People v. Rodriguez

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: May 26, 2026
• Docket: 1-23-1386
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

2026 IL App (1st) 231386-U

SECOND DIVISION May 26, 2026

No. 1-23-1386

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County ) v. ) 08 CR 21347 ) ) SEBASTIAN RODRIGUEZ, ) Honorable ) Neera Lall Walsh Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding _____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE ELLIS delivered the judgment of the court. Justices McBride and D.B. Walker concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Affirmed. Defendant’s sentence of 45 years is not unconstitutional. Sentencing court properly considered relevant mitigating factors.

¶2 A jury convicted Sebastian Rodriguez of first-degree murder for the October 2008

shooting death of Sameere Conn. At the time of the shooting, Rodriguez was 15 years old; his

victim was 13. The trial court sentenced him to 50 years in prison. As the case law concerning

juvenile sentencing rapidly evolved, his case bounced between this court and our supreme court

until we finally remanded this matter for a new sentencing hearing, the one before us now.

¶3 The trial court sentenced Rodriguez to 45 years in prison. He appeals, arguing that his

sentence is unconstitutional, as he was given a de facto life sentence without a finding that he is No. 1-23-1386

irredeemable. He also argues the court erred in its consideration of the mandatory factors

applicable to juvenile sentencing. We disagree on both counts and affirm.

¶4 BACKGROUND

¶5 This is Rodriguez’s third visit to this court, as Rodriguez mounted sentencing challenges

while the legal landscape on juvenile sentencing evolved. The details of his case are laid out in

the first two appellate opinions. See People v. Rodriguez, 2017 IL App (1st) 141379, vacated by

People v. Rodriguez, No. 122467 (Jan. 18, 2018)); People v. Rodriguez, 2018 IL App (1st)

141379-B, vacated by People v. Rodriguez, No. 123769 (March 25, 2020). We summarize only

the facts necessary to address the issues in this appeal.

¶6 The State charged Rodriguez with first-degree murder in connection with the shooting

death of Sameere Conn on October 1, 2008. At the time of the shooting, Rodriguez was 15 years

old, but due to the law at the time, he was automatically transferred to adult criminal court,

where he was tried, convicted, and sentenced.

¶7 In 2008, Rodriguez and Conn went to the same school together and had a dispute. A

group of boys at the school had attacked Rodriguez once because of his Mexican heritage. Conn

was a part of the group but did not participate in the attack. Before the shooting, one of their

classmates, Kionte Lilly, spoke with the two of them in a three-way phone call, during which

Rodriguez told Conn that he was on a “death list.”

¶8 Another one of Conn’s friends, Mario Martinez, testified that a month before the

shooting, Rodriguez told him that he was going to kill Conn. The night of the shooting,

Rodriguez drove to Martinez’s house, asked Martinez if he wanted to take a ride, and showed

him a gun wrapped in a sweater. Martinez declined the offer and went back inside.

¶9 Meanwhile, Conn and a group of friends, on their way home after attending a football

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game, stopped at Hooks Finer Foods, a local grocery store. While some of the boys, including

Conn, went inside, a few stayed outside. A man they later identified as Rodriguez, whom they

knew from school and regularly saw in the neighborhood, approached the storefront, pulled a

gun out of his hooded sweatshirt, and fired into the store. Conn, who was standing in the front of

the store waiting to buy some things, was shot multiple times through a window and died.

¶ 10 Police later searched Rodriguez’s home and recovered a revolver. An Illinois State Police

firearms and tool marks examiner later connected one of the bullets recovered from the scene of

the shooting to that revolver. Forensic testing of swabs taken from Rodriguez’s hand also tested

positive for gunshot residue chemicals, though an expert testified that the test results were not

conclusive enough to say that Rodriguez had most likely fired a gun.

¶ 11 A jury found Rodriguez guilty of first-degree murder and made a special finding that he

had personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused Conn’s death.

¶ 12 In his first sentencing hearing, the trial court recognized that Rodriguez was only 15 at

the time of the offense but characterized the crime as “completely senseless,” “absolutely

ridiculous,” and “an absolute waste of human life,” before imposing a 50-year sentence.

¶ 13 In his first appeal, Rodriguez argued, among other things, that his 50-year sentence was

an unconstitutional sentence under Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 (2012), which forbids a

mandatory life sentence for juveniles without the possibility of parole, and that a 2016

amendment to the automatic-transfer statute should apply retroactively to him. Between those

arguments, primarily the attempt by Illinois reviewing courts to apply Miller to a myriad of

different procedural postures and constitutional claims, this case bobbed up and down between

the appellate and supreme court. It ultimately became clear that Rodriguez’s 50-year sentence

exceeded the threshold for what Illinois considered a “life” sentence under Miller, see People v.

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Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 41, and the case was remanded for re-sentencing.

¶ 14 That brings us to the present. Back in the circuit court, Rodriguez hired a new attorney to

represent him at the new sentencing hearing. An updated pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report

detailed Rodriguez’s struggles in childhood. The report noted that Rodriguez had no criminal

history, and that he told the investigator who prepared the report that he was “innocent and did

not commit this crime.” He maintained that he was not mature when Conn was shot and killed,

that he regretted what happened to Conn’s family and his own, but he insisted he was innocent.

Rodriguez also filed a comprehensive sentencing memorandum, discussing the relevant

mitigating statutory factors that he believed applied to his case. He highlighted his young age at

the time of the shooting.

¶ 15 At re-sentencing, the court made extensive findings and observations. The court

recognized that, though Rodriguez had been convicted of both first-degree murder and

personally discharging a firearm, it had discretion to impose the firearm enhancement. That gave

the court a sentencing range from 20 years in prison to natural life.

¶ 16 Though the trial had been several years earlier, the court remembered the facts of the

case. The court noted the disagreement between Rodriguez, who was 15, and Conn, the 13-year-

old victim. The incident that sparked the argument between them occurred about a month before

Conn was shot and killed, the court recalled, meaning the “defendant had plenty of opportunities

to think about it, plan it, and also recover a gun.” Rodriguez “made a decision, a deadly decision.

He drove himself, he found the victim, who was returning I believe from football practice, and

was going to a store, and that victim, when he was exiting that store or entering possibly ***

inside of that store, that [Rodriguez] gunned him down *** Those were deliberate actions.”

¶ 17 The court then considered a list of enumerated factors, one-by-one, that it was required to

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consider before sentencing. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-110 (West 2024). The court considered

Rodriguez’s age but found no indication he was unusually immature or had any other learning or

developmental issues. The court addressed whether peer pressure, family pressure, or other

negative influences impacted Rodriguez: “There is no indication from anything that happened

during the trial or in any of his presentence investigation or any of the materials that have been

tendered to the court that it was his family or anybody who had undue influence on him. ***

[T]he Court is cognizant of the fact that he indicated that he was a Latin street gang member and

that he was affiliated with a gang from 13 to 22. *** He talked in particular about the fact that he

described his childhood being difficult *** that his parents were both involved in a gang.”

¶ 18 The court also acknowledged receiving “quite a few letters on behalf of the defendant,

and many are from people who have sought to counsel him and family members or friends of the

family that have talked about how they think that he was a good person[.]” On the other hand,

the court noted that Rodriguez had maintained his innocence, so the court could not consider his

remorse in mitigation.

¶ 19 That brought the court back to the facts of the murder, which was “planned,” as

Rodriguez “tracked this victim down. He found him on the street walking back from a sporting

event, and shot him in front of many. His actions were not a spur of the moment, impulsive act

you would expect from a young mind, and as terrible as it sounds, it was planned. It was thought

out. It was deliberate, and we know this by his words and actions.”

¶ 20 Before announcing sentence, the court noted that Rodriguez would be eligible for parole

after serving 20 years of his sentence. See id. § 5-4.5-115.

¶ 21 The court sentenced Rodriguez to a total of 45 years in prison, 20 years for the first-

degree murder charge plus 25 years with the firearm enhancement. The court noted that “this

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defendant is not receiving a life sentence based on the new parole statute[.]”

¶ 22 Rodriguez timely moved to reconsider his sentence, which apparently fell through the

cracks and was not heard. A few months later, Rodriguez filed a late notice of appeal with this

court, which we allowed. By agreement of the parties, we remanded this matter to the circuit

court for a hearing on the post-trial motion. The circuit court denied it. Rodriguez now appeals.

¶ 23 ANALYSIS

¶ 24 On appeal, Rodriguez challenges his 45-year sentence in two ways. First, he raises a

straight Miller challenge: he was sentenced to a de facto life sentence without an adequate

consideration of his youth and its attendant characteristics. The fact that he is entitled to a parole

hearing after serving 20 years is of no consequence, he says, because that parole hearing does not

provide him a meaningful opportunity for release. Miller aside, he claims the trial court did not

properly weigh one of the required mitigating factors, requiring remand for a new hearing.

¶ 25 At the outset, we note several legislative changes in recent years regarding juvenile

sentencing, largely in response to the evolving case law since Miller. First, the court must

consider 12 statutory factors in mitigation concerning the juvenile’s youth and its attendant

characteristics. See 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(a) (West 2022). “This list is taken from and is

consistent with Miller’s discussion of a juvenile defendant’s youth and its attendant

characteristics.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36.

¶ 26 Second, a court sentencing a juvenile has discretion not to impose certain sentencing

enhancements (like the 25-year add-on for personally discharging a firearm during the

underlying crime) that would otherwise be mandatory for an adult. 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-105(e)

(West 2022). And third, a juvenile like Rodriguez, who is sentenced after June 1, 2019, may

apply for parole and early release after serving 20 years of his sentence. Id. § 5-4.5-115.

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¶ 27 With all this in mind, we examine Rodriguez’s individual claims.

¶ 28 I. Miller Challenge

¶ 29 Rodriguez first argues that his 45-year sentence is unconstitutional under Miller, as he

was subjected to a de facto life sentence, but the record does not show that he is beyond

rehabilitation. The State notes several flaws in this argument. We will focus on the most obvious:

Rodriguez’s sentence was discretionary, not mandatory.

¶ 30 Miller only prohibits life sentences that are mandatory—sentences where the court was

robbed of any discretion to downwardly depart based on the defendant’s youth and its attendant

characteristics. See Jones v. Mississippi, 593 U.S. 98, 106 (2021) (Miller “allowed life-without-

parole sentences for defendants who committed homicide when they were under 18, but only so

long as the sentence is not mandatory—that is, only so long as the sentencer has discretion to

‘consider the mitigating qualities of youth’ and impose a lesser punishment.”); People v. Moore,

2023 IL 126461, ¶ 38 (“ ‘Miller did not prohibit life sentences for juveniles but, instead, held

that the eighth amendment required sentencing courts to have discretion in sentencing juveniles

after considering the juvenile’s youth and the attendant characteristics of youth.’ ” (quoting

People v. Clark, 2023 IL 127273, ¶ 54)).

¶ 31 It is undisputed that the court here had discretion in re-sentencing Rodriguez. The court

could have declined to impose the firearm enhancement and sentenced Rodriguez to as little as

20 years in prison. And the court’s sentencing was guided by the 12 statutory factors that our

supreme court has blessed as “consistent with Miller’s discussion of a juvenile defendant’s youth

and its attendant characteristics.” Buffer, 2019 IL 122327, ¶ 36.

¶ 32 None of this was lost on the trial court, which recognized that it could impose a sentence

as low as 20 years. Whether the court properly exercised its discretion is a question we will take

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up in a moment. What matters here is that the court was not required to sentence Rodriguez to

more than 40 years. So his Miller claim fails for that reason alone.

¶ 33 II. Consideration of Relevant Sentencing Factors

¶ 34 Rodriguez next claims the court improperly considered the second of the 12 mandatory

factors a court must consider in sentencing a juvenile—whether Rodriguez “was subjected to

outside pressure, including peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influence.” 730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-105(a)(2) (2021). He says the court did not adequately account for the fact that both his

parents and siblings were gang-affiliated and encouraged him to affiliate, too. This pressure, says

Rodriguez, “narrowed his worldview and steered him toward crime and violence.”

¶ 35 Rodriguez does not deny that the court discussed his childhood influences; he says the

court did not properly consider them. He isolates this observation by the court:

“As to point number two, whether the person was subjected to outside pressure, including

peer pressure, familial pressure, or negative influences. So at this point, he’s the one who

felt he had been wronged in this school situation in the hallway. There is no indication

from anything that happened during the trial or in any of his presentence investigation or

any of the materials that have been tendered to the Court that it was his family or

anybody who had undue influence on him.”

¶ 36 In other words, the court was saying, there is no evidence that anyone coerced Rodriguez

into shooting Sameere Conn; he did it of his own accord. Rodriguez argues that the court

interpreted the second factor too narrowly, that the factor is not necessarily concerned with peer

pressure to commit the crime at issue so much as it speaks more generally to the negative

influences in an offender’s life that steer him or her to crime and violence.

¶ 37 It’s likely both things. Surely this second factor includes the literal interpretation the

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circuit court ascribed it. If a juvenile offender were urged by others to commit a murder, of

course we would expect and want the trial court to consider that fact. And the court found that

this was not the case here.

¶ 38 We don’t disagree that this factor also calls for a more generalized review of the people

influencing the juvenile offender. But here those negative influences were familial, and the third

mandatory factor encompasses this point at least to some extent as well, requiring the court to

consider “the person’s family, home environment, educational and social background, including

any history of parental neglect, domestic or sexual violence, sexual exploitation, physical abuse,

or other childhood trauma including adverse childhood experiences.” Id. § 5-4.5-105(a)(3).

¶ 39 The court did discuss Rodriguez’s family and their gang affiliation and noted the overlap

in this case between factors (2) and (3):

“In reference to his family, he did speak about his family members. He talked in

particular about the fact that he described his childhood as being difficult, and he reported

that his dad was not consistently involved, and—but I will note at the time of this

incident, my recollection of the facts were that he was, at that time, residing there, and

that is, in fact, where the gun was found, too, and that he reported he had not been abused

or neglected. He did make some references about his mother, that his parents were both

involved in a gang, and he denied that there was any substance abuse issues in the home.

He spoke about his mother, about not being the subject of any abuse, but that his mother

was abused by boyfriends and that there was no physical abuse at home. However, in the

presentence investigation, the mother disputes that and says she was not abused by any

boyfriends and that there was not any physical abuse there. And so that goes also to point

three, the person’s family and home environment, educational and social background,

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including any history of parental neglect, physical abuse, or other childhood trauma.”

¶ 40 We thus cannot agree with Rodriguez that the court did not consider the fact that he was

subjected to a difficult home environment and negative influences, including having a family

with gang affiliations. He may not like the extent to which the court was or was not persuaded by

these factors, but that is altogether different from claiming that the court failed to adequately

consider them. The court clearly did. We have no basis to disturb the sentence imposed here.

¶ 41 CONCLUSION

¶ 42 The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

¶ 43 Affirmed.

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