NOTICE 2026 IL App (5th) 241271-U NOTICE Decision filed 02/23/26. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-24-1271 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to not precedent except in the the filing of a Petition for IN THE limited circumstances allowed Rehearing or the disposition of under Rule 23(e)(1). the same. APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Montgomery County. ) v. ) No. 23-CF-123 ) DOUGLAS C. ROBERSON, ) Honorable ) Christopher W. Matoush, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE BOIE delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Moore and McHaney concurred in the judgment. *
ORDER
¶1 Held: We affirm this matter finding no plain error where the trial court properly determined the defendant’s current and prior driver’s license revocations were based upon a conviction of driving under the influence when imposing a felony sentence.
¶2 The defendant, Douglas C. Roberson, was convicted of one count of driving with a revoked
driver’s license after a bench trial. The defendant was sentenced to a term of three years’
incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC), with a six-month term of
mandatory supervised release (MSR). The defendant appeals his sentence, arguing that the
evidence at the sentencing hearing did not show that the defendant’s current and prior driver’s
* Justice Moore fully participated in the decision prior to his retirement. See Cirro Wrecking Co. v. Roppolo, 153 Ill. 2d 6 (1992). 1 license revocations had been based on driving under the influence (DUI) convictions, and
therefore, the trial court’s imposition of a felony sentence was plain error. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 We recite only those facts relevant to the dispositive issue on appeal. The defendant was
charged by information on April 10, 2023, with one count of driving while driver’s license is
suspended or revoked (DWLR), a Class 4 felony, in violation of section 6-303(d-3) of the Illinois
Vehicle Code (Code) (625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3) (West 2022)). The information specifically stated
that the defendant’s driver’s license or driving privilege had been previously revoked pursuant to
section 11-501 of the Code (625 ILCS 5/11-501 (West 2004)), this being “a fourth or subsequent
violation of Section 6-303” of the Code, and referenced the defendant’s previous Class 4 felony
conviction of DWLR in Madison County case No. 2005-CF-1843. The information further
indicated that the defendant was eligible for extended-term sentencing with a minimum of 180
days’ incarceration.
¶5 On July 26, 2023, the defendant filed a motion to terminate his public defender and proceed
pro se. The defendant also filed numerous other motions to dismiss throughout the pendency of
this matter. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to proceed pro se but denied all of the
remaining motions. The matter proceeded to a bench trial on September 3, 2024.
¶6 The State called Lieutenant Brian Reid of the Litchfield Police Department who testified
that he was on duty at around 3:33 p.m. on March 29, 2023. While patrolling, Lieutenant Reid
performed a license plate check of a maroon-colored vehicle as it drove past him southbound on
Highway 66 in Litchfield, Illinois. The plate check indicated that the registration was suspended
and Lieutenant Reid noted that the street was a route maintained by the State of Illinois. Lieutenant
2 Reid was able to stop the vehicle after a short period of time and made contact with the driver.
Lieutenant Reid identified the defendant in court as the individual he pulled over. Lieutenant Reid
stated that the defendant was in the driver’s seat of the vehicle and that no one else was in the car.
Lieutenant Reid asked the defendant for his driver’s license, and he responded that he was driving
“on some tickets.” The defendant provided Lieutenant Reid with a copy of the citations, one of
which indicated that the defendant had been driving while his license was revoked. Lieutenant
Reid asked the defendant if his license was still revoked and he admitted that he was driving with
a revoked license. Lieutenant Reid then ran a check of the defendant’s license by computer with
the Secretary of State, which confirmed that the defendant’s license was still revoked by the State
of Illinois. Lieutenant Reid issued a citation to the defendant, and the vehicle was towed from the
scene.
¶7 Lieutenant Reid further testified that People’s Exhibit No. 1 was a DVD with his body
camera footage from the vehicle stop. A portion of the footage was published, showing the
defendant sitting in the driver’s side of the vehicle and acknowledging that he believed that his
driver’s license was revoked. On cross-examination, the defendant asked Lieutenant Reid if he
remembered the defendant stating that he believed that he had the right to drive. Lieutenant Reid
responded that he did remember the defendant making that statement.
¶8 The State then offered a copy of the defendant’s driving record for admission into evidence
as People’s Exhibit No. 2. The defendant was asked if he objected to the exhibit, and he stated that
he did not. The trial court noted that the exhibit was a self-certified authenticated Illinois State
driver’s abstract from the Secretary of State and admitted the exhibit into evidence. In the interest
of brevity and for ease of reference, relevant portions of the abstract are set forth in detail in the
analysis below. After the abstract was admitted, the State rested.
3 ¶9 The defendant then testified on his own behalf. After repeatedly attempting to present
argument regarding his right to travel, the defendant testified that he was traveling because he
thought he “had the right to do that.”
¶ 10 The trial court found that the State had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while on a highway in the State of
Illinois. The trial court also found that, based upon the defendant’s own admission and People’s
Exhibit 2, the defendant’s driving privileges had been revoked at the time of the incident. The trial
court noted that the defendant’s revocation had been in place since at least November 23, 1991.
The defendant then interrupted the trial court stating that he believed his driver’s license was
actually revoked since 1986. The trial court set a sentencing hearing for November 12, 2024.
¶ 11 A presentence investigation report (PSI) was prepared for the sentencing hearing. The PSI
outlined the defendant’s criminal history, all of which occurred in the State of Illinois unless
otherwise noted, as follows: (1) a 1991 conviction for DUI involving alcohol; (2) a 1991
conviction for DWLR based on suspension; (3) a 1993 conviction for DUI involving alcohol; (4) a
1993 conviction for DWLR based on revocation; (5) a 1994 conviction for DWLR, noted to be a
subsequent conviction; (6) a 1994 conviction for DWLR, noted to be a subsequent conviction, and
also noted to be pursuant to revocation for DUI; (7) a 1996 conviction for DWLR, noted to be a
subsequent conviction; (8) a 1997 conviction for DWLR, noted to be a subsequent conviction;
(9) a 1998 conviction for aggravated DUI, noted to be a third or subsequent conviction; (10) a
1999 conviction for DWLR, noted to be a subsequent conviction and resulting in 18 months’
incarceration in IDOC; (11) a 1999 conviction for deceptive practices involving a bad check, noted
to be either over $150 or a second conviction; (12) 2002 convictions for DUI, noted to have
occurred while the defendant’s driving privileges were suspended or revoked, and for DWLR,
4 noted to be a subsequent conviction; (13) a 2005 conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia
from Montgomery County, Tennessee; (14) a 2005 conviction for battery causing bodily harm;
(15) a 2005 conviction for DWLR, noted to be a subsequent conviction; (16) a 2006 conviction
for DWLR, noted to be a subsequent conviction and noted to have involved statutory summary
suspension of the defendant’s driving privilege; and (17) a 2006 conviction for DWLR, noted to
be a subsequent conviction and noted to have involved statutory summary suspension of the
defendant’s driving privilege. The defendant was also noted in the PSI to have charges pending in
multiple counties.
¶ 12 At sentencing, the defendant was asked whether he disagreed with the criminal history
listed within the PSI, to which he replied, “No. It’s all true. Just blowed out of proportion.” The
trial court then heard the defendant’s statement regarding a motion to dismiss he filed on
November 7, 2024, arguing, inter alia, that he had an “automobile exception” to drive and
addressing the constitutionality of certain sections of the Code. The trial court denied the motion,
referencing its previous rulings on the various motions filed by the defendant. The trial court noted
that although the charging information indicated that the defendant was extended-term eligible,
the defendant was not, in fact, eligible. The State agreed with the trial court’s assessment. The trial
court noted that the PSI clearly indicated that the offense was the fourth or subsequent violation
of DWLR, and therefore, the defendant was subject to a minimum of 180 days in jail.
¶ 13 The trial court heard the State’s argument regarding the factors in aggravation, including
the defendant’s prior criminal history and the necessity to deter others, as well as the defendant,
from operating a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license. The State requested a term of three
years’ incarceration. The defendant stated that he “didn’t go out there looking for trouble” and
“figured [he] had the right to do it.” The defendant requested a term of probation and gave a brief
5 statement of allocution, stating, “I am not a bad guy. I mean, I don’t—I don’t think I deserve to go
back to prison. I thought I was doing the right thing. I thought I could beat you. I should have
known better, but I didn’t. I am sorry.”
¶ 14 The trial court considered the PSI; the evidence presented at the defendant’s bench trial;
the defendant’s argument and statement of allocution; all statutory and non-statutory factors in
mitigation and aggravation whether specifically mentioned or not; the history and character of the
defendant; and the seriousness of the offense. The trial court specifically noted the defendant’s
history of prior delinquency and that he had been previously sentenced to IDOC five or six times.
The trial court noted that the defendant had at least 11 prior DWLR convictions related to alcohol,
as well as 4 prior DUI convictions, the last being in 2002. The trial court further noted that the
defendant had a total of 12 prior felony convictions.
¶ 15 The trial court noted the necessity of deterrence and stated that the only factor in mitigation
to consider was that the defendant did not cause any serious physical harm; however, the
seriousness of the offense would counteract that mitigation. Further, the trial court stated that there
was nothing in the record to indicate that the defendant would comply with the terms of a period
of probation, that the offense was a result of circumstances unlikely to recur, or that it was unlikely
that the defendant would commit another crime. The trial court then sentenced the defendant to a
term of three years’ incarceration in IDOC with a six-month period of MSR. The trial court
admonished the defendant of his appeal rights. The defendant did not file a motion to reconsider
the sentence or any other posttrial motion after sentencing. The defendant filed a timely appeal.
¶ 16 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 17 The defendant appeals, arguing that the evidence at sentencing did not establish whether
the current and prior violations occurred while his driver’s license was suspended or revoked for
6 DUI, and, therefore, the evidence did not show that the defendant was eligible for the enhanced
Class 4 felony sentencing. Accordingly, the defendant requests this court to vacate the Class 4
felony sentence and remand for a new sentencing hearing.
¶ 18 The defendant acknowledges that he failed to raise this argument during the sentencing
hearing, as well as failing to raise the issue in a postsentence motion. “[A]ny allegation that the
State has not proved a defendant’s prior convictions with sufficient competent evidence must be
brought to the attention of the sentencing court, and a failure to do so results in a waiver of the
issue on appeal.” People v. Walton, 240 Ill. App. 3d 49, 59 (1992). Such failure operates as a
forfeiture of the right to raise the issue as grounds for reversal on review. People v. Thompson, 238
Ill. 2d 598, 611-12 (2010).
¶ 19 The defendant, however, requests this court to review the issue under the doctrine of plain
error which provides a narrow and limited exception to the forfeiture rule. People v. Averett, 237
Ill. 2d 1, 18 (2010). To warrant plain error review of a sentencing error, a defendant must show
that the error was clear and obvious and then demonstrate that “(1) the evidence at the sentencing
hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair
sentencing hearing.” People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). Whether there is plain error is
a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Williams, 2022 IL 126918, ¶ 48. Under
either prong of the plain error doctrine, it is the defendant who bears the burden of persuasion. Id.
The first step in plain error review is to determine whether any error occurred at all. Id.
¶ 20 The defendant argues that the State failed to produce evidence that the revocations of his
driver’s license at the time of the violations resulting in his DWLR convictions were pursuant to a
DUI. The defendant was charged with DWLR pursuant to section 6-303(d-3) of the Code which
states:
7 “Any person convicted of a fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, or ninth
violation of this Section is guilty of a Class 4 felony and must serve a minimum
term of imprisonment of 180 days, if:
(1) the current violation occurred when the person’s driver’s license
was suspended or revoked for a violation of Section 11-401 or 11-501 of
this Code, a similar out-of-state offense, a similar provision of a local
ordinance, or a statutory summary suspension or revocation under Section
11-501.1 of this Code; and
(2) the prior convictions under this Section occurred while the
person’s driver’s license was suspended or revoked for a violation of
Section 11-401 or 11-501 of this Code, a similar out-of-state offense, a
similar provision of a local ordinance, or a statutory summary suspension
or revocation under Section 11-501.1 of this Code ***.” (Emphases added.)
625 ILCS 5/6-303(d-3) (West 2022).
The prosecution must prove the defendant’s eligibility for an enhanced sentence by a
preponderance of the evidence. People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 53, 71 (1995). For any prosecution
under section 6-303 of the Code, “a certified copy of the driving abstract of the defendant shall be
admitted as proof of any prior conviction.” 625 ILCS 5/6-303(f) (West 2022). Further, “[a] court
properly may consider a [PSI] to determine a defendant’s criminal record; such a report is a reliable
source for the purpose of inquiring into a defendant’s criminal history.” (Internal quotation marks
omitted.) People v. Owens, 2016 IL App (4th) 140090, ¶ 42.
¶ 21 The defendant argues that the only evidence in the record regarding revocation of his
driver’s license is the abstract from the Secretary of State, People’s Exhibit No. 2; that the abstract
8 is a computer printout with abbreviations and codes; that no witness testified as to how to interpret
the abstract; that the abstract does not state the basis for his current driver’s license revocation;
and, that the last entry in the abstract indicates that his license was revoked for not having a valid
driver’s license. He notes that a driver’s license may be subject to multiple revocations and
suspensions at once, and that no revocation or suspension negates, invalidates, or lessens the effect
of any others; he then argues, however, that only the basis for his most recent revocation can
establish the basis for his DWLR conviction in this case. He argues that the trial court imposed a
felony sentence without proof of eligibility, and that this was an egregious error denying him a fair
hearing. The defendant argues that a new sentencing hearing is required in order for the trial court
to determine the bases for his current and prior revocations, and thus, whether he is eligible for a
Class 4 felony sentence.
¶ 22 The State responds that, while the defendant complains that no expert witness testified
regarding interpretation of the abstract, he does not state that the information in the abstract is
incorrect. The State notes that the abstract is prima facie evidence of its contents, and there is no
evidence that the trial court did not understand the abstract. The State then argues that the abstract
indicates that the defendant’s latest driver’s license revocation was for DUI, and that there is no
indication in the abstract that the driver’s license was ever reinstated. Therefore, the State argues
the defendant cannot satisfy a plain error analysis because he cannot establish that the trial court
erred when it sentenced him to a Class 4 felony sentence according to his driving history.
¶ 23 In his reply brief, the defendant clarifies his argument, stating that he does not challenge
the trial court’s ability to consider the abstract, nor does he challenge the accuracy of the abstract;
rather, he argues that the abstract does not contain the information necessary to determine which
revocations and suspensions in the abstract were in effect during the relevant time periods, which
9 would be the dates of the violations resulting in his four or more DWLR convictions. He notes that
his 2002 revocation was not the most recent revocation, and that the abstract does not indicate
when his driver’s license was last revoked, does not state which conviction formed the basis for
his last revocation, and does not indicate that at the time of his relevant violations, the underlying
revocation was for a reason set forth at section 6-303(d-3).
¶ 24 A driver’s license may be subject to multiple revocations, multiple suspensions, or any
combination of both simultaneously; no revocation or suspension serves to negate, invalidate,
cancel, postpone, or in any way lessen the effect of any other revocation or suspension entered
prior or subsequent to any other revocation or suspension. 625 ILCS 5/6-303(a-10) (West 2022).
The defendant acknowledges that multiple revocations of a driver’s license can be imposed on a
driver at the same time; however, the defendant goes on to argue that only the last or most recent
revocation can form the basis for a DWLR conviction, ultimately contending that only the most
recent DWLR in his driving abstract could form the basis for the DWLR conviction in this case.
¶ 25 The defendant relies on People v. Brown, 2023 IL App (3d) 210460, to argue that, where
neither the PSI nor the driving abstract indicates the most recent basis for a defendant’s license
revocation, and where enhanced sentencing requires proof that the current and prior violations of
DWLR occurred during a period where the driver’s license was revoked for a qualifying reason, a
reviewing court must remand for a new sentencing hearing to determine the basis for the most
recent revocation. We disagree with this reading of Brown.
¶ 26 In Brown, the defendant argued that the State presented no evidence to demonstrate that
his underlying revocation was due to a DUI conviction, or that his prior DWLR convictions
occurred when his driver’s license was suspended or revoked due to DUI. Id. ¶ 96. The only
exhibits in the case regarding the defendant’s driving history were (1) a one-sentence driving
10 abstract that stated only that revocation was in effect on the relevant date, and (2) a PSI listing 44
prior convictions for DWLR that did not state the bases for the revocations on which those
convictions were based. Id. ¶ 100. The defendant in Brown argued that, according to the PSI, his
only DUI conviction was in 2003, he was convicted of DWLR pursuant to revocation in 2003 and
2004, and then he was later convicted of DWLR pursuant to suspension in 2005 and 2007. Id.
¶ 102. He further argued that the PSI indicated that his driver’s license had been reinstated between
the 2004 and 2005 convictions, because if it had not been, then the 2005 and 2007 DWLR
convictions would have been pursuant to revocation rather than suspension. Id. He argued that a
revoked driver’s license could not have been suspended, and therefore, the PSI was evidence that
the driver’s license had been reinstated, and that the 2005 and 2007 convictions could not be
demonstrated by the PSI to be based on the 2003 DUI revocation. Id.
¶ 27 The Brown court reiterated that the State must prove a defendant’s eligibility for an
enhanced sentence by a preponderance of the evidence, noted that neither the PSI nor the abstract
indicated the basis for the most recent driver’s license revocation, and stated that the trial court
had not found by a preponderance of the evidence that the last revocation was based on a DUI. Id.
¶ 100. The court remanded the case to allow the parties to supplement the record, and for the trial
court to determine the defendant’s DWLR conviction classification. Id. ¶ 103.
¶ 28 In this matter, the defendant argues that, pursuant to Brown, only the last revocation in time
is relevant to determine the basis for a DWLR conviction. This argument misapprehends the
holding in Brown, where the PSI contained evidence that the license may have been reinstated at
some point, thereby rendering the most recent revocation relevant to the specific facts of that case.
Id. ¶ 102. The defendant’s suggested reading of Brown directly contradicts the portion of section
6-303(a-10) that states that no subsequent revocation lessens the effect of a prior revocation. 625
11 ILCS 5/6-303(a-10) (West 2022). One of the effects of revocation is to establish a basis for a
DWLR violation under section 6-303; a holding that only the most recent revocation is relevant to
determine the basis for a DWLR violation would lessen the effect of any other revocations also in
force at the time of the violation, directly controverting section 6-303(a-10). Id. § 6-303. Nothing
in Brown suggests that was the reviewing court’s intent. We read Brown to hold that when there
is ambiguity in the evidence as to which revocations were in effect at the time of a DWLR
violation, the case must be remanded for determination of enhanced sentencing eligibility.
¶ 29 We find no such ambiguity in this case. Unlike in Brown, the abstract here did not simply
state that revocation was in effect on the relevant date of the violation. The abstract in this case
was a six-page document outlining the defendant’s driving history, including the bases for his
revocations, both corroborating the PSI and providing additional information. The defendant,
pursuant to his theory that only the basis for the most recent revocation is relevant, asks this court
to consider the last two entries in the abstract; the first indicating a conviction on July 16, 2007,
noted to be for DWLR, and the second indicating an extension on July 25, 2007, noted to be an
extension of revocation. The defendant contends that these entries do not indicate that the latest
revocation was for DUI, but rather for not having a valid driver’s license. We disagree.
¶ 30 In order to determine the basis for revocation of the defendant’s driver’s license, of which
there could be more than one, relevant to the defendant’s DWLR conviction in this case, the
abstract must be considered in its entirety, and not just the small portion cited by the defendant.
While our decision focuses on events reflected in the abstract that occurred on and subsequent to
June 16, 2002, we note that the abstract indicates that prior to June 16, 2002, the defendant’s
driver’s license was either suspended, revoked, or the revocation was extended, on at least 12
occasions since 1986; he was convicted of DUI on 2 separate occasions; and, he was convicted of
12 DWLR on at least 4 occasions, suggesting that there were likely multiple revocations and
suspensions in effect at the time of the DWLR violation in this case. As resolution of this matter
does not require analysis of the revocations and suspensions in place prior to June 16, 2002, we
decline to undertake such an analysis.
¶ 31 Dispositive to the issue currently before this court, the abstract clearly indicates that the
defendant was arrested on June 16, 2002, due to his involvement in an alcohol and/or drug related
accident wherein he was the “DRIVER IN PI OR FATAL CRASH REFUSED OR FAILED
TESTS REQ IN 11-501.6.” Consequently, his driving privileges were automatically suspended for
12 months from August 2, 2002, through August 2, 2003. Further, it is easily discernable from the
abstract that on August 29, 2002, the defendant was convicted in Montgomery County, Illinois, of
“DUI WHILE REV/SUSP FOR DUI/RECK HOM/LEAVE SCENE” pursuant to the June 16,
2002, incident and, as a consequence, his driver’s license was again revoked from September 13,
2002, through September 13, 2012, noted to be for his “OPERATING A MOTOR VEHICLE
WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE.” Also on August 29, 2002, in the same case and relating to
the June 16, 2002, incident, the defendant was convicted of “DRIVING WHILE LICENSE OR
PERMIT REVOKED/SUSPENDED” and, as a result, the previous revocation of his driver’s
license was extended from September 4, 2002, through September 13, 2012, the eligible
reinstatement date for the DUI revocation. At least as of September 13, 2002, then, until at least
September 13, 2012, the abstract indicates that the defendant’s driver’s license was revoked for
DUI.
¶ 32 After the defendant’s driver’s license was revoked on September 13, 2002, the abstract
indicates that the defendant was convicted of DWLR on two separate occasions in 2006 and on
one occasion in 2007. After each of these convictions, the abstract specifically states that the
13 defendant’s revocation was extended until the September 13, 2012, date, again, the same eligible
reinstatement date as the DUI revocation. The six entries relating to these three convictions and
corresponding extensions are the last six entries in the abstract, and they are the only entries that
appear after the entries relating to the June 16, 2002, incident.
¶ 33 At the time of the three subsequent DWLR violations, as well as each of the three
corresponding revocation extensions in 2006 and 2007, the defendant’s license was clearly
revoked until September 13, 2012, for a DUI conviction. Once revoked, a defendant’s driving
privileges are not automatically restored without first making an application and meeting any
additional requirements from the Secretary of State. People v. Turner, 64 Ill. 2d 183, 186 (1976).
The abstract indicates that at no point did the defendant take the required steps to reinstate his
driving privileges after his 10-year revocation period ran on September 13, 2012, and states that
the defendant’s “REVOCATION WAS IN EFFECT ON 03-29-2023.”
¶ 34 In this case, the driving abstract unambiguously stated that the basis for the defendant’s
2002 revocation was DUI, and no subsequent entries in the abstract create any ambiguity as to the
status of that revocation; the subsequent entries are all noted to be extensions of already existing
revocations. Because nothing about those extensions of revocation lessens the effect of the
September 13, 2002, DUI revocation, and there is no evidence or claim that the defendant’s
driver’s license was ever reinstated, there simply is no ambiguity here. It is undisputed that the
revocation which began on September 13, 2002, was in effect on March 29, 2023. The defendant
makes no argument that his license was reinstated at any point and makes no argument that the
information contained in the abstract is incorrect; he only argues that the reason for his suspension
cannot be discerned from the abstract. As set forth above, the basis for the revocations can be
easily discerned from the abstract. We also note that the defendant did not object at trial to the
14 admission of the abstract, and at sentencing he stated that everything in the PSI was correct. He
also stated at trial that he believed that his driver’s license had been revoked since 1986, and
throughout the case filed motions and argued in court that he was allowed to drive even without a
driver’s license, essentially pursuant to his general right to travel.
¶ 35 Given the totality of the abstract and PSI evidence, it was reasonable for the trial court to
infer that the defendant’s driver’s license continued to be revoked for DUI at the time of the instant
offense, and that it had been revoked for DUI at the time of the three prior offenses. See Owens,
2016 IL App (4th) 140090, ¶ 43 (where it was undisputed that a defendant’s driver’s license
remained revoked at the time of the offense, it was reasonable for the trial court to infer that the
driver’s license continued to be revoked for DUI).
¶ 36 We do not find error where the trial court properly considered the abstract and PSI in
sentencing the defendant to the enhanced Class 4 felony term of three years’ incarceration. As
such, we find that no plain error occurred, and the issue remains forfeited.
¶ 37 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 38 We find no plain error where the trial court properly sentenced the defendant to an
enhanced Class 4 felony. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court regarding the
defendant’s sentence is affirmed.
¶ 39 Affirmed.