NOTICE 2022 IL App (4th) 210218-U FILED This Order was filed under April 5, 2022 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the NO. 4-21-0218 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County JOSE DOMINGO RODRIGUEZ, ) No. 19CF662 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) William G. Workman, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the defendant’s seven-year sentence for failure to give information after a motor vehicle accident involving death was not excessive.
¶2 Defendant, Jose Domingo Rodriguez, appeals from the McLean County circuit
court’s judgment sentencing him to seven years in prison following his plea of guilty to failure to
give information after a motor vehicle accident involving death (625 ILCS 5/11-401(b) (West
2018)). On appeal, defendant argues his sentence is excessive. The State disagrees. We affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In June 2019, the State charged defendant by information with failure to give
information after a motor vehicle accident involving death, a Class 1 felony (id.). The information alleged that on June 22, 2019, defendant was the driver of a motor vehicle involved
in an accident resulting in the death of an operator of a motorcycle, and defendant knowingly
failed to (1) remain at the scene of the accident and (2) report the driver’s name and address and
all other occupants of the vehicle to law enforcement within 30 minutes after the accident. The
information was superseded by indictment in July 2019.
¶5 In January 2020, defendant entered an open plea of guilty pursuant to an
agreement with the State. In exchange for defendant’s plea, the State agreed to dismiss
defendant’s citation for disregarding a traffic control device in McLean County case No.
19-TR-10706. The State provided the following factual basis for the plea:
“[O]n June 22nd, 2019, approximately 3:40 p.m., Bloomington Police responded
to a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of Main Street and MacArthur
Avenue. An unoccupied Chevrolet van was at the scene as well as a motorcycle
and an unconscious male on the ground.
Witnesses identified the male, who was later determined to be deceased,
as the operator of the motorcycle involved in the vehicle crash. He was later
identified as Corey Cottrell.
Several witnesses reported that the Chevrolet van had disobeyed a red
traffic signal east on MacArthur Avenue and struck the motorcycle as the
motorcycle was traveling with the flow of traffic.
Witnesses provided the description of the male driver of the Chevy van to
the police. Police contacted the registered owner of the van who identified the
driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident as his nephew, the defendant, Jose
Rodriguez.
-2- Video surveillance from a local business captured the motor vehicle
accident. It captured the defendant getting out of the driver’s seat of the van,
walking towards the victim and remaining near the scene after police had arrived.
On the video surveillance, you can see that at no time did the defendant offer aid
to Corey Cottrell or speak with or make contact with the police to identify himself
as the driver of the van.
On June 23rd, the next day, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the defendant
reported to the Bloomington Police Department and was taken into custody for
this accident.”
¶6 Defendant’s case proceeded to a sentencing hearing in June 2020. At the hearing,
the State first presented two of Cottrell’s family members who read their impact statements into
the record. The assistant state’s attorney then read into the record the initial probable cause
statement, which was substantially similar to the factual basis for the guilty plea. As evidence in
aggravation, the court allowed the admission of surveillance videotapes from the Huck’s gas
station on South Main Street that captured the accident.
¶7 In mitigation, defendant presented the testimony of several of his employers and
family members, whose collective testimony was as follows. Defendant was a good worker,
having been steadily employed in the construction business for a number of years, and was not
known to drink alcohol, smoke, or use drugs. Defendant was a devoted husband, father, and
son-in-law who supported his family, and his absence would cause hardship to his family. Since
the accident, defendant was very remorseful, and it had “affect[ed] him psychologically.”
¶8 During argument, the State played the surveillance footage that had been
previously admitted. The State emphasized defendant’s failure to approach the police officers
-3- who arrived after the accident and his decision to leave the scene. The State argued defendant’s
explanation that he left the scene out of fear because he was not lawfully in the United States and
did not know how to speak English did not excuse his decision to wait over a day to turn himself
in. The State argued a community-based sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense
and would not deter others from similar conduct. The State recommended a sentence of 12 years
in prison.
¶9 Defendant argued for a community-based sentence. Defense counsel emphasized
defendant was unsophisticated, having only completed a sixth-grade education. Defendant had
no criminal record and a strong employment history. Although acknowledging the nature of the
case was “serious,” defense counsel argued a sentence to probation would not deprecate the
seriousness of the offense in this case and defendant was particularly likely to comply with the
terms of probation. Defense counsel emphasized the hardship a prison sentence would cause
defendant’s employer and family.
¶ 10 Defendant then made a statement in allocution. Defendant apologized to Cottrell’s
family and asked for their forgiveness. Defendant stated he was not a bad person and had never
had any problems since coming to the United States five years ago.
¶ 11 The court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison. In pronouncing its
sentence, the court stated it considered the following: the factual basis for the guilty plea; the
gravity of the offense; the presentence investigation report and addendum; the financial impact
of incarceration; the evidence presented; all statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation;
defendant’s history, character, attitude, age, and potential for rehabilitation; all sentencing
options available to the court; the arguments and recommendations of counsel; and defendant’s
statement in allocution. The court stated it found defendant’s lack of criminal history and that he
-4- supported his family to be mitigating factors. On the other hand, it found deterrence to be a
relevant aggravating factor. As to the seriousness of the offense, the court stated it considered the
facts defendant failed to (1) render aid to the victim, (2) cooperate with the police, and (3) turn
himself in until 25 hours after the accident. The court found a community-based sentence would
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NOTICE 2022 IL App (4th) 210218-U FILED This Order was filed under April 5, 2022 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is Carla Bender not precedent except in the NO. 4-21-0218 4th District Appellate limited circumstances allowed Court, IL under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT
OF ILLINOIS
FOURTH DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Circuit Court of v. ) McLean County JOSE DOMINGO RODRIGUEZ, ) No. 19CF662 Defendant-Appellant. ) ) Honorable ) William G. Workman, ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE HOLDER WHITE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Cavanagh concurred in the judgment.
ORDER ¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the defendant’s seven-year sentence for failure to give information after a motor vehicle accident involving death was not excessive.
¶2 Defendant, Jose Domingo Rodriguez, appeals from the McLean County circuit
court’s judgment sentencing him to seven years in prison following his plea of guilty to failure to
give information after a motor vehicle accident involving death (625 ILCS 5/11-401(b) (West
2018)). On appeal, defendant argues his sentence is excessive. The State disagrees. We affirm
the trial court’s judgment.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 In June 2019, the State charged defendant by information with failure to give
information after a motor vehicle accident involving death, a Class 1 felony (id.). The information alleged that on June 22, 2019, defendant was the driver of a motor vehicle involved
in an accident resulting in the death of an operator of a motorcycle, and defendant knowingly
failed to (1) remain at the scene of the accident and (2) report the driver’s name and address and
all other occupants of the vehicle to law enforcement within 30 minutes after the accident. The
information was superseded by indictment in July 2019.
¶5 In January 2020, defendant entered an open plea of guilty pursuant to an
agreement with the State. In exchange for defendant’s plea, the State agreed to dismiss
defendant’s citation for disregarding a traffic control device in McLean County case No.
19-TR-10706. The State provided the following factual basis for the plea:
“[O]n June 22nd, 2019, approximately 3:40 p.m., Bloomington Police responded
to a motor vehicle accident at the intersection of Main Street and MacArthur
Avenue. An unoccupied Chevrolet van was at the scene as well as a motorcycle
and an unconscious male on the ground.
Witnesses identified the male, who was later determined to be deceased,
as the operator of the motorcycle involved in the vehicle crash. He was later
identified as Corey Cottrell.
Several witnesses reported that the Chevrolet van had disobeyed a red
traffic signal east on MacArthur Avenue and struck the motorcycle as the
motorcycle was traveling with the flow of traffic.
Witnesses provided the description of the male driver of the Chevy van to
the police. Police contacted the registered owner of the van who identified the
driver of the vehicle at the time of the accident as his nephew, the defendant, Jose
Rodriguez.
-2- Video surveillance from a local business captured the motor vehicle
accident. It captured the defendant getting out of the driver’s seat of the van,
walking towards the victim and remaining near the scene after police had arrived.
On the video surveillance, you can see that at no time did the defendant offer aid
to Corey Cottrell or speak with or make contact with the police to identify himself
as the driver of the van.
On June 23rd, the next day, at approximately 4:30 p.m., the defendant
reported to the Bloomington Police Department and was taken into custody for
this accident.”
¶6 Defendant’s case proceeded to a sentencing hearing in June 2020. At the hearing,
the State first presented two of Cottrell’s family members who read their impact statements into
the record. The assistant state’s attorney then read into the record the initial probable cause
statement, which was substantially similar to the factual basis for the guilty plea. As evidence in
aggravation, the court allowed the admission of surveillance videotapes from the Huck’s gas
station on South Main Street that captured the accident.
¶7 In mitigation, defendant presented the testimony of several of his employers and
family members, whose collective testimony was as follows. Defendant was a good worker,
having been steadily employed in the construction business for a number of years, and was not
known to drink alcohol, smoke, or use drugs. Defendant was a devoted husband, father, and
son-in-law who supported his family, and his absence would cause hardship to his family. Since
the accident, defendant was very remorseful, and it had “affect[ed] him psychologically.”
¶8 During argument, the State played the surveillance footage that had been
previously admitted. The State emphasized defendant’s failure to approach the police officers
-3- who arrived after the accident and his decision to leave the scene. The State argued defendant’s
explanation that he left the scene out of fear because he was not lawfully in the United States and
did not know how to speak English did not excuse his decision to wait over a day to turn himself
in. The State argued a community-based sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense
and would not deter others from similar conduct. The State recommended a sentence of 12 years
in prison.
¶9 Defendant argued for a community-based sentence. Defense counsel emphasized
defendant was unsophisticated, having only completed a sixth-grade education. Defendant had
no criminal record and a strong employment history. Although acknowledging the nature of the
case was “serious,” defense counsel argued a sentence to probation would not deprecate the
seriousness of the offense in this case and defendant was particularly likely to comply with the
terms of probation. Defense counsel emphasized the hardship a prison sentence would cause
defendant’s employer and family.
¶ 10 Defendant then made a statement in allocution. Defendant apologized to Cottrell’s
family and asked for their forgiveness. Defendant stated he was not a bad person and had never
had any problems since coming to the United States five years ago.
¶ 11 The court sentenced defendant to seven years in prison. In pronouncing its
sentence, the court stated it considered the following: the factual basis for the guilty plea; the
gravity of the offense; the presentence investigation report and addendum; the financial impact
of incarceration; the evidence presented; all statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation;
defendant’s history, character, attitude, age, and potential for rehabilitation; all sentencing
options available to the court; the arguments and recommendations of counsel; and defendant’s
statement in allocution. The court stated it found defendant’s lack of criminal history and that he
-4- supported his family to be mitigating factors. On the other hand, it found deterrence to be a
relevant aggravating factor. As to the seriousness of the offense, the court stated it considered the
facts defendant failed to (1) render aid to the victim, (2) cooperate with the police, and (3) turn
himself in until 25 hours after the accident. The court found a community-based sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of the offense and would be inconsistent with the ends of justice, and
therefore a prison sentence was warranted in this case.
¶ 12 In June 2020, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, arguing it was
excessive in light of the evidence presented at sentencing and his lack of criminal history.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.
¶ 13 Defendant filed a notice of appeal, which this court docketed as case No.
4-20-0351. In December 2020, this court allowed the parties’ agreed motion for summary
remand for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff. July 1, 2017). On remand,
defendant’s counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Rule 604(d) and stood on the previously filed
motion to reconsider defendant’s sentence. The court again denied defendant’s motion.
¶ 14 This appeal followed. In his opening brief, defendant cites an article from Crain’s
Chicago Business that states an estimated average cost to house individuals in prison. The record
shows the article was not presented to the trial court. The State has filed a motion to strike the
citation, and defendant has filed an objection to the same. This court ordered the motion taken
with the case.
¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 16 On appeal, defendant argues his seven-year sentence is excessive. The State
disagrees. We agree with the State and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 17 A. Motion to Strike
-5- ¶ 18 We first address the State’s motion to strike the portion of defendant’s brief which
cities an article from Crain’s Chicago Business. Generally, this court will not consider facts or
data not presented to the trial court. See People v. O’Neal, 2021 IL App (4th) 200014, ¶ 65.
Here, we need not determine whether the article from Crain’s Chicago Business constitutes a
secondary source to which defendant may cite. Instead, because we find defendant failed to
introduce the article in the trial court, we decline to consider it.
¶ 19 B. Excessive Sentence
¶ 20 Defendant argues his sentence is excessive because (1) he was not criminally
culpable for Cottrell’s death, (2) he had no prior convictions, (3) he worked full-time to support
his family, and (4) the court failed to adequately consider the financial impact of incarceration.
¶ 21 We review defendant’s sentence for an abuse of discretion. People v. Stacey, 193
Ill. 2d 203, 209-10, 737 N.E.2d 626, 629 (2000). We deem a sentence within the statutory limits
excessive and the result of abuse of discretion only where it is greatly at variance with the spirit
and purpose of the law or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense. Id. at 210.
¶ 22 Here, defendant was convicted of failure to give information after a motor vehicle
accident involving death, a Class 1 felony (625 ILCS 5/11-401(b) (West 2018)) that carried a
sentence range of probation to 4 to 15 years in prison (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-30(a) (West 2018)).
Because defendant’s sentence to seven years in prison falls within this range, it is presumptively
valid. See People v. Busse, 2016 IL App (1st) 142941, ¶ 27, 69 N.E.3d 425.
¶ 23 In Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209, our supreme court stated as follows:
“It is well settled that the trial court has broad discretionary powers in
imposing a sentence [citation], and the trial court’s sentencing decision is entitled
to great deference [citation]. The trial court is granted such deference because the
-6- trial court is generally in a better position than the reviewing court to determine
the appropriate sentence. The trial judge has the opportunity to weigh such factors
as the defendant’s credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality,
social environment, habits, and age. [Citations.] Consequently, the reviewing
court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it
would have weighed these factors differently. [Citation.]”
¶ 24 Here, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
defendant to seven years in prison.
¶ 25 Initially, we reject defendant’s contention his sentence is excessive on the grounds
it was “greater than the maximum sentence that could have been imposed if [defendant] had
driven recklessly and was criminally culpable for the death.” The maximum sentence for a crime
for which defendant was not charged or convicted is not relevant when determining the propriety
of defendant’s sentence here. Any argument the sentencing range for the offense in this case
should be less than the maximum sentence for homicide is better directed to the legislature. See
People v. Fern, 189 Ill. 2d 48, 53, 723 N.E.2d 207, 209 (1999) (“The legislature sets forth by
statute the range of permissible sentences for each class of criminal offense.”).
¶ 26 We also reject defendant’s argument that the court failed to assign adequate
weight to the applicable factors in mitigation, including his (1) relative youth, (2) lack of
criminal record, (3) consistent employment, (4) lack of substance abuse issues, and (5) role as
financial provider for his family. In pronouncing its sentence, the court specifically stated it
considered all of these mitigating factors. The court found a community-based sentence would
deprecate the seriousness of the offense in this case and explained the factual circumstances that
contributed to that determination, noting defendant failed to (1) render aid to the victim,
-7- (2) cooperate with the police, and (3) turn himself in until 25 hours after the accident. See People
v. Jackson, 2014 IL App (1st) 123258, ¶ 53, 23 N.E.3d 430 (“[T]he seriousness of an offense is
considered the most important factor in determining a sentence.”). Defendant’s sentence to 7
years in prison is only 3 years longer than the minimum applicable prison sentence and well
below the 15-year maximum. This court will not find an abuse of discretion merely because,
given the opportunity, we may have weighed the mitigating factors differently. See Stacey, 193
Ill. 2d at 209. Ultimately, we find no abuse of discretion regarding the court’s consideration of
the mitigating factors in this case.
¶ 27 Finally, we reject defendant’s contention the “lengthy” sentence in this case “fails
to give adequate consideration to the financial costs of incarcerating offenders like [defendant]
for so many years,” citing section 5-4-1(a)(3) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS
5/5-4-1(a)(3) (West 2018) (requiring the sentencing court to consider the financial impact of
incarceration)). Again, the court specifically stated it considered the financial impact of
incarceration in fashioning its sentence and the fact defendant financially supported his family.
Although the court did not specifically state it considered the financial impact of incarceration in
light of the fact defendant would be removed from the United States by the Department of
Homeland Security following completion of his sentence, the court was clearly aware of these
circumstances because it admonished defendant of the immigration consequences when
defendant pleaded guilty. Defendant has failed to overcome the presumption the court considered
the financial impact of incarceration, and we find no abuse of discretion. See People v. Brazziel,
406 Ill. App. 3d 412, 434, 939 N.E.2d 989, 1009 (2010) (stating it is the defendant’s burden to
affirmatively show the sentencing court failed to consider all mitigating factors).
-8- ¶ 28 Here, the court supported its sentencing determination with a thorough
explanation of its consideration of statutory factors in aggravation and mitigation. It further
detailed with specificity every piece of evidence it considered, including the presentence
investigation report, all of the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing, the arguments and
recommendations of counsel, and defendant’s statement in allocution. In this instance, we find
no basis to reverse the sentence the trial court imposed in this matter. Thus, we affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
¶ 29 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 30 For the reasons stated, consistent with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(b) (eff. Jan.
1, 2021), we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
¶ 31 Affirmed.
-9-