Fitzgerald, J.
Defendant-appellee Rich was convicted by a jury on February 20, 1973 of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, contrary to MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305. This conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Defendant-appellant Robinson was jury-convicted on July 3, 1973 of assault with intent to rob being armed, contrary to MCLA 750.89; MSA 28.284. This conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished per curiam opinion. We granted leave to appeal in each case to consider whether
People v Crittle,
390 Mich 367; 212 NW2d 196, decided November 21, 1973, should be retroactively applied.
In
Crittle,
the defendant was charged and convicted of armed robbery. His defense was that he lacked the requisite specific intent because he was intoxicated and/or because he intended nothing
more than a prank. There were some facts which were arguably supportive of each facet of this defense. The trial court charged the jury: "You would not, however, be justified in acquitting * * * unless you find * * * that he was not conscious of what he was doing or why he was doing it * * * ”. 390 Mich at 372. This instruction was held to be reversibly erroneous under the facts of
Crittle
because it charged the jury in effect that "if they found defendant only intended a drunken prank, they would be required to find the defendant guilty of robbery armed because in performing the prank he presumably knew what he was doing if not why he was doing it, * * * ”. 390 Mich at 373. The Court pointed out in footnote 1 of its opinion that the erroneous
Crittle
instruction did not even correctly state the rule of
Roberts v People,
19 Mich 401, 418 (1870). This application of the law to the specific facts of
Crittle
in part IV of that opinion is not directly applicable here.
The question of retroactive application to these cases concerns part V of the
Crittle
opinion, 390 Mich at 373-374, wherein this Court opined that "trial judges would do well to follow Justice Cooley’s language” in
People v Walker,
38 Mich 156, 158 (1878), in instructions on intoxication rather than the
capacity
standard of
Roberts.
The
capacity
standard of
Roberts
was used in instructing both the
Rich
and
Robinson
juries. Neither Rich’s nor Robinson’s counsel objected to these instructions; neither defense counsel nor the trial judges had reason to anticipate this Court’s overruling in
Crittle
of the longstanding precedent of
Roberts v People.
When the issue of retroactivity arises, the case of
Linkletter v Walker,
381 US 618; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), is often used to determine a
solution. The
Linkletter
test measures the question of retroactivity by three key factors: (a) the purpose of the new rule; (b) the general reliance on the old rule; and (c) the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice. The purpose of part V of the
Crittle
opinion was prospective, to insure that juries would be more accurately instructed on the law of intoxication and that of specific intent. Even the language of part V of the
Crittle
opinion — "trial judges would do well” — was precatory.
The latter two
Linkletter
factors, reliance and effect on the administration of justice, are often interdependent. Here, where there was profound reliance on the old rule, the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice could be marked. Instructional law with respect to the effect of voluntary intoxication upon specific intent had in this state long been governed by the rule of
Roberts v People.
As was stated by the Court of Appeals in footnote 6 of
People v
Scott, 55 Mich App 739, 746; 223 NW2d 330 (1974):
"There would appear to be a real question of whether
Crittle,
to the extent that it appears to repudiate the capacity standard, should be given retrospective application. While
Crittle
relies upon the statement made by Cooley in
People v Walker, supra,
it is questionable that Cooley really intended to formulate a rule different from that in
Roberts v People, supra.
Not only did Cooley, along with Campbell and Graves, sit on both panels, but also Cooley in his opinion in
Walker
indicates that what he was saying therein was fully explained by Justice Christancy in
Roberts.
Whatever Cooley may have meant by his language in
Walker,
it is the rule as stated in
Roberts
which has been treated as controlling for the last century. Thus while
Crittle
used Cooley’s language in
Walker
as the vehicle by which to formulate the presently approved instruction
on intoxication,
Crittle
marked a change in the established law with respect to what the proper instruction was. It would therefore appear that since the trial courts of this state had every reason to rely on the
Roberts
rule which had been oft repeated as proper, the change in focus evidenced by
Crittle
should be given only prospective application from the decisional date of
Crittle
Although I regard the
Walker
language elevated to law by
Crittle
as preferable to the rule of
Roberts,
I concur in the above sentiments with respect to the question of
Crittle’s
retroactivity. It makes no sense at all to hold trial courts to instructional standards that could not have been anticipated. In
People v Kirk,
151 Mich 253, 258; 114 NW 1023 (1908), this Court "conceded that the rule of
Roberts v People
* * * is the law of this State.” In
People v Eggleston,
186 Mich 510, 512; 152 NW 944 (1915), it was stated that the "true rule was announced in the case of
Roberts v People”
and followed in
Walker.
In
People v Depew,
215 Mich 317, 320; 183 NW 750 (1921),
Roberts
was said to be "a leading case upon the subject in this State”. In
People v Jones,
228 Mich 426; 200 NW 158 (1924), this Court reversed a conviction of assault with intent to murder, with instructions to charge the jury on retrial in accordance with the rule of
Roberts.
In
People v Hearn,
354 Mich 468, 470; 93 NW2d 302 (1958), an intoxication instruction using the capacity standard was said to have "completely and properly” instructed the jury and "fully protected” the defendant. In
People v Berryhill,
8 Mich App 497; 154 NW2d 593 (1967), then-Judge T. G. Kavanagh cited the rule of
Roberts
as controlling. In
People v Kelley,
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Fitzgerald, J.
Defendant-appellee Rich was convicted by a jury on February 20, 1973 of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny, contrary to MCLA 750.110; MSA 28.305. This conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Defendant-appellant Robinson was jury-convicted on July 3, 1973 of assault with intent to rob being armed, contrary to MCLA 750.89; MSA 28.284. This conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished per curiam opinion. We granted leave to appeal in each case to consider whether
People v Crittle,
390 Mich 367; 212 NW2d 196, decided November 21, 1973, should be retroactively applied.
In
Crittle,
the defendant was charged and convicted of armed robbery. His defense was that he lacked the requisite specific intent because he was intoxicated and/or because he intended nothing
more than a prank. There were some facts which were arguably supportive of each facet of this defense. The trial court charged the jury: "You would not, however, be justified in acquitting * * * unless you find * * * that he was not conscious of what he was doing or why he was doing it * * * ”. 390 Mich at 372. This instruction was held to be reversibly erroneous under the facts of
Crittle
because it charged the jury in effect that "if they found defendant only intended a drunken prank, they would be required to find the defendant guilty of robbery armed because in performing the prank he presumably knew what he was doing if not why he was doing it, * * * ”. 390 Mich at 373. The Court pointed out in footnote 1 of its opinion that the erroneous
Crittle
instruction did not even correctly state the rule of
Roberts v People,
19 Mich 401, 418 (1870). This application of the law to the specific facts of
Crittle
in part IV of that opinion is not directly applicable here.
The question of retroactive application to these cases concerns part V of the
Crittle
opinion, 390 Mich at 373-374, wherein this Court opined that "trial judges would do well to follow Justice Cooley’s language” in
People v Walker,
38 Mich 156, 158 (1878), in instructions on intoxication rather than the
capacity
standard of
Roberts.
The
capacity
standard of
Roberts
was used in instructing both the
Rich
and
Robinson
juries. Neither Rich’s nor Robinson’s counsel objected to these instructions; neither defense counsel nor the trial judges had reason to anticipate this Court’s overruling in
Crittle
of the longstanding precedent of
Roberts v People.
When the issue of retroactivity arises, the case of
Linkletter v Walker,
381 US 618; 85 S Ct 1731; 14 L Ed 2d 601 (1965), is often used to determine a
solution. The
Linkletter
test measures the question of retroactivity by three key factors: (a) the purpose of the new rule; (b) the general reliance on the old rule; and (c) the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice. The purpose of part V of the
Crittle
opinion was prospective, to insure that juries would be more accurately instructed on the law of intoxication and that of specific intent. Even the language of part V of the
Crittle
opinion — "trial judges would do well” — was precatory.
The latter two
Linkletter
factors, reliance and effect on the administration of justice, are often interdependent. Here, where there was profound reliance on the old rule, the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice could be marked. Instructional law with respect to the effect of voluntary intoxication upon specific intent had in this state long been governed by the rule of
Roberts v People.
As was stated by the Court of Appeals in footnote 6 of
People v
Scott, 55 Mich App 739, 746; 223 NW2d 330 (1974):
"There would appear to be a real question of whether
Crittle,
to the extent that it appears to repudiate the capacity standard, should be given retrospective application. While
Crittle
relies upon the statement made by Cooley in
People v Walker, supra,
it is questionable that Cooley really intended to formulate a rule different from that in
Roberts v People, supra.
Not only did Cooley, along with Campbell and Graves, sit on both panels, but also Cooley in his opinion in
Walker
indicates that what he was saying therein was fully explained by Justice Christancy in
Roberts.
Whatever Cooley may have meant by his language in
Walker,
it is the rule as stated in
Roberts
which has been treated as controlling for the last century. Thus while
Crittle
used Cooley’s language in
Walker
as the vehicle by which to formulate the presently approved instruction
on intoxication,
Crittle
marked a change in the established law with respect to what the proper instruction was. It would therefore appear that since the trial courts of this state had every reason to rely on the
Roberts
rule which had been oft repeated as proper, the change in focus evidenced by
Crittle
should be given only prospective application from the decisional date of
Crittle
Although I regard the
Walker
language elevated to law by
Crittle
as preferable to the rule of
Roberts,
I concur in the above sentiments with respect to the question of
Crittle’s
retroactivity. It makes no sense at all to hold trial courts to instructional standards that could not have been anticipated. In
People v Kirk,
151 Mich 253, 258; 114 NW 1023 (1908), this Court "conceded that the rule of
Roberts v People
* * * is the law of this State.” In
People v Eggleston,
186 Mich 510, 512; 152 NW 944 (1915), it was stated that the "true rule was announced in the case of
Roberts v People”
and followed in
Walker.
In
People v Depew,
215 Mich 317, 320; 183 NW 750 (1921),
Roberts
was said to be "a leading case upon the subject in this State”. In
People v Jones,
228 Mich 426; 200 NW 158 (1924), this Court reversed a conviction of assault with intent to murder, with instructions to charge the jury on retrial in accordance with the rule of
Roberts.
In
People v Hearn,
354 Mich 468, 470; 93 NW2d 302 (1958), an intoxication instruction using the capacity standard was said to have "completely and properly” instructed the jury and "fully protected” the defendant. In
People v Berryhill,
8 Mich App 497; 154 NW2d 593 (1967), then-Judge T. G. Kavanagh cited the rule of
Roberts
as controlling. In
People v Kelley,
21 Mich App 612, 622-623; 176 NW2d 435 (1970), then-Judge Levin acknowledged that the
capacity standard was a "correct statement of the law”
(Kelley, supra,
fn 15), but pointed out that reliance on it by the courts of this state had resulted in "misplaced emphasis”
(Kelley, supra,
fn 16).
The misplaced emphasis of pr
e-Crittle
law was corrected in that decision by a unanimous Court. However, if trial courts are to be effectively guided by our appellate pronouncements, a rational dependence on our decisions currently in effect must be encouraged.
These juries were properly instructed under the law extant; their verdicts must stand. The Court of Appeals is reversed in
Rich
and affirmed in
Robinson.
Kavanagh, C. J., and Williams, Levin, Coleman, Lindemer, and Ryan, JJ., concurred with Fitzgerald, J.