People v. Rodney

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

People v. Rodney

131 A.D.3d 424, 15 N.Y.S.3d 47

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedAugust 18, 2015

Docket10045 946/06 1647/06

StatusPublished

This text of 131 A.D.3d 424 (People v. Rodney) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

People v. Rodney, 131 A.D.3d 424, 15 N.Y.S.3d 47 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

Pincite

Opinion

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Michael A. Gross, J.), rendered March 25, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 7 to 14 years, unanimously affirmed.

This Court previously held this appeal in abeyance pending a hearing into the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of a weapon charge against a witness who had already been cooperating with the prosecution, and whether the witness believed that the dismissal was a consequence of his cooperation (109 AD3d 439 [ 1st Dept 2013]). Supreme Court conducted the hearing, which included the testimony of the cooperating witness and two prosecutors. After reviewing the testimony adduced at the hearing, along with the trial evidence, we conclude that although the court should have permitted cross-examination of the witness at trial concerning these matters, the error was harmless (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [ 1975]). In the first place, the People’s case did not depend on the testimony of the cooperating witness, because a second eyewitness gave consistent testimony regarding defendant’s attack on the victim. Furthermore, the evidence elicited at the hearing upon our remand shows that the dismissal of the weapon charge had an explanation, both in the minds of the prosecutors and the witness, that had nothing to do with cooperation, such that trial cross-examination of the witness in this regard would most likely have been unfruitful. Finally, impeachment concerning the dismissed charge could not have materially aided defendant in light of the fact that the witness had already been thoroughly impeached with the substantial benefit he derived from the cooperation agreement itself. Accordingly, there is no reasonable possibility that the additional cross-examination would have affected the verdict.

*425 We have considered and rejected defendant’s challenge to the court’s rulings on submission of lesser included offenses, his related claim regarding the prosecutor’s summation, and his excessive sentence argument.

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Richter, Feinman, Gische and Clark, JJ.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Judgment, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Michael A. Gross, J.), rendered March 25, 2010, convicting defendant, after a jury trial, of manslaughter in the second degree, and sentencing him, as a second felony offender, to a term of 7 to 14 years, unanimously affirmed.

This Court previously held this appeal in abeyance pending a hearing into the circumstances surrounding the dismissal of a weapon charge against a witness who had already been cooperating with the prosecution, and whether the witness believed that the dismissal was a consequence of his cooperation (109 AD3d 439 [ 1st Dept 2013]). Supreme Court conducted the hearing, which included the testimony of the cooperating witness and two prosecutors. After reviewing the testimony adduced at the hearing, along with the trial evidence, we conclude that although the court should have permitted cross-examination of the witness at trial concerning these matters, the error was harmless (see People v Crimmins, 36 NY2d 230 [ 1975]). In the first place, the People’s case did not depend on the testimony of the cooperating witness, because a second eyewitness gave consistent testimony regarding defendant’s attack on the victim. Furthermore, the evidence elicited at the hearing upon our remand shows that the dismissal of the weapon charge had an explanation, both in the minds of the prosecutors and the witness, that had nothing to do with cooperation, such that trial cross-examination of the witness in this regard would most likely have been unfruitful. Finally, impeachment concerning the dismissed charge could not have materially aided defendant in light of the fact that the witness had already been thoroughly impeached with the substantial benefit he derived from the cooperation agreement itself. Accordingly, there is no reasonable possibility that the additional cross-examination would have affected the verdict.

*425 We have considered and rejected defendant’s challenge to the court’s rulings on submission of lesser included offenses, his related claim regarding the prosecutor’s summation, and his excessive sentence argument.

Concur — Friedman, J.P., Richter, Feinman, Gische and Clark, JJ.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

131 A.D.3d 424, 15 N.Y.S.3d 47, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/people-v-rodney-nyappdiv-2015.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack