People v. Ribardo CA4/2

• Court: California Court of Appeal
• Decided: May 27, 2026
• Docket: E084783
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed 5/27/26 P. v. Ribardo CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E084783

v. (Super. Ct. No. SWF2101164)

ALAN FRANK RIBARDO, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. John M. Monterosso,

Judge. Affirmed.

Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,

Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, Christopher P.

Beesley, and Namita Patel, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

1 I.

INTRODUCTION

A jury convicted defendant and appellant Alan Frank Ribardo of assault with a

deadly weapon (Pen. Code,1 § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), brandishing a weapon (§ 417,

subd. (a)(1); count 2), and two counts of hit-and-run (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a);

counts 3 & 4). The jury also found true that defendant had two prior serious felony

convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) and 18 prior serious or violent strike convictions (§ 667,

subds. (c), (e)). The trial court denied defendant’s motion to dismiss his prior strike

convictions under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero)

and sentenced him to 25 years to life. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court

abused its discretion by denying his Romero motion. We find no abuse of discretion and

affirm the judgment.

II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On December 22, 2020, two teenage friends, J.C. and B.H. were parked in a public

parking lot in a truck after getting food. Defendant’s vehicle was parked in a parking

spot one space to the left of J.C.’s truck. J.C. and B.H. began eating in the truck when

J.C. noticed defendant looking at him angrily for approximately five minutes. J.C.

shrugged at defendant as to imply, “‘What’s up?’” In response, defendant grimaced and

held up his arms as if to say “‘What?’”

1 All future statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.

2 J.C. proceeded to back his truck out of the parking space when defendant flipped

him off with two hands. J.C. returned the gesture. Defendant then proceeded to go into

the back of his van from the driver’s seat and exited the van from the passenger’s side

wielding a screwdriver. Defendant then ran towards J.C.’s truck, yelling and wielding the

screwdriver with a stabbing motion. J.C. drove away in fear that defendant was “crazy.”

J.C. and B.H. returned to the parking lot moments later. B.H. got out of the truck

and threw ice from a cup onto the windshield of defendant’s van. B.H. then got back into

the truck on the passenger’s side. Defendant turned his van on while J.C. drove out of the

parking lot.

Defendant followed J.C. out of the parking lot and as they drove onto the street.

While chasing J.C. and B.H., defendant rear-ended J.C.’s truck three times on different

streets before fleeing. J.C. followed defendant in order to obtain his license plate

number, while B.H. was on the phone with the police.

During the incident, J.O. witnessed defendant rear-end J.C. twice. J.O. drove his

Jeep next to J.C.’s truck to determine if J.C. needed help. B.H. told J.O. that the police

were coming.

J.O. then drove towards defendant’s van to help. Defendant drove his van into the

backside of J.O.’s Jeep, causing it to spin. Defendant then “t-boned” the Jeep on the

passenger side, pushing the vehicle from the street and onto the sidewalk.

When J.O.’s Jeep stopped on the sidewalk, he got out of the Jeep and approached

defendant’s van. J.O. saw defendant grin, put the van in drive, and drive directly towards

3 J.O. J.O. jumped away from defendant’s vehicle as he feared he was going to be hit.

Defendant then fled the scene.

The police investigation that followed uncovered auto parts on the scene that

corroborated the statements of J.C., B.H. and J.O. that described the Jeep being “t-

boned.” Police also found a screwdriver in the passenger side of defendant’s van.

Defendant admitted to police that he threatened J.C. and B.H. with a screwdriver and

exclaimed to them, “‘Come on. You want a piece of this old man?’” Defendant also

admitted that he followed J.C.’s truck, rear-ended it once, drove toward J.O. after he

exited out of his Jeep, and fled the scene.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon

(§ 245, subd. (a)(1)), brandishing a weapon (§ 417, subd. (a)(1)), and two counts of hit-

and-run (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)). The jury also found true that defendant had

suffered two prior serious felony convictions (§ 667, subd. (a)) and 18 prior serious or

violent prior strike convictions (§ 667, subds. (c), (e)).

At sentencing, defendant orally moved to strike his 18 prior strike convictions. He

argued that his prior offenses started over 40 years earlier, spanned about 10 years, and

that after his release from custody in 2001, he lived a crime-free life for almost 20 years.

He also asserted that failure to strike his prior strikes and sentencing him to an

indeterminate term of 25 years to life would effectively result in a death sentence given

his age of 74 years.

4 The prosecutor replied that although defendant’s strikes were old, his current

convictions for yet more serious, violent strike offenses demonstrated that defendant

continued to pose a risk to the community. The prosecutor described defendant’s 50-plus

years of felonious serious violent criminal behavior as being the exact type of conduct

contemplated by the “Three Strikes” law.

The trial court weighed defendant’s concerns, his age, and the significant break

between his prior crimes and his current convictions against the jury’s finding that

defendant had sustained 18 prior strikes, including robberies, assaults with firearms,

personally inflicting great bodily injury in the commission of a felony, personal use of a

firearm in the commission of a felony, and a federal conviction for an armed bank

robbery. The court also considered the seriousness and violent nature of his behavior that

led to his current convictions, noting that defendant committed a “doozy in which the

violent conduct was extreme, put lives at risk.” While empathizing with defendant’s

situation, the court denied defendant’s Romero motion and sentenced him to 25 years to

life.

III.

DISCUSSION

Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his

Romero motion for several reasons. First, he contends that the nature of the

circumstances was unusual when he attempted to run over J.O. because J.O. inserted

himself into the incident. Second, defendant argues that his prior strike convictions do

5 not support the trial court’s decision because it is unclear whether his federal bank

robbery conviction qualifies as a strike offense under California law and his 12 robbery

convictions in 1998 arose from a single crime spree. Third, defendant asserts that he has

lived a crime-free life for the past 19 years after he was released from prison in 2001, so

all of his convictions are “remote in time.” Finally, he contends his “background,

character, and prospects” supported his Romero motion. We find no abuse of discretion.

A trial court has discretion to dismiss a prior violent or serious felony conviction

pursuant to the Three Strikes law. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 504.) In deciding

whether to grant a Romero motion, the trial court must “‘consider whether, in light of the

nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior serious and/or violent felony

convictions, and the particulars of his background, character, and prospects, the defendant

may be deemed outside the scheme’s spirit, in whole or in part, and hence should be

treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or

violent felonies.’” (People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 377 (Carmony), quoting

People v. Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.) “A repeat criminal falls outside the spirit

of the Three Strikes law only in extraordinary circumstances.” (People v. Anderson

(2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 780, 786.)

On appeal, we review a trial court’s refusal to strike prior conviction allegations

for abuse of discretion. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 374; People v. Williams, supra,

17 Cal.4th at p. 162.) “[A] trial court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is

so irrational or arbitrary that no reasonable person could agree with it.” (Carmony,

6 supra, at p. 377.) Absent a showing that the lower court acted arbitrarily or irrationally, a

reviewing court presumes the trial court “acted to achieve legitimate sentencing

objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a particular sentence will not be

set aside on review.” (People v. Superior Court (Du) (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 822, 831.)

We neither reweigh evidence nor substitute our judgment for that of the trial court.

(Carmony, supra, at p. 377.) Thus, “[w]here the record demonstrates that the trial court

balanced the relevant facts and reached an impartial decision in conformity with the spirit

of the law, we shall affirm the trial court’s ruling, even if we might have ruled differently

in the first instance.” (People v. Myers (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 305, 309-310.)

Here, the trial court’s ruling was not irrational or arbitrary. The court, in detail,

explained the reasons for denying the Romero motion. It acknowledged that the strikes

were decades-old, but noted that defendant has suffered 18 strikes, which were largely 2 violent offenses.

The trial court also properly emphasized that defendant’s current offenses were

serious and violent. As described by the trial court, the nature and circumstances of the

current felony were a “doozy in which the violent conduct was extreme [and] put lives at 3 risk.” Defendant threatened J.C. and B.H. with a screwdriver and followed them in his

2 Defendant argues his federal bank robbery conviction does not qualify as a strike. But the jury found that it did, and he does not raise a substantial evidence challenge to that finding, so we are bound by it. 3 At sentencing, defendant argued that he “was the victim here” and reiterated his trial argument that “this wouldn’t have even occurred had somebody not come at me.” [footnote continued on next page]

7 van at high speeds, and rammed his car into J.C.’s truck multiple times. Furthermore,

when J.O. stepped in to help J.C. and B.H., defendant t-boned J.O.’s Jeep, pushing it onto

the sidewalk with his car, and then attempted to run over J.O. when he had climbed out of

his Jeep. The nature and circumstances of the present offenses demonstrated that

defendant continues to pose a threat to society.

Defendant nonetheless argues that he does not “fall within [the] spirit of the Three

Strikes [l]aw” because all of his state convictions were either part of a “single ‘crime

spree’” or remote. But nothing in the record suggests that the crimes were committed 4 during a “single ‘crime spree’” and the “remoteness of a prior conviction, ‘by itself,

cannot be the basis for dismissing a prior strike conviction.’” (People v. Dowdy (2024)

107 Cal.App.5th 1, 12; see also § 667, subd. (c)(3) [“[t]he length of time between the

prior serious or violent felony conviction and the current felony conviction shall not

affect the imposition of sentence”].) Instead, remoteness is only a factor in mitigation,

Although the court considered those “valid points,” the trial court reasonably rejected defendant’s argument that the victims’ conduct justified his behavior. On appeal, defendant argues his conduct was “reactionary,” “aberrational,” and “unlikely to occur,” which justified granting his Romero motion. Even if true, the trial court permissibly found that defendant’s “extreme,” violent conduct in committing the current offenses and his criminal history placed him within the Three Strikes law. 4 Although defendant was convicted of his 17 strike offenses on May 26, 1988, the record is silent as to when the underlying criminal conduct occurred. We therefore cannot determine whether they were committed as part of a “single crime spree,” as defendant contends. It is the defendant’s burden to provide the trial court with evidence to support his Romero motion. (People v. Lee (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 124, 129.)

8 which the trial court properly considered here. (People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th

1134, 1141.)

Like the trial court, we acknowledge that defendant led a crime-free life between

2001, when he was released from custody for his 1988 convictions, and 2020, when he

committed the current offenses. And, like the trial court, we recognize that defendant was

living a “quiet life” and spent his time “staying out of trouble and just going to senior

centers and the library.” This nearly 20-year crime-free period could reasonably be

construed as “a crime-free cleansing period of rehabilitation after a defendant has had the

opportunity to reflect upon the error of his or her ways,” which could weigh in favor of

granting defendant’s Romero motion. (People v. Humphrey (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 809,

813.) The trial court thus appropriately gave “great weight” to this crime-free period and

considered how defendant spent his days.

But the abuse of discretion standard is a demanding one for a defendant to meet.

A trial court abuses its discretion in denying a Romero motion only in a few limited

circumstances, including when the trial court was unaware of its discretion to dismiss a

strike, when it considered impermissible factors in declining to dismiss, or “‘the

sentencing norms . . . produce an “arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd” result’ under

the specific facts of a particular case.” (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 378.) None of

these limited circumstances occurred here. The trial court’s comments at sentencing

show that its decision to deny defendant’s Romero motion was “an individualized one

based on the particular aspects of the current offenses for which the defendant has been

9 convicted and on the defendant’s own history and personal circumstances.” (People v.

McGlothin (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 468, 474.)

Again, the trial court reasonably emphasized the violent, dangerous nature of

defendant’s past and current offenses. (See People v. Carrasco (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th

978, 993 [“[T]he trial court considered a wide range of appropriate factors in [denying

defendant’s Romero motion], particularly the nature and circumstances of appellant’s

present and past convictions.”].) The trial court correctly noted that the amount of

defendant’s prior strikes was “extreme and probably rare,” and the offenses were “serious

and violent.” And as the trial court rightfully observed, defendant’s “extreme” conduct in

committing his current offenses put “lives at risk.” It was thus well within the trial

court’s discretion to conclude that defendant did not fall “outside the [Three Strikes]

spirit” and should not “be treated as though he had not previously been convicted of one

or more serious and/or violent felonies.” (People v. Williams, supra, 17 Cal.4th at pp.

161, 163.)

In arguing otherwise, defendant relies heavily on People v. Dryden (2021) 60

Cal.App.5th 1007 (Dryden). The case is distinguishable.

In Dryden, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th 1007, the Court of Appeal held that a trial

court’s “strict application of the Three Strikes law . . . resulted in a sentence so out of

proportion to the offenses as to be an abuse of discretion.” (Id. at p. 1013.) In 2013, the

defendant was convicted of two counts of assault with a deadly weapon, which involved

the defendant striking “two members of a group of five young men with a bamboo stick,

10 scratching one and raising a welt on the neck of the other.” (Id. at pp. 1013, 1031.) Prior

to these offenses, the defendant suffered three prior strike convictions: a 1989 conviction

for residential burglary, a 2005 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon, and a 2007

conviction for residential burglary. (Id. at p. 1030.) The trial court denied the

defendant’s Romero motion and imposed a sentence of 25 years to life, consecutive to 15

years. (Dryden, supra, at p. 1016.) At the time, defendant was 53 years old. (Id. at p.

1031.)

The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court abused its discretion in denying the

Romero motion because the “defendant’s criminal behavior here resulted from a late-

night, spontaneous altercation between an intoxicated and mentally ill homeless person

and a group of youths,” the altercation was not “similar to [the] defendant’s prior strikes

which . . . were characterized by either substantial violence or the deliberate entry into

homes to steal,” and the defendant had a “‘history of homelessness, mental health issues,

and alcoholism [which] most likely contributed to his actions[.]’” (Dryden, supra, 60

Cal.App.5th at p. 1031.) The Dryden court held that the trial court’s “de facto life”

sentence was “‘disproportionate to the severity of the present offense’” and amounted to a

“rare instance of an absurd result.” (Ibid.)

Here, unlike in Dryden, defendant’s encounter was not spontaneous and his

current offenses were violent and extreme. Defendant deliberately followed the victims

and engaged in substantial, repeated acts of violence, including crashing into their

vehicles multiple times and attempting to run J.O. over. Defendant endangered the lives

11 of the victims and posed a much greater threat than the defendant in Dryden. We thus

cannot say that defendant’s sentence is disproportionate to the severity of his current

offenses. And, unlike the Dryden defendant, defendant has no history of homelessness,

mental health issues, or alcoholism that contributed to his conduct at issue here.

It is true that defendant’s age of more than 70 years old renders his 25-years-to-life

sentence a de facto life sentence. While a trial court may consider a defendant’s age

when ruling on a Romero motion, defendant’s old age “is not a reason for him to be

deemed outside of the spirit of the mandatory Three Strikes sentencing scheme.” (People

v. Vasquez (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 374, 391.)

The trial court noted that defendant was “73, 74” when he committed his current

offenses and expressed “sympathies and empathies” for him “and his circumstances,” but

found that it could not grant his Romero motion “however onerous the ultimate outcome

and sentence will end up being.” The court thus expressly recognized that defendant was

being sentenced to a lengthy term when in his 70s. We thus reject defendant’s suggestion

that the trial court did not consider defendant’s age in imposing sentence and did not

consider whether the sentence was disproportionate. Instead, the trial court found that

defendant falls within the spirit of the Three Strikes law, despite his age and the de facto

life sentence imposed. As a reviewing court, we neither reweigh evidence nor substitute

our judgment for that of the trial court. (Carmony, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 377.) It

matters not how much we may disagree with a trial court’s exercise of discretion, but

whether other reasonable minds could have reached the same conclusion. (See People v.

12 Superior Court (Alvarez) (1997) 14 Cal.4th 968, 978.) Based on our review of the

record, we conclude that the trial court did not act arbitrarily or irrationally in denying

defendant’s Romero motion. We cannot say that this was an “extraordinary case” where

the relevant considerations “manifestly support the striking of a prior conviction” and that

“no reasonable minds could differ.” (Carmony, supra, at p. 378.)

IV.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

CODRINGTON Acting P. J.

We concur:

MENETREZ J.

LEE J.