People v. Reyes
Opinion
Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Consolidated
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 98 CR 12440 ) ARTURO REYES, ) Honorable ) Stanley J. Sacks, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 98 CR 12440 ) GABRIEL SOLACHE, ) Honorable ) Stanley J. Sacks, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:
The central issue in these consolidated appeals is whether the confessions of defendants
Arturo Reyes and Gabriel Solache were coerced. In June 2000, following simultaneous trials before
separate juries, defendants were each found guilty of two counts of first degree murder, two counts
of aggravated kidnaping, and home invasion. There was no physical evidence linking either defendant
to the crimes. Solache received a sentence of death for the murder convictions, and Reyes was
sentenced to natural life in prison without possibility of parole. On January 10, 2003, while Solache’s
direct appeal was pending before the Illinois Supreme Court, then-Governor George Ryan commuted
Solache’s death sentence to natural life imprisonment. The supreme court then transferred Solache’s Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
direct appeal to this court. On August 19, 2003, the appellate court affirmed Solache’s convictions
and sentences. People v. Solache, No. 1-03-1149 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). A few weeks later, on September 30, the appellate court came to the same conclusion
regarding Reyes’ convictions and sentences. People v. Reyes, No. 1-01-2875 (2003) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23).1 In December 2003, each defendant filed a petition for
postconviction relief pursuant to section 122-1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-
1 (West 2002)). In their petitions, defendants claimed, inter alia, that their confessions were the
result of physical coercion by Detective Reynaldo Guevara of the Chicago police department. In
March 2004, within the requisite 90 days, the trial court summarily dismissed each petition as
frivolous and patently without merit. Defendants appealed the summary dismissal of their petitions,
and their appeals (Reyes, No. 1-04-1047, and Solache, No. 1-04-1150) were consolidated. For the
reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgments of the circuit court dismissing defendants’
postconviction petitions.
BACKGROUND
Defendants were convicted of the murders of Mariano and Jacinta Soto, who were found
stabbed to death in their apartment in Chicago on April 1, 1998. A third defendant, Adriana Mejia,
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to natural life imprisonment.
According to testimony at trial, including defendants’ inculpatory statements, which were read
to the jury by the assistant State’s Attorneys who took the statements, the murders took place as
1 Defendants’ petitions for leave to appeal these appellate court decisions to the Illinois Supreme Court were denied on October 6, 2004.
2 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
follows. In March 1998, defendants were living in an apartment with Adriana Mejia and her husband,
Rosauro. Adriana had been feigning pregnancy, and she needed a baby to claim as her own. On
Thursday, March 26, Adriana told Reyes she had found a friend with "a very pretty baby." Early in
the morning of Saturday, March 28, Solache drove Reyes to the University of Illinois Hospital and
picked up Adriana, who apparently had gone there under the pretext that she was about to give birth.
Solache, Reyes and Adriana then drove to the Sotos’ residence. While they were en route, Adriana
told them that Reyes’ assignment was to pick up the baby from the crib, and Solache’s assignment
was "to take care of Mr. Soto." Adriana said she would "take care of Mrs. Soto." When they arrived
at the Sotos’ apartment, Adriana knocked and, when Jacinta came to the door, Adriana asked Jacinta
to let her in because she had no place else to go. Adriana, Reyes and Solache then entered the
apartment. Reyes stabbed Jacinta and then ran to the bedroom and picked up the Sotos’ two-month-
old daughter, Maria. Reyes also took Santiago, the couple’s three-year-old son, who was lying next
to his father in the bed. Meanwhile, Solache picked up a knife from the kitchen table and ran to the
bedroom, where he saw a man (Mariano Soto) lying face up, asleep on the bed. Solache stabbed the
man in the stomach, then ran out of the bedroom and threw the knife down just outside the bedroom
door. While Reyes was running out of the apartment with the children, he looked back and saw
Adriana "on top of" Jacinta "stabbing her in the back like an animal." Reyes took the children to the
car. Adriana and Solache then emerged from the apartment, and the three of them drove away. They
dropped Adriana and the two children off at the hospital, and Solache and Reyes went back to their
apartment and went to bed.
3 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
Later in the morning of March 28, Rosauro, believing that Adriana had given birth, came to
the hospital to pick her up. When Rosauro arrived at the hospital, he saw that she had not only a
baby but a three-year-old boy as well. Adriana explained the presence of the boy by stating that
another woman, Norma Salazar, had asked Adriana to care for the boy while she, Salazar, was giving
birth at the hospital. Rosauro and Adriana then returned to their apartment with the two children.
On April 1, 1998, police found the bodies of the Sotos in their apartment. Officer David
Valentin testified that, when he and his partner entered the apartment, they saw a "male Hispanic"
lying face up by the doorway with multiple stab wounds. In the bedroom, they saw a blanket in the
middle of the room. Under the blanket was a "female Hispanic" with multiple stab wounds. The
police also discovered that the Sotos’ two children were missing. A police bulletin describing the
children indicated that the baby had a wine-stain birthmark on her neck.
Late in the evening of the next day, April 2, Guadalupe Mejia, the sister-in-law of Adriana and
Rosauro, saw a picture of the Sotos’ three-year-old son on television, along with a news report about
the murders. Guadalupe, who lived with her husband, Jorge, in the same apartment building as
Adriana and Rosauro, recognized the boy as the same one that Adriana had brought home from the
hospital on March 28. Fearing that the woman (Norma Salazar) who had given the boy to Adriana
had murdered the child’s parents, Guadalupe told Adriana what she had seen and urged her to call
the police. Rosauro arrived home from work at 1:30 a.m. (April 3) and was told that the boy had
been reported missing and his parents had been murdered. Rosauro then took the boy to the 8th
district police station. Reyes and Solache went with him.
4 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
Officers at the 8th district station verified that the boy was Santiago Soto. Rosauro, Solache
and Reyes were taken to the Area 5 station for further questioning. Detective William Kernan
testified that he called the hospital and learned that neither Norma Salazar nor Adriana Mejia had ever
been a patient there.
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Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Consolidated
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 98 CR 12440 ) ARTURO REYES, ) Honorable ) Stanley J. Sacks, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. ) v. ) No. 98 CR 12440 ) GABRIEL SOLACHE, ) Honorable ) Stanley J. Sacks, Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE ROBERT E. GORDON delivered the opinion of the court:
The central issue in these consolidated appeals is whether the confessions of defendants
Arturo Reyes and Gabriel Solache were coerced. In June 2000, following simultaneous trials before
separate juries, defendants were each found guilty of two counts of first degree murder, two counts
of aggravated kidnaping, and home invasion. There was no physical evidence linking either defendant
to the crimes. Solache received a sentence of death for the murder convictions, and Reyes was
sentenced to natural life in prison without possibility of parole. On January 10, 2003, while Solache’s
direct appeal was pending before the Illinois Supreme Court, then-Governor George Ryan commuted
Solache’s death sentence to natural life imprisonment. The supreme court then transferred Solache’s Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
direct appeal to this court. On August 19, 2003, the appellate court affirmed Solache’s convictions
and sentences. People v. Solache, No. 1-03-1149 (2003) (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). A few weeks later, on September 30, the appellate court came to the same conclusion
regarding Reyes’ convictions and sentences. People v. Reyes, No. 1-01-2875 (2003) (unpublished
order under Supreme Court Rule 23).1 In December 2003, each defendant filed a petition for
postconviction relief pursuant to section 122-1 of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-
1 (West 2002)). In their petitions, defendants claimed, inter alia, that their confessions were the
result of physical coercion by Detective Reynaldo Guevara of the Chicago police department. In
March 2004, within the requisite 90 days, the trial court summarily dismissed each petition as
frivolous and patently without merit. Defendants appealed the summary dismissal of their petitions,
and their appeals (Reyes, No. 1-04-1047, and Solache, No. 1-04-1150) were consolidated. For the
reasons set forth below, we reverse the judgments of the circuit court dismissing defendants’
postconviction petitions.
BACKGROUND
Defendants were convicted of the murders of Mariano and Jacinta Soto, who were found
stabbed to death in their apartment in Chicago on April 1, 1998. A third defendant, Adriana Mejia,
pleaded guilty and was sentenced to natural life imprisonment.
According to testimony at trial, including defendants’ inculpatory statements, which were read
to the jury by the assistant State’s Attorneys who took the statements, the murders took place as
1 Defendants’ petitions for leave to appeal these appellate court decisions to the Illinois Supreme Court were denied on October 6, 2004.
2 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
follows. In March 1998, defendants were living in an apartment with Adriana Mejia and her husband,
Rosauro. Adriana had been feigning pregnancy, and she needed a baby to claim as her own. On
Thursday, March 26, Adriana told Reyes she had found a friend with "a very pretty baby." Early in
the morning of Saturday, March 28, Solache drove Reyes to the University of Illinois Hospital and
picked up Adriana, who apparently had gone there under the pretext that she was about to give birth.
Solache, Reyes and Adriana then drove to the Sotos’ residence. While they were en route, Adriana
told them that Reyes’ assignment was to pick up the baby from the crib, and Solache’s assignment
was "to take care of Mr. Soto." Adriana said she would "take care of Mrs. Soto." When they arrived
at the Sotos’ apartment, Adriana knocked and, when Jacinta came to the door, Adriana asked Jacinta
to let her in because she had no place else to go. Adriana, Reyes and Solache then entered the
apartment. Reyes stabbed Jacinta and then ran to the bedroom and picked up the Sotos’ two-month-
old daughter, Maria. Reyes also took Santiago, the couple’s three-year-old son, who was lying next
to his father in the bed. Meanwhile, Solache picked up a knife from the kitchen table and ran to the
bedroom, where he saw a man (Mariano Soto) lying face up, asleep on the bed. Solache stabbed the
man in the stomach, then ran out of the bedroom and threw the knife down just outside the bedroom
door. While Reyes was running out of the apartment with the children, he looked back and saw
Adriana "on top of" Jacinta "stabbing her in the back like an animal." Reyes took the children to the
car. Adriana and Solache then emerged from the apartment, and the three of them drove away. They
dropped Adriana and the two children off at the hospital, and Solache and Reyes went back to their
apartment and went to bed.
3 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
Later in the morning of March 28, Rosauro, believing that Adriana had given birth, came to
the hospital to pick her up. When Rosauro arrived at the hospital, he saw that she had not only a
baby but a three-year-old boy as well. Adriana explained the presence of the boy by stating that
another woman, Norma Salazar, had asked Adriana to care for the boy while she, Salazar, was giving
birth at the hospital. Rosauro and Adriana then returned to their apartment with the two children.
On April 1, 1998, police found the bodies of the Sotos in their apartment. Officer David
Valentin testified that, when he and his partner entered the apartment, they saw a "male Hispanic"
lying face up by the doorway with multiple stab wounds. In the bedroom, they saw a blanket in the
middle of the room. Under the blanket was a "female Hispanic" with multiple stab wounds. The
police also discovered that the Sotos’ two children were missing. A police bulletin describing the
children indicated that the baby had a wine-stain birthmark on her neck.
Late in the evening of the next day, April 2, Guadalupe Mejia, the sister-in-law of Adriana and
Rosauro, saw a picture of the Sotos’ three-year-old son on television, along with a news report about
the murders. Guadalupe, who lived with her husband, Jorge, in the same apartment building as
Adriana and Rosauro, recognized the boy as the same one that Adriana had brought home from the
hospital on March 28. Fearing that the woman (Norma Salazar) who had given the boy to Adriana
had murdered the child’s parents, Guadalupe told Adriana what she had seen and urged her to call
the police. Rosauro arrived home from work at 1:30 a.m. (April 3) and was told that the boy had
been reported missing and his parents had been murdered. Rosauro then took the boy to the 8th
district police station. Reyes and Solache went with him.
4 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
Officers at the 8th district station verified that the boy was Santiago Soto. Rosauro, Solache
and Reyes were taken to the Area 5 station for further questioning. Detective William Kernan
testified that he called the hospital and learned that neither Norma Salazar nor Adriana Mejia had ever
been a patient there. Detectives were then sent to Adriana Mejia’s apartment. When they saw the
baby, they noticed that it was not a newborn (the child’s umbilical cord had healed). They identified
the baby as Maria Soto by the wine-stain birthmark on her neck. Adriana was then arrested. When
authorities at Area 5 (where Rosauro, Solache and Reyes were being questioned) were notified of
what occurred at the Mejia apartment, Rosauro, Solache and Reyes were also arrested.
Rosauro Mejia was held at Area 5 for two to three days and then released. He was never
charged. In addition, Norma Salazar was never charged in this case. Adriana Mejia, Reyes and
Solache were each charged with first degree murder, aggravated kidnaping and home invasion. As
previously noted, Adriana subsequently pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Prior to trial, defendants moved to suppress their statements on the ground, among others,
that the statements had been coerced. In his motion, Solache alleged that he was a Mexican national
and did not speak English and that he had difficulty understanding the Puerto Rican detective
(Guevara) who interviewed him. Solache also alleged that the detective slapped him and chipped his
tooth. Similar to Solache, Reyes alleged in his motion that he was a Mexican citizen and could not
read, write or speak English. According to Reyes, his statements were obtained "as a result of
physical, psychological and mental coercion." Specifically, Reyes alleged that a police officer
(Guevara) interviewed him repeatedly and, on several occasions, struck him. In one instance, the
officer allegedly asked Reyes why he had committed the crimes, and when Reyes denied any
5 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
participation in the offenses, the officer allegedly hit him and told him he was lying. In another
instance, Reyes allegedly was told that if he persisted in his denials and failed to say anything against
Adriana or Solache, he would be allowing them to put the blame entirely on him, and he would get
the electric chair.
The trial court conducted a series of hearings on the motions to suppress. Numerous
witnesses testified, including Reyes, Solache and Guevara. According to the testimony of Guevara
and other witnesses, Adriana, Reyes and Solache were held at Area 5 for at least two days and were
questioned separately. Initially, all three denied any involvement in the murders. However, late in
the evening of April 3, the same day the three were arrested, Adriana implicated Reyes in the crimes.
This occurred at about 10:30 p.m. when Guevara, who was fluent in Spanish, confronted Adriana
with her shoes and a baby’s coat, both of which had blood on them. Adriana then stated that Reyes
was the one who had kidnaped the children and killed their parents. At that point, she did not indicate
that anyone else was involved. At 11:30 p.m., Guevara spoke to Reyes and told him that Adriana had
implicated him. Reyes denied any involvement in the crimes. Shortly thereafter, at 12:15 a.m. on
April 4, Guevara spoke to Solache, and he also denied any involvement.
Guevara further testified that at 3 p.m. on April 4, he again spoke to Reyes and confronted
him with Adriana’s accusation. At that point, according to Guevara, Reyes said: "Well, now I’m
going to tell you who was really there and what everybody did." Reyes told Guevara that he and
Adriana and Solache all were present at the scene of the crimes and that Solache was the one who
went into the bedroom and stabbed the husband. At 8 p.m. on April 4, Guevara again spoke with
Adriana and confronted her with Reyes’ statement that she and Solache also were involved in the
6 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
murders. Adriana then conceded that Solache was involved as well. Shortly thereafter, at 9 p.m.,
Guevara spoke with Solache and told him that both Adriana and Reyes had implicated him in the
murders. According to Guevara, Solache said: "Okay. I’ll tell you. I’ll tell you what happened. I
was there and I’ll tell you what happened."
In the early morning hours of the next day, April 5, Adriana, Reyes and Solache each gave
a written inculpatory statement. Reyes’ statement was given to Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA)
Thomas O’Malley, with Officer Daniel Trevino interpreting. O’Malley testified that at no time in his
presence did any police officer hit or strike Reyes or tell him he was lying. Photographs were taken
of Reyes at the time of his statement. Solache’s statement was taken by ASA Heather Brualdi, with
Guevara interpreting. According to Brualdi, when she finished writing the statement in English, she
gave it to Guevara, and he translated it to Solache. Brualdi testified further that she saw no marks
on Solache’s face. She observed that he had a chipped tooth and an "old scar" on his skull.
Photographs also were taken of Solache. Adriana’s statement was given to ASA David Navarro,
who spoke Spanish.
At about 8:30 a.m. the same day, April 5, Officer Saul Basurto processed Solache and Reyes
when they were brought to the lockup. Basurto testified that when he processed Reyes, he observed
no obvious evidence of pain or injury. According to Basurto, who spoke Spanish, Reyes did not
complain of being hit by a police officer while in custody, nor did he complain that he was screamed
at or interrogated in a loud fashion. Basurto gave essentially the same report regarding Solache.
According to Basurto, Solache did not complain to him of any mistreatment or maltreatment.
Photographs were taken of both Reyes and Solache at the time that they were processed. The next
7 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
day, April 6, John Musa, a medical intake officer at the Cook County jail, processed Solache and
Reyes. Musa, who spoke Spanish, testified that he observed no injuries or bruises on Reyes and that
Reyes made no complaints of any injuries. With regard to Solache, Musa testified that he observed
a scar on Solache’s head which was "an old injury," but he saw no other injuries. Musa asked
Solache if he had any recent head injuries, and Solache answered in the negative.
In his testimony, Reyes stated that he could neither read nor write English and that when he
signed the written statement, which was in English, he had no idea what it said. Reyes denied telling
Guevara that he was involved in the murders of the Sotos. Instead, Reyes told Guevara that he
"wasn’t involved" and that he "didn’t know what had happened." Reyes also testified that Guevara
physically abused him while Reyes was in custody. According to Reyes, when Guevara first
interviewed him, he took a cap off Reyes’ head and slapped him "very hard" in the face. Guevara
then asked Reyes why he had "do[ne] it." Reyes told Guevara that he did not know what he was
talking about. Reyes testified further that on another occasion, Guevara told Reyes that he was not
helping himself and was "letting other people blame [him]," and that if he did not say something,
"most likely [he would] get the electric chair." Subsequently, Guevara interviewed Reyes again and
asked him a series of questions, in a loud voice, regarding whether Reyes had murdered Jacinta and
Mariano Soto and whether he had kidnaped their children. According to Reyes, every time he
answered "no," Guevara would tell him to stop lying and slap him in the face with an open hand.
Reyes also testified that Guevara never advised him of his Miranda rights.
Solache’s testimony was similar to that of Reyes. Solache stated that he could neither read
nor speak English and that he wrote his name on his statement, which was in English, because
8 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
Guevara told him to do it. Solache denied that Guevara read the statement to him. Solache also
testified, as did Reyes, that Guevara physically abused him. According to Solache, when Guevara
first spoke to him, Guevara told Solache what he had been accused of, and Solache told Guevara that
he "wasn’t involved." Solache testified that Guevara then started "beating" him. Solache explained
that Guevara hit him "many times" with an open hand on the left side of his face. Solache testified
that he was handcuffed to a ring in the wall on his right side, and this was the reason he was hit on
the left side of his face. Solache testified further that Guevara left the interview room and returned
with Adriana, who stated that Solache had "helped her" in committing the murders. Solache told
Adriana that this "wasn’t true," and he told Guevara that he "hadn’t done anything." According to
Solache, Guevara then hit him with an open hand in front of Adriana. Guevara and Adriana then left
the room, and Guevara returned and allegedly began beating Solache in the stomach. Solache
testified that he then "pled guilty because [he] couldn’t *** stand the beating anymore."
Solache also testified that, prior to April 3, 1998, when he was arrested in this case, he could
hear in his left ear, but now he could hear in that ear only with a hearing aid. Without the hearing aid,
Solache maintained, he could hear "nothing" with his left ear. On cross-examination, Solache
acknowledged that the scar on his head was from an auto accident in 1997. Solache denied that there
was any injury to his ear in the accident.
Adriana testified in support of defendants’ claims of physical abuse. According to Adriana,
Guevara physically abused her while she was being questioned in his office at Area 5. Adriana stated
that Guevara told her he was tired of her lies, and he pulled her hair three times and hit her "very
9 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
hard" on her back. Adriana also testified, as had Solache, that Guevara took her to the room where
Solache was being held, and he slapped Solache in front of her.
The defense called Maria Rivera to testify in support of defendants’ claims that their
statements were coerced. Rivera testified that in August 1996 she spoke to Guevara about a shooting
that occurred near her house in which two young men were killed. Rivera testified further that she
did not see the individuals who did the shooting. However, on October 18, 1996, she identified a
person in a lineup as one of the individuals who had committed the shooting. According to Rivera,
Guevara told her to identify this person. Rivera also testified that she subsequently told the assistant
State’s Attorney that Guevara had told her to identify the person but that she had not seen that person
commit the shooting.
In answer to a question from the trial court, defense counsel explained the relevance of
Rivera’s testimony to defendants’ claims that their statements were coerced. According to counsel,
Rivera’s testimony showed that Guevara used the same technique in the past to coerce a witness in
another murder case to make a false identification. Counsel added that, after Rivera told the state’s
attorney what had happened, the State nol-prossed the murder charges against the defendants in that
case.
On cross-examination, Rivera conceded that Guevara did not hit her or give her money to
persuade her to make the identification. However, she insisted that Guevara "forced" her to do it.
She stated: "I know a lot of things about that detective."
The trial court denied defendants’ motions to suppress based on "so-called physical abuse."
The court stated:
10 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
"The police in my opinion *** based on the *** credible evidence did not do anything
at all to mistreat either Arturo DeLeon [Reyes] or Gabriel Solache. Everybody [who] came
into contact with them, the booking officers, the jailers, whoever came into contact with those
two men indicated they never expressed anything about being mistreated by the police, about
any injuries supposedly obtained as a result of police misconduct regarding them."
According to the trial court, the evidence clearly established that "neither m[a]n [was] abused in any
fashion by Detective Guevara." The court noted that Reyes and Solache gave inculpatory statements
only after "they were confronted with respect to the statements of other defendants."
The testimony at trial was essentially the same as the testimony at the suppression hearings,
with a few notable additions. Barbara Wilson, a biochemist with the Illinois State Police, testified that
she performed DNA analysis in this case on a number of items with bloodstains, including knives,
shoes and other articles of clothing. Wilson found that DNA samples taken from bloodstains on
Adriana’s shoes and trousers matched the DNA profile of Mariano Soto, one of the murder victims.
Wilson found, in addition, that DNA from a bloodstain on a knife taken from the Sotos’ apartment
matched Adriana’s DNA profile. However, Wilson’s tests uncovered no DNA matching the profile
of either Reyes or Solache.
As previously indicated, the written inculpatory statements given by Reyes and Solache were
read to their respective juries. Solache’s statement was read to the jury by the ASA who took the
statement, Heather Brualdi. Reyes’ statement was read to the jury by the ASA who took his
statement, Thomas O’Malley.
11 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
Adriana’s husband, Rosauro2, who was never charged in this case, testified in support of
defendants’ claims of physical abuse. Rosauro stated that Guevara questioned him while he, Rosauro,
was being held at Area 5 along with Reyes and Solache shortly after their arrest. According to
Rosauro, Guevara asked him how much he had paid for the little girl. When Rosauro answered that
he did not pay anything for a girl, Guevara hit him. Rosauro stated: "He kept hitting me because he
did not believe me." Rosauro testified that he was being held down by another person while Guevara
hit him two or three times.
In their testimony at trial, defendants repeated their allegations of abuse by Guevara. Each
defendant also expressly denied any involvement in the murders. For his part, Guevara denied hitting,
striking, or slapping either defendant. According to Guevara, he saw no injuries on Solache’s or
Reyes’ face, and neither of them ever complained to Guevara that he had been struck by a police
officer.
In his instructions to the jury, the trial court included the following instruction regarding
defendants’ statements:
"You have before you evidence that the defendant made statements relating to the
offenses charged in the indictment. It is for you to determine whether the defendant made the
statements, and, if so, what weight should be given to the statements. In determining the
weight to be given to a statement, you should consider all of the circumstances under which
it was made."
2 On June 19, 2000, the date of Rosauro’s testimony, he stated that he was no longer married to Adriana.
12 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
On June 20, 2000, each defendant was found guilty by his respective jury of two counts of
first degree murder, two counts of aggravated kidnaping, and home invasion. In his motion for a new
trial, Solache alleged, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements
"based on the conduct of Detective Reynaldo Guevara." Reyes filed a similar posttrial motion
alleging, inter alia, that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements based on
coercion. Included as an attachment to each motion was a copy of the same article from The Chicago
Reporter (R. Anderson, Eyewitnesses Confuse, Convict in Humboldt Park Murder Cases, The
Chicago Reporter, June 2000, at 3). The article examined what it termed "questionable police
practices" at Area 5 regarding several murder cases. Guevara was involved in each of these cases.
In August 2000, the trial court denied defendants’ motions for a new trial. With regard to
defendants’ claims that their statements were coerced, the court concluded that "[t]here was no
credible evidence whatever that Solach[e] and Reyes were injured in police custody at all." The court
noted defendants’ testimony that their statements were coerced, but stated: "I don’t believe any of
that testimony. I did not believe it then [during the pretrial suppression hearings] and nothing has
happened to change my mind." The court added that defendants’ inculpatory statements were given
only after they were confronted with statements implicating them in the kidnaping and double murder.
Defendants waived a jury trial for sentencing. Following first- and second-stage capital
sentencing hearings, the trial court found, with regard to Reyes, that there were sufficient mitigating
factors to preclude the sentence of death. With regard to Solache, the court found no such mitigating
factors. The court sentenced Reyes to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for the murder
13 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
convictions. Reyes was also sentenced to 30 years< imprisonment for his kidnaping and home
invasion convictions, to run concurrently with the life sentences. Solache received death sentences
for the murder convictions, and the same 30-year sentences as Reyes for the other convictions.
Under Supreme Court Rule 603 (134 Ill. 2d R. 603), because Solache was sentenced to death,
his appeal lay directly to the Illinois Supreme Court. As previously noted, on January 10, 2003, while
Solache’s appeal was pending, then-Governor George Ryan commuted Solache’s death sentence to
natural life imprisonment. Because Solache was no longer sentenced to death, the supreme court
transferred his direct appeal to the appellate court.
On August 10, 2003, the appellate court affirmed Solache’s convictions and sentences.
People v. Solache, No. 1-03-1149 (unpublished order under Supreme Court Rule 23). A few weeks
later, on September 30, the appellate court reached the same conclusion with regard to Reyes’
convictions and sentences. People v. Reyes, No. 1-01-2875 (unpublished order under Supreme Court
Rule 23). The court expressly rejected defendants’ claims that their inculpatory statements were
coerced. In Reyes’ case, the court stated:
"Ultimately, the instant case hinges almost entirely on credibility. As detailed above,
this determination was for the trial court to make, which it did, against defendant.
Specifically, the trial court did not find defendant’s claim of abuse/beatings credible. *** It
is not for this court to second guess the trial court’s decision, particularly given that it was
specifically based on the demeanor of the witnesses during their testimony. Moreover, as
noted above, the trial court was not required to give more credence to defendant’s claim over
14 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
that of Detective Guevara, who denied striking defendant." People v. Reyes, slip op. at 27-
28.
In Solache’s case, the court employed similar language with regard to this issue.
On December 17, 2003, Reyes filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief asserting,
among other claims, that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate the abuse inflicted
on Reyes by Guevara. According to Reyes, this physical coercion rendered his inculpatory statement
involuntary. Reyes also claimed that he was the victim of prosecutorial misconduct, that he was
subjected to an illegal search and seizure, and that he was not proven guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.
The next day, December 18, Solache filed a petition for postconviction relief. Solache’s
petition, which contained 14 claims, was filed with the assistance of counsel. Chief among Solache’s
claims was the allegation, similar to Reyes’, that Solache’s confession was the product of a beating
by Guevara. In support of this claim, Solache presented what he termed "substantial new evidence
that Detective Guevara has systematically used improper techniques, including excessive physical
force, to coerce false statements from suspects and civilians." This "new evidence" consisted of 23
allegations that, in Solache’s view, "establish a clear pattern and practice of misconduct and abuse
by Detective Reynaldo Guevara." Four of these allegations were not new. They included the
complaints made against Guevara in this case by Maria Rivera, Adriana, and Reyes at the suppression
hearings, and by Rosauro Mejia at trial. An additional item of allegedly new evidence attached to
Solache’s petition was an FBI report regarding an interview with Mohamed Omar, who was
15 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
convicted in April 2001 on racketeering and drug conspiracy charges. In this interview, which took
place on June 20 and 21, 2001, at the United State’s Attorney’s office in Chicago, Omar alleged that
Guevara had a reputation for taking bribes to fix cases.
Solache’s petition also claimed, in the alternative, that if it were found that the allegedly new
evidence was not newly discovered, then his trial counsel had a duty to investigate and present this
evidence, and her failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The remainder of the
claims in Solache’s petition consisted of additional allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel and
allegations of Brady violations for failure to disclose materially favorable evidence.
On March 2, 2004, the trial court summarily dismissed Reyes’ postconviction petition as
frivolous and patently without merit. Ten days later, on March 12, the trial court reached the same
conclusion regarding Solache’s petition. Each defendant filed a notice of appeal, and their appeals
were consolidated.
DISCUSSION
The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) provides a remedy for defendants who have suffered
a substantial violation of their constitutional rights at trial. A proceeding under the Act is not an
appeal of a defendant’s underlying judgment. Rather, it is a collateral attack on the judgment. People
v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999). Consequently, any issues that were decided on direct appeal are
res judicata, and any issues that could have been presented on direct appeal, but were not, are
forfeited. People v. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d 216, 221 (2001). Under the Act, a postconviction proceeding
not involving the death penalty contains three stages. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 244
16 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
(2001). At the first stage, the defendant files a petition and the circuit court determines whether it
is frivolous or patently without merit. People v. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (1996). At this stage,
the Act does not permit any motions or responsive pleadings from the State. Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d
at 418. If the court determines that the petition is either frivolous or patently without merit, the court
must dismiss the petition in a written order. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244; 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2)
(West 2002). A postconviction petition is considered frivolous or patently without merit only if the
allegations in the petition, taken as true and liberally construed, fail to present the gist of a
constitutional claim. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244; Gaultney, 174 Ill. 2d at 418. The "gist" standard
is a low threshold, and a defendant need only present a limited amount of detail in the petition.
Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244. The claim need not be set forth in its entirety. Further, the petition need
not include legal arguments or citation to legal authority. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244; Gaultney, 174
Ill. 2d at 418. The circuit court may summarily dismiss a postconviction petition if the defendant’s
allegations are contradicted by the record from the original trial proceedings. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d at
222.
If the petition is not dismissed as frivolous or patently without merit, it advances to the second
stage. Counsel is appointed to represent the defendant, if necessary (725 ILCS 5/122-4 (West
2002)), and the State is allowed to file responsive pleadings (725 ILCS 5/122-5 (West 2002)). At
this stage, the circuit court must determine whether the petition and any accompanying
documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246.
"If no such showing is made, the petition is dismissed. If, however, a substantial showing of a
17 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
constitutional violation is set forth, then the petition is advanced to the third stage, where the circuit
court conducts an evidentiary hearing." Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246.
In the case at bar, defendants’ petitions were dismissed as frivolous and patently without
merit. Because this was a first-stage dismissal, the question before us is not whether defendants’
petitions made a substantial showing of a constitutional violation. "[T]hat is a second-stage inquiry."
Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 246. Rather, the question we must address is whether defendants’ petitions
were frivolous or patently without merit, i.e., whether they presented the gist of a constitutional
claim. Our review of the circuit court’s dismissals of defendants’ postconviction petitions is de novo.
Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 247; People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 388-89 (1998).
Solache argues before this court, as he did in his postconviction petition, that his confession
was coerced and that the "substantial new evidence" he presented in his petition demonstrated that
"Detective Guevara has systematically used improper techniques, including excessive physical force,
to coerce false statements from suspects and witnesses." In Solache’s view, this evidence "would
have had a dramatic effect on the credibility of those who testified at the suppression hearing."
Solache argues that he has met his burden of alleging the gist of a constitutional claim, and his
petition should have been advanced to the second stage.
In his brief to this court, Reyes makes essentially the same argument. He points to the
allegedly newly discovered evidence included in Solache’s petition, and argues that this evidence
establishes a pattern of abuse and misconduct by Guevara "beginning in 1983 and continuing through
the time of Reyes’ arrest." According to Reyes, this evidence lends support to a similar claim in his
18 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
pro se petition that other claims of abuse existed (Adriana and Solache) to substantiate his claims of
abuse by Guevara.
However, in his pro se petition, Reyes did not raise newly discovered evidence. His claim in
his petition was that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate "the abuse inflicted upon
[him] at the hands of Det. Reynaldo Guevara." Reyes stated:
"[Counsel] should have asked and filed a complaint asking that Det. Reynaldo Guevara be
investigated because the allegations that I put forth about being Slapped by Det. Reynaldo
Guevara are true and factual. Not only did I bring this up but Gabriel Solache and Adriana
Mejia also said they were abused in the same fashion and testified to this as well. *** My
Attorney *** should have fought this issue harder. *** This was a really big issue in My
Defense and had this been investigated thoroughly it would have shown this Statement
[Reyes’ confession] was involuntary and was given because of physical coercion by Det.
Reynaldo Guevara."
The State argues that because Reyes’ claim in his petition was for ineffective assistance of
counsel, rather than newly discovered evidence, he has waived his right to raise the newly-discovered-
evidence claim on appeal. The State contends that Reyes has simply adopted Solache’s claims as his
own, even though "none of it was before the trial judge when he ruled on Reyes’ petition," and this
issue (newly discovered allegations of abuse by Guevara) is being improperly raised for the first time
on appeal. We disagree with the State.
19 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
At the first stage of the proceedings, a post-conviction petition need not set forth a claim in
its entirety, and need only present a limited amount of detail. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244. Moreover,
the allegations in the petition are to be liberally construed. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 244. These
principles apply with special force where the petition is pro se and the petitioner is likely a person of
limited education. People v. Dredge, 148 Ill. App. 3d 911, 913 (1986). In the case at bar, Reyes’
petition, as did Solache’s, alleged physical abuse by Guevara. Reyes mentioned that Solache and
Adriana had complained of similar abuse, and Reyes further alleged that if the issue of physical abuse
had been thoroughly investigated, such an investigation would have shown that Reyes’ statement was,
in fact, the result of physical coercion by Guevara. Interpreting Reyes’ allegations liberally, we
conclude that Reyes’ petition sufficiently included a claim of newly discovered evidence, and Reyes
therefore did not forfeit his right to raise this issue on appeal.
In reaching this conclusion, we reject the State’s argument that none of the claims of newly
discovered evidence that were included in Solache’s petition were before the trial judge when he ruled
on Reyes’ petition. As previously indicated, Reyes’ pro se petition was filed on December 17, 2003,
and Solache’s petition was filed one day later, on December 18. The trial judge ruled on Reyes’
petition on March 2, 2004, and on Solache’s petition 10 days later, on March 12. Solache’s and
Reyes’ trials were before separate juries, but the trials were conducted simultaneously before the same
trial judge. The two cases were intertwined. In our view, it would elevate form over substance to
conclude, as the State contends, that Solache’s claims of newly discovered evidence were not before
the judge when he ruled on Reyes’ petition.
20 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
We turn next to the issue of whether defendants’ claims of coercion by Guevara are barred
by the doctrine of res judicata. In the case at bar, the issue of the voluntariness of defendants’
confessions was litigated and decided on direct appeal. Issues that were decided on direct appeal are
barred by res judicata. Rogers, 197 Ill. 2d at 221; Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 89. However, our supreme
court has recognized that, "in the interests of fundamental fairness, the doctrine of res judicata can
be relaxed if the defendant presents substantial new evidence." People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93,
139 (2000). In order for new evidence to be sufficient to warrant a new trial, (1) it must be material
and not merely cumulative, (2) it must be of such conclusive character that it will probably change
the result on retrial, and (3) the evidence must not have been discovered or discoverable through the
defense’s due diligence prior to the original trial. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 139.
The question before us is whether the allegedly new evidence at issue qualifies as "substantial
new evidence" and therefore warrants relaxation of the doctrine of res judicata. As previously noted,
4 of the 23 allegations included in Solache’s petition are not new. At least one other allegation makes
no mention of Guevara, and another is an allegation of physical abuse against Guevara’s partner
rather than Guevara. Of the remaining allegations, at least six allege the use of physical force against
suspects and witnesses, and six others involve the improper influencing of witnesses to identify
suspects.
An example of the physical force allegations is that of Armando Serrano. Solache’s petition
included as an exhibit a copy of Serrano’s petition for postconviction relief, dated August 6, 1999.
In this petition, which indicated Serrano was sentenced in March 1995 for murder and armed robbery,
21 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
Serrano alleged that Guevara and his partner took Serrano from his home on June 11, 1993, and
transported him to the Area 5 police station for interrogation. During this interrogation, Guevara
allegedly hit Serrano in the face, called him a liar, and struck Serrano on his body "in hopes of
obtaining a confession." Another exhibit included in Solache’s petition is a copy of the opinion in
People v. Pena, 174 Ill. App. 3d 281 (1988). Defendant Daniel Pena was convicted of murder,
conspiracy to commit murder, and armed violence. On appeal, Pena argued, among other things, that
his confession was involuntary. According to Pena, during his interrogation at Area 5 in January
1986, Guevara "repeatedly struck defendant in the face, ribs and on the legs from the groin to his
knees with a flashlight." Pena, 174 Ill. App. 3d at 282. Guevara testified that Pena was not abused
but there was a struggle when he was arrested. The appellate court concluded that Pena’s confession
was voluntary and affirmed his convictions and sentence. An additional exhibit attached to Solache’s
petition was a summary report of a complaint filed by Melvin Warren with the Chicago Police
Department’s Office of Professional Standards (OPS). Warren complained that, on April 16, 1986,
Guevara (1) hit Warren with his fist on the right side of his face, (2) pushed Warren down in Warren’s
car, grabbed him around the neck, and choked him, (3) verbally abused him by calling him a "nigger
dog" several times, and (4) verbally threatened Warren by stating that he (Guevara) would tear
Warren’s head off. According to the summary report (page 5 of which is missing from the record),
the complaint arose from a traffic incident that took place while Guevara was off duty. Warren
apparently cut Guevara off while Guevara was driving. Guevara then motioned for Warren to pull
over. Warren alleged that, when he (Warren) emerged from his car, Guevara called him a "nigger
22 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
dog" and threatened to tear his head off. Warren further alleged that when he (Warren) walked back
to his car, Guevara hit him on the right side of his face with his fist, pushed Warren down in his car,
grabbed him around the neck, and choked him. Warren stated that he then grabbed Guevara’s wrist
and bit Guevara until Guevara released Warren’s neck. Two eyewitnesses confirmed that Guevara
initiated this beating. The OPS report cited the arrest report in this case as indicating that Warren
was arrested for simple battery, resisting arrest, and negligent driving. The OPS conducted an
investigation of Warren’s complaint and sustained Warren’s allegations that Guevara hit Warren in
the face with his fist; pushed Warren in his car, grabbed him by the neck, and choked him; and
verbally abused Warren by calling him a "nigger."
An example of the improper-influencing allegations is that of David Velasquez. Solache’s
petition included as an exhibit Velasquez’s testimony recanting an identification he made on May 10,
1991, in the murder case of Daniel Rodriguez. According to Velasquez, he falsely identified the
accused after being questioned at Area 5 by Guevara and his partner, Detective Halvorsen.
Velasquez testified that he was chained to a wall at Area 5, he was hit with a flashlight, and that
Guevara told him what to say and threatened to "pin" the murder on him if he did not sign the false
identification. Another exhibit attached to Solache’s petition was the testimony of Luis Figueroa,
who recanted his previous identification of Angel Diaz in a murder case. Figueroa, who was
incarcerated at the time of his recantation testimony, stated that he viewed a lineup on February 6,
1995, and falsely identified Diaz as the shooter after Officer "Ray Cavera" "told [Figueroa] to pick
him out." Figueroa further testified that "Cavera" told him Diaz "was the one that did it and he wants
23 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
to take him down *** when I got there he was asking me *** what did you see, you know, I told him
I could not see anything, and he told me [']I found out who did it and his name is Angel Diaz.[’]" Also
attached as an exhibit to Solache’s petition was the testimony of Jose Melendez, who stated that on
May 30, 1995, he falsely identified the accused in a murder case. According to Melendez, he was at
Area 5 when Guevara showed him a photo array consisting of six photographs. Melendez testified
that he indicated he had not seen the shooter, but Guevara separated out one of the photos from the
rest and told Melendez he had reason to believe this was the killer. Melendez testified: "I think that
day I was mad, I was angry. My friend got shot, and [Guevara] told me to point [the accused] out
because he had reason to believe this was the guy."
Before applying the Patterson test to determine if defendants’ allegedly new evidence is
sufficient to warrant relaxation of res judicata, we note the difference in procedural posture between
Patterson and the case at bar. Patterson was a capital case, and such cases are handled differently
under the Act than are noncapital cases. There is no provision authorizing the circuit court to dismiss
a capital defendant’s petition if it is frivolous or patently without merit. People v. Thomas, 195 Ill.
2d 37, 40 (2001). Instead, where the petitioner is under sentence of death, the circuit court must first
determine whether the petitioner, if indigent, wants to be represented by counsel. After the petitioner
makes that choice, the matter is docketed for further proceedings. At that point, the State may either
answer the petition or move to dismiss it. Thomas, 195 Ill. 2d at 40. Accordingly, there is no "first
stage" proceeding for a capital postconviction petition. Instead, such a petition moves automatically
to the second stage, where counsel is appointed to represent the defendant, if necessary, and the State
24 Nos. 1-04-1047 & 1-04-1150 Cons.
is allowed to file responsive pleadings (Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 245-46). In Patterson, pursuant to
this procedure, the defendant’s petition was dismissed only after the State had moved to dismiss it.
Because this dismissal came at the second stage, the defendant’s burden was greater than in the first
stage, where he is required only to present the gist of a constitutional claim. At the second stage, as
noted, the question is whether the petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial
showing of a constitutional violation.
This greater, second-stage burden is apparent in the language used in Patterson to introduce
the three-tier test for determining whether allegedly new evidence constitutes "substantial new
evidence" such that res judicata may be relaxed. The court states: "For new evidence to be sufficient
to warrant a new trial ***." (Emphasis added.) Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d at 139. However, at the first
stage, as in the case at bar, the petitioner is not seeking a new trial. Rather, he is seeking only to
advance to the second stage of the proceeding, where he may have the assistance of counsel, if
necessary, and the State may file responsive pleadings. Because the dismissal of the petition in the
instant case came in the first stage rather than the second stage, the burden on defendants to establish
that their allegedly new evidence was "substantial new evidence" is necessarily lighter than was the
burden on the petitioner in Patterson. In order to set forth the gist of a constitutional claim, which
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