People v. Robinson

2022 IL App (2d) 210409-U

Appellate Court of Illinois·Decided September 7, 2022·No. 2-21-0409·Unpublished

Opinion

2022 IL App (2d) 210409-U No. 2-21-0409 Order filed September 7, 2022

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). ______________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

SECOND DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE ) Appeal from the Circuit Court OF ILLINOIS, ) of Winnebago County. ) Plaintiff-Appellee, ) ) v. ) No. 03 CF 3197 ) CHRISTOPHER ROBINSON, ) Honorable ) Joseph G. McGraw, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE SCHOSTOK delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Jorgensen and Birkett concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The defendant failed to establish cause and prejudice for not raising his claims in his initial postconviction petition.

¶2 The defendant, Christopher Robinson, appeals from the trial court’s dismissal of his

successive postconviction petition at the second stage under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act)

(725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)). On appeal, the defendant argues that the trial court erred

in dismissing his petition or, alternatively, that postconviction counsel rendered unreasonable

assistance. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND 2022 IL App (2d) 210409-U

¶4 On January 18, 2006, the defendant was charged in a superseding indictment with the first-

degree murder of 13-year-old Shontrelle Graham. The defendant was 18 years old at the time of

the offense. The defendant was alleged to have personally discharged a firearm four times into a

group of four or five teenage boys in retaliation for a prior gang related shooting. Following a jury

trial, the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 50 years’ imprisonment.

At sentencing, the trial court stated that it had considered the defendant’s lack of criminal history,

his transient and abused childhood, his learning disabilities, and his mental health issues.

¶5 On direct appeal, the defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial by improper comments

made by the prosecutor during rebuttal closing argument. This court affirmed the defendant’s

conviction and sentence. People v. Robinson, No. 2-07-0691 (Apr. 20, 2009) (unpublished order

under Supreme Court Rule 23).

¶6 The defendant later filed a postconviction petition, arguing that he was deprived of the

effective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to seek to suppress his statement to

the police based on his diminished mental capacity. The trial court dismissed the petition as

frivolous and patently without merit. We reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for

additional proceedings. People v. Robinson, 2012 IL App (2d) 100536-U. The defendant filed an

amended postconviction petition that included affidavits and medical records. The trial court

granted the State’s motion to dismiss the amended petition. This court reversed that dismissal and

remanded for a third-stage evidentiary hearing. People v. Robinson, No. 2-17-0561 (Dec. 18,

2019) (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23(c)(2)). This appeal does not stem from

the defendant’s initial postconviction petition as the third-stage hearing had not been held as of the

time of the filing of the notice of appeal in the present case.

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¶7 Rather, on June 24, 2020, after the initial postconviction petition was remanded for a third-

stage evidentiary hearing, postconviction counsel filed a motion for leave to file a successive

postconviction petition. In the successive petition, the defendant noted that he was 18 years old at

the time of the offense and argued that his 50-year sentence was a de facto life sentence that

violated the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. On August 27, 2020, the

trial court granted the motion for leave to file the successive petition, finding that it stated the gist

of a constitutional claim, and advanced the petition for second-stage proceedings.

¶8 On November 6, 2020, the State filed a motion to dismiss the defendant’s successive

postconviction petition. The State argued that, because the defendant was an adult at the time of

the offense, any claim that his sentence violated the eighth amendment based on Miller v. Alabama,

567 U.S. 460 (2012), was without merit. The State also argued that it was well established that

the defendant’s proportionate penalties argument was available pre-Miller and thus Miller could

not be used to establish cause for failing to raise the claim earlier. Thus, the defendant was barred

from raising his proportionate penalties argument in a successive postconviction petition.

¶9 On May 20, 2021, the defendant filed a response to the motion to dismiss, arguing that the

petition demonstrated that the defendant’s sentence violated the proportionate penalties provision

of the Illinois Constitution. The defendant also argued for the first time that, based on the

defendant’s young age, mental health problems, and learning disability, the principles in Miller

should be extended and the trial court should find that his sentence violated the eighth amendment

of the U.S. Constitution.

¶ 10 On June 28, 2021, the trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The trial court

found that the defendant’s petition was untimely, that his claims were barred by the doctrine of

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waiver, and that his sentence did not violate the proportionate penalties clause. The defendant

filed a timely notice of appeal from this order.

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 On appeal, the defendant first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his successive

postconviction petition. The Act allows a defendant to collaterally attack a prior conviction and

sentence where there was a substantial violation of the defendant’s state or federal constitutional

rights. People v. Gosier, 205 Ill. 2d 198, 202-03 (2001). The Act contemplates the filing of only

one postconviction petition. People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 456 (2002). As such, a

defendant filing a successive postconviction petition must first obtain leave of court. 725 ILCS

5/122-1(f) (West 2018).

¶ 13 To obtain leave to file a successive postconviction petition, a defendant must show “cause”

and “prejudice.” Id. A failure to establish either prong is fatal to the claim. People v. Smith, 2014

IL 115946, ¶ 37. “[C]ause” is “an objective factor that impeded [the defendant’s] ability to raise

a specific claim during his or her initial post-conviction proceedings.” 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f)(1)

(West 2018). “[P]rejudice” requires a showing that “the claim not raised during his or her initial

post-conviction proceedings so infected the trial that the resulting conviction or sentence violated

due process.” Id. § 122-1(f)(2).

¶ 14 The cause-and-prejudice test is higher than the standard applied at a first-stage review of a

petitioner’s initial petition. Smith, 2014 IL 115946, ¶ 35. To survive a first-stage review, a petition

needs only to allege a claim with an arguable basis in law or fact. People v. Tate, 2012 IL 112214,

¶ 9.

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