People v. Robles

13 P.R. 299
Supreme Court of Puerto Rico·Decided December 13, 1907·No. No. 120·Published

Opinion

Mr. Justice MacLeary

delivered the opinion of the court.

This prosecution was instituted against Candelario Robles, Antonio Rivera and Ensebio Vicente for the crime of burglary •in the first degree. It is charged in the information that on the night of the 4th of June, 1907, in the town of Juncos, the three men named broke open the store of Quiterio López and robbed him of money and other property. .The defendants Robles and Rivera were tried separately. Vicente seems to be still at large, as a fugntive from justice. Rivera having been first tried and convicted, was used as a- witness for the [300]*300The People against Robles on the trial. The verdict of the jury was rendered, on the 6th of August last, finding the defendant guilty as charged. On the 8th of the same month sentence was pronounced by the court condemning the defendant Robles to suffer imprisonment in the penitentiary, for the period of 10 years at hard labor and to the payment of the costs of the prosecution. On the 15th of August last an appeal was taken to this court from the judgment rendered against him, and the accused asks a reversal of the judgment and that a new trial be granted.

No motion was made for a new trial in the court belo\y; if it had been asked, probably a new trial would have been granted. This is always the better practice in criminal cases, when the insufficiency of the evidence to justify a conviction is the only matter of which complaint is made.

The only question arising on this appeal is the sufficiency of the corroboration offered to the testimony of Antonio Rivera, who was the principal witness produced and relied on for The People. Article 253 of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as follows:

“A conviction, cannot be bad on the testimony of an accomplice, unless be is corroborated by other evidence, wbicb in itself, and without the .aid of the testimony of the accomplice, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient, if it merely shows the commission of the offense, or the circumstances thereof.”

There is no question that the witnéss, Rivera, falls within the category of an accomplice, within the purview of the law of evidence.

The section of our Code of Criminal Procedure above cited is identical with and copied from section 1111 of the Penal Code of California, and of course we may look for constructions of that section bjr the Supreme Court of the said State and follow them as we have often done in such cases.

[301]*301In one of the California cases the trial judge instructed the jury as follows:

“Where a number of persons have been engaged in the commission of an offense, when any one of them turns State’s evidence and testifies to the circumstances under which the alleged crime was committed, no one of the parties engaged in the commission of the crime can be convicted upon the testimony of the accomplice, unless there is other evidence outside of his testimony which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the connection is not sufficient if it simply shows the offense or the circumstances of the offense itself.
‘1 Whenever the prosecution introduces ' evidence which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the given offense, then the jury may take into consideration, and should do so, the evidence of the accomplice, for the purpose of determining whether or not the defendant is guilty of the given offense; but this evidence upon propositions other than those showing the fact of the offense itself committed, and the circumstances thereof.”

The Supreme Court of California goes on to say:

“But section 1111 of the Penal-Code does not require that the corroborating evidence shall be such as shall prove that the accomplice has told the truth; nor does it declare that he must be presumed to have sworn falsely, such presumption to be overcome only in case the other evidence shall show he has told the truth. It simply requires that in addition to his testimony — however trustworthy that testimony — there must, to justify a conviction, be evidence tending to connect the defendant with-the commission of the offense. Of course, mere evidence of the corpus delicti is not such evidence." (People v. Clough, 73 Cal., 349, 350, 351 and 352.)

We may also refer to the following cases: People v. Main, 114 Cal., 632; People v. Smith, 98 Cal., 218; People v. Cleveland, 49 Cal., 577; People v. Ames, 39 Cal., 403; People v. Garrett, 29 Cal., 624.

In our opinion the California cases expound the law correctly and should he followed in the interpretation of this statute.

[302]*302There is no direct testimony found in the record, connecting the appellant “with the commission of the offense” except that of Bivera. The corroborating evidence is purely circumstantial. It is not necessary that a testifying accomplice should be corroborated by an eyewitness to the crime. Circumstantial evidence is ample to serve as corroboration if it demonstrates the guilt of the accused, or is sufficient to “connect the defendant with the commission of the offense.” As the trial judge correctly instructed the jury at the request of the defendant’s counsel, we may say of corroborating testimony :

“If that evidence only creates suspicions, it is insufficient.to corroborate the testimony of the accomplice. The testimony of the accomplice alone is not sufficient; it is not necessary to have corroboration for each statement, each fact testified to by the accomplice, but if the corroborative evidence tends to connect the accused with the commission of the crime, it is sufficient. If it only creates suspicions in regard to the accused, it is not sufficient. ’ ’

This instruction was given in accordance with a request of counsel to instruct the jury in regard to the requisites which circumstantial evidence should have in order to be taken into consideration in arriving at a verdict. It is substantially correct, though very much condensed.

As this proposition is expressed in the syllabus to one of the California cases:

“The corroborating evidence required to convict a defendant, in addition to that of an accomplice, is not sufficient if it merely tends to raise a suspicion of guilt of the accused.” (People v. Thompson, 50 Cal., 480; People v. Koenig, 99 Cal., 574; People v. Ames, 39 Cal., 403.)

This is substantially the same as the instruction given by the trial judge in the case at bar at the request of the defendant who appears here as the appellant. No sufficient fault can be found with the charge given to the jury to justify [303]*303a reversal of the judgment rendered against the defendant. Now let ns examine the evidence introduced on the trial. ' In turning to the statement of facts, erroneously called, in the brief of appellant, a statement of the case, we find the only corroborating circumstances to support the testimony of the accomplice Eivera to be those detailed by the witnesses for The People as follows:

“Quiterio López,

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People v. Robles, 13 P.R. 299 (prsupreme 1907).

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Related

People v. Ames
39 Cal. 403 (California Supreme Court, 1870)
People v. Cleveland
49 Cal. 577 (California Supreme Court, 1875)
People v. Thompson
50 Cal. 480 (California Supreme Court, 1875)
People v. Clough
15 P. 5 (California Supreme Court, 1887)
People v. Smith
33 P. 58 (California Supreme Court, 1893)
People v. Koening
34 P. 238 (California Supreme Court, 1893)
People v. Main
46 P. 612 (California Supreme Court, 1896)