2026 IL App (1st) 231798-U No. 1-23-1798
Filed August 19, 2026
Third Division
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County.
)
v. ) No. 17 CR 2002 )
WESLEY RODGERS, ) Honorable ) Michele Pitman, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
PRESIDING JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices Lampkin and Reyes concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: Evidence was sufficient to prove defendant’s conduct was the proximate cause of three deaths. Trial court’s limitation of defense witness’s testimony did not prejudice defendant. Evidence derived from automobile’s data recorder was admissible. Expert witness did not testify to a retrograde extrapolation. Verdict forms were legally sufficient.
¶2 Following a jury trial, Wesley Rodgers was convicted of aggravated driving under the influence of alcohol (aggravated DUI) and reckless homicide. The trial court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of 23 and 5 years, respectively. We affirm. 1
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In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Rodgers celebrated his birthday at a club in Harvey, Illinois, where he was a regular. Rodgers left the club sometime around 2:40 a.m. on December 15, 2016. He got behind the wheel of his black BMW sedan, along with four passengers—Jaquira Brown, Tondalia Dubose, Lanae Riley, and Juanitra Holloman—and drove away. The club owner who hosted his party found Rodgers to appear “very much” in control.
¶5 About 10 minutes after departing the club, Rodgers’ BMW struck a parked Chevy Trailblazer on a residential street in the Village of Posen, Illinois. The collision caused a chain reaction in which six parked vehicles were each pushed into the vehicle in front of it. The first two vehicles, the Trailblazer and a Jeep, were pushed 52 feet onto the curb. After striking the Trailblazer, Rodgers’ BMW spun clockwise and came to a stop over 120 feet from the point of the collision. The BMW’s right side was sheared off. Three passengers were ejected. Those three— Brown, Dibose, and Riley—were killed. Holloman sustained severe injuries but survived. Rodgers sustained a cut to his forehead.
¶6 Minutes before the accident, Dixmoor police officer Carlos Rosa observed the BMW pass him, travelling in the opposite direction on Western Avenue. The BMW’s speed was so great that Officer Rosa felt his vehicle “tremble” from the wake of air disturbance after it passed. Looking in his rear-view mirror, Officer Rosa observed another vehicle swerve as the BMW passed it. He also noticed that the BMW was not maintaining its lane.
¶7 Posen police officer Ryan Bartels also observed the BMW on Western Avenue shortly before the crash. The radar in his squad car measured the BMW’s speed at 93 miles per hour (mph) in a 35 mph zone.
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¶8 Eventually, Officers Rosa and Bartels both drove to the scene of the accident on Harrison Avenue in Posen, between 143rd and 144th Streets. This portion of Harrison is residential, with a 20 mph speed limit and vehicles parked on both sides of the street. Officer Rosa arrived first. He viewed the damaged BMW in the middle of the street, several damaged parked vehicles, and bodies on the ground. Officer Rosa found Rodgers standing in the street near the BMW, bleeding from his head. He asked Rodgers if he was okay. Rodgers told Officer Rosa, “I hit a patch of ice and this is what happened.” It had snowed earlier on December 14. Officer Rosa suspected the accident was alcohol-related but did not investigate, as the accident occurred in Posen and the Posen Police Department would conduct any DUI investigation. He did not observe whether Rodgers exhibited any clues of alcohol consumption or impairment, such as bloodshot eyes or an odor of alcohol. Except for a brief exchange to obtain Rodgers’ driver’s license, Officer Rosa did not get any closer to Rodgers than four or five feet.
¶9 Later, Rodgers told Officer Bartels that he lost control of his vehicle. He also stated that he had a couple drinks at a club that evening during his birthday celebration. Officer Bartels noticed a strong odor of alcohol on Rodgers’ breath and that his speech was slurred. He asked Rodgers to stand next to the squad car, but Rodgers went to his BMW to retrieve his keys. Rodgers wandered in the street before eventually complying with the officer’s instruction. Though Officer Bartels suspected Rodgers of being intoxicated, he did not conduct further investigation, such as administering field sobriety tests. Officer Bartels believed it unnecessary, as Rodgers would be going to a hospital for treatment of the visible wound on his head.
¶ 10 Rodgers was transported to a hospital and received treatment for a head laceration. Analysis of a blood sample taken at 6:05 a.m.—more than three hours after the accident—revealed a blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.102.
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¶ 11 Investigators conducted an accident reconstruction. They also obtained information from the BMW’s event data recorder (EDR). The accident reconstruction and the EDR both revealed that the BMW was travelling at 84 mph when it struck the Trailblazer. EDR data also showed that the BMW was decelerating from 112 mph over the five seconds before impact.
¶ 12 Autopsies of the decedents revealed that each suffered multiple, severe external and internal injuries.
¶ 13 Holloman testified on Rodgers’ behalf. Rodgers’ cousin was the father of Holloman’s child. After his cousin passed away, Rodgers helped Holloman care for her baby. After attending the birthday party, she and the other young women entered Rodgers’ BMW, as he agreed to drive them home. Rodgers had been drinking, but he did not smell of alcohol or slur his speech, and he maintained his balance. Riley, who was dating Rodgers, sat in the front passenger seat. As they rode along, the group “danced” to music playing loudly on the radio. At some point, Rodgers indicated that he was dropping Riley off. Then Riley and Rodgers began to argue. Holloman could not hear what they were saying due to the radio’s volume but perceived their conversation as “unfriendly.” Riley repeatedly raised her left hand and Rodgers pushed it away. The BMW was going fast, and they turned down a residential street. The last thing Holloman remembered was Riley grabbing Rodgers’ hand from the steering wheel. Holloman’s next memory was waking in the hospital. She suffered a brain injury. Holloman did not recall speaking with Posen police detective Ryan Grab in January 2017. She admitted that she did not tell anyone about Riley grabbing Rodgers’ hand until 2022—more than five years after the accident. She explained that she had not spoken of this before because she did not think it was necessary, as the victims were deceased and she did not want to “make people mad.” Holloman admitted that she came forward because Rodgers was on trial.
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¶ 14 Rodgers elected to not testify and rested after Holloman’s testimony.
¶ 15 In rebuttal, Detective Grab testified that he spoke with Holloman in January 2017. She described riding in Rodgers’ BMW before the accident but did not mention Riley grabbing Rodgers’ hand from the steering wheel.
¶ 16 While conferring about jury instructions, defense counsel objected to the verdict forms for aggravated DUI. Counsel argued that they were deficient, since they referenced other elements of the offense but omitted any reference to the offense being the proximate cause of death. The trial court overruled the objection, reasoning that the issues instruction informed the jury of the elements the State was required to prove.
¶ 17 The jury found Rodgers guilty of three counts of aggravated DUI, premised on driving under the influence of alcohol resulting in the deaths of the three victims (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2016)); three counts of aggravated DUI, premised on driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more resulting in the deaths of the three victims (id. § 11-501(a)(1)); and three counts of reckless homicide (720 ILCS 5/9-3(a) (West 2016)). The court sentenced Rodgers to 23 years’ imprisonment for aggravated DUI and a concurrent term of five years for reckless homicide. This appeal followed.
¶ 18 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 19 A. Proximate Cause
¶ 20 Rodgers first argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove him guilty. Specifically, he contends the State failed to prove his conduct was the proximate cause of the three victims’ deaths, 2 since (1) no evidence established that he was impaired or that any such
2
Though Rodgers’ briefs do not specify, his argument ostensibly pertains to all counts, as causing death is an element of each offense.
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impairment “actually caused the deaths,” and (2) Riley’s act of grabbing Rodgers’ hand from the steering wheel was a superseding cause of the accident.
¶ 21 When this court reviews a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our function is not to retry the defendant. People v. Johnson, 2026 IL 131337, ¶ 59. Rather, the question is “ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) People v. McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). It is the trier of fact’s responsibility to weigh evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Johnson, 2026 IL 131337, ¶ 59; People v. Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64. Therefore, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact on issues involving the weight of evidence or witness credibility. Johnson, 2026 IL 131337, ¶ 59. “A criminal conviction will not be set aside on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence unless the evidence is so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant’s guilt.” Jackson, 2020 IL 124112, ¶ 64.
¶ 22 “[A]ggravated DUI is simply misdemeanor DUI with an aggravating factor, which turns the offense into a felony.” People v. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 24. The aggravating factor charged in each count here was that Rodgers’ commission of misdemeanor DUI resulted in the death of another person and was a proximate cause of the death. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(d)(1)(F) (West 2016). Thus, the State was required to prove Rodgers’ commission of misdemeanor DUI was a proximate cause of each victim’s death. People v. Olvera, 2023 IL App (1st) 210875, ¶ 51.
¶ 23 The State alleged that Rodgers committed misdemeanor DUI in two ways: driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more (counts 1-3) and driving while under the influence of alcohol
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(counts 4-6). For the counts premised on driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more, the State did not have to prove that impairment was the proximate cause of death because impairment is not an element of this form of misdemeanor DUI. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2016); Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 26 (“[W]hether proof of impairment is necessary to sustain a conviction for aggravated DUI *** depends upon whether impairment is an element of the underlying misdemeanor DUI.”); People v. Turner, 2018 IL App (1st) 170204, ¶ 78 (“[T]he ‘proximate cause’ element of the aggravated offense requires only that the death was caused by the defendant’s driving.”).
¶ 24 For the other counts of aggravated DUI, the State had to prove both that Rodgers was driving under the influence of alcohol and doing so was a proximate cause of the deaths. 625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2), (d)(1)(F) (West 2016). A driver is under the influence when “[their] mental or physical faculties are so impaired as to reduce [their] ability to think and act with ordinary care.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.] Olvera, 2023 IL App (1st) 210875, ¶ 25. Impairment may be proven by circumstantial evidence. People v. Phillips, 2015 IL App (1st) 131147, ¶ 18. “The testimony of a single, credible police officer may alone sustain a conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol.” Id.
¶ 25 Rodgers contends that despite registering a BAC of .102, the evidence was insufficient to prove he was under the influence of alcohol. The club owner found him “very much” in control and Officer Rosa did not notice any signs of impairment. Both Officers Rosa and Bartels described Rodgers as cooperative, noting that he followed their directions and answered their questions appropriately. He also maintained his balance and walked to Bartels’ vehicle when directed. Further, no officer administered field sobriety tests, and the State presented no expert testimony to explain how Rodgers’ BAC affected his ability to drive.
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¶ 26 We are unpersuaded. For one, expert testimony is not required for the trier of fact to decide whether a defendant was impaired. People v. Hires, 396 Ill. App. 3d 315, 320 (2009). In addition, impairment may be presumed from a BAC of 0.08 or more. 625 ILCS 5/11-501.2(b)(3) (West 2016). Moreover, Rodgers merely points to portions of the evidence supporting that he was not impaired. It was the jury’s task to resolve conflicts in the evidence and ample evidence supported that Rodgers was under the influence. Officer Rosa observed the BMW failing to maintain its lane. Although Officer Rosa observed no signs of impairment, he deferred the DUI investigation to the Posen Police Department, as the crash occurred in their jurisdiction. Officer Bartels, however, did observe Rodgers to have slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol. Rodgers also admitted drinking at his birthday party. Though generally cooperative, Rodgers walked to his BMW, against Officer Bartels’ instructions, to retrieve his keys, and he wandered around before reaching Officer Bartels’ vehicle.
¶ 27 Apart from impairment, Rodgers argues the evidence failed to prove he caused the deaths of the three victims, since Riley’s act was a superseding cause. The jury, however, was not required to believe that Riley grabbed Rodgers’ hand from the steering wheel. 3 Holloman’s testimony was the sole evidence of this. But the jury was not required to find her credible. People v. Joiner, 2018 IL App (1st) 150343, ¶ 62 (“The trier of fact may accept or reject all or part of a witness’ testimony.”). Indeed, several factors weighed against Holloman’s credibility. Only when she learned Rodgers was on trial—five years after the accident—did Holloman claim Riley grabbed Rodgers’ hand from the steering wheel. She failed to mention this when she spoke with Detective Grab just a month after the accident. And, at the scene, Rodgers had told officers he lost control after hitting ice, making no mention of a passenger grabbing his hand from the steering wheel.
3
In his brief, Rodgers repeatedly asserts that Riley grabbed the steering wheel. However, Holloman testified only that Riley “grabbed [Rodgers’] hand from the steering wheel.”
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¶ 28 Yet, even if the jury believed Riley had grabbed Rodgers’ hand from the steering wheel, they could reasonably find that her act was not a superseding cause of the deaths. “[I]f some new causal factor, completely unrelated to or unconnected with the defendant’s conduct, intervenes and brings about the victim’s death, that new factor will relieve the defendant of criminal responsibility for the death, notwithstanding the defendant’s original infliction of potentially fatal injuries.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.] People v. Nelson, 2020 IL App (1st) 151960, ¶ 52. Whether a third party’s act amounts to a superseding cause is a question of fact. Thomas v. Khoury, 2021 IL 126074, ¶ 6. Here, the jury could have found that Riley’s act of grabbing Rodgers’ hand from the steering wheel was not completely unrelated to or unconnected with Rodgers’ impaired driving in bringing about the victims’ deaths. Had Rodgers been driving at a reasonable speed, Riley’s act would have likely resulted in no worse than a minor collision with little or no injury to anyone. But the accident was catastrophic, ripping the BMW apart and ejecting three passengers. Excessive speed was the obvious and overwhelming factor in why this accident was fatal and there is no dispute as to whose foot was on the accelerator. The defendant’s impaired driving need not be the sole or immediate cause to be a proximate cause of death. Olvera, 2023 IL App (1st) 210875, ¶ 53. So, even if Riley’s act contributed to the accident, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude Rodgers’ impaired driving was a proximate cause of the deaths.
¶ 29 B. Evidentiary Rulings
¶ 30 Next, Rodgers challenges several evidentiary rulings, which he argues deprived him of a fair trial.
¶ 31 First, Rodgers asserts that the trial court erred by sustaining hearsay objections during Holloman’s testimony as to statements Rodgers and Riley made before the accident. He contends
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the statements would have supported the defense’s theory that Riley grabbing the steering wheel was a superseding cause of the victims’ deaths.
¶ 32 Hearsay evidence is testimony regarding an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matters asserted. People v. Cook, 2018 IL App (1st) 142134, ¶ 30; Ill. R. Evid. 801(c) (eff. Oct. 15, 2015). Conversely, “testimony about an out-of-court statement which is used for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the statement is not hearsay.” People v. Banks, 237 Ill. 2d 154, 180 (2010). “ ‘Thus, whether a statement is hearsay depends upon the purpose for which it is offered.’ ” People v. Rainey, 2025 IL App (1st) 231769, ¶ 28 (quoting 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence § 652 (May 2025 Update)).
¶ 33 Here, Holloman’s direct examination indicates that she attempted to testify to Rodgers’ and Riley’s statements to explain what precipitated Riley to grab Rodger’s hand from the steering wheel; specifically, that they argued about dropping Riley off. Thus, the statements were not offered to prove the truth of any matter asserted. Rather, they were offered to explain why Riley would have done an otherwise inexplicable act. Accordingly, the statements were not hearsay, and Holloman should have been permitted to testify to them.
¶ 34 Nevertheless, an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless when there is no reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted the defendant absent the error. People v. Stull, 2014 IL App (4th) 120704, ¶ 104. Such is the case here. Although Holloman did not testify to the content of their statements, she nevertheless testified that Rodgers and Riley were arguing about dropping Riley off and added that it was not a “friendly” conversation. Thus, Holloman provided context and explanation for what led Riley to grab Rodgers’ hand, thereby accomplishing the purpose for which the statements were offered. Further, the defense made no offer of proof as to the content of the statements. “A detailed and specific offer of proof is necessary when it is not clear what the
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witness’ testimony will be or his basis for so testifying.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.] People v. Burgess, 2015 IL App (1st) 130657, ¶ 189. So, it is speculative as to whether the jury would have acquitted Rodgers had Holloman been permitted to testify to the content of the statements. It is also dubious that the statements Holloman could testify to were significant, since she could not hear most of what was being said due to the radio’s volume. In addition, our conclusion that the jury could have found Rodgers guilty even if they believed Riley grabbed Rodgers’ hand from the steering wheel weighs against finding the trial court’s ruling prejudicial.
¶ 35 Second, Rodgers argues the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the introduction of evidence extracted from the BMW’s EDR, which indicated, inter alia, the BMW’s speed before and at the time of the collision. Rodgers acknowledges that the EDR data is generally admissible, since it is computer-generated and records automatically without human intervention. See People v. Holowko, 109 Ill. 2d 187, 191-93 (1985) (finding computer-generated data is not hearsay evidence). His objection, however, was that the State failed to lay a proper foundation, since the investigator used a Bosch crash data retrieval device to extract and analyze data from the EDR and the State failed to certify that the Bosch device was functioning properly. Further, Rodgers contends the Bosch device may have been unreliable, since its analysis showed a deceleration from 112 mph to 103 mph with the brake depressed but no antilock braking system activity, which would have been expected. It also reported an increase in the engine’s revolutions per minute at one point without a corresponding increase in speed.
¶ 36 We will not disturb a trial court’s ruling on the admission of evidence absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Bush, 2023 IL 128747, ¶ 57. “An abuse of discretion occurs only where the trial court's decision is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable to the degree that no reasonable person would agree with it.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.] Id.
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¶ 37 Here, Master Sergeant Theodore Pappas testified that he was trained in using the Bosch device and explained how its software indicates whether it is functioning properly. Specifically, the device reads data three times to ensure accuracy. If it is unable to do so, the device reports the problem. Pappas further testified that the device did not indicate any problems when he used it to extract the BMW’s EDR data. Based on his testimony, the trial court could reasonably find that the State established a foundation for evidence regarding the EDR data, and, therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence.
¶ 38 Yet, even if the EDR data were admitted in error, we would find it harmless. The salient evidence derived from the EDR was the BMW’s speed of 112 mph just seconds before the accident and 84 mph at collision. The accident reconstruction independently concluded that the BMW was going 84 mph when it collided with the Trailblazer. Moreover, precise measurement was not necessary, since the catastrophic nature of the accident was sufficient to demonstrate Rodgers was driving at an excessive, reckless speed. The force required to push a row of six parked vehicles, tear the vehicle’s side off, and eject three passengers could only be generated at high speed. The jury did not need exacting analysis to discern this. Thus, there is no reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted Rodgers had the EDR data been excluded.
¶ 39 Third, Rodgers argues the trial court erred in permitting the medical examiner who performed the autopsy of Dubose to testify that BAC measurements taken from blood and eye fluid differed because of differing rates at which alcohol dissipates from blood and eye fluid. Rodgers contends the testimony amounted to retrograde extrapolation evidence, which required a pretrial hearing to establish its scientific reliability before admitting the testimony into evidence. See People v. Floyd, 2014 IL App (2d) 120507, ¶ 20 (finding a toxicologist’s retrograde extrapolation testimony was improperly admitted when the toxicologist failed to account for
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factors that affected the reliability of his calculation). Although the testimony pertained to Dubose, Rodgers argues it was prejudicial, since it may have led the jury to infer that his BAC at the time of the accident was greater than the level measured from blood drawn hours later.
¶ 40 We are unpersuaded. Extrapolation means “[t]o estimate an unknown value or quantity on the basis of the known range, esp. by statistical methods.” Black’s Law Dictionary 607 (7th ed. 1999). “Retrograde extrapolation is a method determining a person’s BAC at a particular time based on a subsequent test of his or her BAC.” People v. Carlson, 2023 IL App (2d) 210782, ¶ 11. The calculation “is premised on the theory that a person’s BAC, derived from a breath or blood test at a particular time, can be extrapolated back to an allegedly higher BAC that existed at the time of a prior incident.” Floyd, 2014 IL App (2d) 120507, ¶ 1. In Floyd, such testimony was found prejudicial when an expert witness testified the defendant’s BAC was above the statutory limit at the time she was found driving based on a BAC below the limit from a breath test taken over an hour later. Id. ¶¶ 9, 20. The expert assumed she was in the “elimination phase” without considering the factors affecting whether she was in that phase. Id. ¶ 23.
¶ 41 This case is distinguishable. Here, the medical examiner simply did not testify to a retrograde extrapolation calculation. Instead, she explained why two BAC values obtained from Dubose close in time were different. See Carlson, 2023 IL App (2d) 210782, ¶ 11 (noting that admissibility of retrograde extrapolation testimony was not at issue when no party sought to introduce such evidence at trial). Further, Rodgers’ measured BAC was over the statutory limit. Moreover, the jury was permitted to reason that Rodgers’ BAC was likely greater at the time of the accident, since his blood was drawn over three hours later. See People v. Epstein, 2022 IL 127824, ¶ 25 (“Given the facts of a particular case, the jury may reasonably infer that a defendant’s
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BAC at the time of driving was similar to, if not higher than, the level when it was subsequently tested.” [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).
¶ 42 For these reasons, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the medical examiner’s testimony and Rodgers suffered no prejudice.
¶ 43 Last, Rodgers argues the trial court erred in allowing the State to present numerous gruesome autopsy photographs depicting the decedents’ injuries. He contends the photos were cumulative and only served to inflame the passions of the jury.
¶ 44 The decision to admit photographs of a decedent is within the trial court’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. People v. Richardson, 401 Ill. App. 3d 45, 52 (2010). Here, the autopsy photographs were probative of the nature and extent of the decedents’ injures and, significantly, the force needed to inflict them. The severity of their injuries demonstrates the extreme nature of the crash, thereby proving Rodgers was driving at an excessive, reckless speed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the photos.
¶ 45 Even if we deemed admission of the photos erroneous, we would find the error harmless. The evidence here was not closely balanced and there is no reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted Rodgers if the photos had not been admitted.
¶ 46 C. Verdict Forms
¶ 47 Finally, Rodgers argues the verdict forms for the aggravated DUI counts were legally insufficient. Relying on our supreme court’s decision in People v. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d 525 (1995), he contends that the verdict forms purported to set out the elements of the offense as specific findings but failed to include the necessary element that the violation of the DUI statute was the proximate cause of death. The omission was especially significant here, Rodgers asserts, since the central disputed issue was whether his conduct was the proximate cause of the victims’ deaths. Moreover,
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it was possible for the jury to find that the accident resulted in death, but that Rodgers’ conduct was not the proximate cause. Although the jury was properly instructed on all the elements the State was required to prove, Rodgers insists the proper instructions did not cure the deficient verdict forms. Thus, he argues, his aggravated DUI convictions should be reversed, as the jury failed to return a verdict fully finding that the aggravating factor was proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 48 Our research yielded no instance where this issue was, as here, preserved for appeal. But since it presents a question of law, our review is de novo. Gardner v. Mullins, 234 Ill. 2d 503, 508 (2009) (noting questions of law are subject to de novo review on appeal).
¶ 49 In Mack, a jury determined that a defendant found guilty of murder was eligible for the death penalty, which the trial court imposed. The State sought to prove the aggravating factor that the victim was killed in the course of another felony. Mack, 167 Ill. 2d at 529. The jury’s verdict stated that they found “ ‘the following aggravating factor exists in relation to this Murder: Larry Mack killed Joseph Kolar in the course of an Armed Robbery.’ ” Id. at 529-30. The relevant statute, however, required the State to also prove the defendant killed the victim intentionally or with the knowledge that the acts which caused the death created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm. Id. at 529. Thus, the verdict failed to specify that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state to establish the aggravating factor. Id. at 530.
¶ 50 The supreme court found the verdict insufficient and vacated the death sentence. The court stated that “[t]he test of the sufficiency of a verdict is whether the jury’s intention can be ascertained with reasonable certainty from the language used.” Id. at 537. However, the court instructed, “all parts of the record will be searched and interpreted together in determining the meaning of a verdict.” Id. A verdict may be set aside for, among other reasons, “ ‘a failure to find
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upon some material issue involved.’ ” (Emphasis in original.) Id. (quoting People v. Swinson, 405 Ill. 302, 305 (1950)). Proper jury instructions, the court noted, do not necessarily cure an improper verdict. Id. at 536. The court observed that a general verdict is sufficient to sustain a conviction, but “where the verdict purports to set out the elements of the offense as specific findings, it must do so completely or be held insufficient.” Id. at 538.
¶ 51 Here, the jury received six separate instructions setting forth the five propositions the State was required to prove for the jury to find Rodgers guilty of aggravated DUI—one for each count. The first proposition was that Rodgers drove a motor vehicle. The second was that Rodgers committed misdemeanor DUI. Three instructions stated that at the time he drove a vehicle, his BAC was 0.08 or more. The other three stated that at the time he drove a vehicle, he was under the influence of alcohol. The third proposition in each instruction was that, in so driving a motor vehicle, Rodgers was involved in an accident. The fourth proposition was that the accident resulted in the death of another person and named one of the three decedents. Each decedent’s name appeared in two instructions: once for each manner of committing misdemeanor DUI. The fifth proposition repeated the same allegation as to how Rodgers committed misdemeanor DUI and that his doing so was the proximate cause of the named decedent’s death. Accordingly, the six instructions corresponded to the six counts of aggravated DUI alleged in the indictment: two separate ways of committing misdemeanor DUI and three deaths for each.
¶ 52 The six verdicts likewise corresponded with the six counts. Each verdict stated one or the other way Rodgers allegedly committed misdemeanor DUI and named one of the three decedents. To illustrate, one verdict read:
“We, the jury, find the defendant, Wesley Rodgers, guilty of Aggravated Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol resulting in the death of Tondalia Dubose.”
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And another read:
“We, the jury, find the defendant, Wesley Rodgers, guilty of Aggravated Driving with an Alcohol Concentration of 0.08 or more resulting in the death of Tondalia Dubose.”
The four other verdicts were identical, except for naming Lanae Riley or Jaquira Brown in place of Tondalia Dubose.
¶ 53 Thus, the verdicts did not, as Rodgers contends, contain all elements of the offense, except the element regarding proximate cause. The verdicts also omitted references to driving a vehicle and being involved in an accident. Instead, the verdicts stated the only two aspects that distinguished each aggravated DUI count from the other five: which basis of committing misdemeanor DUI and which person was killed. By doing so, the jury’s verdict on each count was clear.
¶ 54 The verdicts here avoided the potential of the problem encountered in People v. Filipiak, 2023 IL App (3d) 220024. There, the defendant was charged with three counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, all committed during a sleepover at his house. Id. ¶ 3. Two counts pertained to one victim and the other to a second victim. Id. Both counts regarding the first victim alleged the defendant digitally penetrated her vagina. Id. ¶ 9. The victim testified to two separate instances of this, one occurring after a shower and the other in the living room. Id. ¶ 8. The jury was given two verdict forms, but the forms did not distinguish between the incidents. Id. ¶ 9. Nor did the court instruct the jury as to which count and form related to which conduct. Id. The jury found the defendant guilty on one count but not guilty on the other. Id. Applying Mack, the third district found “[t]he failure to somehow distinguish the two charges for the jury’s deliberation *** makes it impossible to reasonably ascertain whether the jury unanimously decided whether either offense was committed by defendant.” Id. ¶ 18. Since the jury could have rendered a verdict
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without unanimity, the court was required to reverse the conviction. Id. ¶¶ 16, 20. The court observed that the problem could have been avoided by simply “specif[ying] in the verdict forms which count related to which specific conduct.” Id. ¶ 18.
¶ 55 In this case, the jury could have conceivably found Rodgers guilty on some counts of aggravated DUI and not guilty on others. But, as in Filipiak, if the verdicts failed to distinguish which form pertained to which count, it could have created confusion as to what exactly the jury found him guilty of and whether unanimity was reached.
¶ 56 Thus, considering all parts of the record, we find that the verdict forms did not purport to set out the elements of the offense as specific findings. Rather, the verdicts stated the two aspects that distinguished each count of aggravated DUI from the other five, thus enabling unambiguous discernment of the jury’s verdict on each count. For these reasons, we find the jury’s intention can be ascertained with reasonable certainty from these verdicts and reject Rodgers’ argument.
¶ 57 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 58 Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
¶ 59 Affirmed.