances that the evidence from

the dismissed charges would not be used against him.

¶ 13 After hearing the arguments of counsel, the trial court addressed defendant and stated that

it believed that he was surprised that the evidence relating to the dismissed charges was considered

at his sentencing. However, the court also stated that it did not believe that understanding was

objectively reasonable as the PSI contained information about the dismissed charges, and

defendant knew that the PSI would be considered. The court also noted that there was a difference

between considering a sentence based on dismissed charges and increasing a sentence merely

because there were other charges. The court further noted that it admonished defendant that it was

4 considering the evidence heard at the trial and the factual basis at sentencing. Thus, the court

concluded that defendant understood the nature of the guilty plea, the possible penalties, and the

allegations in the charge. The court also found that defendant was not provided ineffective

assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the court denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty

plea.

¶ 14 On appeal, this court affirmed. See Rogers, 2021 IL App (5th) 190203-U. This court

affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea where his

misapprehension about evidence relating to his dismissed charges being used was not objectively

reasonable because the trial court admonished him that this evidence would be used at sentencing.

¶ 15 Relevant to this appeal, on September 11, 2023, defendant filed a postconviction petition

alleging that he received the ineffective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Defendant

alleged that in a private conversation with defense counsel, defendant advised his counsel that he

did not wish to proceed to a jury trial. Defendant alleged that he advised his counsel that he wished

to accept the State’s 10-year offer. Defendant alleged, “Defense counsel said that he [counsel] was

running the show and that, the state’s attorney is his friend and that he [the state’s attorney]

probably wants the jury to decide my fate, so counsel rejected the state’s guilty plea offer of ten

years against my protestations and I proceeded to a jury trial against my wishes [sic].” Defendant

alleged that he was prejudiced, because but for defense counsel’s actions, he would have received

a sentence of 10 years.

¶ 16 On November 14, 2023, the trial court summarily dismissed defendant’s postconviction

petition. The court found that the trial court’s plea admonishment rebutted defendant’s claim, and

also that defendant forfeited the claim by failing to raise it on direct appeal. The court’s written

order noted that during defendant’s open plea, the trial court “thoroughly admonished, interacted,

5 questioned, and involved the defendant in the hearing.” The court observed that the “record

contains excerpts where the Judge was aware of potential plea offers and the parameters under

which they remained open to [defendant].” The court also noted that there was a hearing on

defendant’s motion to withdraw guilty plea, at which time defendant’s “public defenders provided

detailed testimony as to their representation of [defendant], and the interactions, conversations,

and discussions pursuant to their representation.” Finally, the trial court noted that it reviewed this

court’s direct appeal decision, and the trial court explicitly noted that this court considered the

ineffective assistance of counsel and whether defendant entered his plea knowingly and

voluntarily.

¶ 17 Based on this, the trial court determined that the claims raised in defendant’s

postconviction petition “were raised, or could have been raised in his direct appeal.” As such, the

court determined that defendant “cannot raise them in a post-conviction petition.” Thus, the court

concluded that defendant failed to make a substantial showing that his constitutional rights were

violated and found defendant’s petition patently without merit. The court dismissed the petition.

¶ 18 On November 28, 2023, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.

¶ 19 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 20 On appeal, defendant contends that he stated an arguable claim that his attorney was

ineffective for preventing him from accepting the State’s offer to plead guilty in exchange for a

10-year sentence. The State responds, arguing that the trial court properly dismissed defendant’s

postconviction petition as the issues raised were either forfeited or barred by res judicata. For the

reasons that follow, we agree with the State and affirm.

¶ 21 Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act), there is “a three-stage process for an

imprisoned person to raise a constitutional challenge to a conviction or sentence.” People v. Hatter,

6 2021 IL 125981, ¶ 22 (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). “At the first stage, the circuit

court has 90 days to review a petition and may summarily dismiss it if the court finds it is frivolous

and patently without merit.” People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472 (2006). A postconviction

petition is frivolous or patently without merit “only if the petition has no arguable basis either in

law or in fact.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12 (2009). “A petition which lacks an arguable

basis either in law or in fact is one which is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a

fanciful factual allegation.” Id. at 16. “An example of an indisputably meritless legal theory is one

which is completely contradicted by the record.” Id. “Fanciful factual allegations include those

which are fantastic or delusional.” Id. at 17.

¶ 22 The doctrines of res judicata and forfeiture bar a defendant from raising claims in an initial

postconviction proceeding “that were or could have been adjudicated on direct appeal.” People v.

Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443-44 (2005). A postconviction petition may be summarily dismissed based

upon either doctrine. Id. at 445. “The doctrine of res judicata bars consideration of issues that were

previously raised and decided on direct appeal.” Id. at 443. “For res judicata to apply, there must

have been a final judgment on the merits of the case.” In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 455 (2008).

Alternatively, forfeiture bars a defendant from raising claims in a postconviction proceeding “that

could have been raised [on direct appeal] but were not.” Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 443-44.

¶ 23 Additionally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are governed by the standard set

forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17. Under that

standard, “a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance ‘fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness’ and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id.

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). “At the first stage of postconviction proceedings under

the Act, a petition alleging ineffective assistance may not be summarily dismissed if (i) it is

7 arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) it

is arguable that the defendant was prejudiced.” Id. A trial court’s first-stage dismissal of a

postconviction petition is subject to de novo review. People v. Swamynathan, 236 Ill. 2d 103, 113

(2010).

¶ 24 We find defendant forfeited review of the alleged errors raised in his postconviction

petition. The record demonstrates that defendant could have raised these issues on direct appeal.

The record reflects that the trial court asked defendant about the State’s 10-year offer prior to

proceeding to a jury trial. Defendant indicated that he declined the State’s offer and wished to

proceed to trial. Defendant acknowledged that he discussed the State’s offer with his defense

counsel. Nonetheless, defendant proceeded to trial, wished to plead guilty in the midst of trial, and

ultimately received a sentence of 17 years.

¶ 25 Additionally, we note that defendant raised a slew of complaints related to his

representation during postplea proceedings. Specifically, the trial court held a hearing on

defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. During that hearing, defendant was represented by

counsel, and his former attorneys were called and sworn as witnesses. During the hearing,

defendant admitted that he rejected the plea offers prior to trial. Throughout defendant’s many

allegations, he failed to raise any issue related to his rejection of the 10-year plea for the reasons

that he gives in his petition for postconviction relief. Succinctly stated, defendant could have raised

this claim as part of his motion to withdraw guilty plea, and he failed to do so.

¶ 26 Similarly, defendant filed a direct appeal, and he failed to raise any issue related to the

State’s 10-year offer in his direct appeal. The record supports the trial court’s determination that

defendant could have raised an issue related to the 10-year offer in his direct appeal. Defendant’s

failure to do so results in forfeiture of the issue in his postconviction petition.

8 ¶ 27 Finally, the record positively rebuts defendant’s claims. We find support for this in

defendant’s own brief. In the opening paragraphs of his brief, defendant states: “In his petition,

Rogers alleges that his attorney would not let him accept the State’s offer to plead guilty to one

count of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (‘PCSA’) in exchange for a ten year sentence.

This is not the first time Rogers has made this claim. He said the same thing at his sentencing

hearing.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant also notes in his brief: “At the hearing on the motion [to

withdraw guilty plea], Rogers testified that one of the reasons he rejected the State’s pre-trial offer

to plead guilty in exchange for a ten-year sentence [was] because he had another case pending in

Kentucky involving similar conduct.” (Emphasis added.) Despite his arguments otherwise,

defendant takes a position that is inconsistent with his earlier claims in the record. Thus, the trial

court properly summarily dismissed defendant’s petition at the first stage.

¶ 28 For all of these reasons, we find the trial court did not err by summarily dismissing

defendant’s postconviction petition as frivolous and patently without merit. The trial court

committed no error in summarily dismissing defendant’s postconviction petition.

¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 30 For these reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Massac County is affirmed.

¶ 31 Affirmed.