People v. Reyes

Opinion

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9 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF GUAM 10

il THE PEOPLE OF GUAM ) CRIMINAL CASE NO. CMO766.O8 ) t2 vs. ) ) l3 VINCENT R. REYES, i DECISION AND ORDER ) t4 Defendant. ) l5

t6 This matter came before the Honorable Alberto C. Lamorena III on March 27,2009 on II

Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Attorney Shane F.T. Black appeared onbehalf of the People of l8 Guam. Appearing on behalf of Defendant was Attorney Richard Dirkx. After reading the 19

parties'briefs, the Court took the matters under advisement. The Court now issues its Decision 20

and Order. 2l

FACTUAL IIISTORY

24 On Decemb er 16,2007 , the Defendant was arested for Driving While Under the

25 Influence of Alcohol and Reckless Driving. Defendant was booked and released, and issued a

26 Notice to Appear for Decernber 24,2008. Defendant was charged with the above of[enses on

27 September 5, 2008, however, no sunmons was issued and Defendant appeared in court on

28 Decernber 24,2008, at which time his attorney was assigned, and was arraigned on Jamtary 7,

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srq peuesss ,{ltuenbesqns lu?pueJeq 'ppr,(peeds e o11q8F sIrI pe^r?1t\ eg eurl qcFl/t\ ]p-'6002 I I GCA $25.10. Pursuant to Chapter 25, anofficer is required to prepare a Notice to Appear, have 2 the a:restee sign the Notice to Appear and deliver a copy of the Notice to Appear to the J

prosecuting attomey. 8 GCA $$ 25.20 and 25.30. If a prosecutor reviews the case and the 4

Notice to Appear, and determines that the offense should be prosecuted, the prosecutor must file .)

6 the Notice to Appear with the Court, along with the complaint and any affidavits necessary. 8

7 ccA $2s.30. 8 Defendant does not allege or show that the Government failed to follow this procedure. 9 Rather, the Defendant alleges that the Government could have and should have applied for an l0

lt eaflier summons in lieu of filing the Notice to Appear which was issued to the Defendant to

12 prevent delay. This contention is belied by the plain language of 8 GCA $25.30, which

l3 mandates that the prosecutor decides to institute a criminal prosecution in this manner, the t4 prosecutor "shallfile the notice to appear and a complaint . . . in the court in which the person l5 has promised to appear." 8 GCA $25.30 (emphasis added). There is no statutoryrequirement l6

l7 that the prosecutor request a sunmons and neglect the duty to file the notice to appear with the

18 court. Accordingly, the requirements of Palomo were not violated by the Governm€,nt's use of t9 the Notice to Appear issued to the Defendant. 20 The Defendant next argues that Palomo was violated because his first appearance before 2l the court occurred more than one year after his arrest. However, 8 GCA $45.30, which governs 22

ZJ the Defe'ndant's first appearance before a judge, does not have any language regarding a statute

24 of limitations or any mention of a time requirement. The Defendant argues that the Court should 25 infer that the Defendant's first appearance before the Court must occur before the expiration of 26 the applicable statute of limitations, even when the defendant is charged before the expiration of 27

28 the statute of limitations, because the Villapando and Palomo decisions suggest that police

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.suo4?tlrullJo elnlels elqecgdde erpJo uorprrdxe eql eroJeq epp readde ol ecpou eql les ptnoqs I I criminal action under 8 GCA gS0.60(a) if trial "has not commenced within sixty (60) days after 2 his araignment." 8 GCA $80.60(a)(2). J Defendant asserts that the Court and the Govemment have violated this provision of the 4

Code because he was not charged and arraigned promptly, thus causing unnecessary delay in ) 6 bringing the underlying case to trial. Defendant contends that he was "accused" of a crime when

7 he was arrested and issued aNotice to Appear, however, he was not charged with any crime unti 8 nine months later. Therefore, he claims dismissal is warranted. 9 Dismissal is considered a drastic step and is generally disfavored as a remedy l0

ll particularly where the right to speedy trial is in question. "The amorphous quality of the right (

t2 speedy trial) . . . leads to the unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal of the indicbnent

t3 the right has been deprived." Barker v. Wingo,407 U.S. 514, 522,92 S.Ct. 2182,2188, 3 t4 L.Ed.2d l}l (1972). Overzealous application of dismissal for speedy trial violation would l5 those gutlty of crimes immunization based on procedural legal error, rather than protecting t6

t7 societal interest in 0rying people accused of crime." United States v. Ewell,383 U.S. 116, l2l

t8 86 S.Ct. 773, 777, 15 L.Ed.2d 627 (1966). t9 In this case, the Defendant was not held in custody following his arrest. 8 GCA $ 10. 20 specifically allows the Govemment up to one year to charge a defendant in a misdemeanor 2l after the person's arrest. The legislature has determined that this is a reasonable time period 22

23 allow the Government to investigate and charge the crime, and to ensure that the Defendant

24 not unduly prejudiced by a lengthy delay. Each jurisdiction is free to prescribe its ow 25 reasonable time standard for the commencement of prosecutions. Barker v. Wingo. 407 U.I 26 574,523 (1972\. Because the Government charged the Defendant within the time allowed by 27

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eq uuc eleql '(1)@)Oq'Og VJC g ol luensmd,(polsnc q lou s?^\ luupueJeq eql pnu 'em1e1s€s1 I I gg 15.20(a) and 25.30. The Defendant does not argue, and presents no evidence that 2 summons issued by the Court "at a stated time and place," under 8 GCA $15.40 could not 3 been set for a date later than the statute of limitations. Accordingly, there is no 4

difference between the date of the Defendant's first appearance as set pursuant to a notice 5

6 appear or a summons. Because the Court has already found that the prosecution was

within the statute of limitations, the delay of only eight days between the end of the li 8 period and the Defendant's first appearance had no cognizable effect on the date of 9 Defendant's arraignment, and the Defendant was promptly arraigned. 10

ll Defendant next contends that his right to a speedy trial granted by the Sixth

t2 has been violated by the Government's failure to charge the Defendant quickly. The

Amendment guarantees a person accused of a crime to a speedy trial. The Defendant claims 13

l4 he was "accused" and therefore the Sixth Amendment applied to him, when he was arested 15

issued a Notice to Appear. t6

lt Under Barker v. Wingo,407 U.S. 514 (1972), to determine whether a defendant has

l8 deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy fial, the court balances four factors : (l) l9 length of the delay; (2) the reason for delay; (3) the defendant's assertion of his tights; and (4 20 prejudice to the defendant. The balancing test is one in which the actions of both the 2l and the defendant are weighed. Id. at 530. 22

23 The length of delay is a threshold factor. The issue addressed under the first factor i

24 whether the length of delay before trial was unusually long. Doggett v. United States,505 U.S 25 647, 651 (1992). This factor requires a double inquiry. Id. First, to tigger a speedy hi 26 analysis, an accused must allege that the interval between accusation and trial has crossed 27

28 threshold dividing ordinary delay from "presumptively prejudicial" delay. Id., (ci1'anon omitted

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for inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance." Barker,407 U.S. at 530, 92 S'Ct' 2

J 2lg1. Therefore, Defendant does not allege the proper time interval upon which to claim that 4

delay was presgmptively prejudicial, and further examination of Defendant's speedy frial cl J

6 is unnecessary, because a speedy ffial analysis has not been triggered under Barlcer'

Noting the fact that the length of the "delay'' in this case does not trigger a speedy trial

analysis, and was authorized by the Guam legislature througlr the applicable statute of 8

9 limitations, the Court has sufficient grounds to deny the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for l0

ll Denial of Right to Speedy Trial. Accordingly, dismissal is not required by 8 GCA $30.60 or the

l2 Sixth Amendme'nt.

l3

t4 CONCLUSION l5

l6 Based on the above, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. Trial setting t7 be held on July 8, 2009 at 3:30 P.M. 18

19 IT IS SO ORDERED this 29h day of June, 2009. 20

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