Filed 8/19/26 P. v. Richards CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B346155
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. 24EMCF00071)
v.
MICHAEL ALLEN RICHARDS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Victor D. Martinez, Judge. Affirmed.
Jared G. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Maggie Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Michael Richards appeals from a judgment of conviction after a jury found him guilty of felony taking or driving of a vehicle without the owner’s consent in violation of Vehicle Code1 section 10851, subdivision (a). Richards argues substantial evidence does not support his conviction, the court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge under Penal Code section 1181.1, and the court prejudicially erred in sentencing him by imposing the upper term based on an aggravating circumstance that had neither been admitted to by Richards nor found true by a jury. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Evidence at Trial On February 2, 2024, at 5:30 p.m., Salvador Torres parked his truck on the street near his home in Chatsworth, Los Angeles. He locked the doors and left only a pair of work shoes and a pillow inside the car. The truck did not have any damage to its ignition, front bumper, or back window.
The next morning, at 7:30 a.m., Torres discovered his truck was missing. He had in his possession the only pair of car keys, and he did not give anyone else permission to drive the truck. Torres reported to the police that his truck had been stolen.
The next day, at 7:15 p.m., Officer Steven Armstrong with the El Monte Police Department was on patrol when dispatch notified him of Torres’s stolen truck. At some point later, Armstrong saw Richards driving the truck and followed behind it for two miles until it stopped at a shopping center in Rosemead,
1 All statutory references are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise stated.
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Los Angeles. Armstrong then conducted a traffic stop and ordered the occupants of the truck to exit the vehicle. Richards exited from the driver’s side door, and a female passenger exited from the passenger side door.
Armstrong searched the truck and saw that the ignition was heavily damaged and had metal shavings in it. Inside the car were a shaving tool, two screwdrivers, several keys, four or five bags that belonged to the female passenger, a bicycle, a bottle of soda, and a portable cup. None of the keys found inside the car worked to start the car. Additionally, the front bumper was damaged, and the back window had a hole in it that was covered with a trash bag. No fingerprints were lifted from the truck, shaving tool, or screwdrivers.
Armstrong testified that an ignition normally has “specified markings” on it that correspond with a particular key, and only that key can turn the car on. However, the markings can be shaved off, allowing other devices, such as a screwdriver, to turn the car on. In fact, one of the screwdrivers from inside Torres’s truck successfully turned the car on. Based on the condition of the truck, Armstrong concluded that the truck was stolen.2
B. Charges and Verdict The People charged Richards with one count of felony taking or driving of a vehicle without the owner’s consent. (§ 10851, subd. (a); count 1.) They alleged Richards had a prior conviction for the same offense within the meaning of Penal Code
2 Richards did not testify or call any witnesses.
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section 666.5, subdivision (a),3 and five other prior felony convictions.
At trial, at the end of the prosecution’s case-in-chief, the defense moved for acquittal on count 1 under Penal Code section 1118.1. The court denied the motion, finding sufficient evidence to support the conviction.
The People argued, and the trial court instructed the jury on, only one theory of liability for violating section 10851, subdivision (a): posttheft driving. The trial court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 1820 that to find Richards guilty of unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle, the People had to prove that: (1) Richards “drove someone’s vehicle without the owner’s consent”; (2) when Richards “drove the vehicle, he intended to deprive the owner of possession or ownership of the vehicle for any period of time”; and (3) “[t]he driving occurred after a substantial break from the original theft of the vehicle.”
During deliberations, the People amended the information to include two circumstances in aggravation: Richards’s prior convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness (Cal. Rules of Court,4 rule 4.421(b)(2)), and he served a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)). The court advised Richards of his right to
3 Penal Code section 666.5, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part: “Every person who, having been previously convicted of a felony violation of section 10851 of the Vehicle Code, … is subsequently convicted of [this offense] shall be punished by imprisonment pursuant to subdivision (h) of section 1170 for two, three, or four years, or a fine of ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or both the fine and the imprisonment.” 4 All rules references are to the California Rules of Court.
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a jury trial on the aggravating circumstances, and Richards waived that right.
The jury found Richards guilty on count 1. Richards admitted the prior conviction under Penal Code section 666.5 and the five other felony convictions, and the court found them to be true. He also admitted the two aggravating factors, and the court found them to be true.
C. Sentencing The court imposed the upper term after stating the following: “[The] court does find the factors in aggravation of defendant’s prior convictions are numerous and that he has served a prior term in county jail under [Penal Code] section 1170[, subdivision] (h). The court does not believe those factors in aggravation are mitigated by factors in mitigation. In this particular case, the court does not believe the defendant is being punished for going to trial. At this time the defendant has not admitted any culpability in these, taken any responsibility for his actions. As I indicated, he has numerous aggravating factors, and I don’t find any factors in mitigation. As a result of that, the court will be intending to impose the high term.”
Richards timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Substantial Evidence Supports Richards’s Conviction Under Section 10851, Subdivision (a) Richards argues there was insufficient evidence of his conviction for unlawfully taking or driving a vehicle based on a theory of posttheft driving. He specifically disputes the sufficiency of the evidence as to two elements—that the driving
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occurred after a substantial break from the original theft and that Richards had the requisite intent. We disagree.
1. Relevant legal principles “ ‘When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] We determine ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation.] This determination ‘presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence.’ ” (People v. Cardenas (2025) 18 Cal.5th 797, 821.) “We do not reweigh the evidence, resolve conflicts in the evidence, or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses.” (People v. Jacobo (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 32, 42.)
Section 10851, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part:
“Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, ... is guilty of a public offense ....”
The statute “can be violated by a range of conduct.” (People v. Lara (2019) 6 Cal.5th 1128, 1135 (Lara).) Specifically, a person can violate section 10851 in three ways: (1) by taking a vehicle from the owner with the intent to permanently deprive the owner of title or possession (vehicle theft); (2) by taking the
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vehicle from the owner with the intent to temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession (joyriding); or (3) after a theft of the vehicle is complete, by driving the vehicle with the intent to deprive the owner permanently or temporarily of title or possession (posttheft driving). (People v. Garza (2005) 35 Cal.4th 866, 871; People v. Gutierrez (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 847, 854.)
Posttheft driving requires proof of a “ ‘ “substantial break”
between the taking and the driving.’ ” (Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1136.) Thus, to be guilty of posttheft driving, the People must prove (1) the defendant drove a vehicle without the consent of the owner, (2) the defendant had the intent to deprive the owner of title or possession, and (3) a substantial break occurred between the taking and the driving of the vehicle. (§ 10851, subd. (a); Lara, at p. 1136; People v. Gutierrez, supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 854.)
2. There was a substantial break Richards contends there was insufficient evidence of a substantial break between the taking and the driving of the truck. He asserts the People “never offered facts showing that [Richards’s] driving was a separate and distinct episode of unlawful conduct.” The record shows otherwise.
A substantial break occurs between the original taking and the posttheft driving “when the driving is not ‘part of the original taking’ [citation]; when the driving is ‘an act distinct from the taking’ [citation]; when the driving is ‘for purposes unconnected with the original taking’ [citation]; ‘when the driving is no longer part of a “ ‘continuous journey away from the locus of the theft’ ” ’ [citation]; or when the driving is not part of the escape from the scene of the theft.” (People v. Calistro (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 387, 395 (Calistro).) To guide our determination of whether a
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substantial break occurred, we consider several factors, including if there was a separation in time, driving for purposes unrelated from the original taking, a separation in location, or a change in the condition of the vehicle. (See Lara, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 1138; Calistro, at pp. 394-395; People v. Strong (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 366, 375 (Strong); People v. Malamut (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 237, 242 (Malamut).) There was evidence of each of the relevant factors here.
When Officer Armstrong found Richards driving the truck, approximately 36 hours had passed since the truck was originally stolen. Such a time gap can qualify as a substantial break. (Calistro, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 403 [substantial break where “[f]ive hours had passed since the car was stolen”].)
In addition, Armstrong drove behind Richards for two miles, during which time “[n]othing suggested [Richards] was still in the process of taking the car or fleeing the scene of the crime.” (Calistro, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 403.) For example, there is no evidence Richards “appeared to be in [a] hurry” or tried to “avoid detection” while he drove. (Ibid. [sufficient evidence of substantial break where, five hours after the theft, defendant stopped for gas and lingered in the stolen car].) Indeed, Richards admits in his opening brief that he “complied with the stop without attempting to flee.”
Further, Richards parked in a shopping center in Rosemead, a different area from the site of the original theft in Chatsworth, suggesting “the driving [was] not part of the escape from the scene of the theft.” (Calistro, supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 395; see Malamut, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 242 [sufficient evidence of a substantial break where police discovered car “in an entirely different location”]; Strong, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at
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p. 375 [same where defendant was found driving the stolen vehicle in an area that was not on a continuous journey away from the location of the theft].)
Lastly, the condition of the truck was materially different from when it was stolen. The front bumper was damaged, and inside the truck were several personal belongings, including a bicycle, a bottle of soda, and a portable drinking cup—none of which belonged to Torres. The jury could have reasonably inferred from the changed condition of the truck that the theft was completed, and sufficient time had passed for other intervening events to occur. (See, e.g., Strong, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 375 [sufficient evidence of a substantial break where “[i]tems [the victim] had left in the pickup were missing; in their place were cassette tapes, magazines, a blanket, a knife, and a compressed air tank, none of which belonged to [the victim]”]; Malamut, supra, 16 Cal.App.3d at p. 242 [“major alteration of the vehicle” demonstrated that “[t]he theft was definitely completed”].) Thus, considering the factors together, the evidence was sufficient to show a substantial break between the original theft and the posttheft driving.
Richards also contends there was “no direct evidence” of a substantial break. But direct evidence is not required. “[C]ircumstantial evidence is as sufficient as direct evidence to support a conviction. [Citations.] ‘Whether the evidence presented at trial is direct or circumstantial, ... the relevant inquiry on [substantial evidence review] remains whether any reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1208; accord, People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 339 [“ ‘ “Substantial evidence includes circumstantial evidence and
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any reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence.” ’ ”].) As noted, there was circumstantial evidence of each of the relevant factors.
3. Richards had the requisite intent Richards argues there was insufficient evidence that he had the specific intent under section 10851, subdivision (a), to “permanently or temporarily deprive the owner … of his or her title or possession of the vehicle.” His argument lacks merit.
“Specific intent to deprive the owner of possession of his car may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the particular case.” (People v. Clifton (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 195, 200.) “Knowledge that the vehicle was stolen, while not an element of the offense, may constitute evidence of the defendant’s intent to deprive the owner of title and possession. [Citation.] [¶] Possession of recently stolen property itself raises a strong inference that the possessor knew the property was stolen; only slight corroboration is required to allow for a finding of guilt.” (People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574 (O’Dell); accord, People v. Green (1995) 34 Cal.App.4th 165, 180-181; Clifton, at p. 200.) “[T]he slight corroboration that permits an inference that the possessor knew that the property was stolen may consist of no explanation, of an unsatisfactory explanation, or of other suspicious circumstances that would justify the inference.” (O’Dell, at p. 1575; see Clifton, at p. 200 [“possession of the recently taken vehicle by the defendant with slight corroboration through statements or conduct tending to show guilt is sufficient to sustain a conviction”].)
There was sufficient evidence Richards had the specific intent to deprive Torres of possession of his truck. It is undisputed that Richards was in possession of a recently stolen
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truck. As noted, this leads to a “strong inference” that Richards knew the truck was stolen. (O’Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1574.) The condition of the truck, namely that the window was broken and the ignition was so heavily damaged that only the screwdriver could turn it on, additionally supports the inference Richards knew the truck was stolen. As Armstrong testified, it is “common” for stolen cars to have damaged ignitions. (See People v. Green, supra, 34 Cal.App.4th at p. 181 [“evidence of a tampered ignition” “coupled with other evidence may support a finding of intent to deprive the owner of possession”].) Moreover, there were personal belongings in the car that the jury could have reasonably inferred belonged to Richards, given Torres’s testimony they did not belong to him. From that evidence, the jury could further conclude Richards was treating the car as his own and using it to transport his things, which in turn supports the inference he intended to deprive the owner of possession.
Richards points to specific evidence in the record, including that there were no fingerprints recovered; that Richards “did not attempt to flee, did not switch seats, and complied with the officers’ commands”; and that “[t]he truck still bore its original rear license plate.” He asserts “[t]hese are not the classic indicia of someone knowingly driving a stolen truck.”
“That other inferences might be drawn from the evidence at trial is not to say insufficient evidence supports the verdict.” (People v. Clark (2011) 52 Cal.4th 856, 945.) In fact, defense counsel made a similar argument during closing to the one Richards makes on appeal, which the jury necessarily rejected. (See ibid.) As the California Supreme Court has made clear, “ ‘ “ ‘[i]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings, the judgment may not be reversed simply because the
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circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1118.) The circumstances here reasonably support the jury’s finding that Richards had the required intent.5
B. The Court Did Not Impose the Upper Term Based on an Aggravating Factor That Was Neither Admitted by Richards nor Found True by a Jury At sentencing, the People asked the court to impose the upper term of four years pursuant to Penal Code section 666.5. Defense counsel asked for the middle term of three years, arguing there was no violence, the People’s offer before trial was three years, and “Richards should not be penalized for exercising his right to jury trial.” The court imposed the upper term.
Richards contends the court prejudicially erred by imposing the upper term based in part on an aggravating factor—that he failed to take responsibility—without his admission or a jury finding on the aggravating factor, as required by Penal Code
5 For the same reasons, we reject Richards’s contention the trial court erred in dismissing the charge under Penal Code section 1118.1 for lack of sufficient evidence. “ ‘ “The standard applied by a trial court in ruling upon a motion for judgment of acquittal pursuant to [Penal Code] section 1118.1 is the same as the standard applied by an appellate court in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction[.]” … The sufficiency of evidence is tested at the point the motion is made.’ ” (People v. Lamb (2024) 16 Cal.5th 400, 442.) Richards made the motion to dismiss at the conclusion of the People’s case-in-chief, which is the same point at which we test the sufficiency of the evidence in this case, given Richards did not present any evidence.
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section 1170, subdivision (b)(2).6 The People argue Richards forfeited this challenge because he did not object at sentencing. We need not determine whether Richards’s claim is forfeited because, assuming there is no forfeiture, Richards has not shown the court relied on Richards’s failure to take responsibility to impose the upper term.
The People alleged, and Richards admitted, two aggravating factors: that Richards’s prior convictions were numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule 4.421(b)(2)), and that he served a prior prison term (rule 4.421(b)(3)). The court found the factors true, stating it “does find the factors in aggravation of defendant’s prior convictions are numerous and that he has served a prior term in county jail under section 1170 [subdivision] (h).” The court then stated: “The court does not believe those factors in aggravation are mitigated by factors in mitigation. In this particular case, the court does not believe the defendant is being punished for going to trial. At this time the defendant has not admitted any culpability in these, taken any responsibility for his actions. As I indicated, he has numerous aggravating factors, and I don’t find any factors in mitigation. As a result of that, the court will be intending to impose the high term.”
6 Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (b)(2), provides: “The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.”
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Richards contends that when the court stated “the defendant has not … taken any responsibility for his actions,” the court was relying on that additional fact to impose the upper term. We are not persuaded.
Before the court mentioned Richards’s failure to take responsibility, it stated multiple times that the two factors that the People alleged—that Richards’s prior convictions were numerous and that he had served a prior prison term—were factors in aggravation. First, in finding the two factors true, the court referred to them as “the factors in aggravation.” Then, the court immediately referred to them again as “those factors in aggravation” when it discussed weighing them against any mitigating factors.
In contrast, when the court mentioned Richards’s failure to take responsibility, it did not identify that fact as an aggravating factor. Instead, the court made the statement after it referred to the “factors in mitigation.” It appears that at most, the court treated Richards’s failure to take responsibility as evidence that no mitigating factors were present. Indeed, one of the enumerated factors in mitigation is that “[t]he defendant voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing before arrest or at an early stage of the criminal process.” (Rule 4.423(b)(8).) Moreover, the court’s final statement, “As I indicated, he has numerous aggravating factors,” can reasonably be interpreted as referring back to the court’s earlier finding on the two alleged aggravating factors, not to the court’s statement that Richards failed to take responsibility. The introductory phrase “As I indicated” naturally points to the court’s earlier statements about the aggravating circumstances.
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Nothing in the record suggests the court mistakenly believed it could impose the upper term based on additional facts beyond the properly proven aggravating circumstances. “In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume that the court ‘knows and applies the correct statutory and case law.’ ” (People v. Thomas (2011) 52 Cal.4th 336, 361; see also People v. Andrade (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 651, 654, fn. 1 [“ ‘ “A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.” ’ ”].) Richards has not demonstrated the court relied on facts not found true by a jury or admitted by him in sentencing him to the upper term.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
FEUER, J.