People v. Robinson

2023 IL App (1st) 220959-U

Opinion

2023 IL App (1st) 220959-U

FIRST DISTRICT, FIRST DIVISION November 27, 2023

No. 1-22-0959

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County ) v. ) No. 18 CR 08079 ) JAMES ROBINSON, ) Honorable ) Vincent M. Gaughan, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Lavin and Pucinski concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: Defendant’s convictions for unlawful use of a weapon by a felon is affirmed where the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction and Section 24-1.1 of the Criminal Code of 2012 is constitutional under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions.

¶2 Following a bench trial, defendant James Robinson was convicted of unlawful use or

possession of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) and possession of a controlled substance (PCS). The

trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of nine years’ imprisonment for UUWF and 14

months imprisonment for PCS. On appeal, defendant argues that the State failed to prove him

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of UUWF and that the UUWF statute is an unconstitutional

violation of his rights under the Second Amendment and the Illinois Constitution. For the No. 1-22-0959

following reasons, we affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND

¶4 On March 23, 2021, defendant was arrested after police officers observed the car he was

driving run a red light, almost hit another vehicle, and come to a stop on top of the curb. Defendant

exited the driver’s side of the car and fled on foot. While one officer chased defendant, another

officer recovered a loaded handgun from between the driver’s seat and the center console.

¶5 On April 29, 2021, defendant was charged by indictment with possession of a controlled

substance with intent to deliver, two counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW), and

UUWF for possession of a gun “after having been previously convicted of the felony offense of

[UUWF] under case number 15 CR 1610001.” The State dismissed the AUUW counts at trial.

¶6 A. Bench Trial

¶7 Chicago Police Officer Jamel Pankey testified that he and his partner, Officer Demetrius

Prothro, were on duty around 9:46 p.m. on March 23, 2021. The officers were assigned “to go to

the local gas stations for community interactions” to “let [drivers] know that it’s not good to have

your car running while at the gas station” because of recent carjackings.

¶8 At a gas station near 7600 South State Street, Pankey saw a “dark” colored Chevy Malibu

with tinted windows and the engine running. Pankey “looked in the direction” of the Malibu and

observed defendant in the driver’s seat. The car “immediately” drove off, ran through a red light,

“almost hit another vehicle,” and came to a stop on the curb. Defendant fled from the vehicle on

foot and Prothro chased him while Pankey stayed with the car. The front seat passenger got out of

the car and “immediately went to the ground.”

¶9 Pankey detained the passenger and performed a “protective pat-down” to check for

weapons. He then made a “visual inspection of the vehicle” and observed “Promethazine” bottles

“[i]n plain view on the front driver floorboard.” Pankey searched the car and recovered the bottles

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and a loaded Glock 22 semiautomatic handgun from between the front center console and the

driver’s seat. He also recovered approximately $11,000 in cash from the center console.

¶ 10 Pankey’s body-worn camera recorded part of the incident, and the audio and video from

the camera was admitted into evidence. Pankey explained that defendant had fled from the vehicle

before the video started. As Pankey approaches the car, the passenger lies on the ground next to

the car. Pankey handcuffs the passenger and then shines a light in the open passenger door. After

patting down the passenger, Pankey opens the rear passenger side door and shines a light inside.

Pankey opens the driver’s door and brown bottles are visible on the floor. Pankey leans inside the

car and shines a light at the center console and side of the driver’s seat. A handgun is visibly

protruding from between the driver’s seat and center console and Pankey recovers the weapon.

¶ 11 Prothro eventually placed defendant into custody “a few blocks away.” A custodial search

of defendant did not reveal any narcotics, material for packaging narcotics, or ammunition.

Defendant and the passenger were transported to the police station. The parties stipulated that the

Chevy Malibu was not registered to defendant and that the recovered Promethazine bottles tested

positive for codeine, a controlled substance. The parties also stipulated that defendant had

previously been convicted of “a qualifying felony offense” and that his driver’s license was

revoked at the time of the March 23, 2021, incident.

¶ 12 Defendant moved for directed finding and counsel argued that the State did not prove “both

exclusive control over the area where the contraband was located and *** knowledge” because the

passenger “certainly would have had the opportunity to discard any contraband that he may have

had” and “the weapon was accessible to where that passenger was.”

¶ 13 The trial court found defendant guilty of UUWF. The court also found defendant not guilty

of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver, but guilty of the lesser-included

offense of PCS. Regarding UUWF, the court found:

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“Now to look at the search, there wasn’t actual possession. Was there constructive

possession? It has to be because Mr. Robinson had left the car when the gun was seized.

The gun was seized in between the driver’s seat and the console. Certainly there was ***

sufficient evidence that it was within reaching distance of Mr. Robinson.”

¶ 14 Defendant’s motion for new trial was denied. Defendant’s presentence investigation (PSI)

detailed felony convictions in 2012 for reckless discharge of a firearm, 2013 for identity theft, and

2015 for UUWF. The trial court sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of nine years’

imprisonment for UUWF and 14 months’ imprisonment for PCS.

¶ 15 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16 A. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶ 17 Defendant first contends that the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

of UUWF because the State failed to prove that he “had either exclusive control over the gun or

knowledge the gun was in the car.”

¶ 18 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the question is ‘whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Emphasis in original) People v.

McLaurin, 2020 IL 124563, ¶ 22 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). In a

bench trial, the trial court is responsible for determining the credibility of the witnesses, weighing

the evidence, resolving conflicts in the evidence, and drawing reasonable inferences therefrom.

People v. Siguenza-Brito, 235 Ill. 2d 213, 228 (2009). In weighing the evidence, the trial court is

not required to disregard the inferences that flow naturally from that evidence, nor is it required to

search for any possible explanation consistent with innocence and raise it to the level of reasonable

doubt. People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009). This court will not retry the defendant nor

substitute its judgment for that of the trier of fact on the weight of the evidence or credibility of

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witnesses. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. “We will not reverse a conviction unless the

evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or inconclusive that it creates a reasonable doubt of

defendant’s guilt.” People v. Collins, 214 Ill. 2d 206, 217 (2005).

¶ 19 To prove defendant guilty of UUWF as charged in this case, the State was required to show

that he knowingly possessed on or about his person any firearm after having been previously

convicted of the offense of UUWF. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(a) (West 2020). Defendant does not

challenge the proof of his prior conviction, to which he stipulated at trial. Thus, the only element

in dispute is whether defendant knowingly possessed a firearm.

¶ 20 Possession of a firearm may be either actual or constructive. People v. Jones, 2023 IL

127810, ¶ 30. Where, as here, the firearm was not found on defendant’s person, the State had to

prove he had constructive possession of the firearm. Id. Constructive possession exists where a

defendant had knowledge of the presence of the firearm and exercised immediate and exclusive

control over the location where the weapon was found. Id.

¶ 21 Whether defendant knowingly possessed the firearm and had control over its location are

questions for the trier of fact. Id. ¶ 27. Constructive possession may be inferred from the evidence

and is “ ‘often entirely circumstantial.’ ” People v. McCarter, 339 Ill. App. 3d 876, 879 (2003)

(quoting People v. McLaurin, 331 Ill. App. 3d 498, 502 (2002)). The trier of fact is entitled to rely

on reasonable inferences of knowledge and possession, absent other factors that might raise a

reasonable doubt of defendant’s guilt. People v. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17.

¶ 22 A defendant’s mere presence in a vehicle, without more, does not establish his knowledge

of a weapon therein. People v. Bailey, 333 Ill. App. 3d 888, 891 (2002). Knowledge may be

demonstrated by evidence of a defendant’s acts or conduct from which one can infer that he knew

the contraband existed in the place it was found. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17.

Knowledge may be inferred from several factors, including: “(1) the visibility of the weapon from

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defendant’s location in the vehicle, (2) the amount of time in which defendant had an opportunity

to observe the weapon, (3) gestures or movements made by defendant that would suggest an effort

to retrieve or conceal the weapon, and (4) the size of the weapon.” People v. Ingram, 389 Ill. App.

3d 897, 900 (2009).

¶ 23 Control is established when a defendant has the capability and the intent to maintain

dominion and control over the firearm. Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17. Proof that a

defendant had control over the location where the firearm was found gives rise to an inference of

his knowledge and possession of that weapon. Jones, 2023 IL 127810, ¶ 30. The defendant’s

proximity to the firearm is another factor courts have found relevant in determining whether the

defendant had constructive possession of a firearm. People v. Wise, 2021 IL 125392, ¶ 29. The

fact that other people may have also had access to the firearm does not diminish a defendant’s

control. People v. Givens, 237 Ill. 2d 311, 338 (2010).

¶ 24 Here, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for

the trial court to find that defendant had constructive possession of the firearm.

¶ 25 The evidence of defendant’s knowledge went beyond his mere presence in the car. First, it

is apparent from the body-worn camera that the handgun was visibly protruding from between the

driver’s seat and center console when Officer Pankey shined a flashlight into the vehicle. Second,

defendant had not just entered the car, but had been in the driver’s seat long enough to move the

car from its parked position at the gas station, run a red light, “almost hit another vehicle,” and

come to a stop on the curb. See Ingram, 389 Ill. App. 3d at 900 (“[D]efendant had not just entered

the car but had been in the car for a sufficient period of time to imply knowledge”). Finally, the

size of the gun made it easily identifiable as a handgun. See id.

¶ 26 While there was no evidence that defendant made furtive “gestures or movements,”

defendant’s other conduct supports the inference of knowledge. Id. It is well-settled that a fact-

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finder may consider evidence of flight “as tending to demonstrate a defendant’s consciousness of

guilt.” People v. Moore, 2015 IL App (1st) 1400051, ¶ 26; see also Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st)

102094, ¶ 18 (the defendant’s attempt to flee from a room suggested that he knew about the firearm

in the room). Although defendant put forth an alternative explanation for his flight—his driver’s

license had been revoked— it is for the court as trier of fact “to resolve any inconsistencies in the

testimony” and “the trier of fact is free to accept or reject as much or as little” of the testimony as

it pleases. People v. Logan, 352 Ill. App. 3d 73, 80-81 (2004).

¶ 27 As to control, the video from Pankey’s body-worn camera corroborates his testimony that

the handgun was found between “the front console and the front driver’s seat,” within easy reach

of defendant. See People v. O’Neal, 35 Ill. App. 3d 89, 91 (1975) (contraband may be considered

under the defendant's immediate control if it is within his easy reach). Defendant’s assertion that

the evidence did not show he had control over the firearm where he was not the registered owner

of the car is unavailing. “It is control of a vehicle where [contraband is] found, rather than

ownership, which is pertinent to proving exclusive control of the area.” People v. Robinson, 233

Ill. App. 3d 278, 287 (1992); see also People v. Janis, 56 Ill. App. 3d 160, 163 (1977) (facts

supporting a finding of control over the vehicle for purposes of constructive possession included

that defendant was in driver's seat, gave police reason to approach the vehicle, and claimed vehicle

was borrowed from another).

¶ 28 In addition, it is of no import that there was no physical evidence, such as fingerprints,

linking defendant to the firearm. It is well-established that the testimony of a single witness, if

positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction. People v. Gray, 2017 IL 120958, ¶ 36.

This court has repeatedly found that where a witness’s testimony is credible, the State is not

required to present additional physical evidence to link a defendant to a firearm. People v.

Campbell, 2019 IL App (1st) 161640, ¶ 33. Here, the trial court clearly found Pankey’s testimony

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credible and, therefore, it was not necessary for the State to present any physical or forensic

evidence linking defendant to the firearm.

¶ 29 Taken in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient to establish that

defendant had constructive possession of the weapon and sustain his conviction for UUWF.

¶ 30 B. Second Amendment

¶ 31 Defendant argues, for the first time on appeal, that the UUWF statute violates the second

amendment on its face and as applied to him in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision

in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111, 2122 (2022).

While a facial challenge alleges that the statute is unconstitutional under any set of facts, an as-

applied challenge alleges only that the statute violates the constitution as applied to the particular

facts and circumstances in the instant case. People v. Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 36. There is a

strong presumption that a statute is constitutional, and the burden is on the party challenging the

statute “to clearly establish any constitutional invalidity.” Allegis Realty Investors v. Novak, 223

Ill. 2d 318, 334 (2006). We review de novo whether a statute is constitutional. Id.

¶ 32 1. Facial Challenge

¶ 33 Defendant first argues that the unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon statute violates

the second amendment on its face. Specifically, defendant argues that the statute applies to any

felon “regardless of the nature of the previous felony conviction and regardless of whether the

present offense was committed in a dangerous or violent manner.” The State disagrees.

¶ 34 “A facial challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is the most difficult challenge to

mount.” People v. Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 25. Our supreme court has explained the review of a

facial challenge as follows:

“A party raising a facial challenge to a statute faces a particularly heavy burden. [Citation.]

A statute will be deemed facially unconstitutional only if there is no set of circumstances

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under which the statute would be valid. [Citation.] The particular facts related to the

challenging party are irrelevant. [Citation.] If it is reasonably possible to construe the

statute in a way that preserves its constitutionality, we must do so.” People v. Bochenek,

2021 IL 125889, ¶ 10.

Accordingly, “a facial challenge must fail if any situation exists where the statute could be validly

applied.” (Emphasis added) Davis, 2014 IL 115595, ¶ 25.

¶ 35 The second amendment provides: “A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security

of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. Const.,

amend. II. “Throughout the twentieth century the prevailing understanding of the second

amendment, at least in some way, related to militia service.” People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st)

200435, ¶ 66 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)). This changed in 2008 with

the United States Supreme Court’s decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).

Heller interpreted the second amendment as establishing an individual right and identified the

“core” of the second amendment as “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in

defense of hearth and home.” Id. at 635. Two years later, in McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561

U.S. 742 (2010), the Court extended the second amendment’s individual right to keep and bear

arms to the states under the fourteenth amendment. The Court reiterated, “We made it clear in

Heller that our holding did not cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as prohibitions

on the possession of firearms by felons *** We repeat those assurances here.” Id. at 786.

¶ 36 Following Heller and McDonald, “[e]very circuit court” in the country developed the

“same two-step test” for evaluating second amendment challenges to gun regulations. Atkinson v.

Garland, 70 F.4th 1018, 1020 (7th Cir. 2023) (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2126-

27); see also Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 2019), abrogated by Bruen, 597 U.S. ___,

142 S. Ct. 2111. “At the first step, the government could defend the challenged restriction by

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showing that the regulated activity fell outside the scope of the Second Amendment as originally

understood.” Atkinson, 70 F.4th at 1020. “If history proved inconclusive or suggested that the

regulated activity was not ‘categorically unprotected,’ ” then courts proceeded to the second step—

conducting a means-end analysis, “weighing the severity of the regulation against the ends the

government sought to achieve.” Id. (quoting Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 703 (7th Cir.

2011)).

¶ 37 Recently, however, in Bruen, the United States Supreme Court rejected the two-step

approach as “one-step too many” and condemned any means-end analysis in the second

amendment context. Bruen, 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2127, 2131. The Supreme Court

reviewed a challenge to a New York licensing regime that regulated gun possession and carry. Id.,

597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2122. Persons wishing to possess a firearm at home were required

to convince a licensing officer that they were of good moral character and did not have a history

of crime or mental disease and that no good cause for denial existed. Id., 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S.

Ct. at 2122-23. However, persons wishing to carry a firearm outside the home had to show “proper

cause” to be issued a license. Id., 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2123. This meant that people had

to “demonstrate a special need for self-protection distinguishable from that of the general

community.” Id., 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2123.

¶ 38 The Supreme Court explained that, under a new analytical framework for evaluating the

constitutionality of firearm regulations, courts first needed to determine whether “the Second

Amendment’s plain text covers an individual’s conduct.” Id., 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2129-

30. If it does, then “the government must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with this

Nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation.” Id., 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2126. “Only

then may a court conclude that the individual’s conduct falls outside the Second Amendment’s

unqualified command.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.). Id., 597 U.S. at ___, 142 S. Ct. at

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2130. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the proper cause requirement of New York’s carry

regulation violated the constitutional right to keep and bear arms, and struck down the licensing

scheme. Id., 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2122, 2156.

¶ 39 The Supreme Court reiterated that the second amendment does not grant an unrestricted

right to carry firearms by all people at all times, explaining:

“The Second Amendment guaranteed to ‘all Americans’ the right to bear commonly used

arms in public subject to certain reasonable, well-defined restrictions. Heller, 554 U.S. at

581. Those restrictions, for example, limited the intent for which one could carry arms, the

manner by which one carried arms, or the exceptional circumstances under which one

could not carry arms, such as before justices of the peace and other government officials.”

Id., 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2156.

¶ 40 In Heller, McDonald, and Bruen, the Supreme Court made clear that felons are not, and

have historically not been, categorically protected by the second amendment as “law-abiding

citizens.” Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2122. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that there

is “no set of circumstances under which the statute would be valid” (Bochenek, 2021 IL 125889,

¶ 10) and his facial challenge to the UUWF statute fails.

¶ 41 2. As-Applied Challenge

¶ 42 Defendant also argues that the UUWF statute is unconstitutional as applied to him because

he was “not under a felony sentence or on mandatory supervised release at the time he committed

the present offense” and was not “dangerous at the time of his arrest.” The State responds that

defendant has forfeited this challenge and, regardless, Bruen does not “cast doubt on Illinois’

prohibition against convicted felons possessing firearms.”

¶ 43 Ordinarily, a defendant must present an as-applied constitutional challenge to a statute at

trial in order to develop the record as it pertains to the specific facts and circumstances of his claim.

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Thompson, 2015 IL 118151, ¶ 37 (because “an as-applied constitutional challenge is dependent on

the particular circumstances and facts of the individual defendant” it is “paramount that the record

be sufficiently developed in terms of those facts and circumstances for purposes of appellate

review”).

¶ 44 Defendant concedes that he did not raise this issue in the trial court but urges review

because “there are no additional facts to be found relevant to the Second Amendment inquiry.”

The State disagrees, arguing that “defendant’s as-applied Second Amendment claim *** turns on

whether he is non-violent felon and on whether his criminal conduct in the instant case was not

dangerous – factual issues that were not litigated below.”

¶ 45 We find that in the present case, the defendant’s as-applied challenge is based on facts

already in the record, i.e., the defendant’s possession of the firearm and his prior predicate felony

convictions. See People v. Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 57. The evidence at trial

unequivocally showed that defendant’s constructive possession of the firearm was the basis for his

UUWF conviction, and it is undisputed that defendant’s prior felony conviction for UUWF served

as the predicate offense. Further, the PSI shows that defendant’s remaining criminal history

included a 2012 conviction for reckless discharge of a firearm and a 2013 conviction for identity

theft. Accordingly, we fail to see which additional facts must be adduced at an evidentiary hearing

that would preclude our review of the defendant’s constitutional challenge.

¶ 46 That said, we find that neither Bruen nor the Supreme Court’s previous second amendment

jurisprudence supports the defendant’s as-applied challenge to the UUWF statute. Since Bruen,

numerous courts from various jurisdictions have considered similar prohibitions against felons

possessing weapons and “the vast majority of cases have found that, as applied to nonviolent

felons, statutes prohibiting felons from possessing weapons are constitutional under Bruen.”

Brooks, 2023 IL App (1st) 200435, ¶ 79 (collecting cases).

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¶ 47 We recently addressed a defendant’s similar claim that the UUWF statute was

unconstitutional under the second amendment as applied to him based on Bruen. People v. Baker,

2023 IL App (1st) 220328, ¶¶ 33, 37. We rejected the defendant’s claim because, we found, “Bruen

just does not apply to him.” Id. ¶ 37. We explained:

“The Bruen Court could not have been more clear that its newly announced test applied

only to laws that attempted to regulate the gun possession of ‘law-abiding citizens,’ and

not felons like defendant. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. at 2156 (the holding was limited

to laws affecting ‘law-abiding citizens’). Just in case a reader missed the first time that the

court said it, the court repeated it 18 times. Bruen, 597 U.S. ___, 142 S. Ct. 2111 passim

(the six justices in the majority repeated the phrase ‘law-abiding’ 18 times in their majority

opinion and their concurrences). Further, Justice Kavanaugh in his concurrence quoted an

earlier case that stated: ‘ “[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on

longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons ***.” ’ Bruen, 597 U.S.

___, 142 S. Ct. at 2162 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring, joined by Robers, C.J.) (quoting

[District of Columbia v.] Heller, 554 U.S. [570,] 626-27 [(2008)]). Justice Kavanaugh’s

concurrence was joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and they both joined the six-justice

majority opinion. Based on the plain, clear, and repeated language of the justices in the

majority, defendant is simply outside the box drawn by Bruen.” Baker, 2023 IL App (1st)

220328, ¶ 37.

¶ 48 The same rationale applies to defendant’s as-applied challenge in this case. Defendant is

not a “law-abiding citizen” as emphasized by the Supreme Court in Bruen. Instead, defendant had

been convicted of three felony offenses prior to the instant crimes, including reckless discharge of

a firearm in 2012.

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¶ 49 Defendant suggests we should not rely on the “law-abiding citizen” language in Bruen as

indicative that the decision does not apply to felons. In support, defendant cites the Seventh

Circuit’s decision in Kanter v. Barr, 919 F.3d 437 (7th Cir. 2019), which was abrogated by the

Bruen decision. There, the court simply declined to “read too much into” the Supreme Court’s

cautionary statement in Heller “that nothing in its decision ‘should be taken to case doubt on the

longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons’ which it referred to as

‘presumptively lawful.’ ” Id. at 445 (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27, 627 n.26). However, the

Supreme Court’s language in Bruen supports the validity of this cautionary statement.

¶ 50 Before this appeal was fully briefed, defendant filed numerous motions to cite additional

cases as supplemental authority. We granted defendant’s motion to cite United States v. Daniels,

77 F.4th 337 (5th Cir. 2023), and ordered defendant’s motion to cite Range v. Attorney General,

69 F.4th 96 (3d Cir. 2023) (en banc), United States v. Jackson, 69 F.4th 495 (8th Cir.), United

States v. Bullock, ___ F.Supp.3d ___, 2023 WL 4232309, and People v. Thompson, 2023 IL (1st)

220429-U, taken with the case. In his reply brief, defendant cited Range, Jackson, Bullock, and

Thompson for support. Defendant’s motion to cite Range, Jackson, Bullock, and Thompson as

additional authority is therefore granted, but unavailing.

¶ 51 C. Illinois Constitution

¶ 52 Defendant further argues that even if section 24-1.1 is constitutional under the second

amendment, it violates article I, section 22 of the Illinois Constitution on its face and as it applies

to him because it provides “greater protection” than the second amendment. That provision

provides the following: “Subject only to the police power, the right of the individual citizen to

keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2. Our supreme court has

recognized that this section “does not mirror the second amendment to the Federal Constitution

(U.S. Const., amend. II); rather it adds the words ‘[s]ubject only to the police power,’ omits

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prefatory language concerning the importance of a militia, and substitutes ‘the individual citizen’

for ‘the people.’ ” Kalodimos v. Village of Morton Grove, 103 Ill. 2d 483, 491 (1984). Our supreme

court explained that the police power is “a limitation on the liberty the provision affords.” Id.

Therefore, “the possession and use of arms is subject to an extraordinary degree of control under

the police power” because “arms pose an extraordinary threat to the safety and good order of

society.” Id. at 491-92 (citing Report of the Bill of Rights Committee on the Preamble and Bill of

Rights, 6 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention (1970)).

¶ 53 More recently, we recognized that “[p]olice power includes the power to regulate certain

aspects of gun possession.” People v. Robinson, 2011 IL App (1st) 100078, ¶ 23 (citing McDonald,

561 U.S. 742 (2010)). As previously noted, the Supreme Court in McDonald reiterated its

statement in Heller that its holding did not cast doubt on longstanding regulatory measures such

as “prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons.” McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786.

Accordingly, we find section 24-1.1 is a proper exercise of police power, and therefore defendant

has not shown that the statute violates the Illinois Constitution on its face or as applied to him.

¶ 54 CONCLUSION

¶ 55 For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 56 Affirmed.

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