FIRST DIVISION April 21, 2008
No. 1-05-0955
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 84 C 2387 ) ANTHONY RICHARDSON, ) The Honorable ) Clayton J. Crane, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding .
JUSTICE GARCIA delivered the opinion of the court.
The defendant, Anthony Richardson, appeals the trial court's dismissal of his successive
postconviction petition. Richardson argues his appointed postconviction counsel provided
unreasonable assistance by failing to amend his petition to include allegations he was brutalized
by Detective Robert Dwyer and other detectives working under the command of Jon Burge at
Area 2 Violent Crimes, and he was denied the effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
Richardson also contends appointed counsel failed to satisfy the requirements of Illinois Supreme
Court Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)).
On August 13, 2007, this court entered an order pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23 (166
Ill. 2d R. 23) in which we affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Richardson subsequently filed No. 1-05-0955
a petition for rehearing pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 367 (210 Ill. 2d R. 367). We asked the
State to respond, and Richardson replied. We granted the petition for rehearing and granted oral
argument. After reconsidering the matter in light of the arguments on rehearing, we again affirm
the judgment of the trial court.
BACKGROUND
At approximately 7 a.m. on February 20, 1984, the power went
out in 20-year-old Angela Crum's apartment. When she went to the
basement in an apparent attempt to check the fuse box, she was
stabbed twice in the heart. Crum died shortly thereafter.
Richardson, who lived in Crum's apartment building, was
arrested on the evening of the murder and was taken to Area 2
headquarters, where he was questioned by detectives. At 8:20
a.m. on February 21, 1984, Richardson gave an incriminating
statement before a court reporter in the presence of an assistant
State's Attorney and Chicago police detective Robert Dwyer.
According to the statement, Richardson went to the basement at
6:50 a.m. with a flashlight and a knife. He tampered with Crum's
fuse box in an attempt to "lure" her to the basement because he
"wanted to screw around with her," that is, to have sex with her.
When Crum entered the basement, Richardson "jumped out of the
dark" and grabbed her. Richardson told Crum he did not want to
hurt her, he just wanted to "fool around a little." When Crum
resisted, Richardson "made an accident" and stabbed her.
2 No. 1-05-0955
Richardson's statement also detailed how he asked the building's
custodian and his neighbor for help, and how he took the knife, a
scarf Crum had been wearing, and a flashlight Crum had been
carrying, to Bob's apartment. The statement also described how
he retrieved an animal-print blanket from his own apartment,
wrapped Crum in it, and attempted without success to carry Crum
out of the basement.
Prior to trial, Richardson sought to suppress his statement.
Richardson testified at the hearing that the investigating
detectives repeatedly punched him in the stomach, handcuffed him
to a ring in the wall of an interview room, and kept a plastic
bag over his head until he lost consciousness. Richardson,
however, denied ever making a statement admitting to Crum's
murder. The trial court denied Richardson's motion, accepting
the testimony from the investigating officers, including
Detectives Dwyer and Grunhard, that no abuse occurred.
At trial, the State advanced the theory that Richardson
tampered with the electricity to Crum's apartment in order to
lure her to the basement, where he was waiting with a knife to
rape her. When Crum resisted, Richardson killed her. The State
presented Richardson's statement and corroborative incriminating
evidence, including eyewitness testimony from the building's
custodian and testimony from a neighbor who identified the
3 No. 1-05-0955
blanket in which Crum's body was found as belonging to
Richardson. The defense conceded Richardson stabbed Crum, but
argued the evidence would show the stabbing was an accident.
After a bench trial, the trial court found Richardson guilty
of three counts of murder, attempted rape, and unlawful
restraint. The court sentenced Richardson to an 80-year
extended-term sentence based on the court's finding that the
murder was exceptionally brutal and heinous, and to concurrent
15-year and 3-year sentences for the attempted rape and unlawful
restraint convictions.
On direct appeal, Richardson argued the trial court erred in
imposing an 80-year extended-term sentence because the offenses
were not accompanied by exceptionally brutal conduct, and two of
his three murder convictions must be vacated. This court vacated
two of the murder convictions and affirmed Richardson's felony
murder conviction and remaining convictions and sentences.
People v. Richardson, No. 1-85-1409 (1987) (unpublished order
pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 23).
On January 6, 1992, Richardson filed a pro se postconviction
petition in which he alleged (1) his trial counsel was
ineffective for pursuing the defense theory that Crum's death was
accidental and for failing to object when not all witnesses
material to Richardson's motion to suppress statements were
4 No. 1-05-0955
called to testify, and (2) the trial court erred in finding his
warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause. In making
his material-witness contention, Richardson included an
allegation that his confession had been physically coerced. In
his petition, Richardson also alleged appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise trial counsel's ineffectiveness.
The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. This court
subsequently allowed appellate counsel's motion to withdraw from
the case pursuant to Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 95 L.
Ed. 2d 539, 107 S. Ct. 1990 (1987), and affirmed the dismissal.
People v. Richardson, 1-92-0830 (1993) (unpublished order
On January 16, 2003, Richardson filed a successive
postconviction petition1 in which he argued his 80-year extended-
term sentence violated the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000). The trial
court appointed counsel to represent Richardson. Appointed
counsel filed an amended petition on June 16, 2004, in which she
1 The petition's heading indicated it was filed pursuant to
section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-1401
(West 2004)). As in People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 41, 862
N.E.2d 977 (2007), the trial court treated the petition as a
postconviction petition.
5 No. 1-05-0955
argued Richardson's sentence violated Apprendi for reasons
unaddressed by the supreme court in People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.
2d 426, 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003), which held that Apprendi did not
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. Appointed
counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(c)
(134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)) on September 23, 2004, in which she
stated (1) she consulted with Richardson by letters, (2) she
obtained and examined the report of proceedings of Richardson's
trial, and (3) she prepared a supplemental petition for
postconviction relief "augmenting [Richardson's] previously filed
Petition for Post Conviction Relief." Appointed counsel also
stated in the certificate that the supplemental petition
"adequately complements [Richardson's] claims of deprivation of
his constitutional rights."
The trial court subsequently granted the State's motion to
dismiss Richardson's petition. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Richardson contends the record fails to affirmatively show
appointed postconviction counsel satisfied her duties under
Supreme Court Rule 651(c) where she failed to amend Richardson's
pro se petition to include two claims: (1) his due process rights
were violated when he was brutalized by detectives at Area 2; and
(2) his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
6 No. 1-05-0955
challenge his conviction of attempted rape as a lesser included
offense of murder and his conviction of unlawful restraint as a
lesser included offense of attempted rape.
In noncapital criminal cases, the Post-Conviction Hearing
Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2004)) establishes a three-
step procedure for a defendant to challenge a conviction based on
a substantial denial of constitutional rights. People v.
Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 471, 861 N.E.2d 999 (2006). If the
circuit court determines a pro se petition states the gist of a
constitutional claim, the petition moves to the second stage,
where counsel may be appointed if the petitioner so requests and
is indigent. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(b) (West 2004); 725 ILCS 5/122-4
(West 2004); People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418, 675 N.E.2d
102 (1996). At the second stage, if a substantial showing of a
constitutional violation is made, a third-stage evidentiary
hearing is ordered. 725 ILCS 5/122-6 (West 2004). Dismissal of
a postconviction petition without an evidentiary hearing is
reviewed de novo. People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 389, 701
N.E.2d 1063 (1998).
Regarding the appointment of counsel at the second stage of
proceedings, our supreme court has explained:
"There is no constitutional right to the
assistance of counsel in postconviction
7 No. 1-05-0955
proceedings; the right to counsel is wholly
statutory (see 725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West 2000)),
and petitioners are only entitled to the
level of assistance provided for by the Post-
Conviction Hearing Act (Act) [citations].
The Act provides for a reasonable level of
assistance. [Citation.] To ensure that
postconviction petitioners receive this level
of assistance, Rule 651(c) imposes specific
duties on postconviction counsel." People v.
Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 42, 862 N.E.2d 977
(2007).
In his rehearing petition, Richardson argues "[h]ad post-
conviction counsel satisfied her duties under Rule 651(c), she
would have presented newly available evidence to support Mr.
Richardson's consistent claim that his confession was coerced by
Area 2 detectives acting under Jon Burge, including Detective
Robert Dwyer *** and argued that his appellate counsel failed to
contest his improper lesser-included sentences." Richardson
points to new evidence demonstrating instances of police torture
at Area 2 headquarters and points out he was improperly convicted
of lesser included offenses, including the underlying felony of
felony murder. See People v. Johnson, 223 Ill. App. 3d 169, 170,
8 No. 1-05-0955
584 N.E.2d 515 (1991) (improper to convict on felony murder and
underlying felony); People v. Davis, 156 Ill. 2d 149, 160, 619
N.E.2 d 750 (1993) (only supreme court has authority to vacate
voidable lesser offenses "in exercise of [its] supervisory
authority").
We agree with Richardson that the resolution of this case
turns on counsel's "duties under Rule 651(c)." Rule 651(c)
imposes on counsel the duties that she have
"consulted with petitioner either by mail or
in person to ascertain his contentions of
deprivation of constitutional rights, has
examined the record of the proceedings at the
trial, and made any amendments to the
petitions filed pro se that are necessary for
an adequate presentation of petitioner's
contentions." 134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c).
Rule 651(c) provides that a showing of such compliance with the
enumerated duties be made in the record filed with the circuit
court or by "certificate of petitioner's attorney," confirming
she has consulted, examined and amended as required by the rule.
"[T]he purpose of Rule 651(c) is to ensure that counsel shapes
the petitioner's claims into proper legal form and presents those
claims to the court." People v. Perkins, No. 103693, slip op. at
9 No. 1-05-0955
7 (November 29, 2007). Richardson contends counsel's
certificate is "incomplete and therefore insufficient to create a
presumption of compliance with Rule 651(c)." According to
Richardson, "[p]ost-conviction counsel simply certified that she
'consulted with the petitioner by letters,' " but did not certify
that she "consulted with [Richardson] in order 'to ascertain his
contentions of deprivation of constitutional right,' " as
required by Rule 651(c). Richardson also argues that although
postconviction counsel certified she prepared a supplemental
petition that "adequately complements petitioner's claims of
deprivation of his constitutional rights," she did not certify
she made "any amendments *** necessary for an adequate
presentation" of Richardson's claims, as required by Rule 651(c).
In effect, Richardson argues that had his counsel below
adequately reviewed the record, she would have discovered his
"consistent claim" of being brutalized based on the suppression
hearing challenging the investigating detectives' claim that he
confessed to the murder, and his improper convictions of lesser
included offenses. Thus, in satisfying her duty to "amend" under
Rule 651(c), counsel would have added the brutality and improper
convictions claims to his pro se petition.
We examine our case law to determine whether there is any
authority for the legal obligation Richardson seeks to impose on
10 No. 1-05-0955
postconviction counsel below.
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act recognizes that "most
postconviction petitions [are] filed by pro se prisoners who
lack[] the assistance of counsel in framing their petitions."
Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 46. Appointment of counsel is provided
for those that satisfy the "gist" requirement "to ensure that the
complaints of a prisoner are adequately presented." Suarez, 224
Ill. 2d at 46.
The pronouncements of the supreme court have made clear,
however, it is the "complaints of a prisoner" that frame
counsel's duties under Rule 651(c). As recently reaffirmed by
our supreme court, " '[p]ost-conviction counsel is only required
to investigate and properly present the petitioner's claims.' "
(Emphasis in original.) Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 475, quoting
Davis, 156 Ill. 2d at 164. "While postconviction counsel may
conduct a broader examination of the record [than the issues
raised in the pro se petition might require] (Davis, 156 Ill. 2d
at 164), and may raise additional issues if he or she so chooses,
there is no obligation to do so." (Emphasis in original.)
Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 476. In the circumstance where no
certificate was filed, our supreme court stated much the same.
"'The statute cannot perform its function unless the attorney
appointed to represent an indigent petitioner ascertains the
11 No. 1-05-0955
basis of his complaints, shapes those complaints into appropriate
legal form and presents them to the court.'" (Emphasis added.)
Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 46, quoting People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill.
2d 278, 285, 235 N.E.2d 566 (1968).
Richardson contends the supreme court's language in
Pendleton and Suarez does not dictate the outcome here because
our analysis must focus on the inadequacy of the certificate of
compliance filed by postconviction counsel.
In support of his contention that the certificate here fell
short, Richardson relies most heavily on People v. Bashaw, 361
Ill. App. 3d 963, 838 N.E.2d 972 (2005). In Bashaw, a decision
from the Second District, appointed postconviction counsel's Rule
651(c) certificate stated:
" '2. *** I have consulted by mail with
[defendant] concerning the allegations in
this post-conviction petition.
3. *** I have examined the record of
proceedings on appeal as to the issues being
raised by the defendant.
4. *** the [sic] petitioner has
indicated that he wishes to rely on his
original post conviction petition.' "
(Emphasis in original.) Bashaw, 361 Ill.
12 No. 1-05-0955
App. 3d at 967.
The reviewing court concluded appointed counsel's
certificate fell short in two ways. First, counsel failed to
certify she reviewed the record of the proceedings at trial, as
opposed to on appeal. Second, counsel failed to certify she
"made 'any amendments to the petitions filed pro se that are
necessary for an adequate presentation of petitioner's
contentions.' " Bashaw, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 969, quoting 134
Ill. 2d R. 651(c). The court found counsel's deference to the
defendant's decision to " 'rely on his original postconviction
petition' " was not an "appropriate substitute" for counsel's
duty to make any necessary amendments to the pro se petition
" 'for an adequate presentation of petitioner's contentions.'
[Citation.]" Bashaw, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 969. Further, the
court concluded the record of the postconviction proceedings
"cast serious doubt" on the notion that appointed postconviction
counsel reviewed the trial proceedings. Bashaw, 361 Ill. App. 3d
at 968. Consequently, the court reversed the dismissal of the
defendant's petition and remanded for Rule 651(c) compliance.
Bashaw, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 970.
We read Bashaw to hold that either of the two shortfalls
regarding the certificate would suffice to warrant reversal based
on noncompliance with Rule 651(c). While we may differ with the
13 No. 1-05-0955
Bashaw court as to its reading of the certificate there as
falling short of a showing "that counsel had in fact reviewed the
trial proceedings" because of postconviction counsel's "remarks
during the proceedings below." Bashaw, 361 Ill. App. 3d at 967-
68. We do not disagree that postconviction counsel improperly
acceded to the petitioner's "wishes to rely on his original
postconviction petition." Such deference violates the spirit of
the Act and our supreme court's admonishment in Suarez, 224 Ill.
2d at 46, quoting People v. Slaughter, 39 Ill. 2d at 285, " 'The
statute cannot perform its function unless the attorney appointed
to represent an indigent petitioner ascertains the basis of his
complaints, shapes those complaints into appropriate legal form
and presents them to the court.' " Consistent with Bashaw, we
examine the record here to determine whether postconviction
counsel complied with her Rule 651(c) duties to ascertain the
basis of Richardson's complaints, shape those complaints into
legal form and present them to the circuit court.
There is no dispute that even a most liberal reading of the
complaints in Richardson's instant pro se petition does not make
out a claim other than one based on Apprendi. There is also no
question that the defendant's first pro se petition, filed in
1992, set out "allegations that he was brutalized" by an
arresting detective. But Richardson did not reassert that
14 No. 1-05-0955
allegation in his successive pro se petition at issue in this
case. Nor does Richardson contend otherwise. Rather, his
contention boils down to the state of the record that, also
without question, supports the two claims Richardson contends
should have been amended to his pro se petition.
In our original Rule 23 decision we affirmed based on the
authority of Pendleton. In his petition for rehearing,
Richardson contends our reliance on Pendleton was mistaken.
"Pendleton did not involve post-conviction counsel's failure to
satisfy Rule 651(c)'s consultation requirement or to review the
trial record, but addressed only post-conviction counsel's
failure to raise a claim that was not included in the pro se
petition." We must reject Richardson's attempt to limit the
supreme court's explicit language in Pendleton regarding the
specific duties required under Rule 651(c). "Rule 651(c) only
requires postconviction counsel to examine as much of the record
'as is necessary to adequately present and support those
constitutional claims raised by the petitioner.' " (Emphasis
added.) Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 475, quoting People v. Davis,
156 Ill. 2d at 164, 619 N.E.2d 750 (2005). While postconviction
counsel below was free to reassert claims Richardson contends she
should have added, albeit on the hope that the State would not
raise a res judicata defense as the claims were previously
15 No. 1-05-0955
rejected by this court, we are compelled to conclude
postconviction counsel was under "no obligation to do so."
Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 476.
We also find no support for Richardson's contrary reading of
Pendleton in Suarez, where the court once again discussed
counsel's duties under Rule 651(c). In Suarez, the court made
clear that when no Rule 651(c) certificate of compliance is
filed, a clear and affirmative showing of compliance on the
record must be present. As the supreme court observed, the
vindication of constitutional rights of prisoners depends heavily
on the involvement of counsel. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 46, citing
People v. Jones, 43 Ill. 2d 160, 251 N.E.2d 218 (1969) (failure
to consult is a failure to discharge an elementary responsibility
of representation), and People v. Garrison, 43 Ill. 2d 121, 251
N.E.2d 200 (1969) (failure to confer does not meet even a minimal
professional standard). Compliance with the specific duties of
Rule 651(c) cannot turn on the merit of the claims contained in
the pro se petition, itself, because counsel is duty-bound to
examine the "complaints" or allegations in the pro se petition
for a gist of a constitutional deprivation that may go beyond the
express claims that the petitioner raises. While an Apprendi-
type complaint may be expressly contained in a pro se petition,
as it apparently was in Suarez, the professional responsibility
16 No. 1-05-0955
of postconviction counsel is to determine whether the petitioner
complains of other constitutional violations as well. Finally,
the Suarez court observed "fundamental fairness may require the
review of waived issues." Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d at 47.
Richardson's postconviction counsel's certificate states:
"1. I have consulted with petitioner by
letters.
2. I have obtained and examined the
Report of Proceedings of the trial *** which
trial was heard by the Honorable Judge
William Cousins.
3. I have prepared a Supplemental
Petition for Post Conviction Relief
augmenting Petitioner's previously filed
Petition for Post Conviction Relief and state
that said supplemental petition adequately
complements petitioner's claims of
deprivation of his constitutional rights."
We find counsel substantially complied with her specific
duties under Rule 651(c), even against the alleged shortcomings
of the certificate as pointed out by Richardson. First, counsel
plainly asserted she "examined the Report of Proceedings of the
trial." Second, it is reasonable to infer that counsel consulted
17 No. 1-05-0955
"with petitioner by letters" regarding her second-stage
appointment "to ascertain his contentions" of constitutional
deprivation set out in his pro se petition as required by Rule
651(c). Finally, counsel asserted she "prepared a Supplemental
Petition for Post Conviction Relief" that "adequately
complement[ed]" Richardson's claims of constitutional
deprivation, which we conclude was in substantial compliance with
her duty to make "any amendments *** necessary for an adequate
presentation of [the defendant's] contentions," as required by
Rule 651(c) (134 Ill. 2d R. 651(c)).
We conclude that in this case, unlike in Bashaw, counsel
exercised her professional judgment in her representation of
Richardson and did not improperly defer to the defendant's
wishes. We note that were we to find counsel's certificate in
this case insufficient to pass muster under Rule 651(c), we would
be hard-pressed to conceive of a certificate that would
demonstrate counsel's compliance, short of one that exactly
mirrors the language of the rule. However, our supreme court has
never required strict compliance with Rule 651(c). Rather,
substantial compliance has been found sufficient. People v.
Wright, 149 Ill. 2d 36, 63, 594 N.E.2d 276 (1992) (finding
postconviction counsel "substantially complied with the mandate
of Rule 651(c)").
18 No. 1-05-0955 Should Richardson contend fundamental fairness, as the
Suarez court observed, requires review of the two claims he did
not himself present in this successive pro se petition, he is
free to file a second successive petition. In such a third
petition Richardson, of course, would be subject to the "cause
and prejudice" showing. See Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 476. But
we note he would be subject to such a showing in this case as
well if we were to remand to the circuit court. We must decline
to provide him that opportunity in the instant appeal based on
our concern that a finding of inadequacy of counsel's certificate
would expand the specific duties under Rule 651(c) imposed on
postconviction counsel beyond that which our supreme court has
recognized. See Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 475-76.
Ultimately, however, our holding does not depend exclusively
upon the adequacy of the certificate filed by postconviction
counsel. While we have determined postconviction counsel
substantially complied with her specific duties under Rule
651(c), we also hold the duty to amend under Rule 651(c) is
limited by " 'the constitutional claims raised by the
petitioner.' [Citation.]" Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d at 475. In the
face of two explicit claims that Richardson contends should have
been added to his pro se petition, we look to the allegations in
the instant pro se petition under our de novo review to determine
19 No. 1-05-0955 whether there exists a "gist" of such constitutional claims. See
People v. Delton, 227 Ill. 2d 247 (2008). As we have already
stated, a gist of each such constitutional claim is not present.
Richardson's position that postconviction counsel was
nonetheless required to "amend" his pro se petition to add such
claims transforms the petitioner's burden of complaining of a
constitutional deprivation to a burden on counsel to scour the
record for such complaints; in effect, transforming what the
supreme court has explicitly stated is a matter of counsel's
judgment into a legal obligation. Richardson argues that because
the record demonstrates constitutional violations as borne out by
the allegation in his 1992 pro se petition regarding possible
police brutality by officers otherwise linked to allegations of
police torture and his plainly improper sentence imposed on the
underlying felony of felony murder, appointed postconviction
counsel was required to amend the pro se petition to add these
claims. We find no authority for this position. See People v.
Rials, 345 Ill. App. 3d 636, 643, 802 N.E.2d 1240 (2003) (counsel
"need not scour the record to ascertain any other potential
errors and constitutional issues not implicated in the
defendant's pro se petition" (emphasis added)).
We also reject Richardson's fall-back argument that the
presumption of compliance based on the filing of a certificate is
20 No. 1-05-0955 overcome here. Once again, under our de novo review, where there
is no "gist" in his successive pro se petition of the
constitutional claims Richardson now contends should have been
added, Rule 651(c) places no legal duty on postconviction counsel
to add those claims to his successive pro se petition for
postconviction relief.
Following Pendleton, we find claims otherwise not supported
by allegations in his pro se petition and the supplemental
petition filed by postconviction counsel waived. Nor can support
in the record for the omitted claims serve to shore up his claim
that postconviction counsel's Rule 651(c) certificate was
deficient. The circuit court did not err in granting the State's
motion to dismiss.
CONCLUSION
Postconviction counsel substantially complied with the
specific duties required by Rule 651(c). Postconviction
counsel's duty to amend under Rule 651(c) is constrained by the
complaints Richardson set out in his successive pro se petition.
Postconviction counsel did not provide unreasonable assistance.
Accordingly, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook
County is affirmed.
Affirmed.
CAHILL, P.J., and R. GORDON, J., concur.
21 No. 1-05-0955
REPORTER OF DECISIONS - ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT _________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Respondent-Appellee,
v.
ANTHONY RICHARDSON, Petitioner-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appellate Court of Illinois First District, First Division
Filed: April 21, 2008 _________________________________________________________________
CAHILL, P.J., and R. GORDON, J., concur. _________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County Honorable Clayton J. Crane, Judge Presiding _________________________________________________________________
For PETITIONER - Michael J. Pelletier, Deputy Defender APPELLANT Erin E. G. McFeron, Assistant Appellate Defender Office of the State Appellate Defender 203 North LaSalle Street-24th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60601
For RESPONDENT - Lisa Madigan, Attorney General of Illinois APPELLEE Gary Feinerman, Solicitor General Leah C. Myers, Assistant Attorney General 100 W. Randolph Street, 12th Floor Chicago, Illinois 60601